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Judgment
Rajesh H. Shukla, J.—The present petition has been filed by the petitioners under Articles 14, 19, 265 and 300A of the Constitution of India as well as under the provisions of the Bombay Electricity Duty Act, 1958 and Bombay Electricity Duty (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1983 for the prayer, inter alia, that appropriate writ, order or direction may be issued directing the respondents to grant exemption to the petitioner-company for a period of 15 years from payment of electricity duty as stated in detail on the grounds stated in the petition. It is also prayed that the respondents may be directed to refund the amount recovered from the petitioner company as electricity duty for the period from 31.8.2001 to 30.9.2001 with interest and restrain the respondents from recovering electricity duty on the energy generated on 3.45 MW back pressure turbine (TG set) during the period from 31.8.2001 to 30.8.2006 on the grounds stated in the memo of petition. The facts of the case briefly summarized are that the petitioner company has a factory at Dhrangadhra in Surendranagar District for manufacture of soda ash and other chemicals. The petitioner company undertook the programme for modernization and as a result the capacity was enhanced. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent Gujarat Electricity Company has been supplying the electricity to the petitioner company as a consumer. As a result of modernization and expansion of capacity, the petitioner company enjoyed excess power for which it employed diesel generating set (DG set) and turbo generating set (TG set) which was purchased by the petitioner company. However, the Bombay Electricity Duty Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ''Electricity Duty Act'') as applicable to the State of Gujarat provides for charging of the duty. It is contended that sec. 3 of the said Act is a charging section for levy of electricity duty. It is contended that sub-sec. (2)(vii)(a) of sec. 3 refers to the exemption granted from levy of electricity duty on such industrial undertakings for a period of 10 years from the commencement of the aforesaid Bombay Electricity Duty (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the ''Gujarat Amendment Act, 1983'') or generation of such energy, whichever was later. It is, therefore, the case of the petitioner company that the petitioner as an industrial undertaking which has been generating energy by back pressure turbine as well as co-generation method would be entitled to exemption from payment of electricity duty for a period of 15 years. The exemption was available for a period of 10 years if energy was generated based on any other process. Therefore, the petitioner company has been claiming the benefit of exemption from payment of electricity duty for a period of further 5 years as the benefit has been availed of for a period of 10 years, which is declined, and the present petition has been filed.
Heard learned counsel Shri Paresh Dave appearing for the petitioners. He has referred to the background of the case at length and submitted that the petitioner company expanded its capacity by installing the TG set (technically known as back pressure turbine co-generation system) for 3.45 MW. Therefore, an application was made for exemption from levy of electricity duty under sec. 3(2)(vii)(a) of the Electricity Duty Act as it has been statutorily provided that no such duty shall be leviable on such units for electricity consumed for a period of 15 years from the date of commencement of the Gujarat Amendment Act 1983 or the date on which it started generation of such energy, whichever is later. Learned counsel Shri Dave submitted that, therefore, as the energy generated by such generating set of 3.45 MW was consumed by the petitioner itself, the certificate for remission of duty for 10 years has been granted as per the notification dated 12.2.1990 issued under purported exercise of power under sec. 3(3) of the Electricity Duty Act.
Learned counsel Shri Dave referred to the provisions of the Electricity Duty Act and pointedly referred to sec. 3(1) which is a charging section and also referred to sec. 3(2)(vii)(a) as applicable to the petitioner. He therefore submitted that when the electricity is generated by the consumer for its own purpose, the benefit would be available. He referred to the provisions to emphasize that exemption was available for a period of 15 years as stated in the statute and sec. 3(2-AA) provide that the State Government may, by notification, subject to the terms and conditions, reduce the rate of duty or remit the duty. He therefore submitted that the scheme of the Act, as could be seen, has different aspects with regard to grant of exemption as well as remission by the statutory provision as well as by notification which the State Government may issue. Learned counsel Shri Dave referred to the provisions of sec. 3(3) of the Act for that purpose and submitted that the notification issued in exercise of power under sec. 3(3) granted the benefit of remission for a period of 10 years. However, the petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of exemption.
He referred to the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat (Coram: J.R. Vora, J.) dated 4.10.2002 in Special Civil Application No. 6967 of 1988 in case of Atik Industries and submitted that the scheme was to grant exemption for certain period and observations have been made regarding the right of exemption arising from the provision for certain period. Learned counsel Shri Dave submitted that though remission has been granted to the petitioner pursuant to the notification, the petitioner would be entitled for exemption which cannot be denied when the statute itself provides for such exemption. Learned counsel Shri Dave submitted that there was some confusion with regard to remission or the exemption. He stated that though the remission was enjoyed by the petitioner for a period of 10 years, it would not disentitle the petitioner from claiming exemption for a period of 15 years, meaning thereby, the benefit for 5 more years. He has also referred to the explanation to clause (b) of sec. 3(2)(vii)(b) which reads,
(b) Where an industrial undertaking by installing an additional generating set starts generation of additional energy either single or jointly with any other industrial undertaking for its own use or, as the case may be, for the use of industrial undertakings which are jointly generating additional energy at any time on or after the commencement date, electricity duty shall not be leviable on such units of additional energy so generated as are consumed for motive power and lighting in respect of premises used by the industrial undertaking for industrial purpose until the expiry of
(i) fifteen years from the commencement date or the date of starting the generation of such additional energy whichever is later if such generation of additional energy is by back pressure turbine or if such generation of additional energy is obtained by co-generation.....
Therefore, learned counsel Shri Dave submitted that the benefit would be available to the petitioner.
Learned counsel Shri Dave has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court reported in Anchor Pressings (P) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P. and Others, in the case of Anchor Pressing (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of income tax, U.P. & ors. and submitted that the statute provides for granting of the benefit. He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court reported in Union of India and Another Vs. Wing Commander T. Parthasarathy, in the case of Union of India and anr. v. Wing Commander T. Parthasarathy and referred to the observations in Head Note B to support his submission that a substantive legal right cannot be denied to a person on the basis of some policy decision of the Government. Therefore, learned counsel Shri Dave submitted that the policy decision by which the benefit has been given for a limited period may not be construed as denying the right or statutory right in favour of the petitioner. He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court reported in Unichem Laboratories Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, in the case of Unichem Laboratories Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay.
Learned AGP Shri Bipin Bhatt referred to the papers and submitted that the application was made by the petitioner for exemption in the year 1992 for which he referred to Annexure-B and submitted that on the basis of the same, the petitioner was granted the remission for a period of 10 years from 1992. He referred to the communication dated 23.3.1992 at Annexure-C and submitted that the certificate has been issued by the Collector of Electricity Duty, Ahmedabad that the petitioner was eligible for remission of electricity duty with effect from 31.8.1991 to 30.8.2001. Therefore, learned AGP Shri Bhatt submitted that the petitioner did not make any grievance at the relevant time that he was entitled for exemption and has accepted the remission granted by the authority. Further, he has never raised any objection that his application was for exemption and not remission under the Electricity Duty Act. He therefore submitted that the exemption could be granted subject to fulfillment of the conditions as provided in sec. 3(2)(vii)(a).
He has also referred to the affidavit-in-reply and submitted that as stated in the affidavit-in-reply, the benefit of exemption from payment of duty for energy generated by back pressure turbine under the Act is not applicable to the petitioner as the date of starting of the generation by the petitioner is 1.1.1926. He therefore submitted that in view of the provisions of the Gujarat Amendment Act, 1983 r/w the Rules, the petitioner company has not been found eligible for exemption from payment of duty under sec. 3(2)(vii)(a). Learned AGP Shri Bhatt submitted that, however, as the remission was available as per the notification dated 12.12.1990 issued in exercise of power under sec. 3(3) of the Act, the certificate has been granted in favour of the petitioner on the basis of which the benefit of remission has been made available to the petitioner. He therefore submitted that the petition may not be entertained.
In view of rival submissions, it is required to be considered whether the present petition can be entertained or not.
From the rival submissions and the facts narrated hereinabove, it makes it evident that the claim is made by the petitioner for exemption under the Act referring to the provisions of sec. 3(2)(vii)(a). The communication at Annexure-B which has been referred to earlier clearly states about the claim for exemption from payment of duty. However, as stated in the affidavit-in-reply and also as it transpires from the record, the remission was made available to the petitioner company for a period of 10 years. Therefore, the moot question now is that if the petitioner is found eligible for exemption under the statute, he would have got the exemption for 15 years, whereas the benefit of remission was available for a period of 10 years and therefore the present petition has been filed to claim that actually the petitioner was entitled for exemption.
Another facet of the argument is the eligibility of the petitioner company in view of the contentions raised. There is a specific contention that the petitioner is not entitled to claim the benefit as the date of starting the generation by the petitioner was way back on 1.1.1926. However, a close look at the provision would make it clear that it is not that the benefit could not be availed of if the date of generation of electricity is earlier. In fact, as stated in the petition, after the programme for modernization the capacity was expanded which led to generation of electricity by back pressure turbine as well as co-generation method and it is the date for claiming the exemption. Therefore, again, the provision of sec. 3(2)(vii)(a) is required to be considered with the explanation. Section 3(2) provides that electricity duty shall not be leviable on the units of energy consumed in certain circumstances as narrated in sub-sec. (2). Clause (vii)(a) provide,
in the case of an industrial undertaking which generates energy for its own use, five years from the 1st April, 1999, the date of commencement of the Bombay Electricity Duty (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1999 (Guj. 8 of 1999) or the date of starting the generation of such energy, whichever is later.
The proviso provides,
provided that no industrial undertaking shall be entitled to exemption from payment of electricity duty under this clause, unless it has obtained a certificate regarding eligibility for such exemption in prescribed form by making an application therefor in prescribed form and within prescribed period to such officer as the State Government may by notification in the official gazette, specify.
Thus, it is clear that an industrial unit which generates energy of its own would be eligible for such benefit from the date of commencement of the Bombay Electricity Duty (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1999, or the date of starting the generation of energy, whichever is later, meaning thereby, in order to get the benefit of the scheme or the duty it has to be considered with reference to either the date of generation or the date of the Amendment Act, whichever is later. Further, it would mean that after the Amendment Act has been brought into force, when the industrial undertaking starts generating such electricity for its own consumption after the commencement of this Act, it can claim the benefit from the date of generation of such energy in terms of this provision of the Act.
Therefore, assuming that the petitioner is entitled to claim the benefit of exemption under the statute, the benefit would be available in terms of the provision with effect from 1991, which is admittedly stated by the petitioner also. However, submissions have been made that since the petitioner has been granted remission instead of exemption, though such exemption was permissible and ought to have been granted, which would be for 5 more years, the prayer may be granted. These submissions are required to be appreciated in background of the following facts that the petitioner itself, vide communication dated Sept. 22, 2001, specifically requested for remission of electricity duty and extension for a period of 5 years with effect from 31.8.2001 on the ground of earthquake. Thus, it is evident that the petitioner is very much aware that what was claimed by the petitioner was for remission which it has accepted and enjoyed for the full period of 10 years. Thereafter, it appears that conveniently the petitioner company seems to have changed the argument to avail the benefit in the name of exemption vide communication dated 28.11.2001 produced at Annexure-E. In this communication, as it is evident from the subject, what is claimed is extension of exemption and the letter refers to exemption for the period from 31.8.1991 to 30.8.2001, though, in fact, according to their own say, it was remission which was granted.
Therefore, in order to now get higher benefit for a further period of 5 years a contention is sought to be raised that instead of exemption, remission was ranted and therefore the arguments are advanced referring to the provisions of the Act. However, it is required to be scrutinized in the background of the fact that admittedly when the petitioner has claimed remission which has been granted and which has been enjoyed for the full period of 10 years, is it permissible for the petitioner now to change the stand that it was entitled for exemption which ought to have been granted, and not remission? Therefore, by such change of stand or playing with the words it cannot be a ground to claim the benefit which is otherwise not available. Had the petitioner raised this very contention at the relevant time when remission was granted, perhaps, it could have been examined and it could have been decided whether the petitioner would have been entitled for exemption or remission. Since no such contention has been raised till the expiry of the period of remission which has been enjoyed, it is too late now to permit such a contention to claim benefit for a further period of 5 years. If that is permissible, it would amount to allowing the petitioner to take undue advantage by shifting the stand. It is well-accepted that the benefit which is granted or available would be for a stipulated period as provided in the statute or notification and no further extension can be granted. It is in these circumstances when the petitioner has made the submissions at length, the petition deserves to be dismissed only on such count that the petitioner cannot be permitted to claim such benefit.
The reliance placed by the learned counsel for petitioner on the judgments of the Hon''ble Apex Court would not have any bearing to the facts of the case. Though the submission has been made that substantive legal right cannot be denied to a person on the basis of policy decision of government or any certificate relying upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Another Vs. Wing Commander T. Parthasarathy, it has no relevance and it would not be applicable to the facts of the case.
Explanation (b) to sub-sec. (2-A) is also required to be noted which provides that where an industrial undertaking generates additional energy for its own use the duty shall not be leviable for the additional energy so generated and consumed by it. Further explanation provide with regard to calculation of energy on the basis of the existing generating set for the purpose of eligibility for the benefit. Therefore, the submissions made by learned counsel Shri Dave with much emphasis on the provision of the statute cannot be accepted and the petition deserves to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, shall stand vacated. No order as to cost.
FURTHER ORDER
After the order was pronounced, learned counsel Shri Dave has requested for stay of the operation of the order and continuation of the interim relief which, according to him, is granted as per the order passed in Civil Application (for orders) No. 4713/2004 dated 26.10.2009.
Therefore, in view of this order, the operation of the order is stayed and the interim relief shall continue till 22.11.2013 in order to enable the petitioner to have further recourse.