Dillip Kumar Nayak vs State Of Odisha

G. Satapathy, J

This is a bail application U/S.483 of BNSS by the petitioner for grant of bail in connection with EOW P.S. Case No.13 of 2025 corresponding to CT Case No.16 of 2025 pending in the Court of learned PO Designated Court under the OPID Act, Cuttack for commission of offences punishable under Sections 406/420/467/468/471 of the IPC, on the allegation of deceitfully inducing the informant and his wife with false assurance of providing good returns for the investment in real-estate business and in the process managing to dupe them for an amount of Rs.12,42,00,000/-as per FIR, but subsequently the same was pegged at Rs.15.03Crores in the charge-sheet by misappropriating the investment of the informant and his wife after forging documents on the pretext of purchasing the land in the name of the informant and his wife, but purchasing the land in his own name and siphoning off the amount taken from the informant.

Heard Mr. Devashis Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner; Mr. Bibhuti Ranjan Mohanty, learned counsel for the informant and Mr. M.R. Patra, learned Addl. PP in the matter and perused the record. In opposing the bail application, Mr. M.R. Patra, learned Addl. PP prays to reject the bail application by taking into account the conduct of the petitioner and the allegation made against him. Similar is the submission as advanced by Mr. Bibhuti Ranjan Mohanty, learned counsel for the informant who submits that not only the petitioner has concealed his criminal antecedent in EOW PS Case No.1 of 2026, but he has averred in paragraph 9 of the bail application that he has got no criminal antecedent and thereby, the petitioner having suppressed the material before this Court, is not entitled to the discretionary relief.

2.1 The sum and substance of the elaborate submission as made by Mr. Panda are as under:-

(i) The civil dispute in this case has been given the color of criminal case;

(ii) Sec.420 & 406 of IPC cannot co-exist mutually, but charge-sheet has been submitted for the offences U/S.420/406 together with other offences;

(iii) Criminal antecedent has been shown only to detain the petitioner in custody further, but one antecedent shown against the petitioner having already been settled and the petitioner has thereon been acquitted, however, another PS Case has been instituted against the petitioner only to defeat his liberty, but, both the cases being subsequently instituted, it would not constitute criminal antecedents against the petitioner;

(iv) The detention of the petitioner is illegal and lastly, the suit and the agreement belies the allegation of the informant.

After having considered the rival submissions upon perusal of record, there appears allegation against the petitioner for duping the informant and his wife, but on conclusion of investigation, the petitioner has been charge-sheeted for commission of offences punishable U/S.406/420/467/468/471 of IPC and the deceived amount has risen to Rs.15.03Crores which was initially alleged in the FIR to be Rs.12.42Crores, however, this Court is equally alive with the principle that mutually the offence U/S.420/406 of IPC cannot co-exist, but considers it proper that the petitioner is also charge-sheeted for other offences like offences U/Ss.467/468/471 of IPC. It is also not disputed that punishment prescribed for Sec.467 is up to imprisonment for life. Here one thing may come to the mind that the offences alleged against the petitioner is triable by Magistrate, but facts remains that the punishment as prescribed in Sec.467 being for imprisonment for life and the Magistrate having power U/S.323 of the CrPC to commit the case to the Court of Session, if it appears to him that the case ought to be tried by the Court of Session, the assumption that the case is triable by a Magistrate is premature. In this context, it would be beneficial to refer to the decision in Rakesh Mittal Vrs. Ajay Pal Gupta @ Sonu Chaudhary and another; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 170, wherein at paragraph-14, the Apex Court has held as under:-

"14. xx xx xx It would always be open to a Magistrate, if he is of the opinion that any of the offences in the case are exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, to commit the case to a Court of Sessions under Section 209 CrPC or Section 323 CrPC. It may be noted that under Section 323 CrPC, such power can be exercised by the Magistrate even during the course of the trial. Therefore, the assumption of the High Court that the case on hand is triable by a Magistrate is premature."

Besides, it is also alleged against the petitioner that he has issued seven cheques, each for Rs.50,00,000/-two cheques, each for Rs.25,00,000/-; two cheques each for Rs.35,00,000/-; one cheque for Rs.30,00,000/- and another cheque for Rs.42,00,000/-, all total thirteen cheques for a sum of Rs.5.42Crores, however, such cheques have allegedly been dishonored when presented for the reason of insufficient of funds and mismatch of signatures of the drawer. It is also alleged that the petitioner has taken two crores from the wife of the informant.

On coming back to the cases registered against the petitioner, the petitioner appears to have disclosed a statement with regard to a criminal case in paragraph 9 of the bail application which reads as under:-

That Petitioner is a permanent resident within the jurisdiction of Badambadi P.S. under Cuttack U.P.D., has no criminal antecedents and Barang P.S. Case No. 36 of 2025 stands closed with his acquittal while he is on bail in another case instituted to solely create prejudice in the court's mind of him being a habitual offender and there is no chance of his absconding 'or' avoiding the trial in case the prayer for bail is heard and allowed and he is ready and willing to abide by any terms and conditions of bail as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper.

No doubt the cases registered against the petitioner subsequent to this case may not constitute criminal antecedent, but it was the duty of the petitioner to disclose the details of the cases which has been registered against him. In this regard this Court considers it apt to refer to the decision in Munnesh Vrs. State of Uttar Pradesh; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1319, wherein, the Apex Court at Paragraph 9 has held as under: -

"9. xx xx xx, since the petitioner has suppressed material facts with regard to his involvement in criminal cases, he is not entitled to the discretionary relief of bail. xx xx".

5.1. Similarly in Zeba Khan Vrs. State of UP and others; 2026 SCC OnLine 188, the Apex Court in paragraph Nos.42, 43, 47 & 48 has held as under:-

"42. It has been consistently emphasized by this Court that an accused or applicant seeking bail is under a solemn obligation to make a fair, complete and candid disclosure of all material facts having a direct bearing on the exercise of judicial discretion. Any suppression, concealment or selective disclosure of such material facts amounts to an abuse of the process of law and strikes at the very root of the administration of criminal justice.

In the present case, Respondent No. 2 deliberately concealed his criminal antecedents before the High Court, both in the petition for quashing FIR as well as in successive bail applications. Even before this Court, only partial disclosure was made in the counter-affidavit, despite the existence of multiple criminal cases on record. This conduct cannot be viewed as an isolated lapse but reflects a growing and disturbing trend of accused persons securing discretionary relief by suppressing material facts.

As repeatedly observed by this Court, bail applications are examined at multiple stages - from the trial Court to the High Court and ultimately this Court - where courts are often constrained to take a prima facie view on incomplete or selectively presented records. Non-disclosure of material aspects such as criminal antecedents, prior bail rejections, duration of custody, compliance with constitutional and statutory safeguards, and the progress of trial may result in the unwarranted grant of bail, or conversely, the prolonged incarceration of accused persons despite substantial custody having already been undergone.

Thus, this Court is of the view that every petitioner or applicant seeking bail, at any stage of proceedings, is under an obligation to disclose all material particulars, including criminal antecedents and the existence of any coercive processes such as issuance of non-bailable warrants, declaration as a proclaimed offender, or similar proceedings, duly supported by an affidavit, so as to promote uniformity, transparency and integrity in bail adjudication."

On applying the law laid down by the Apex Court in these decisions referred to above to the facts of the case at hand, it appears that the petitioner has not disclosed the details of EOW PS Case No.01 of 2026, which is not in conformity with the law laid down by the Apex Court.

Another aspect which requires consideration is that the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the agreement in this case to consider that the dispute between the parties is civil in nature, but this Court does not consider it proper to appreciate the agreement in threadbare at this stage in a bail proceeding, more particularly when it is not known whether such agreement is a part of investigation or not. Besides, detail analysis of evidence and meticulous examination of documents on merit should be avoided at the stage of considering the bail application. What should be the parameters to exercise discretion in a bail application has been well elucidated by the Apex Court in a plethora of decision, but in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar Vrs. Ashis Chatterjee & Anr : (2010) 14 SCC 496, the Apex Court in Paragraph 9 has held as under:-

"9. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

(i) Whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the Accused had committed the offence;

(ii) Nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) Severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) Danger of the Accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

(v) Character, behavior, means, position and standing of the Accused;

(vi) Likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) Reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

(viii) Danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail."

In the backdrop of the allegation against the petitioner, it would be too early to arrive at that the dispute between the parties is civil in nature, more particularly when witnesses are yet to be examined. Further, law is well settled that when the intention of a party is to deceive the other from the very inception of the transaction, the accused cannot take umbrage of civil or contractual dispute to shield his action from criminal liability. No doubt, the petitioner has renewed his prayer for bail after submission of charge-sheet, but materially, there is no change in circumstances to consider the bail application of the petitioner afresh. In view of the above facts and taking into consideration the nature and gravity of the offences as alleged against the petitioner vis-a-vis the accusation sought to be brought against him and the enormity of the financial allegation as levelled against the petitioner and keeping in view the non-disclosure of the material facts such as the criminal cases registered against him in the bail application despite knowing the same and taking into account the materials placed on record in support of the allegation against the petitioner and the mode and manner in which the informant has been deceived, this Court does not consider proper to grant bail to the petitioner at this stage especially when the witnesses are yet to be examined.

Hence, the bail application of the petitioner stands rejected. Mr. Panda, however, seeks leave to prefer appeal against this judgment, but needless to say that the petitioner is at liberty to challenge this judgment, if the same is permissible under law, but this Court has no authority to grant leave to appeal against the order/judgment passed in a bail application.

Accordingly, the BLAPL stands disposed of. A soft copy of this order be immediately transmitted to the concerned Court for compliance.