Dilip Singh and Others vs The State and Another

R.S. Chauhan, J.—The petitioners are aggrieved by the order dated 20.5.2012 passed by the Judicial Magistrate No. 13, Jaipur City, Jaipur whereby the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance for offence u/s 341 & 323 IPC against the petitioners. They are equally aggrieved by the order dated 7.9.2012 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 5, Jaipur Metropolitan whereby the learned Judge has upheld the cognizance order dated 20.5.2010. Mr. R.S. Tanwar, learned counsel for the petitioner, has vehemently contended that the complainant had filed a complaint on 27/2/2007. However, the cognizance was not taken till 20/5/2010. According to Section 468 Cr.P.C. a bar has been placed on the power to take cognizance after a lapse of period of limitation. The period of limitation is three years if the punishment for the offence exceeds one year, but does not exceed three years. Therefore, cognizance ought to have been taken within a period of three years. However, the cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate beyond the said period. Secondly, the learned Magistrate has not given any reasons for extending the time of limitation. The said reason has been given only by the learned Judge.

Relying upon the cases of Kuljeet Singh & Ors. Vs. State & Anr. 1998 Cr. L.R. (Raj.) 713 and on the case of Kamru and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, the learned counsel has vehemently contended that the cognizance order should be set aside as it has been passed after expiry of the limitation period.

Heard the learned counsel, perused the impugned orders, and considered the case law cited at the Bar.

Section 468 reads as under:

Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation-(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court, shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of Limitation.

(2) The period of limitation shall be -

(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only:

(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;

(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.

For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.

Section 473 reads as under:

Extension of period of limitation in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitations, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice.

A bare perusal of the two provisions clearly show that Section 468 Cr.P.C. cannot be read in isolation. Section 468 Cr.P.C. has to be read along with section 473 Cr.P.C. Reading both these provisions together, it is obvious that the period of limitation does not bar taking of cognizance. In the interest of justice the period of limitation can be extended.

According to the learned Judge, the complainant was submitted on 27/2/2007, the statement of the complainant was recorded on 25/11/2008. Therefore from 27/2/2007 to 25/11/2008 the proceedings were pending because the statement of the complainant could not be recorded. Once the complainant''s statement was recorded on 25/11/2008, the cognizance was taken on 20/5/2010 i.e. well within the period of three years. Hence, the cognizance was taken well within the period of limitation.

Considering the fact that according to the complainant the petitioners had trespassed and had assaulted the complainant and his family members, such a case could not be thrown out merely on the ground of limitation. After all, society does expect that those who commit an offence should face a trial. Hence, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order. This petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed.