Tribunals and Commissions

DILIPKUMAR HIRALAL SHAH vs LOKHANDWALA EDUCATION TRUST

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission · Decided on 21 March 1995 · Citation: 1995 2 CPC 317 : 1995 2 CPR 685 : 1995 3 CPJ 451 : 1996 1 CLT 102

HON’BLE JUDGES
R.C.Mankad , R.K.Shah J.
RESULT
Complaint partly allowed
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Judgment

10 paragraphs · 6,310 words
1.

COMPLAINANTS are parents of a girl named Shital, aged 7 years who died in a stampede in the primary school in which she was studying and they have filed this complaint for recovery of compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- from the opponents who are running the school alleging negligence and deficiency of service on their part.

2.

THE case of the Complainants is as follows; 2.1. Shital was studying in Division-A of Standard IV (Gujarati Medium) of Aroma Primary School which is run by the Lokhandwala Education Trust, Opponent No. 1 herein. Opponent Nos. 2 to 11 are trustees of the said trust (trust for short). THE trust is running six schools, one of which is Aroma Primary School, Gujarati medium in a building on Somnath Road in Usmanpura area of city of Ahmedabad. THE other schools run by the trust in the said building are: (i) Aroma Pre-Primary School (English Medium); (ii) Aroma Primary School (English Medium); (iii) Aroma Secondary School (Gujarati Medium); (iv) Aroma Secondary School (English Medium); and (v) Aroma Higher Secondary School (English Medium).

THE schools are run in two shifts-morning shift and the afternoon shift and the total strength of students studying in the school from pre-primary to secondary is about 2600. THE morning shift is from 7 a.m. to 12.15 a.m. with recess from 9.25 a.m. to 9.50 a.m. In each class there are about 60 to 65 students. THE building in which the classes are conducted is a two storeyed building with a playground. On December 22, 1992, there was recess at about 9.25 a.m. in the morning shift and students from various classes rushed down a staircase which was about 3 ft. wide to go to the playground. THEre were students on the playground who rushed upstairs to collect their snack boxes from their class rooms. THE result was that some students fell down and two of them were crushed to death. One of the students who died was Complainants'' daughter Shital. THE Complainants were not infomed about the injuries sustained by Shital soon after the incident occurred. At about 12.30 p.m. the Complainants received a telephonic message from the school that Shital had left school leaving her diary in the school. THE Complainants were asked to give the number of rickshaw which she was using for coming to school to deliver the diary. THE Complainants gave the rickshaw number to the person who gave the telephonic message. As Shital did not reach home long time after the message was received, the Complainants rushed to Aroma School to enquire about her and they reached the school at about 1 p.m. THE Complainants were not informed about the incident but they were taken to V.S. Hospital by someone. When they reached the Hospital, they found Shital lying dead on a stretcher. THE Doctor on duty informed the Complainants, on their making enquiry, that Shital had died because of ''traumatic asphyxia''. It was only thereafter that the Complainants came to know about the incident in which Shital received fatal injuries. 2.2. It is submitted that the Opponents had not taken adequate measures to control and regulate flow of students during recess and the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school had shown callous indifference and negligence in taking care of the students of the school. It is submitted that the opponents and teaching and non-teaching staff of the school had not taken adequate measures for the safety of the students. It was only on account of negligence of the Opponents, Principal of the school and teachers and other staff, of the school that the incident in which Shital sustained fatal injuries occurred. Shital was a brilliant student having a promising and bright career and she met with untimely death by sheer negligence of the Opponents and teaching and non-teaching staff of the school. THEre is, therefore, according to the Complainants, deficiency of service on the part of the Opponents and they are liable to pay compensation to them for the death of their daughter Shital. On the above grounds, the Complainants have prayed for compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- together with interest @ 18% p.a. from the date of complaint till realisation and costs of the complaint. The Opponents have contested the complaint by filing affidavit of Opponent No. 5, Bhaskar R. Patel who is Principal and Director of Aroma School (Gujarati Medium, Primary Sections). The Opponents have denied the allegations made by the Complainants and contended that the Complainants are not consumers within the meaning of consumer defined in Section 2 (1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act (Act for short). It is contended that fees paid by guardian/parents of a student to take education in the school cannot be said to be consideration for hiring services and the function of imparting education does not bring about any contractual relations between the school on the one hand and the students or their parents on the other hand. Fees are charged for meeting the expenses for payment of salary to teachers who are appointed to impart education and other incidental expenses for running the school. It is further contended that it is not the case of the Complainants that there was deficiency of service on the part of the Opponents in imparting education for which they have paid tuition fees to the school. In other words, according to the Opponents, it is not the Complainants'' case that school was negligent or careless in giving proper education to their daughter Shital. At the best the Complainants'' case falls under Law of Torts and their only remedy is to approach the Civil Court for redressal of their grievance or claim of compensation. It is submitted that case of accident cannot be tried by this Commission. Therefore, the instant case which is a case of accident in which Shital died is not maintainable in this Commission. It is further submitted that the complaint is not maintainable also because the complaint involves complicated questions of law and facts which cannot be adjudicated upon under the Act and the Complainants should be relegated to the Civil Court for adjudication of the disputes raised by them. It is further submitted that this Commission can entertain the complaint only if the value of the claim made in the complaint exceeds Rs. 5 lakhs but does not exceed Rs. 20 lakhs. In the instant case, the Complainants having claimed compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.

The Opponents have submitted that the sad demise of Shital had taken place not on account of any negligence on the part of the Opponents, teachers and other staff of the school. It was a pure case of accident which was beyond the control of the Opponents. It is submitted that on the happening of the incident, the State Government had appointed one man Commission headed by Mr. R.S. Trivedi, Chairman of the Gujarat Higher Education Board to hold an inquiry into the incident. This one man Commis sion had submitted its report to the State Government which has been accepted by the State Government. In this report it has been held that it was a case of accident and there was no negligence or carelessness on the part of the Opponents. Recommendations were made by the State Government on the basis of one man Commission''s report and these recommendations are at Annexure-A to the reply.

3.

SO far as the incident in which Shital received fatal injuries is concerned, the opponents'' submit as follows: 5.1 The classes run by the Trust could not function from December 7 to December 19 because of tense situation in the city of Ahmedabad following the incidents which had taken place in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992. The education of the students was disrupted for a period of 12 days and on December 22, 1992, the date on which the incident occurred, the schools started at 7 a.m. and educational process started after prayer in the school. The examination was to be held from January 4, 1993 and since the students could not study for 12 days, a meeting of teachers of Standard 1 to 7 was called in room No. 20 on the ground floor to discuss about completion of course before the commencement of the examination. Intimation of the meeting was given to teachers well in advance. At 9.25 a.m. recess bell rang and all the teachers of Gujarati Medium assembled in or near room No. 20. Before the discussion about measures to be taken for completing the course could start,at about 9.23 a.m. watchman Hasmukhbhai Patel came near room No. 20 and informed Opponent No. 5, Principal and Director of the school that on the R.C.C. staircase on the right side of the building, 5 to 6 students had fallen down. On getting this information, all the teachers who had gathered in room No. 20 including Opponent No. 5 rushed to the place of incident. Teachers and Higher Secondary School students lifted the students who were Injured, took them to ground floor and made them lie on wooden benches in a classroom. First aid was given to the students by teachers. Opponent No. 5 informed the Doctor and one of the staff members went on scooter to bring the Doctor. Students of Standards 1 to 12 had gathered on the playground because of recess and, therefore. Opponent No. 5 gave instructions to ring the bell so that the students could go to their respective class rooms. After all the students went to their class rooms, Dr. SOni who was called, gave first aid to one boy and three girl students including Shital. Ambulance and autorickshaws were called, injured students were removed to V.S. Hospital and staff members went to the Hospital in autorickshaws. According to the Opponents, the parents who had come to collect their children thronged the school campus and rushed into the class rooms creating an unruly atmosphere by shouting. The situation became uncontrollable and it became impossible to know as to which student was taken away by his or her guardian and who remained in the school either injured or without injury. It is further stated that Opponent No. 5 instructed Supervisor N.K. Patel to make phone calls to guardians of students who were involved in the incident. A rumour that poison was mixed with drinking water in the overhead tank also spread in the school. Opponent No. 5, therefore gave instructions to the concerned persons to allow the students of Higher Secondary classes to go home. The students of different class rooms were allowed to leave the class rooms at intervals of 5 minutes. Students of Standards 1 to 7 were, however, not allowed to go home before time. Health Department of A.M.C. was also summoned to take sample of drinking water. There was also rumour of explosion having taken place in the school. It is submitted that Opponent No. 5 and other staff members of the school had gone to the Hospital to look after the injured students. 5.2 It is stated that when the opponent No. 5 was about to leave for V.S. Hospital at about 12.20 p.m.. Complainants came to inquire about their daughter Shital. Opponent No. 5 instructed one of the employees of the school to accompany the Complainants to V.S. Hospital. At the hospital, parents of Dipika who also sustained fatal injuries were present. It is submitted that during the post-mortem examination of dead bodies of Shital and Dipika, Opponent No. 5, Mayor of Ahmedabad City, Bhailalbhai Patel, Corporator of Navrangpura and Hasmukhbhai Patel, Corporator of Vadaj were with the parents of above students. SO far as injured students were concerned, the Hospital Authorities gave assurance that they would be given best treatment. Police, who was also informed about the incident, came to the school and investigated the incident. According to the Opponents, the description of the incident given by the Complainants is not correct. 5.3 The Opponents have submitted that there was no negligence or defidency of service on their part and, therefore, they are not liable to pay any compensation to the Complainants. Therefore, the Complainants are not entitled to claim Rs. 1,50,000/- or any other amount by way of compensation. On the above grounds the Opponents have prayed for dismissal of the complaint. Complainants'' daughter Shital was a very bright student and this is evident from progress reports and results of examinations, copies whereof are placed on record. Shital secured 100% marks in Sr. K.G. classes with remark that she was very good in studies. In 1st Standard she secured 90% and in 2nd Standard 93% marks at the final examinations. Before she completed 5 years age, she was given certificate of merit in healthy baby contest held by Rotary Club of Kankaria, Ahmedabad. There is, therefore, no doubt that Shital had a bright future before her and her parents i.e., the Complainants would have received from her both physical and monetary assistance in future. In the death of Shital, the Complainants have not only lost their beloved daughter but they have also lost their future support. Death of Shital was obviously a big blow and set back for the Complainants.

4.

THE school building in which aforesaid schools are run is two storeyed building with 53 class rooms and three office rooms. THEre is also a playground. THEre is a slope/incline to go to the second floor near the main gate of the school. On the southern end of the building there is a stair case leading to first floor and this staircase is about 3 ft. wide. THEre is a second stair case on the rear side of the main building but that is not used or rarely used. On the ground floor of the building, there are 17 class rooms exclusive of office and staff rooms whereas on the first floor there are 20 class rooms and on the second floor 16 class rooms. As already stated above, there are in all 2600 students in the aforesaid schools. Schools are run in two shifts. THE play ground is in front of the school building and from this play ground students use slope and stair case on two sides of the school to go to upper floor. It is stated that there are 60 to 65 students in each class. This is also evident from the letter Annexure-A to the affidavit in reply dated April 26, 1993 addressed to the President of the Trust by Deputy Secretary of Education Department of Government of Gujarat. Complainants admittedly were not present when the incident occurred. Statements regarding the incident made in the complaint are based on the information gathered by them after the incident after they came to know about the death of their daughter. It is for the opponents to explain as to how the incident occurred. THEre is however no detailed description of the incident given by the Opponents. All that has been stated on their behalf is that watchman reported at 9.23 a.m. that 5 to 6 students had fallen down on the stair case on the right side of the school building. Evidence of this watchman Hasmukhbhai Patel is not adduced. THEre is no evidence of any other person or student who had witnessed the incident. We are left completely in dark as to how the incident in which several students sustained injuries, two of whom died, occurred. In our opinion, it was the duty of the opponents to adduce evidence and bring on record the details about the incident. However, the fact remains that the incident happened on the stair case during recess and many students sustained injuries, two of whom fatal injuries. Postmortem was performed on the dead body of Shital and in the postmortem report cause of death is given as "cardio respiration failure as a result of traumatic asphyxia". THE postmortem report also describes the injuries sustained by Shital. Police had drawn up panchnama of the scene of incident at about 2.30 p.m. on the day of the incident in this panchnama it is stated that there is stair case on the backside of Aroma School and this stair case led to 1st floor on the southern side of the school. First there are 11 cement steps on the staircase, the width of which is 3 ft. After 11 steps, there is 8 x 8-3/4'' long space of landing or lobby on the stair-case on which the incident had taken place. THEre were blood stains and snacks consisting of biscuits, ''bajri vada'' etc. lying scattered and crushed all over the place. From the above lobby/ space there are 11 more stairs which are 3'' wide. After the stairs are over, there is gallery of 8'' x 4'' from where one could go to the northern side of the first floor on both the sides of which there are class rooms with a space of 6'' placed between them. It would thus appear that the stair-case on which the incident occurred is in two parts and the incident occurred in the middle of the staircase. From the circumstantial evidence and the injuries sustained by the deceased Shital, the only inference which could be drawn is that Shital sustained fatal injuries when she fell down in the stampede. Students from classes must have rushed down to go to the playground when the recess bell rang and during this rush Shital fell down and sustained injuries. THEre is no evidence about students rushing from playground to their classrooms on the first floor. It does appear that flow of students going down or up was not controlled or regulated. Students of all the classes left class rooms at a time when the recess bell rang. Same thing must be happening when the school time was over. THE one man Commission appointed by the State Government has also recommended to regulate the flow of the students. THE School Authorities should have resorted to staggering for students leaving their class rooms during recess. In other words, some time interval should have been kept between students of different class rooms for leaving their class rooms to avoid stampede or rush of students at a time. It is clear from the opponents'' reply that after the incident occurred, wisdom dawned upon the Authorities of the school and they did not allow the students of Higher Secondary classes to leave their class rooms at a time and time interval of 5 minutes was kept between two classes. This method was, however, not adopted in the past before the incident. It further appears that more students than what was permitted under the rules were admitted to each class and this was also a cause for overcrowding and rushing of students during recess. This is clear from the conclusion reached by the one man Commission in which it is stated that in most of the classes, strength of students was between 60 and 65 and it was necessary to limit the strength of students as per rules to avoid rush and stampede. It is, therefore, clear that the incident occurred because the flow of students on stair-case during recess was not regulated or controlled and there was no one to supervise the students going down or up the stairs. To say the least, it was a sorry state of affairs. The opponents have contended that the value of the subject-matter of the complaint being less than Rs. 5 lakhs, the complaint could be entertained only by the District Forum and not this Commission. There is no substance in this contention. Before Clause (a) of Section 17 of the Act was amended with effect from June 18, 1993, this Commission had jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the value of the goods or service or compensation, if any, claimed exceeded Rs. 1 lakh but did not exceed Rs. 10 lakhs. By the aforesaid amendment "Rs. 1 lakh" and "Rs. 10 lakhs" were substituted by "Rs. 5 lakhs" and "Rs. 20 lakhs" respectively. This amendment has only prospective effect and it would not affect the jurisdiction of this Commission to entertain or decide complaints where value of the subject-matter is less than Rs. 5 lakhs and which were filed before the amendment. The present complaint was filed on April 5, 1993 before the amendment. Therefore, this Commission has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. It was next urged that there is no contract between the Complainants or their daughter Shital on one hand and the school on the other hand in which the school had agreed to impart education to Shital. In other words, contractual relationship between the Complainants or Shital on one hand and the school on the other hand did not exist. In any case imparting of education by school is not service as defined in Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. It was further urged that even if the Opponents were held to be rendering any service to the Complainants or Shital, such service was not for consideration. Therefore, the Complainants or Shital could not be considered to be consumers as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. The meaning of the word "service" used in Section 2(1)(o) came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, III (1993) CPJ 7 (SC). The Supreme Court observed that the word "service" has variety of meanings. It may mean any benefit or any act resulting in promoting interest or happiness. It may be contractual, professional, public, domestic, legal, statutory etc. The concept of service thus is very wide. How it should be understood and what it means depends on the context in which it has been used in an enactment. After referring to the definition of service in Clause (o) of Section 2(1), the Supreme Court observed that it is in three parts. The main part is followed by inclusive clause and ends by exclusionary clause. The main clause itself is very wide. It applies to any service made available to potential users. The words ''any'' and ''potential'' are significant. Both are of wide amplitude. The word ''any'' according to its dictionary meaning in Black''s Law Dictionary is explained thus: "word ''any'' has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate ''all'' or ''every'' as well as ''some'' or ''one'' and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject-matter of the statute". The use of word ''any'' in the context it has been used in Clause (o) indicates that it has been used in wider sense extending from one to all. The other word ''potential'' is again very wide. In Oxford Dictionary it is defined as ''capable of coming into being, possibility''. In Black''s Law Dictionary it is defined as existing in possibility but not in act. Naturally and probably expected to come into existence at some future time, though not now existing; for example, the future product of grain or trees already planted, or the successive future installments or payments on a contract or engagement already made. In other words, service which is not only extended to actual users but those who are capable of using it are covered in the definition. The clause is thus very wide and extends to any or all actual or potential users. But the Legislature did not stop there. It expanded the meaning of the word further in modern sense by extending it to even such facilities as are available to a consumer in connection with banking, financing etc. Each of these are wide-ranging activities in day to day life. They are discharged both by statutory and private bodies. It would thus appear that the meaning of the word ''service'' defined in Section 2(1)(o) is very wide and in our opinion it would take within its sweep imparting of education. In the instance case it is not disputed that the Opponents or the school are charging fees from the students for imparting education. The Opponents have produced a sample receipt which indicates that so far as primary school run by them is concerned, the school is charging from each student monthly tuition fees of Rs. 65/-, term fee of Rs. 35/-, admission fee of Rs. 70/- and examination fee of Rs. 35/-. It is for payment of fees that the Opponents are imparting education to the students admitted to the school. In other words, the parents who send their child to school for education have to pay fees and it is only if the fees are paid the school is imparting education. There is, therefore, contractual relationship between the parents of the students and the school. Fees is consideration for imparting education and imparting of education, as already observed above, would amount to rendering service as defined in Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. The Opponents are rendering such service for consideration in the shape of fees. Therefore, the parents and the student who is imparted education are consumers as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. It is, therefore, futile to contend that the Complainants are not consumers within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the Act and consequently this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain this complaint. There is also no substance in yet another technical objection raised by the Opponents that as the complaint involves complicated questions of law, the Complainants should be relegated to Civil Court. We do not find any substance in this objection also. There are no complicated questions involved in this complaint which cannot be adjudicated in these proceedings.

5.

IT is next contended by the Opponents that their duty is only to impart education to the students in class rooms. In other words, their duty begins and ends in the class rooms. They are not in any way responsible for what happens outside the class rooms. Therefore, they cannot be said to be rendering any service to the student or their parents when the students are not within class rooms. The above argument is an argument to desperation and this argument is advanced only to escape from the liability which arises out of the incident. The duty of the school authorities towards students and their parents do not begin and end only in class rooms. Parents send their wards/children to school for their physical and mental development. Physical development is also part of education. IT is, therefore, that students are taken to open ground or play ground for physical exercises and playing games during school hours. The school has also to see that the students take part in cultural activities such as drama, music, drawing etc. The school authorities have to maintain discipline among students, both within and outside the class rooms. The school authorities have also to take care of students when they are taken out for excursions and picnics. IT is, therefore, not correct to say that imparting of education is confined to class rooms. As already observed above, it is part of the duty of the school authorities to maintain discipline amongst the students. The students who go to school to take education are immature and many of them are of tender age. IT is, therefore, the duty of the school authorities which include Principal and teachers to take utmost care of the students so long as they are under their supervision. Students are under their supervision from the moment they enter the school premises and till they leave it. The school authorities are rendering service to the parents and students even when the students are engaged in educational and other activities outside the class rooms. Therefore, it was the duty of the Opponents and other school authorities including teachers to see that flow of students going down and up the stairs during recess or any other time was properly regulated and controlled so as to avoid any mishap. The school authorities are expected to take same care of students which parents take of their children. Had the school authorities been alive to their duties and taken adequate steps for maintaining discipline and regulating and controlling flow of students on staircases and in the premises of the school during and outside recess, tragic incident which happened on 22.12.92, could have been avoided and lives of two girls could have been saved. IT was due to total lack of care and caution on the part of the school authorities that the incident occurred and two girls lost their lives and others sustained injuries.

6.

WE are fortified in the view which we are taking by decisions which we shall presently refer. The first case which we will refer to is the case of Fryer v. Salford Corporation, (1937) 1 A.E.R. 617. That was a case in which plaintiff, a little girl named Fryer was seriously injured while attending a class at a domestic training centre in the city of Salford in a school maintained by the Corporation of Salford under the Education Acts, Under Section 48 of Education Act, 1918, it was the duty of the Corporation to give all children of certain age practical instruction in cookery. It was in accordance with that statutory power that instruction was given in that case and Fryer was attending the class when she met with the injuries. Whilst Fryer was being instructed in cooking, her apron caught fire from the gas cooker and she received injuries. There was no guard round the cooker. In the above circumstances, it was alleged that the Corporation was negligent in that it failed to have round the stove at which plaintiff Fryer stood any guard or fence, so as to prevent the pinafore, or apron, or any other part of the clothing, getting into the gas flame and catching fire. The Court of Appeal observed that the danger was one which ought reasonably to have been anticipated and one which a local authority ought to have taken precaution to prevent by the provision of a guard round the stove or otherwise. The test which was applied in such circumstance was; what would a reasonably careful parent have done in like circumstance? The Court, therefore, held that plaintiff Fryer had succeeded in establishing a duty towards her on the part of the local authority and a failure to perform the duty. In the instant case also danger of stampede or rush of students was one which ought reasonably to have been anticipated by the Opponents or school authorities and the school authorities ought to have taken precaution to prevent it by making provision for regulating and controlling rush or flow of students. The above decision of the Court of Appeal in Fryer v. Salford Corporation was one of the decisions on which reliance was placed by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court (to which the President was a party) in Shivkor Motasing v. Ramnaresh Munsising, reported in 1978 A.C.J. 334. That was a case in which young students of a Municipal School were taken by two teachers who were defendant Nos. 1 and 3 to Bhadreshwar situated on the Bank of the river Sabarmati on the outskirts of city of Ahmedabad. When the two teachers who were in charge of the picnic were taking their food, they heard noise from river side and rushed there. Two boys who were in water were rescued by fisherman Mahavir Raghu and his companions. However, Jagpalsingh who was still in water was drowned. His dead body was found by Mahavir Raghu and his companions. Parents of the deceased Jagpalsingh alleging that Jagpalsingh was drowned and killed on account of negligence of the two teachers instituted action in torts against two teachers; the School and the Municipal Corporation who was running the school to recover Rs. 15,000/- as damages. The Division Bench relied on the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeal in Fryer v. Salford Corporation and two other decisions which were cited before it and held that the principle which these three decisions lay down is that in a case of the type which was before the Court the test which should be applied is what a reasonably careful parent would have done in like circumstances. Between teachers and students what reasonably careful parent would have done in like circumstances is a very correct test to apply. The Division Bench after considering the facts and circumstances of the case held that negligence on the part of the two teachers was proved. In the instant case, if we apply the above test, the question which we have to ask ourselves is whether the school authorities had taken care which a reasonably careful parent would have taken in the circumstances. As already observed above, the school authorities have not taken reasonable care which a parent would have taken. There is, therefore, no doubt whatsoever that the Prindpal, teachers and other staff members of the school were negligent and it was only on account of their negligence that the mishap or incident occurred as a result of which two young lives including that of Shital were lost. Had the school authorities i.e. Principal, teachers and the Opponents taken proper care and precaution, the tragic incident could have been avoided. What is disturbing and shocking is that the Opponents who should hung their heads in shame, have brazen facedly opposed the complaint and contended that they owed no duty to the students and their parents outside the class rooms and there was no negligence on their part. The only comment one can make is what an auda-city! The behaviour of school authorities and Opponents is disgraceful. As held by the Gujarat High Court in Shivkor Motasing v. Ramnaresh Munsising, the Opponents who are employers of the Principal, teachers and other staff of the school are vicariously liable for their negligence. The Opponents and the other school authorities must, therefore, be held to be guilty of negligence or deficiency of service. In our opinion, therefore, the Complainants are entitled to claim compensation from the Opponents.

The next question is what compensation should be awarded to the Complainants. There are several decisions on the question of quantum of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. The learned Advocate for the Complainants also invited our attention to IInd Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act introduced by Act 54 of 1994 with effect from November 14, 1994 and submitted that if the income of the deceased Shital is taken at Rs. 1,500/- p.a. for the purpose of working out compensation, the compensation would work out to Rs. 2,25,000/- by applying muliplier of 15 to the said annual income. 1/3rd of said amount would come to Rs. 75,000/- which is required to be deducted and, therefore, the compensation payable would work out to Rs. 1,30,000/-. If Rs. 2,000/- for funeral expenses and Rs. 2,500/- for loss to the estate are added to this amount, compensation would work out to Rs. 1,54,500/-. Therefore, if parallel is drawn from the above Schedule, the Complainants are justified in claiming compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/-. In our opinion it would not be proper to apply the formula for working out compensation laid down in IInd Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act which has been inserted in 1994 whereas the incident in question has taken place in the end of 1992. In our opinion, it is not necessary to refer to any decision under the Motor Vehicles Act also since, in our opinion, guideline is provided by the Supreme Court in Kumari v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., I (1993) ACC 80 (SC)=1992 ACJ 283. That was a case in which a 6 years old son of appellant before Supreme Court died as a result of falling in 10'' deep sewerage tank in city of Madras. The bank was not covered with a lid and left open. The appellant filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before Madras High Court seeking a writ in nature of mandamus directing the respondents to pay Rs. 50,000/- as compensation to the appellant. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that in writ jurisdiction it was not possible to determine as to which of the respondents was negligent in leaving the sewerage tank uncovered. The Supreme Court in the facts and circumstances of the case set aside the High Court judgment and directed respondent No. 1, State of Tamil Nadu to pay to the appellant a sum of Rs. 50,000/- with interest at 12% from January 1, 1990 till the date of payment. Respectfully following said decision, in our opinion, in the instant case also it would be proper to award Rs. 50,000/- as compensation together with interest to the Complainants. This amount, in our opinion, would meet the ends of justice.

7.

IN the result, we partly allow this complaint and direct the Opponents to pay to the Complainants compensation of Rs. 50,000/- together with interest @ 12% p.a. from December 22, 1992 till payment and costs of Rs. 2,000/- within six weeks from the date of this order. Before parting with the matter we would like to observe that we expect the Opponents to pay compensation to the parents of the deceased Dipika who was killed in the incident and injured students. Compensation to parents of Dipika shall be same as paid to Complainants i.e., Rs. 50,000/- together with 12% interest as stated above. Compensation to parents of injured students shall be quantified as per the settled principles in Motor Accident cases and such compensation shall be paid together with interest at 12%. We think that to deny compensation to aforesaid parents merely because they have chosen not to approach this Commission or Court of Law would be immoral, improper and discriminatory. We also expect the Opponents to carry out the directions/recommendations given by the Government on the basis of R.S. Trivedi Commission''s report. Complaint partly allowed.