Director General (Road Development) National Highways Authority Of India vs Aam Aadmi Lokmanch & Ors

S. Ravindra Bhat, J

Leave granted in SLP (C) Nos. 28178/2018, 1706/2019, Diary No. 19018 of 2018 and 1632 of 2019. With consent of counsel for the parties, they

were tagged with the companion civil appeals and heard finally.

On 06 June, 2013, when Ms. Vishakha Wadekar, was driving her car with her young daughter, Sanskruti Wadekar she had no inkling that danger

lurked round the corner of the highway; over-mining at the height of 75 x 30 ft, in Gut No. 112, resulted in the destruction of a small hill by the side of

the national highway. The resultant debris and a part of the hill collapsed and slid down to the road, claiming the lives of Ms. Vishakha and her

daughter. The directions made by the Pune bench of the National Green Tribunal, on an application by a registered organization, (the respondent in the

appeal, the Aam Aadmi Lokmanch, hereafter “Lokmanchâ€) are the subject matter of the appeals (CA 6932/2015 by NHAI; CA 5971/2019; CA

11803/2018 and CA 6862/2018) before this court. The other appeals by special leave question the judgments and orders of the Bombay High Court,

which upheld the regulations framed pursuant to the order of the NGT. The High Court negatived the challenge to those regulations in the writ

petitions presented before it.

The facts in brief are that the National Highways Authority of India (hereafter “NHAIâ€) had entered into an agreement with M/s P.S. Toll

Road (Pvt.) Ltd., a unit/undertaking of Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. (which is arrayed as the ninth respondent; PS Toll Road (Pvt.) Ltd. hereafter

referred to as “the concessionaireâ€) on 10.03.2010 for the maintenance and operation of the Pune-Satara section of National Highway No. 4, to

an extent of 140 kms. The scope of the agreement included construction of the project (i.e. the highway stretch) as well as its operation and

maintenance for a period of 24 years. The agreement included stipulations mandating safety to the highway users (clause 18.1.1). The NHAI was

duty bound to appoint experienced safety consultants for carrying out safety audits of Project Highways (clause 18.1.2), the expenditure for which

was to be borne by the concessionaire (clause 18.1.3). An elaborate highway monitoring mechanism was also contemplated by the agreement (clause

19.1) through which by the seventh of each month, an independent engineer was to furnish a report after due inspection (of the operation and

maintenance arrangements), containing defects or deficiencies (clauses 19.2). Additionally, the independent engineer was to require the

concessionaire to carry out specified tests for confirming that the highway was operated in accordance with applicable standards (clause 19.3). Other

stipulations included, inter alia, requirements that the concessionaire had to carry out remedial measures (Clause 19.4.1) within a period of 15 days

after receipt of the report of the independent engineer. The concessionaire was put to terms in that if relevant repairs or remedial measures were not

undertaken, the NHAI could recover damages in terms of Clause 17.8. Another obligation cast on the concessionaire was to send a periodic report of

various occurrences, including “unusual occurrences on the Project Highwayâ€​ such as death or injury to any person (clause 19.6), any obstruction,

or “flooding of Project Highwayâ€​.

In terms of Clause 19.4.2, the measure of damages which NHAI could recover was calculable in terms of each days delay in complying with the

remedial measures suggested by the engineer, based on the “higher (a) 0.5% of the Average Daily Fee and (b) 0.1% of the cost of such repair or

repair estimated by the Independent Engineerâ€​ The same clause (17.8.1) stated that:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in this agreement, should the actual traffic exceed the design capacity during any year or part thereof and the

Concessionaire fails to repair or rectify any defect or deficiency set forth in the Maintenance Requirements within the period specified therein, it shall

be deemed to be in breach of this agreement and the Authority shall be entitled from such date to recover damages, to be calculated and paid for each

day of the delay until the breach is cured, at the higher of (a) 5% (five percent) of Average daily fee and 1% (one percent) of the cost of such repair

or rectification as estimated by the Independent Engineer, for the balance period of the concession. The recovery of such damages shall be without

prejudice to the rights of the Authority under this agreement, including the right of termination thereof.â€​

In the meanwhile, the fifth respondent (who has filed CA 5971/2019 against the NGT’s order, hereafter referred to as “Rathodâ€) on

03.01.2011 applied to the Government of Maharashtra for a license to extract minor minerals. This license was sought in respect of land bearing

survey number 112A to look more to an extent of 5 acres and 93 cents. The license was granted by the appropriate authority of the government. By

clause 1 of the terms of this license, the period of the license was two months; clause 5 stated that for extraction and minor minerals digging, work

could not exceed more than 20 feet down side of the land surface.

Apparently soon after the license was taken over, certain demands were made regarding construction of a connecting road to the village. The

materials on record by way of letters written to the local panchayat are to the effect that as a result of construction of the highway and due to the

passage of time the existing road had been washed away. Consequently, the 2 km stretch from the left side of the new tunnel going up to the village

was virtually non-existent. The panchayat requested that the road should be strengthened and widened.

On 31.01.2011, the local authorities of the State government issued a show cause notice to Rathod alleging that debris were stored illegally on the

site. It was alleged that this was contrary to Section 48 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (hereafter “land revenue codeâ€​). Again, on

16.06.2011, the local panchayat issued a notice (which is on the record) stating that as a result of mineral extraction, the natural flow of rainwater was

being obstructed. The notice also added that two heavy machines in non-performing condition were lying idle on the land and two JCB machines were

also stationed there. Rathore evidently received these notices; this is attested by his replies to the Tehsildar and other local authorities. After obtaining

a report from the local officials, the Tehsildar, Bhor issued an order directing payment of ₹ 1,271,200 by Rathod for violation of the land revenue code

on account of illegal extraction and use of minor minerals.

This activity of excavation and piling of debris, did not go unnoticed on the part of NHAI; it wrote to the Collector of Pune, pointing out that:

“…large scale and indiscriminate excavation in the upper side hills of New Katraj Tunnel at both ends is in progress. Due to this excavation,

drainage system above and near tunnel has been affected. This may lead to seepage of water inside tunnel roof thereby collapse of walls and ceiling

of tunnel resulting in collapse of tunnel and may lead to major mishap. The collapse in tunnel will block the entire traffic of NH4 from Mumbai/Pune to

Bangalore and vice versa leading to chaotic situation.â€​

The letter also mentioned specifically that Rathod had been notified; it sought action from the state government.

In the early hours of the morning of 6th June, 2013, due to the monsoon, there was heavy rainfall at Mauje Shindewadi Tehsil, Bhor and the

surrounding areas. Water flowing through the hills at Mauje Shindewadi entered the road near the octroi post of the Pune Municipal Corporation, at

Mauje Shindewadi Tehsil Bhor, District Pune, on NH-4, with great force. This created an obstacle in the form of a large sheet of water. Under these

conditions, when the Alto car driven by Vishakha Wadekar and her daughter Sanskruti, was obstructed, they alighted to wade across to safety;

however, the water gushed with great intensity and swept them away, resulting in their death. The resulting magisterial inquiry under Section 176,

Code of Criminal Procedure resulted in a report dated 04.10.2013. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate who inquired into the incident appointed an expert,

whose report was considered; he also visited the site and held several hearings. During the hearings, pursuant to notices issued to various parties, the

statements of Rathod, the local police authorities, eyewitnesses (Abhay Arvind Ranade, Vineet Vasant George and relatives of the deceased), the

Project Director (General Manager) of NHAI, the team leader of the independent engineering firm associated with checking quality of maintenance

of the highway, etc. were recorded.

Soon after the incident, the Lokmanch, through its president, filed an application under Section 14(1) read with Sections 16 and 18 of the National

Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (hereafter “the NGT Actâ€), seeking mandatory injunction to restore natural contours at the foot base of the hill that had

been destroyed by Rathod. Besides, general relief by way of directions to other respondents to take necessary action for the protection of hills from

destruction and for maintaining foot base design of the hills in the natural survey was sought.

The material produced before the NGT by the State of Maharashtra in the form of an affidavit revealed that large scale destruction of hills by

individuals and concerns who had been given short term mining licenses, had occurred. According to the affidavit, there were 62 cases, and in many

cases “hill-cuttingâ€​ was resorted to by developers. The state had apparently imposed fines and penalties for these illegal activities.

The NGT, in its impugned order, commenting on the role of Rathod, held as follows, while justifying the imposition of liability upon that respondent:

“It appears from the record that land Survey No. 112, is owned by the Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and their family members. There are hills in the

said land. They illegally cut hills without permission and extract minor mineral, which reduced height of hill, circumference of the hill and or peripheral

nature, surface of the hill in question. Acts of the Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 made the area of hill fragile, susceptible to danger to the ecology and

support of natural soil. In such a case, mere recovery of additional royalty would not be a proper remedial measure. At many places, the hill cutting is

noticed prior to and after the pathetic incident and now inquiry is undertaken by the concerned revenue officials.â€​

Thereafter, the NGT based on its reasoning that the regulation of some activities, especially involving anything affecting hills has to be strictly

regulated, directed as follows:

“12. The question may arise as to what is the meaning of expression 'Hill'. General perception is that it would depend upon ocular assessment of

the area, which is rounded land that is higher than the land surrounded by it, but is not expected to be as high as mountain. In other words, it is usually

rounded natural elevation of land, lower than a mountain. There is no particular definition of the word 'Hill'. The Oxford Dictionary gives meaning of

word 'Hill' as follows:

Hill - noun a naturally raised area of land, not as high or craggy as a mountain, a sloping stretch of road: they were climbing a steep hill in low gear, a

heap or mound of something, a hill of sliding shingle.

The wordbook has given meaning of expression 'Hill' as follows:

231 ""Hill is an elevation of the earth's surface that has a distinct summit. It has much less surface area than a mountain and is lower in elevation. Hills

rise less than 305 metres above the surrounding area, whereas mountains always exceed that height. However, a hill is not simply Small Mountain. It

is formed in a considerably different way.

Hills may be classified according to the way they were formed and the kinds of materials they are made of. There are two types, constructional and

destructional. Constructional hills are created by a built-up of rock debris or sand deposited by glaciers and wind. Oval-shaped landforms called

drumlins and sand dunes are samples of this type. Destructional hills are shaped by the deep erosion of areas that were raised by disturbances in the

earth's crust. Such hills may consist of limestone overlying layers of more easily eroded rock.

Draft Development Control Regulation Plan (DCR) of Pune is yet not approved by the PMC or Government. The cutting of hill by the Respondent

Nos. 5 and 6, created destruction to render a part of land useless, including development thereof for plantation of trees. It goes without saying that the

destruction of hill could not have occurred without connivance or at least purposeful act or omission by the Project Proponent i.e. NHAI (Respondent

No. 9). It is in the affidavit of Mr. Rajeskumar Kundal, that agreement requires to take necessary steps for stoppage of illegal construction activity at

Katraj hill top. However, a Notice dated 25th April, 2011, was issued to the Respondent No. 5 and copy of the same was marked to the Tehsildar,

Bhor before occurrence of the incident. The Collector, Pune was requested to look into the matter. The authorities were thus, asked to take

appropriate steps for stoppage of illegal activity in order to avoid major mishap and to ensure not to occur. They stated that one Mrs. Vishakha

Vadekar, and her daughter died due to water flow, which gushed from the hill top and poured on the road.

We do not find any significant material to show that the Respondent No. 9 (NHAI) has taken reasonable steps to avoid the untoward incident. We

do not find copies of the complaint made by NHAI to the authority. Assuming for a moment that such communications were made at the fag end of

April, 2011, yet, it was responsibility of NHAI to persuade said authority or the higher authority about inaction after 2011. The incident of raining in

which Mrs. Vishakha Vadekar and her daughter had flown away, is said to have occurred on 10th July, 2013. Obviously, the Respondent No. 9,

appears to have kept silence for about two (2) years, inspite of knowledge that the work of hill cutting was going on. In our opinion, NHAI

(Respondent No. 9) perhaps was likely to be impliedly benefited due to the illegal act of hill cutting due to availability of murum, stones and soil for the

work for its project. The contractor of NHAI was, therefore, interested in keeping the fingers crossed.

Considering probability and circumstances appearing on record, we have no hesitation in holding that there took place degradation of environment

to large extent due to hill cutting at Katraj. We have further no hesitation in holding that the hill cutting occurred due to illegal acts of the Respondent

Nos. 5, 6 and with or due to act of omission of the Respondent No. 9. They are liable to pay compensation to the legal representatives of the victims

of incident in question. They are also liable to pay restitution charges and penalty for causing damage to the environment, in order to avoid such

incident in future.

We deem it proper to give certain further directions to the concerned authority. In keeping with these findings, we direct:

a) The Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 9 shall pay amount of Rs. 50 Lakhs as joint penalty imposed on them for causing environmental damage in the

nearby area of Katraj, due to the hill-cutting.

b) This amount shall be deposited with Collector (Pune) within six (6) weeks, else Collector can recover the amount as arrears of Land Revenue. This

amount shall be deposited by Collector in special escrow account, and the amount be spent for environmental protection and conservation activities,

including hill protection and conservation in the district.

c) The Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 9 shall jointly and severally pay amount of Rs. 15 Lakhs towards compensation to the legal representatives of

deceased Mrs. Vishakha Vadekar, and her daughter if identity of legal representatives is proved before the Collector. The above three (3)

Respondents shall immediately within four (4) weeks, deposit such amount in the office of Collector, Pune for payment to the legal representatives of

deceased in the incident. The Collector may issue a publication for locating legal representatives of above deceased women for payment of

compensation and pay to them compensation after satisfaction of identity of the legal representatives by making due proportion as provided under the

relevant provisions of the Succession Act.

d) The Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 9 shall also deposit amount of Rs. 10 Lakhs with the office of Collector for plantation of trees in order to restore

damage caused to environment, though it may not be a sufficient remedy.

e) The Respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 shall give instructions to the concerned revenue officials working within all districts to have regular vigil

within their areas to verify whether fringes or nearby any hill or hill-top construction is/are noticed and if found to be so, due inquiry may be made as

to whether it is authorized or unauthorized. So also, instructions may be issued to the Municipal authorities to ensure that no construction permission

shall be given to any construction/development work, which is being proposed and is located at a distance may be of 100 ft. away from lowest slope

i.e. incline of any hill within its territorial limits, as well as hill-tops, except for Bamboo cottages.

f) In case of emergency or public purpose, the Hill cutting may be done by the concerned office of the Collector/Commissioner by passing a reasoned

order or if so required by Law as provided under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and the Regulations thereunder.â€​

Rathod, the NHAI and three other appellants (Patel India Pvt Ltd, Fern Constructions (India) Ltd and D.B. Realty Ltd.) have preferred appeals

against the impugned order of the NGT; their grievance is from the general directions issued in the impugned order, implicating buildings near hills.

In the second set of matters, i.e. the appeals by special leave, the facts are that acting on the directions of the NGT, the State of Maharashtra

invoked its powers under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (for short ""MRTP Act"") and directed, by a

notification/circular dated 14.11.2017 that development (relating to construction) was impermissible in an area abutting hills up to 100 feet.

By the impugned common judgment, the High Court held that there was no denial that the power to issue such directions or circulars existed by

way of the amended Section 154 and that such power was essential. The court further held that no individual or entity could claim any absolute right

and contend that he could develop or construct anywhere and that the directions contained in the notification supplemented bye-laws and building

codes already in place in Mumbai and Pune. It was also observed that:

“In Regulation 2 we have the definitions and as far as Part II is concerned, that is general planning and building requirements. Regulation 11.1 says

that no piece of land shall be used as site for construction of building if the site is hilly and having gradient more than 1:5. Thus, these stipulations are

already in place. What the National Green Tribunal brought to the notice of the authorities is in-discriminable cutting of hills in the Katraj Ghat. This

unauthorized construction by breaking of hills resulted in an accident. That is why the NGT directed that on hill tops and hill slopes and the portion at

the foot of the hill and surrounding 100 feet, no construction activity should be permitted and no development permission be issued and such directions

be issued to the Municipal Corporations and Municipal Councils. Bearing in mind that there are in place legal provisions restricting the development

activity on hill top and hill slope zones, all that the NGT and this Government Resolution directs is that in cases where there has already been a

permitted development activity within 100 feet of the hill, then, no permission for additional construction be granted nor any development be permitted

by sanctioning additional Floor Space Index (FSI) or Transferable Development Rights (TDR). In the event in sanctioned development plans if area of

the above nature is in buildable zone, then, for carrying out development in such zone and while granting individual development permissions, an area

of 100 feet surrounding the hills should be demarcated as non-buildable. It can be used as open space, road etc. We are surprised that an order and

direction of the NGT traceable to and in accordance with the planning law it challenged before us. Further, the directions of the State Government,

which are but reiteration of the existing regulations, are under challenge. The impugned Government Resolution is in consonance with the provisions of

the MRTP Act and the constitutional mandate enshrined in Article 21 and 48 thereof.

We are not in agreement with Dr. Sathe, Mr. Godbole and Dr. Saraf that merely because such directions are issued in exercise of the powers

conferred by sub-section (1) of section 154, the development Plan for the limits of the Municipal Corporations, namely Pune and Mumbai is altered or

modified. We are also not impressed by their argument that by such a Government Resolution, a modification is brought about in the Development

Control Regulations and all this is without recourse to the specific powers conferred by the MRTP Act. In other words, these are bypassed and by a

Government Resolution, the above stand amended. In that regard our attention has been invited to the provisions in the MRTP Act enabling

modifications or changes in the Development Plan and the procedure prescribed in that behalf.

We do not see any modification to the plan being brought about by the subject Government Resolution. If at all, the directions therein complement

the provisions of the Development Control Regulations for the cities of the Mumbai and Pune or the concerned Municipal Corporation/Municipal

Council areas. As it is, there was no permission to construct buildings other than a electric sub-stations, water works etc. on hill tops. As far as these

slopes are concerned, by their very nature, a hill slides down and if the slope is steep, then, no construction activity can be carried out. There is no

guarantee or assurance that any construction activity in such areas would be able to withstand a landslide or accidents, resulting from erosion of the

hills on account of natural reasons. It is experienced that human intervention is necessarily not responsible for a landslide, mudslide etc. On account of

natural causes and calamities, such events can occur. Apart from that, the occurrence increases because of human intervention including a

construction activity carried out at the foot of the hill or on top thereof. It is also possible if the hill is cut from its sides indiscriminately. It is also

possible if there is damage to a hill while extracting minor minerals. The hill then becomes uneven. Then, it is not possible to prevent any calamity.

Hence, in order to take care of the natural calamities and which have occurred in various places in the State of Maharashtra recently and also on

account of unrestricted and unregulated breaking and cutting of the hills resulting in accidents endangering human life and safety that these

supplemental directions have been issued. If they are for efficient administration of the Act and if they subserve larger public interest, then no fault

can be found with the Government Resolution. Each of the operative directions, namely, serial Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of this Government Resolution subserve

this object and purpose. If the Government Resolution has been issued after the attention of the Government has been invited to an accident in Katraj

Ghat occurring due to unauthorized and illegal cutting of hills, then, it is not as if the State Government has construed it as a command or a binding

order and issued the subject Government Resolution. The attention of the State Government being invited to such illegal and unauthorized so also

uncontrolled, unregulated and unrestricted hill-cutting, that in order to prevent the same, the Government stepped in. It took recourse to its power

conferred by section 154 of the MRTP Act in order to prevent future occurrences of this nature. If accidents and calamities can be prevented by

timely intervention of the State Government in this manner, then, we do not think that on the specious and unsubstantiated pleas of the petitioners, we

should strike down the Government Resolution.â€​

The NHAI in its appeal contends that the NGT fell into error in issuing sweeping directions against it without considering that was no evidence to

establish that it was in any way responsible for the degradation of the environment, which led to the tragedy. It is urged by Senior Counsel Mr P.S.

Narasimha that the NGT’s findings are contrary to established facts and have also resulted in grave miscarriage of justice. He highlighted that

there was no material on record to establish that the NHAI was in any way culpable or had failed to perform a public duty or neglected to avert a

foreseeable calamity. Elaborating on this, it was urged that the illegal mining activity was not carried on within the right-of-way or the carriageway of

the highway. What occurred was the result of an act of God, i.e. extremely heavy rains, which resulted in flooding on the highway caused entirely on

account of the debris collected which acted to obstruct the smooth flow of water.

It was highlighted that in any case, the NHAI could not be held responsible or made liable for the occurrence which led to the tragedy. Mr

Narasimha also argued that the NGT did not return any finding that the construction of the highway was in any way contrary to environmental

clearances or permissions secured by the NHAI. Therefore, the findings of the Tribunal in so far as they pertained to the neglect or alleged omission

of the NHAI, were contrary to law. He urged that the findings were illogical and irrational, and deserve to be set aside.

The NHAI also highlights that it wrote letters to the local administration on 24.04.2011 and 15.07.2011, seeking its intervention on account of the

illegal mining and activities and hill destruction, for which Rathod was responsible. However, the State government did not take any action. Likewise,

Rathod did not take any remedial steps or cease the activity. The resultant tragedy entirely on account of the omissions of the state's authorities to

take action and the neglect and culpable negligence on the part of Rathod, was the cause of the tragedy and the events which led to the loss of two

lives. It was also emphasized that the direction to pay compensation was contrary to legal principles and undermined the law. It was argued that

neither the NHAI nor its concessionaire had any control over the activities of the state, which granted the mining licences. Rathod, the licensee, had

continued illegal mining in the vicinity causing the accumulation of debris. This in turn, resulted in the obstruction of a culvert which resulted in

collection of a large volume of water. A huge sheet of water gushed out into the highway, sweeping away the car, tragically resulting in the death of

two individuals. It was argued that in these circumstances, the NHAI could not be saddled with the responsibility of either paying damages to the

dependents and legal representatives of the deceased nor could it be made liable to restore the environment through the payment of ₹ 50 lakhs or any

part of it.

Rathod urges that the NGT’s findings against him are contrary to law. He argues that the NGT did not implead those who had standing, i.e.

the legal representatives of the deceased; in fact, they had filed a civil suit, claiming compensation against him, as well as the NHAI and the state, for

alleged negligence and tortious liability. In those proceedings, the court is bound to record evidence and render findings based on the facts. The NGT

could not thus have unilaterally, based on a one-sided view of the materials, held that he was liable.

It was submitted that the allegation that Rathod was primarily responsible for degradation of the hill, which clogged the culverts and water

channels, resulting in the tragedy, was contrary to the facts. Mr. Vijay Verma, counsel for Rathod, relied on some portions of the magisterial report to

say that the NHAI had the report of an independent engineer, who had pointed to certain deficiencies on the part of the concessionaire. Therefore, to

hold him responsible for the tragedy, and direct him to pay a huge sum of ₹ 15 lakh and further pay amounts towards environmental damage, was

unwarranted.

It was argued that the NGT could not have issued directions with respect to payment of any sums, in the absence of any application by the legal

representatives of the deceased. It is further argued in Rathod’s appeal that apart from issuing notice for recovery of amounts towards alleged

illegal mining, neither the state authorities nor the NHAI took any positive remedial action for strengthening the culvert and the catch water drains

which were in disrepair, and constructed on the hill above the tunnel for drainage of rainwater. The masonry on the culvert for draining water was

choked due to lack of maintenance. Such maintenance was the sole responsibility of the concessionaire and for that, the NHAI had to be held liable. It

is also highlighted that Section 18 of the NGT Act mandates that the procedure established by the statute to exercise jurisdiction had to be followed.

Since the legal heirs of the deceased had not applied to the NGT for any relief and had instead approached the civil court claiming compensation on

account of wilful neglect and culpable inaction on the part of NHAI, the NGT ought to have left the matter for proper decision in accordance with the

evidence led. Instead the NGT took upon itself the task of a judging the appellant as one of those responsible for the incident. It is emphasised that the

mining activity carried on was in accordance with the license and if there was any irregularity that was cured on payment of fine. So far as the

collection of debris which ultimately led to the overflow of water and the deaths of two individuals goes, it is argued that the proper functioning of the

drainage system would have ensured that such collection of vast quantities of water would not have occurred. Therefore, the inaction of the NHAI in

taking timely action and intervening with the state authorities, led to the tragic incident. The responsibility for this incident could not have been placed

at the doorstep of Rathod. The actions of Rathod, it is stated were too remote and could not have been the subject of damages at all.

In the appeals (by special leave as well as the statutory appeals by third parties), where the grievance is on account of the directions issued by the

State of Maharashtra under Section 154 of the MRTP Act, the third party appellants challenge the order of the NGT arguing that the provisions of the

NGT Act, especially sections 14, and 19 do not authorise that tribunal to issue sweeping and unilateral directions requiring stoppage and cessation of

all manner of building activity or developments within hundred feet of hill slopes. It is highlighted that such sweeping directions are illogical and are not

based on any scientific study or analysis. It is argued that the NGT has issued general directions couched in a vague manner in para 17 (e) of its

order.

These appellants argue that the Bombay High Court also fell into error and did not appreciate that the entire basis of the Directions/Resolution of

14.11.2017 by the State of Maharashtra were the directions issued by the NGT. Highlighting various provisions of the MRTP Act, learned counsel

argued that wherever development codes were formulated, they were in accordance with established principles, after following the prescribed

procedure. Based upon these codes and the building regulations framed by various town planning departments, clearances and permissions/approval

for development and construction were issued. It was argued that the mandatory and sweeping nature of the directions in para 17 (e) by the NGT has

resulted in these directions being embodied in the impugned resolution, which has a catastrophic effect on those clearances.

Learned senior counsel, Mr. Shyam Divan, highlights that apart from the fact that the definition of ‘hill’ is vague, and even the regulations

under the MRTP Act are silent in this regard, the NGT failed to consider that the impact of its directions and the impugned notification, in hilly terrains

where the population is concentrated in particular areas, in small towns, semi urban and rural areas would be devastating inasmuch as all nature of

buildings would be banned. It is pointed out that hill development is based upon consideration of individual local soil conditions, the stability of the

surrounding terrain, etc. All these are taken into account by individual local town planning authorities when they permit or refuse permission to

individual development or construction projects. The uniform adoption of the “no construction within the hundred feet area†rule, it is submitted, is

completely contrary to well-established principles of town planning.

It is argued that the directions issued by the state government impugned in the writ petitions before the Bombay High Court, are contrary to the

provisions of the MRTP Act inasmuch as they amount to supplanting provisions of the existing master plan and other development codes, which have

the force of law and were framed after widespread consultations. It is pointed out that the provisions of the MRTP Act require that any change in

such codes or master plans would have to be made after mandatory due consideration of objections, which are to be preceded by publication of the

proposals. By directing the state government to follow the order in paragraph 17(e), the NGT in fact made directions contrary to law. It is argued that

the state also acted contrary to the express provisions of the MRTP Act inasmuch as it did not follow the procedure required by the Act to change the

master plan and the development codes.

It is further submitted that the NGT’s directions were the basis of the state government's notification. It was argued that the state

government’s blind adherence to these directions amounted to abdication of its duties, was in contravention of express provisions of the MRTP

Act and also amounted to acting on the dictates of another authority. It was submitted that for these reasons, the impugned notification cannot be

sustained. Counsel relied on the decision of this court in Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board v. Sterlite Industries (I) Ltd. & Ors 2019 SCC OnLine

SC 221 to highlight that the NGT has a narrow and circumscribed jurisdiction in regard to issuing directions as well as ordering compensation.

The Lokmanch justified the order of the NGT and blamed the NHAI, the concessionaire, Rathod and the state government for not taking adequate

and timely measures in public interest. It is alleged that proper channels were not created and maintained alongside the highway to avoid water

clogging on the main carriageway. It is argued that existing water channels were extremely narrow and were incapable of handling significant

volumes, and that even those channels were clogged due to construction debris which had fallen on the sides. It is pointed out that under Section 4 of

the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereafter “Highways Actâ€) “highways†include lands appurtenant thereto, all bridges, culverts, tunnels,

causeways and other structures constructed on or over the highway and all fences, trees, posts, etc. The duty of keeping them in good repair, clearly

was that of the NHAI and the concessionaire.

So far as the Rathod’s role is concerned, learned counsel, Ms. Shilpa Chohan, submitted that the NGT acted well within its rights and acted

within its jurisdiction in entertaining and proceeding with the application, under Sections 14 read with 16 and 18 of the NGT Act. The Lokmanch

sought mandatory injunction to restore the natural contour at the foot base of the hills, particularly the hill that was destroyed by the private

respondents. It was submitted that apart from the enquiry report of the magistrate /sub-divisional officer, a report was also commissioned by the NGT

through the local tehsildar; that report dated 15.09.2014 disclosed that unauthorised hill destruction under the pretext of minor mineral extraction was

widespread during 2011-2013. This report showed that as many as 62 cases of hill destruction (mostly indulged in by developers), came to light. Many

of these occurred without obtaining any permit or authorisation and were plainly illegal.

It is argued further that the private respondents were permitted to extract minor minerals only for a short period. However, they exceeded not only

the permit, but also went further and destroyed the hill for the purpose of mining minerals. This over-mining as well as hill destruction was not within

the permission or the terms of the license. It is highlighted that “hill cutting†or hill destruction causes shortening of hills, poses a potential danger

of soil erosion and reduces vegetation, forestry, flora and fauna, and deprives natural support to the earth, therefore ultimately posing an environmental

hazard to nearby areas, including residential areas. It is argued that the destruction of hills results in the distortion of the flow of streams and rivers,

which change their courses resulting in heavy loss to human life and also to flora and fauna, besides at times, destruction of property. It is submitted

that the NGT's decision requiring payment of compensation was within its jurisdiction; to support this, learned counsel relied upon the provisions of

Schedule II to the NGT Act, particularly referring to the heads of compensation relief for damages that can be claimed and granted, i.e. death,

permanent, temporary, or total, or partial disability or other injury, damages to private property, expenses incurred by the government for any

administrative or legal action, or to cope with any harm or damage, including compensation for environmental degradation and restoration of the quality

of the environment. It was submitted that the statutory basis for calculating these damages under Schedule II to the NGT Act is provided by Section

15, which empowers the NGT to provide relief and compensation to victims of pollution in terms of Schedule I for restitution of property, restitution of

environment, and also importantly Section 17, which empowers the NGT to direct the payment of compensation on account of death of or injury to any

person or damage to property, under all any of the heads specified in Schedule II, which is the result of any accident or is an adverse impact of any

activity or operational process. It is submitted that there is nothing in the enactment which confines the jurisdiction of the NGT to adjudicate

complaints, especially those relating to fatalities caused by environmental damage, to applications initiated by legal representatives or persons directly

affected. It is submitted that if a particular accident or incident is so widespread as to affect an entire area, it would be well within the jurisdiction of

the NGT to entertain an application made by anyone. Learned counsel highlighted the difference in phraseology between Sections 15 and 17 on the

one hand, and Section 18 on the other. It is submitted that Section 18(2) clearly is without prejudice to the provisions contained in Section 16 and

primary jurisdiction can be invoked by the Tribunal upon being moved by anyone in this regard.

Ms. Chohan cited the decision of this court in Mantri Technoze Pvt. Ltd. V Forward Foundation 2019 (18) SCC 494 to say that the NGT could

legitimately issue directions which are binding on all other statutory authorities. She also relied on Section 33 of the NGT Act, emphasizing that the

enactment overrides all other enactments. Reliance was also placed on the decision in Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India 2019 (15) SCC

401.

The State of Maharashtra supported the arguments made on behalf of the Lokmanch. It was pointed out that the jurisdiction to issue general

directions to preserve and protect the environment, through restitution orders is found in Section 15(1)(c) of the NGT Act. It is also submitted that the

power and jurisdiction to order compensation in the case of death, is independent and can be invoked in case of fatal accidents, as is evident from the

provisions of Schedule II. The state further argues that the judgment of the Bombay High Court too is unexceptionable, inasmuch as it correctly

appreciated and upheld the exercise of regulatory power under Section 154 of the MRTP Act. Counsel urged that the said provision was amended in

2015 and in the absence of any challenge to it, the exercise of power after due consideration of relevant factors, could not be countenanced.

The Issues

Four issues arise for consideration. Firstly, the jurisdiction of the NGT to award compensation; secondly the merits and soundness of the

NGT’s decision to award compensation and the legal principles applicable; thirdly, the NGT’s wide directions with respect to the ban on

construction in and around foothills and lastly, the vires of the directions/notifications issued under Section 154, MRTP Act.

I. Jurisdiction of the NGT

The relevant provisions of the NGT Act are extracted below:

“2. Definitions. â€" (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires

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(m) “substantial question relating to environmentâ€​ shall include an instance whereâ€

(i) there is a direct violation of a specific statutory environmental obligation by a person by whichâ€

(A) the community at large other than an individual or group of individuals is affected or likely to be affected by the environmental consequences; or

(B) the gravity of damage to the environment or property is substantial; or

(C) the damage to public health is broadly measurable;

(ii) the environmental consequences relate to a specific activity or a point source of pollution;

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Tribunal to settle disputes.â€"(1) The Tribunal shall have the jurisdiction over all civil cases where a substantial question relating to environment

(including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment), is involved and such question arises out of the implementation of the enactments

specified in Schedule I.

(2) The Tribunal shall hear the disputes arising from the questions referred to in sub-section (1) and settle such disputes and pass order thereon.

(3) No application for adjudication of dispute under this section shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless it is made within a period of six months from

the date on which the cause of action for such dispute first arose:

Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the application within the said period,

allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.â€​

Relief, compensation and restitution.â€"(1) The Tribunal may, by an order, provide,â€

(a) relief and compensation to the victims of pollution and other environmental damage arising under the enactments specified in the Schedule I

(including accident occurring while handling any hazardous substance);

(b) for restitution of property damaged;

(c) for restitution of the environment for such area or areas, as the Tribunal may think fit.

(2) The relief and compensation and restitution of property and environment referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) shall be in addition

to the relief paid or payable under the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 (6 of 1991).

(3) No application for grant of any compensation or relief or restitution of property or environment under this section shall be entertained by the

Tribunal unless it is made within a period of five years from the date on which the cause for such compensation or relief first arose:

Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the application within the said period,

allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.

(4) The Tribunal may, having regard to the damage to public health, property and environment, divide the compensation or relief payable under

separate heads specified in Schedule II so as to provide compensation or relief to the claimants and for restitution of the damaged property or

environment, as it may think fit.

(5) Every claimant of the compensation or relief under this Act shall intimate to the Tribunal about the application filed to, or, as the case may be,

compensation or relief received from, any other court or authority.â€​

“16. Tribunal to have appellate jurisdiction.â€"Any person aggrieved by,

(a) an order or decision, made, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the appellate authority under Section 28 of

the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974);

(b) an order passed, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the State Government under Section 29 of the Water

(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974);

(c) directions issued, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by a Board, under Section 33-A of the Water

(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974);

(d) an order or decision made, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the appellate authority under Section 13 of

the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977 (36 of 1977);

(e) an order or decision made, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the State Government or other authority

under Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (69 of 1980);

(f) an order or decision, made, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the Appellate Authority under Section 31

of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (14 of 1981);

(g) any direction issued, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, under Section 5 of the Environment (Protection)

Act, 1986 (29 of 1986);

(h) an order made, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, granting environmental clearance in the area in which

any industries, operations or processes or class of industries, operations and processes shall not be carried out or shall be carried out subject to certain

safeguards under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986);

(i) an order made, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, refusing to grant environmental clearance for carrying out

any activity or operation or process under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986);

(j) any determination of benefit sharing or order made, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the National

Biodiversity Authority or a State Biodiversity Board under the provisions of the Biological Diversity Act, 2002 (18 of 2003),

may, within a period of thirty days from the date on which the order or decision or direction or determination is communicated to him, prefer an appeal

to the Tribunal:

Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow

it to be filed under this section within a further period not exceeding sixty days.

Liability to pay relief or compensation in certain cases.

(1) Where death of, or injury to, any person (other than a workman) or damage to any property or environment has resulted from an accident or the

adverse impact of an activity or operation or process, under any enactment specified in Schedule I, the person responsible shall be liable to pay such

relief or compensation for such death, injury or damage, under all or any of the heads specified in Schedule II, as may be determined by the Tribunal.

(2) If the death, injury or damage caused by an accident or the adverse impact of an activity or operation or process under any enactment specified in

Schedule I cannot be attributed to any single activity or operation or process but is the combined or resultant effect of several such activities,

operations and processes, the Tribunal may, apportion the liability for relief or compensation amongst those responsible for such activities, operations

and processes on an equitable basis.

(3) The Tribunal shall, in case of an accident, apply the principle of no fault

Application or appeal to Tribunal.

(1) Each application under sections 14 and 15 or an appeal under section 16 shall, be made to the Tribunal in such form, contain such particulars, and,

be accompanied by such documents and such fees as may be prescribed.

(2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in section 16, an application for grant of relief or compensation or settlement of dispute may be made

to the Tribunal by--

(a) the person, who has sustained the injury; or

(b) the owner of the property to which the damage has been caused; or

(c) where death has resulted from the environmental damage, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or

(d) any agent duly authorised by such person or owner of such property or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be;

or

(e) any person aggrieved, including any representative body or organisation; or

(f) the Central Government or a State Government or a Union territory Administration or the Central Pollution Control Board or a State Pollution

Control Board or a Pollution Control Committee or a local authority, or any environmental authority constituted or established under the Environment

(Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986) or any other law for the time being in force:

Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation or relief or settlement of

dispute, the application shall be made on behalf of, or, for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who

have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application:

Provided further that the person, the owner, the legal representative, agent, representative body or organisation shall not be entitled to make an

application for grant of relief or compensation or settlement of dispute if such person, the owner, the legal representative, agent, representative body or

organisation have preferred an appeal under section 16.

(3) The application, or as the case may be, the appeal filed before the Tribunal under this Act shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and

endeavour shall be made by it to dispose of the application, or, as the case may be, the appeal, finally within six months from the date of filing of the

application, or as the case may be, the appeal, after providing the parties concerned an opportunity to be heard.

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Bar of jurisdiction.â€"(1) With effect from the date of establishment of the Tribunal under this Act, no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain

any appeal in respect of any matter, which the Tribunal is empowered to determine under its appellate jurisdiction.

(2) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle dispute or entertain any question relating to any claim for granting any relief or compensation or

restitution of property damaged or environment damaged which may be adjudicated upon by the Tribunal, and no injunction in respect of any action

taken or to be taken by or before the Tribunal in respect of the settlement of such dispute or any such claim for granting any relief or compensation or

restitution of property damaged or environment damaged shall be granted by the civil court.â€​

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“33. Act to have overriding effect.â€"The provisions of this Act, shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law

for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.â€​

A plain reading of the above provisions of the NGT Act would reveal that the tribunal possesses two kinds of power and jurisdiction: one, primary

jurisdiction under Sections 14-15, and appellate jurisdiction under Section 16. Under Section 14, the NGT has the power to adjudicate upon disputes

relating to “civil cases where a substantial question relating to environment (including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment), is

involved†relating to the implementation of “the enactments specified in Schedule I†[Section 14 (1)]. The other provisions [Sections 14(2) and

(3)] are incidental to the primary jurisdiction under Section 14(1). Section 15, on the other hand, is couched in wide terms. Section 15(1) provides that

compensation or damages can be given by the NGT to “victims of pollution and other environmental damage arising under the enactments specified

in the Schedule I†[Section 15 (1)(a)]; for restitution of property damaged [Section 15(1)(b)] and for restitution of the environment for such area or

areas [Section 15(1)(c)]. Section 15(2) is procedural; Section 15(3) prescribes the period of limitation for applications. Section 15(4) enables the NGT

to, having regard to the damage to public health, property and environment, “divide the compensation or relief payable under separate heads

specified in Schedule II so as to provide compensation or relief to the claimants and for restitution of the damaged property or environment, as it may

think fit.â€​

The enactments specified under Schedule I are the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; the Water (Prevention and Control of

Pollution) Cess Act, 1977; the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; the Environment (Protection)

Act, 1986; the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991; and the Biological Diversity Act, 2002.

Schedule II reads as follows:

“SCHEDULE II [See sections 15(4) and 17(1)] HEADS UNDER WHICH COMPENSATION OR RELIEF FOR DAMAGE MAY BE

CLAIMED

(a) Death;

(b) Permanent, temporary, total or partial disability or other injury or sickness;

(c) Loss of wages due to total or partial disability or permanent or temporary disability;

(d) Medical expenses incurred for treatment of injuries or sickness;

(e) Damages to private property;

(f) Expenses incurred by the Government or any local authority in providing relief, aid and rehabilitation to the affected persons;

(g) Expenses incurred by the Government for any administrative or legal action or to cope with any harm or damage, including compensation for

environmental degradation and restoration of the quality of environment;

(h) Loss to the Government or local authority arising out of, or connected with, the activity causing any damage;

(i) Claims on account of any harm, damage or destruction to the fauna including milch and draught animals and aquatic fauna;

(j) Claims on account of any harm, damage or destruction to flora including aquatic flora, crops, vegetables, trees and orchards;

(k) Claims including cost of restoration on account of any harm or damage to environment including pollution of soil, air, water, land and eco-systems;

(l) Loss and destruction of any property other than private property;

(m) Loss of business or employment or both;

(n) Any other claim arising out of, or connected with, any activity of handling of hazardous substance.â€​

A conjoint reading of Sections 14, 15 and the Schedules would lead one to infer that the NGT has circumscribed jurisdiction to deal with,

adjudicate, and wherever needed, direct measures such as payment of compensation, or make restitutionary directions in cases where the violation

(i.e. harm caused due to pollution or exposure to hazards, etc.) are the result of infraction of any enactment listed in the first schedule. Yet, that,

interpretation, in the opinion of this court, is not warranted.

The reference to Schedule II, in Section 15(4) is not merely by way of events which are actionable in relation to harm caused due to the acts

resulting in violation of any enactment under Schedule I. The wide language of that provision enables the tribunal (NGT) to direct, inter alia, payment

of compensation, “having regard to the damage to public health, property and environmentâ€. This interpretation is borne out by a reading of

Section 17(2) regarding the apportionment of liability for payment of compensation.

In the decision of this court reported as Hinch Lal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi 2001 (6) SCC 496, this court held that ponds constituted public utility and

were meant for common use. The court held that ponds could not be allotted or commercialised, and that filling up of ponds was illegal. Recently, in

Jitendra Singh v. Ministry of Environment & Ors 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1510, the Court quoted and applied the observations in Hinch Lal (supra), in

the context of an appeal directed against an order of the NGT which had summarily dismissed an application under Sections 14 and 15 of the NGT

Act seeking directions to cease the filling up of ponds in the Greater Noida Industrial Development Area.

Long ago, in State of Tamil Nadu v. M/s. Hind Stone & Ors 1981 (2) SCC 205, this court made following observations:

“6. Rivers, Forests, Minerals and such other resources constitute a Nation's natural wealth. These resources are not to be frittered away and

exhausted by any one generation. Every generation owes a duty to all succeeding generations to develop and conserve the natural resources of the

nation in the best possible way. It is in the interest of mankind. It is in the interest of the nation. It is recognised by Parliament. Parliament has

declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the Regulation of mines and the development of minerals.

It has enacted the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 ...â€​

Likewise, in Lafarge Umiam Mining (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. 2011(7) SCC 338 these pertinent observations were made:

“75. Universal human dependence on the use of environmental resources for the most basic needs renders it impossible to refrain from altering the

environment. As a result, environmental conflicts are ineradicable and environmental protection is always a matter of degree, inescapably requiring

choices as to the appropriate level of environmental protection and the risks which are to be regulated. This aspect is recognised by the concepts of

sustainable development"". It is equally well settled by the decision of this Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of India that environment has

different facets and care of the environment is an ongoing process. These concepts Rule out the formulation of an across-the- board principle as it

would depend on the facts of each case whether diversion in a given case should be permitted or not, barring ""no go"" areas (whose identification

would again depend on undertaking of due diligence exercise). In such cases, the margin of appreciation doctrine would apply.â€​

Recently, in State of Meghalaya and Ors. vs. All Dimasa Students Union, Dima-Hasao District Committee & Ors. 2019 (8) SCC 177 this court

had affirmed a part of the decision of the NGT issuing directions in respect of large-scale mining in the state of Meghalaya, on the ground that it had

an adverse impact on the environment. This was despite the fact that mining and the subject of mines is not specified in the list of enactments under

the first schedule. The court also approved the NGT’s directions, appointing experts, to assess the impact of such mining on the environment.

The legal position and jurisdiction of NGT was considered by this court in Mantri Techzone (supra) where it was held that the NGT has

“special jurisdictionâ€​ for “enforcement of environmental rights.â€​ It was held that:

“41. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is provided under Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Act. Section 14 provides the jurisdiction over all civil cases

where a substantial question relating to environment (including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment) is involved. However, such

question should arise out of implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I.

The Tribunal has also jurisdiction under Section 15(1)(a) of the Act to provide relief and compensation to the victims of pollution and other

environmental damage arising under the enactments specified in Schedule I. Further, under Section 15(1)(b) and 15(1)(c) the Tribunal can provide for

restitution of property damaged and for restitution of the environment for such area or areas as the Tribunal may think fit. It is noteworthy that Section

15(1)(b) & (c) have not been made relatable to Schedule I enactments of the Act. Rightly so, this grants a glimpse into the wide range of powers that

the Tribunal has been cloaked with respect to restoration of the environment.

Section 15(1)(c) of the Act is an entire island of power and jurisdiction read with Section 20 of the Act. The principles of sustainable development,

precautionary principle and polluter pays, propounded by this Court by way of multiple judicial pronouncements, have now been embedded as a

bedrock of environmental jurisprudence under the NGT Act. Therefore, wherever the environment and ecology are being compromised and

jeopardized, the Tribunal can apply Section 20 for taking restorative measures in the interest of the environment.

The NGT Act being a beneficial legislation, the power bestowed upon the Tribunal would not be read narrowly. An interpretation which furthers

the interests of environment must be given a broader reading. (See Kishsore Lal v. Chairman, Employees' State Insurance Corpn. (2007) 4 SCC 579,

para 17). The existence of the Tribunal without its broad restorative powers under Section 15(1)(c) read with Section 20 of the Act, would render it

ineffective and toothless, and shall betray the legislative intent in setting up a specialized Tribunal specifically to address environmental concerns. The

Tribunal, specially constituted with Judicial Members as well as with Experts in the field of environment, has a legal obligation to provide for

preventive and restorative measures in the interest of the environment.

Section 15 of the Act provides power & jurisdiction, independent of Section 14 thereof. Further, Section 14(3) juxtaposed with Section 15(3) of the

Act, are separate provisions for filing distinct applications before the Tribunal with distinct periods of limitation, thereby amply demonstrating that

jurisdiction of the Tribunal flows from these Sections (i.e. Sections 14 and 15 of the Act) independently. The limitation provided in Section 14 is a

period of 6 months from the date on which the cause of action first arose and whereas in Section 15 it is 5 years. Therefore, the legislative intent is

clear to keep Section 14 and 15 as self-contained jurisdictions.

Further, Section 18 of the Act recognizes the right to file applications each under Sections 14 as well as 15. Therefore, it cannot be argued that

Section 14 provides jurisdiction to the Tribunal while Section 15 merely supplements the same with powers. As stated supra the typical nature of the

Tribunal, its breadth of powers as provided under the statutory provisions of the Act as well as the Scheduled enactments, cumulatively, leaves no

manner of doubt that the only tenable interpretation to these provisions would be to read the provisions broadly in favour of cloaking the Tribunal with

effective authority. An interpretation that is in favour of conferring jurisdiction should be preferred rather than one taking away jurisdiction.

Section 33 of the Act provides an overriding effect to the provisions of the Act over anything inconsistent contained in any other law or in any

instrument having effect by virtue of law other than this Act. This gives the Tribunal overriding powers over anything inconsistent contained in the

KIAD Act, Planning Act, Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (“KMC Actâ€); and the Revised Master Plan of Bengaluru, 2015

(“RMPâ€). A Central legislation enacted under Entry 13 of List I Schedule VII of the Constitution of India will have the overriding effect over

State legislations. The corollary is that the Tribunal while providing for restoration of environment in an area, can specify buffer zones around specific

lakes & water bodies in contradiction with zoning regulations under these statutes or the RMP.â€​

It is noteworthy that this court clearly held that under Section 15(1)(b) and 15(1)(c), the NGT has the power to make directions and provide for

“restitution of property damaged and for restitution of the environment for such area or areas as the Tribunal may think fit. It is noteworthy that

Section 15(1)(b) & (c) have not been made relatable to Schedule I enactments of the Act.†Though a direction for compensation under Section 15(1)

(a) is relatable to violation of enactments specified under the first schedule, the power under Section 17 appears to be cast in wider terms.

As noticed earlier, Section 17 (1) refers to first schedule enactments; it talks of death of, or injury to, any person “or damage to any property or

environment†which “has resulted from an accident or the adverse impact of an activity or operation or process, under any enactment†in

Schedule I. One of the enactments is the Environment Protection Act, 1986 (hereafter “EPAâ€​).

The definition of “environment†under the EPA is wide and is an inclusive one: ""environment"" includes water, air and land and the inter-

relationship which exists among and between water, air and land, and human beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organism and propertyâ€

[Section 2 (a) EPA]. Similarly, “environmental pollutantâ€​ and “environmental pollutionâ€​ are defined as follows:

environmental pollutant"" means any solid, liquid or gaseous substance present in such concentration as may be, or tend to be, injurious to environment

[Section 2 (b) EPA];

environmental pollution"" means the presence in the environment of any environmental pollutant;[ Section 2 (c) EPA]

Section 3 (1) of the EPA confers upon the Central Government, wide power in relation to protection of the environment:

“3. POWER OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO TAKE MEASURES TO PROTECT AND IMPROVE ENVIRONMENT.- (1) Subject to the

provisions of this Act, the Central Government, shall have the power to take all such measures as it deems necessary or expedient for the purpose of

protecting and improving the quality of the environment and preventing controlling and abating environmental pollution.â€​

Long back, in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2004) 12 SCC 118 this court recognized the potential harm to the environment caused by mining

operations:

“Legal parameters

The natural sources of air, water and soil cannot be utilised if the utilisation results in irreversible damage to environment. There has been

accelerated degradation of environment primarily on account of lack of effective enforcement of environmental laws and non-compliance of the

statutory norms. This Court has repeatedly said that the right to live is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and it includes the right

to enjoyment of pollution-free water and air for full enjoyment of life. (See Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar [(1991) 1 SCC 598.)

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The mining operation is hazardous in nature. It impairs ecology and people's right to natural resources. The entire process of setting up and

functioning of mining operation requires utmost good faith and honesty on the part of the intending entrepreneur. For carrying on any mining activity

close to township which has tendency to degrade environment and is likely to affect air, water and soil and impair the quality of life of inhabitants of

the area, there would be greater responsibility on the part of the entrepreneur. The fullest disclosures including the potential for increased burdens on

the environment consequent upon possible increase in the quantum and degree of pollution, has to be made at the outset so that the public and all those

concerned including authorities may decide whether the permission can at all be granted for carrying on mining activity. The regulatory authorities

have to act with utmost care in ensuring compliance of safeguards, norms and standards to be observed by such entrepreneurs. When questioned, the

regulatory authorities have to show that the said authorities acted in the manner enjoined upon them. Where the regulatory authorities, either connive

or act negligently by not taking prompt action to prevent, avoid or control the damage to environment, natural resources and people's life, health and

property, the principles of accountability for restoration and compensation have to be applied.â€​

Acting under the provisions of the EPA, the Central Government had issued a notification on 14.09.2006, mandating Environmental Impact

Assessment (EIA) in exercise of its power under Section 3(2) of the EPA read with Rule 5 of the rules framed thereunder. In terms of this

notification, environment impact assessment and clearance was necessary for different processes and industries. Mining too, was included as part of

the notification; the only exception was that minor mineral leases for an area below five hectares were exempted. Clearly, therefore, the Central

Government included within the purview of the EPA, major and minor mineral extraction.

Several irregularities were noticed over a period of time, with regard to minor mineral extraction, including sand, and there was need for

introducing stringent regulations for those activities. A report of the then Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF, now MoEF&CC) submitted in

2010 was critical of the prevailing norms. As a result, this court and the NGT issued orders and directives making ECs compulsory for projects less

than five hectares. The Central Government too initiated measures.

The following observations of this court were made in Deepak Kumar v. State of Haryana (2012) 4 SCC 629 :

“18. Comments and inputs from various States and experts were also invited so as to prepare a report for consideration of MoEF. Based on the

discussion held and subsequent inputs received, a draft report was prepared and circulated to all members for their further inputs. The report was

further discussed on 29- 1-2010 for its finalisation. The observations/comments made during the meeting were incorporated in the report and it was

again circulated to all members for their consideration. The report so circulated was ultimately finalised. The decision taken by MoEF affects

generally the mining of minor minerals including the riverbed mining throughout the country.

For an easy reference, we may extract the issues and recommendations made by MoEF, which are as follows:

“4.0. Issues and recommendations

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It may thus be observed that minerals have been classified into major and minor minerals based on their end use rather than level of production, level

of mechanisation, export and import, etc. There do exist some minor mineral mines of silica sand and limestone where the scale of mechanisation and

level of production is much higher than those of industrial mineral mines. Further, in terms of the economic cost and revenue, it has been estimated

that the total value of minor minerals constitutes about 10% of the total value of mineral production whereas the value of non-metallic minerals

comprises only 3%. It is, therefore, evident that the operation of mines of minor minerals need to be subject to some regulatory parameters as that of

mines of major minerals.

Further, unlike India there does not exist any such system based on end usage in other countries for classifying minerals into major and minor

categories. Thus, there is a need to relook at the definition of ‘minor minerals’ per se.

It is, therefore, recommended that the Ministry of Mines along with Indian Bureau of Mines, in consultation with the State Governments may re-

examine the classification of minerals into major and minor categories so that the regulatory aspects and environment mitigation measures are

appropriately integrated for ensuring sustainable and scientific mining with least impacts on environment.

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4.5. Requirement of mine plan for minor minerals

At present, most of the State Governments have not made it mandatory for preparation of mining plan in respect of minor minerals. In some States

like Rajasthan, eco-friendly mining plans are prepared, which are approved by the State Mining Department. The eco-friendly mining plans so

prepared, though conceptually welcome, are observed to be deficient and need to be made comprehensive in a manner as is being done for major

minerals. Besides, the aspects of reclamation and rehabilitation of mined out areas, progressive mine closure plan, as in vogue for major minerals could

be introduced for minor minerals as well.

It is recommended that provision for preparation and approval of mine plan, as in the case of major minerals may appropriately be provided in the rules

governing the mining of minor minerals by the respective State Governments. These should specifically include the provision for reclamation and

rehabilitation of mined out area, progressive mine closure plan and post mine land use.

4.6. Creation of separate corpus for reclamation/rehabilitation of mines of minor minerals

Mining of minor minerals, in our country, is by and large an unorganised sector and is practised in haphazard and unscientific manner. At times, the

size of the leasehold is also too small to address the issue of reclamation and rehabilitation of mined out areas. It may, therefore, be desirable that

before the concept of mine closure plan for minor minerals is adopted, the existing abandoned mines may be reclaimed and rehabilitated with the

involvement of the State Government. There is thus, a need to create a separate corpus, which may be utilised for reclamation and rehabilitation of

mined out areas. The respective State Governments may work out a suitable mechanism for creation of such corpus on the ‘polluter pays’

principle. An organisational structure may also need to be created for undertaking and monitoring these activities.

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4.8. Uniform minor mineral concession rules      Â

The economic value of the minor minerals excavated in the country is estimated to contribute to about 9% of the total value of the minerals whereas

the non-metallic minerals contribute to about 2.8%. Keeping in view the large extent of mining of minor minerals and its significant potential to

adversely affect the environment, it is recommended that model mineral concession rules may be framed for minor minerals as well and the minor

minerals may be subjected to a simpler regulatory regime, which is, however, similar to major minerals regime.

4.9. Riverbed mining

4.9.1. Environment damage being caused by unregulated riverbed mining of sand, bazari and boulders is attracting considerable attention including in

the courts. The following recommendations are therefore made for the riverbed mining:

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5.0. Conclusion

Mining of minor minerals, though individually, because of smaller size of mine leases is perceived to have lesser impact as compared to mining of

major minerals. However, the activity as a whole is seen to have significant adverse impacts on environment. It is, therefore, necessary that the

mining of minor minerals is subjected to simpler but strict regulatory regime and carried out only under an approved framework of mining plan, which

should provide for reclamation and rehabilitation of the mined out areas. Further, while granting mining leases by the respective State Governments

location of any eco- fragile zone(s) within the impact zone of the proposed mining area, the linked rules/notifications governing such zones and the

judicial pronouncements, if any, need be duly noted. The Union Ministry of Mines along with the Indian Bureau of Mines and respective State

Governments should therefore make necessary provisions in this regard under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957,

Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 and adopt model guidelines to be followed by all States.â€​

(emphasis supplied)

The Report clearly indicates that operation of mines of minor minerals needs to be subjected to strict regulatory parameters as that of mines of

major minerals. It was also felt necessary to have a relook to the definition of “minor minerals†per se. The necessity of the preparation of

“comprehensive mines plan†for contiguous stretches of mineral deposits by the respective State Governments may also be encouraged and the

same be suitably incorporated in the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 by the Ministry of Mines.

Further, it was also recommended that the States, Union Territories would see that mining of minor minerals is subjected to simpler but strict

regulatory regime and carried out only under an approved framework of mining plan, which should provide for reclamation and rehabilitation of mined

out areas. Mining plan should take note of the level of production, level of mechanisation, type of machinery used in the mining of minor minerals,

quantity of diesel consumption, the number of trees uprooted, export and import of mining minerals, environmental impact, restoration of flora and host

of other matters referred to in the 2010 Rules. A proper framework has also to be evolved on cluster of mining of minor minerals for which there must

be a Regional Environmental Management Plan. Another important decision taken was that while granting of mining leases by the respective State

Governments, location of any eco-fragile zone(s) within the impact zone of the proposed mining area, the linked rules/notifications governing such

zones and the judicial pronouncements, if any, need to be duly noted.

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The Central Government also should take steps to bring into force the Minor Minerals Conservation and Development Rules, 2010 at the earliest.

The State Governments and UTs also should take immediate steps to frame necessary rules under Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals

(Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 taking into consideration the recommendations of MoEF in its Report of March 2010 and model guidelines

framed by the Ministry of Mines, Government of India. Communicate the copy of this order to MoEF, Secretary, Ministry of Mines, New Delhi;

Ministry of Water Resources, Central Government Water Authority; the Chief Secretaries of the respective States and Union Territories, who would

circulate this order to the Departments concerned.

We, in the meanwhile, order that leases of minor minerals including their renewal for an area of less than five hectares be granted by the

States/Union Territories only after getting environmental clearance from MoEF. Ordered accordingly.â€​

By virtue of a notification, [No. 3181 dated 14 August, 2018, published by the Government of India, in the Official Gazette] environmental

clearance is necessary even for minor mineral extraction where the area of operation is less than 5 hectares; the procedure has been outlined under

Appendix XI of that notification. Clearly, therefore, mining of even minor minerals, when resorted to on a large scale (i.e. where more than a few

leases or permits are granted), has a potential impact on the environment. In the facts of this case, the state had granted no less than 62 minor mineral

permits in the vicinity; unauthorized activity (in the form inter alia, of over-mining and piling of debris) had resulted in the imposition of the penalty.

Clearly, there was violation of the EPA in the present case, because Rathod’s mining lease covered an area in excess of 5 hectares; it fell within

the regulatory notification of 2006. There is nothing on record to show that the relevant clearance was obtained by Rathod. Plainly, therefore, the facts

of the present case disclosed violation of the EPA- an enactment listed in Schedule I of the NGT Act. This meant that the NGT’s jurisdiction

under Section 15(1)(a) and Section 17 could not have been disputed.

This court is of the considered opinion that the expression “environment†and “environmental pollution†have to be given a broader

meaning, having regard to Parliamentary intent to ensure the objective of the EPA. It effectuates the principles underlying Article 48A of the

Constitution of India. The EPA is in essence, an umbrella legislation enacting a broad framework for the central government to coordinate the

activities of various central and state authorities established under other laws, such as the Water Act and Air Act. The EPA also effectively

enunciates the critical legislative policy for environment protection. It changes the narrative and emphasis from a narrow concept of pollution control

to a wider facet of environment protection. The expansive definition of environment that includes water, air and land “and the interrelation which

exist among and between water, air and land, other human creatures, plants, micro-organisms and property†give an indication of the wide powers

conferred on the Central Government. A wide net is cast over the environment related laws. The EPA also empowers the central government to

comprehensively control environmental pollution by industrial and related activities. For these reasons, and in view of the above discussion, it is held

that the NGT correctly assumed jurisdiction, having regard to the nature of the accident in the facts of this case.

II. Was the direction to pay compensation towards death, and damages towards restitution justified?

In the present case, the deceased were concededly travelling on the highway. The incident of flooding occurred, and was caused due to clogging

of the water channels. The report of the sub divisional magistrate indicated that the Inspecting Engineer (Arvi Associates, a firm) had given a report

after inspection. On behalf of the independent engineering firm appointed by the NHAI, an oral deposition was given before the sub-divisional officer.

It was stated that the roadside channel and culvert from where water is disposed of, had been rendered screen blinded and a pipeline of 1.2 m

diameter existed there for disposal of water. The necessity of remedial action was communicated to the concessionaire, before the occurrence of the

accident. It was also stated that in terms of the instructions of the NHAI, the concessionaire was informed about the deficiency on 15.05.2013 and by

a further letter dated 04.06.2013. An action plan for completing pre-monsoon work was sought from the concessionaire. However, the concessionaire

did not submit an action plan despite lapse of one month.

The SDO’s report noted that the culvert had been constructed from the new tunnel and was existing from 2004. Apparently a 1m diameter

pipe was positioned in the culvert and had made a causeway. One hotel also had constructed an approach road and placed a 950 MM pipe. The

existing drainage capacity of the octroi post and the hotel was insufficient due to heavy rains as a result of which rainwater was not totally drained.

This water started accumulating on the road. Certain ramps were also constructed by Tata Motors for its convenience; they were removed by the

concessionaire; nevertheless, the ramps were prepared again. The existing cross drainage provision was of a sub-culvert -type structure and the size

at the time of the old highway was 1m x 1 m. The report further observed that the natural drainage and sides of hills of the highway was adversely

affected and had been tampered with. The disposal of water on the right side overhead of the tunnel through the cross train on the old highway via the

catch drain and subsequently the channels for the water flow were choked due to development work and adversely affected the clearance of rain

water. The report indicates that after the accident on 06.06.2013, the local administration cleared the debris which had created obstacles, to facilitate

the free flow of water into the catch drain culvert and further flow of water.

The legal position regarding highways is outlined in two enactments, i.e. the National Highways Act, 1956 (“the Highways Actâ€) and the

NHAI Act. The provisions of the Highways Act, to the extent they are relevant are as follows:

“4. National highways to vest in the Union. â€" All national highways shall vest in the Union, and for the purposes of this Act “highwaysâ€

includeâ€

(i) all lands appurtenant thereto, whether demarcated or not;

(ii) all bridges, culverts, tunnels, causeways, carriageways and other structures constructed on or across such highways; and

(iii) all fences, trees, posts and boundary, furlong and milestones of such highways or any land appurtenant to such highways.

Responsibility for development and maintenance of national highways.â€"It shall be the responsibility of the Central Government to develop and

maintain in proper repair all national highways; but the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that any function in

relation to the development or maintenance of any national highway shall, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the notification, also

be exercisable by the Government of the State within which the national highway is situated or by any officer or authority subordinate to the Central

Government or to the State Government.

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8A. Power of Central Government to enter into agreements for development and maintenance of national highways â€" (1) Notwithstanding anything

contained in this Act, the Central Government may enter into an agreement with any person in relation to the development and maintenance of the

whole or any part of a national highway.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 7, the person referred to in sub-section (1) is entitled to collect and retain fees at such rate, for

services or benefits rendered by him as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify having regard to the expenditure

involved in building, maintenance, management and operation of the whole or part of such national highway, interest on the capital invested, reasonable

return, the volume of traffic and the period of such agreement.

(3) A person referred to in sub-section (1) shall have powers to regulate and control the traffic in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter

VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988) on the national highway forming subject-matter of such agreement, for proper management

thereof.â€​

Section 16 of the NHAI Act spells out the functions of the NHAI; it reads as follows:

“16. Functions of the Authority.â€" (1) Subject to the rules made by the Central Government in this behalf, it shall be the function of the Authority

to develop, maintain and manage the national highways and any other highways vested in, or entrusted to, it by the Government. rules made by the

Central Government in this behalf, it shall be the function of the Authority to develop, maintain and manage the national highways and any other

highways vested in, or entrusted to, it by the Government.â€​

Acting in furtherance of its powers, the NHAI entered into an agreement with the concessionaire for the construction, operation and maintenance

of the highway in question (i.e. the stretch of 140 kms on which the accident occurred). The question is whether the NHAI, which indisputably owns

and controls the highway, and on whose behalf it was constructed, and for which the maintenance and operation agreement was entered into, led to a

duty of care, to the users (of the highway).

This issue had arisen in Rajkot Municipal Corpn. v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum (1997) 9 SCC 552 in the context of certain facts. The deceased

used to travel on a railway season ticket to Rajkot to attend to his office work. One day whilst he was on the footpath on the way to his office, a

roadside tree suddenly fell on him, resulting in serious injuries on the head and other parts of the body, and later died in the hospital. The High Court

allowed the writ petition. This court noted the distinction between a common law duty of care owed to members of the public, and whether liability

could be imposed upon a local authority for breach of its statutory duty. The court noticed previous English decisions [Gorris v. Scott [(1874) 9 Exch

125] and Kilgollan v. William Cooke & Co. Ltd. (1956) 2 All ER 294, CA]] and stated that

“18. The question emerges as to when would the breach of statutory duty under a particular enactment give rise to tortious liability? The statutory

duty gives rise to civil action. The statutory negligence is sui generis and independent of any other form of tortious liability. It would, therefore, be of

necessity to find out from the construction of each statutory duty whether the particular duty is general duty in public law or private law duty towards

the plaintiff. The plaintiff must show that (a) the injury suffered is within the ambit of statute; (b) statutory duty imposes a liability for civil action; (c)

the statutory duty was not fulfilled; and (d) the breach of duty has caused him injury. These essentials are required to be considered in each case. The

action for breach of statutory duty may belong to the category of either strict or absolute liability which is required, therefore, to be considered in the

nature of statutory duty the defendant owes to the plaintiff; whether or not the duty is absolute; and the public policy underlying the duty. In most

cases, the statute may not give rise to cause of action unless it is breached and it has caused damage to the plaintiff, though occasionally the statute

may make breach of duty actionable per se. The burden, therefore, is on the plaintiff to prove on balance of probabilities that the defendant owes that

duty of care to the plaintiff or class of persons to whom he belongs, that defendant was negligent in the performance or omission of that duty and

breach of duty caused or materially contributed to his injury and that duty of care is owed on the defendant. If the statute requires certain protection

on the principle of volenti non fit injuria, the liability stands excluded. The breach of duty created by a statute, if it results in damage to an individual

prima facie, is tort for which the action for damages will lie in the suit. One would often take the Act, as a whole, to find out the object of the law and

to find out whether one has a right and remedy provided for breach of duty. It would, therefore, be of necessity in every case to find the intention of

legislature in creating duty and the resultant consequences suffered from the action or omission thereof, which are required to be considered. No

action for damages lies if on proper construction of statute, the intention is that some other remedy is available. One of the tests in determining the

intention of the statute is to ascertain whether the duty is owed primarily to the general public or community and only incidentally to an individual or

primarily to the individual or class of individuals and only incidentally to the general public or the community. If the statute aims at duty to protect a

particular citizen or particular class of citizens to which the plaintiff belongs, it prima facie creates at the same time corelative right vested in those

citizens of which plaintiff is one; he has remedy for enforcement, namely, the action for damages for any loss occasioned due to negligence or for

failure of it. But this test is not always conclusive.

Duty may be of such paramount importance that it is owed to all the public. It would be wrong to think that on an action, the duty could be

enforced by way of damages when duty is owed to a section of public and cannot be enforced if an individual sustains damages to whom the

Corporation owes no duty and no private interest is infringed. Breach of statutory duty, therefore, requires to be examined in the context in which the

duty is created not towards the individual, but has its effect on the right of individual vis-Ã -vis the society.

Statutory duty generally is towards public at large and not towards an individual or individuals and the corelative right is vested in the public and not in

private person, even though they may suffer damages. The duty in such a case is to be enforced by way of criminal prosecution or by way of

injunction at the suit under Section 192 of CPC or with leave of court under Order I, Rule 8 CPC by public-spirited person or in any appropriate

manner to enforce the right and not by way of private action for damages. In that situation, the legislature, while recognising the private right vested in

an injured individual, may intend that it shall be maintained solely by some special remedy provided for a particular case and not by ordinary method of

an action for damages as penalty or compensation.

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Generally, a public authority entrusted with no statutory obligation to exercise a power, does not come under common law duty of care to do so but

by conduct the public authority may place itself in such a situation that it attracts the duty of care which calls for exercise of the power. Common

illustration is provided by an action in which an authority in the exercise of its functions, if it had created a danger, thereby subjecting itself to a duty of

care for the safety of others which must be discharged by an exercise of its statutory power or by giving necessary warnings. It is the conduct of the

authority in creating the danger that attracts the duty of care as envisaged in Sheppard v. Borough of Glossop [(1921) 3 KB 132 : 1921 All ER Rep 61,

CA] . The statute does not by itself give rise to a civil action but it forms the formulation on which the common law can build a cause of action….

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It can be seen that ordinarily the principle of the law of negligence applies to public authorities also. They are liable to damages because by a

negligent act or failure to act when they are under a duty to act or for a failure to consider whether to exercise a power conferred on them with the

intention that it would be exercised if and when public interest requires it. Where the public authority has decided to exercise a power and has done it

negligently a person who has acted in reliance on what the public authority has done, may have no difficulty in proving that the damages which he has

suffered have been caused by the negligence. Where the damage has resulted from a negligent failure to act there may be greater difficulty in proving

causation and requires examination in greater detail. …â€​

In the UK, the duty of a highway authority was described by Diplock L.J. in Griffiths v. Liverpool Corporation [1967] 1 Q.B. 374 as follows:

“The duty at common law to maintain, which includes a duty to repair a highway, was not based in negligence but in nuisance. It was an absolute

duty to maintain, not merely a duty to take reasonable care to maintain, and the statutory duty which replaced it was also absolute.â€​

Again, Diplock, LJ stated in Burnside v. Emerson [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1490 described the duty as follows:

“in such good repair as renders it reasonably passable for the ordinary traffic of the neighbourhood at all seasons of the year without danger

caused by its physical condition.â€​

Later, in Haydon v. Kent County Council [1978] Q.B. 343 Lord Denning M.R. explained that while the duty to maintain the highway meant an

absolute duty to ensure that it was in a condition to be used as a highway and to ensure safety, it did not include the duty to ensure at all times that the

road surface was kept clean. It was clarified however, that the issue had to be considered in each case, and it was to be considered whether the

authority had taken reasonable steps to keep it in good repair after being notified about obstruction:

“If section 41 is to be construed as capable of imposing a duty to take remedial measures to deal with ice and snow on a highway, or footway,

which is in good physical repair, so that whether in particular circumstances that duty has arisen is to be decided ‘as a question of fact and

degree,’ it would seem that the facts relevant to determining whether the duty has arisen would be essentially similar to those relevant to deciding

whether a breach of the duty has been proved and whether the statutory defence under section 58 has been made out. Parliament did not define those

facts for the purpose of section 41. The concept of the passing of sufficient time to make it prima facie unreasonable for the highway authority to

have failed to take remedial measures must presuppose some idea of the amount and nature of the resources for dealing with snow and ice which are

or ought to be available to the authority, and of the order of priority among different carriageways and footways which guides or which ought to guide

the authority; and of the necessary degree of urgency in using those resources. No such guidance is given in the statute with reference to proof of the

arising of the duty.â€​

In Stovin v Wise 1996 (3) All ER 801, the defendant emerged from a side road and ran down the plaintiff, because she was not keeping a proper

look-out. When she was sued for damages, the defendant joined the County Council as a third party because the visibility at the intersection was poor

and they said that the Council, which had the duty to maintain the road should have done something to improve it. The council had statutory powers

which would have enabled the necessary work to be done and there was evidence that the relevant officers had decided in principle that it should be

done, but they had not taken steps to do it. The House of Lords held that there was no duty of care in private law based on the statutory duty, and that

“Drivers of vehicles must take the highway network as they find itâ€. It was held that statutory power could not be converted into a common law

duty. The council had done nothing which, apart from statute, would have attracted a common law duty of care. It had done nothing at all. The only

basis on which it was a candidate for liability was that Parliament had entrusted it with general responsibility for the highways and given it the power

to improve them and take other measures for the safety of their users. Lord Hoffmann observed,

“In summary, therefore, I think that the minimum preconditions for basing a duty of care upon the existence of a statutory power, if it can be done

at all, are, first, that it would in the circumstances have been irrational not to have exercised the power, so that there was in effect a public law duty to

act, and secondly, that there are exceptional grounds for holding that the policy of the statute requires compensation to be paid to persons who suffer

loss because the power was not exercised.â€​

Stovin (supra) and its enunciation that the existence of a public duty did not per se extend to a private duty of care to take special measures, unless

exceptional features were proved, was followed in Gorringe v. Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council 2004 (1) WLR 1057. The entire law was re-

examined and the correct position, restated in a recent judgment by the UK Supreme Court in Robinson v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police

[2019 (2) All ER 1041], which observed as follows:

“32 At common law, public authorities are generally subject to the same liabilities in tort as private individuals and bodies: see, for example, Entick v

Carrington (1765) 2 Wils KB 275 and Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Gibbs (1866) LR 1 HL 93. Dicey famously stated that “every official,

from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as

any other citizenâ€: The Law of the Constitution, 3rd ed (1889), p 181. An important exception at common law was the Crown, but that exception was

addressed by the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, section 2.

Accordingly, if conduct would be tortious if committed by a private person or body, it is generally equally tortious if committed by a public

authority: see, for example, Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office [1970] AC 1004, as explained in Gorringe’s case 2004 (1) WLR 1057, para 39.

That general principle is subject to the possibility that the common law or statute may provide otherwise, for example by authorising the conduct in

question: Geddis v Proprietors of Bann Reservoir (1878) 3 App Cas 430. It follows that public authorities are generally under a duty of care to avoid

causing actionable harm in situations where a duty of care would arise under ordinary principles of the law of negligence, unless the law provides

otherwise.

On the other hand, public authorities, like private individuals and bodies, are generally under no duty of care to prevent the occurrence of harm: as

Lord Toulson JSC stated in Michael’s case [2015] AC 1732, para 97, “the common law does not generally impose liability for pure

omissionsâ€. This “omissions principle†has been helpfully summarised by Tofaris and Steel, “Negligence Liability for Omissions and the

Policeâ€​ [2016] CLJ 128:

“In the tort of negligence, a person A is not under a duty to take care to prevent harm occurring to person B through a source of danger not

created by A unless (i) A has assumed a responsibility to protect B from that danger, (ii) A has done something which prevents another from

protecting B from that danger, (iii) A has a special level of control over that source of danger, or (iv) A’s status creates an obligation to protect B

from that danger.â€​

35 As that summary makes clear, there are certain circumstances in which public authorities, like private individuals and bodies, can come under a

duty of care to prevent the occurrence of harm: see, for example, Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550 and Phelps v Hillingdon

London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619, as explained in Gorringe’s case 2004 (1) WLR 1057, paras 39â€"40. In the absence of such

circumstances, however, public authorities generally owe no duty of care towards individuals to confer a benefit upon them by protecting them from

harm, any more than would a private individual or body: see, for example, Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241, concerning a private

body, applied in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] AC 874, concerning a public authority.

36 That is so, notwithstanding that a public authority may have statutory powers or duties enabling or requiring it to prevent the harm in question. A

well known illustration of that principle is the decision of the House of Lords in East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent [1941] AC 74. The

position is different if, on its true construction, the statutory power or duty is intended to give rise to a duty to individual members of the public which is

enforceable by means of a private right of action. If, however, the statute does not create a private right of action, then “it would be, to say the

least, unusual if the mere existence of the statutory duty [or, a fortiori, a statutory power] could generate a common law duty of careâ€:

Gorringe’s case 2004 (1) WLR 1057, para 23.

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40 However, until the reasoning in the Anns case was repudiated, it was not possible to justify a rejection of liability, where a prima facie duty of care

arose at the first stage of the analysis from the foreseeability of harm, on the basis that public bodies are not generally liable for failing to exercise their

statutory powers or duties so as to confer the benefit of protection from harm. Instead, it was necessary to have recourse to public policy in order to

justify the rejection of liability at the second stage. That was accordingly the approach adopted by the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal in a

series of judgments, including Hill’s case [1989] AC 53. The need to have recourse to public policy for that purpose has been superseded by the

return to orthodoxy in Gorringe’s case. Since that case, a public authority’s non-liability for the consequences of an omission can generally be

justified on the basis that the omissions principle is a general principle of the law of negligence, and the law of negligence generally applies to public

authorities in the same way that it applies to private individuals and bodies.

41 Equally, concerns about public policy cannot in themselves override a liability which would arise at common law for a positive act carried out in the

course of performing a statutory function: the true question is whether, properly construed, the statute excludes the liability which would otherwise

arise: see Gorringe’s case 2004 (1) WLR 1057, para 38, per Lord Hoffmann.

42 That is not to deny that what might be described as policy considerations sometimes have a role to play in the law of negligence. As explained

earlier, where established principles do not provide a clear answer to the question whether a duty of care should be recognised in a novel situation, the

court will have to consider whether its recognition would be just and reasonable.â€​

In Yetkin v. Mahmood 2011 QB 827, where injury was caused to a highway user by shrubs which had overgrown and impeded visibility, the court

upheld the claim for damages. The court observed as follows:

“…The planting of vegetation in the raised beds of the central reservation is obviously a reasonable exercise of the authority’s powers but to

plant shrubs which will grow so large as to obscure the view and then not to ensure that they are trimmed back is a negligent exercise of those

powers. The judge held that that failure was a cause of this accident. It is not suggested that he was not right so to hold. I have no doubt that, in the

circumstances of this case, the local authority had a common law duty of care towards the claimant, notwithstanding her own negligence, that that

duty was breached and that the breach was a cause of the accident. There was no need for the judge to consider whether the danger created by the

bushes amounted to a trap or enticement. It follows in my judgment that the judge erred in dismissing the claim. He should have held that primary

liability was established.â€​

A similar approach was indicated by this court in Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Sushila Devi (1999) 4 SCC 317 at page 323 (where a tree fell on a

passer-by causing injury) the court upheld the findings that the municipal corporation was liable, stating that:

“13. By a catena of decisions, the law is well settled that if there is a tree standing on the defendant's land which is dried or dead and for that

reason may fall and the defect is one which is either known or should have been known to the defendant, then the defendant is liable for any injury

caused by the fall of the tree (see Brown v. Harrison [1947 WN 191 : 63 TLR 484], Quinn v. Scott [(1965) 1 WLR 1004 : (1965) 2 All ER 588] and

Mackie v. Dumbartonshire County Council [1927 WN 247] ). The duty of the owner/occupier of the premises by the side of the road whereon

persons lawfully pass by, extends to guarding against what may happen just by the side of the premises on account of anything dangerous on the

premises. The premises must be maintained in a safe state of repair. The owner/occupier cannot escape the liability for injury caused by any

dangerous thing existing on the premises by pleading that he had employed a competent person to keep the premises in safe repairs. In Municipal

Corpn. of Delhi v. Subhagwanti [AIR 1966 SC 1750] a clock tower which was 80 years' old collapsed in Chandni Chowk, Delhi causing the death of

a number of persons. Their Lordships held that the owner could not be permitted to take a defence that he neither knew nor ought to have known the

danger. “[T]he owner is legally responsible irrespective of whether the damage is caused by a patent or a latent defect,†â€" said their Lordships.

In our opinion the same principle is applicable to the owner of a tree standing by the side of a road. If the tree is dangerous in the sense that on

account of any disease or being dead the tree or its branch is likely to fall and thereby injure any passer-by then such a tree or branch must be

removed so as to avert the danger to life. It is pertinent to note that it is not the defence of the Municipal Corporation that vis major or an act of God

such as a storm, tempest, lightning or extraordinary heavy rain had occurred causing the fall of the branch of the tree and hence the Corporation was

not liable.â€​

This approach that a statutory corporation or local authority can be held liable in tort for injury occasioned on account of omission to oversee, or

defective supervision of its activities contracted out to another agency, was also followed in Vadodara Municipal Corporation v Purshottam V. Muranji

2014 (16) SCC 14.

The terms of the agreement which the NHAI entered into with the concessionaire clearly contemplated the safety of highway users (Clause

18.1.1) and an elaborate highway monitoring mechanism (Clause 19.1). The agreement also required any unusual occurrences to be reported; an

independent engineer was required to, and did inspect the highway. The reports of the inspecting engineer reveal that the deficiencies by way of

narrowing of water channels, and the unusual collection of debris, were noted. Even before the incident, the NHAI was alive to this; it had separately

written to Rathod, and later to the local administration about it through its letter dated 15.04.2011. That letter is revealing; it inter alia, states that:

“During pre-monsoon rains all the excavated muck has been carried to NH4 alongwith rain water and block Satara bound traffic lane for quite

some time. The problem will be severe during heavy rains of July and August.

As such safety of highway and tunnel is completely at stake due to indiscriminate cutting of hills on upper side of tunnel and both the end.â€​

Having regard to the duty imposed on the NHAI by virtue of Sections 4 and 5 of the Highways Act, read with Section 16 of the NHAI Act, there

can be no manner of doubt that the NHAI was responsible for the maintenance of the highway, including the stretch upon which the accident

occurred. The report of the sub-divisional officer clearly shows that inspection reports were furnished to the NHAI shortly before the incident,

highlighting the deficiencies; also, the NHAI’s correspondence with Rathod, and the local administration, reveal that it was aware of the danger

and likelihood of risk to human life, and the foreseeability of the event that actually occurred later. Further, letters addressed by the local administration

and the NHAI to Rathod similarly show that it was incumbent upon him to take remedial action. The failure of the NHAI to ensure remedial action,

and likewise the failure by Rathod to take measures to prevent the accident, prima facie, disclose their liability.

The absence of legal representatives or heirs of the deceased in the proceedings, or the fact that they had initiated independent civil action, in the

opinion of this court, was not an impediment, nor could it have precluded the NGT from exercising its jurisdiction, given the gravity of the matter and

the danger posed to the members of the public. The initiation of civil action did not mean that the NGT had to either reject the application (as far as it

claimed relief for the accident), or await the outcome of the civil suit. This position is clear from the proviso to Section 18(1) which reads as follows:

“Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation or relief or settlement

of dispute, the application shall be made on behalf of, or, for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives

who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application.â€​

The above provision clearly implies that an application without impleading the legal heirs cannot be rejected. At the most, the tribunal has to

implead all legal heirs. In the present case, that procedure was not followed. However, the legal heirs have instituted a suit. The ends of justice would

be served if that suit (Special Civil Suit No. 890 of 2014 before the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division, Pune) is directed to revive and continue it;

a direction is issued to the concerned court (Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division, Pune). The directions in this regard by the NGT, towards

payment of compensation are to be regarded as indicative of a prima facie determination. Consequently, the direction to the NHAI and Rathod, jointly

making them liable to pay ₹ 15 lakhs is justified. It is clarified that the civil suit will now proceed, and based on evidence, the court would finally decide

the issue of liability, and make such further consequential orders or decrees as may be found necessary in this regard, towards apportioning of liability

of the NHAI, Rathod, the state or any other party (including the concessionaire). This court’s order shall not be treated as conclusive; the trial

court shall independently proceed to evaluate the evidence and hear the parties on the merits of their submissions. The restitutionary order by the

NGT, directing payment by Rathod and NHAI of ₹ 10 lakhs too, in this court’s opinion, cannot be found to be at fault. It is upheld. The NHAI and

Rathod shall comply with the directions of the NGT and deposit the sum of ₹ 15 lakhs with the said court within four weeks, in equal proportion. The

sum ₹ 10 lakhs shall be deposited in the same proportion, in court, to be disbursed to the state government for restoring the environment and carrying

out afforestation/planting of trees etc.

Point Nos III and IV: Correctness of NGT’s directions contained in Para 17 (e) of its impugned order, and the legality of the order/notification of

the state of Maharashtra, issued under Section 154, MRTP Act

As to the third point, two issues arise for consideration - firstly, the power of the NGT to issue directions banning development and building

activities of the kind contained in Para 17(e) of its impugned order, and secondly, the correctness of the procedure adopted while issuing such

directions, in this case.

In the All Dimasa Student Union case27, this court considered the nature of powers and jurisdiction of NGT. The relevant discussion is as follows:

“156. What are the powers and jurisdiction of the Tribunal given under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 has to be looked into to consider the

above submission? Insofar as jurisdiction of the Tribunal is concerned, we have already noticed Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Act. Section 19 of the

Act deals with procedure and powers of the Tribunal. Section 19 which is relevant for the present case is as follows28:

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

Sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure but shall be

guided by the principles of natural justice. What sub-section (1) meant to convey is that the Tribunal is not shackled with the procedure laid down by

CPC for conducting its proceedings. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 empowers the Tribunal with powers to regulate its own procedure. Section 19(2)

confers vide powers on the 27 See f.n.9 (supra).

28 “19. Procedure and powers of Tribunal.â€"(1) The Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure.

(3) The Tribunal shall also not be bound by the rules of evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

(4) The Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging its functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908, while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namelyâ€

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;

(d) subject to the provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, requisitioning any public record or document or copy of such

record or document from any office;

(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents;

(f) reviewing its decision;

(g) dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex parte;

(h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte;

(i) pass an interim order (including granting an injunction or stay) after providing the parties concerned an opportunity to be heard, on any application

made or appeal filed under this Act;

(j) pass an order requiring any person to cease and desist from committing or causing any violation of any enactment specified in Schedule I;

(k) any other matter which may be prescribed.

(5) All proceedings before the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 for the

purposes of Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code and the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter

XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.â€​

Tribunal insofar as its procedure is concerned. Section 19(4) vests some powers as are vested in the civil court, while trying a suit, in respect of

matters enumerated therein. The use of the expression “shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by CPC†is not akin to saying that

procedure as laid down by CPC is in no manner relevant to the Tribunal. Further, Section 19(1) also does not mean that the Tribunal cannot follow any

procedure given in CPC. One provision of CPC inserted by Act 104 of 1976 with effect from 1-2-1977 is Order 26, which is relevant for present

inquiry. Order 26 Rule 10-A provides as follows:

“10-A. Commission for scientific investigations .â€"(1) Where any question arising in a suit involves any scientific investigation which cannot, in the

opinion of the Court, be conveniently conducted before the Court, the Court may, if it thinks it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice so to

do, issue a commission to such person as it thinks fit, directing him to inquire into such question and report thereon to the Court.

(2) The provisions of Rule 10 of this Order shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to a Commissioner appointed under this Rule as they apply in

relation to a Commissioner appointed under Rule 9.â€​

Rule 10-A provides that where any question arising in a suit involves any scientific investigation which cannot, in the opinion of the Court, be

conveniently conducted before the Court, the Court may, if it thinks necessary or expedient in the interests of justice so to do, issue a commission to

such person as it thinks fit, directing him to inquire into such question and report thereon to the Court. Rule 10-A is enabling power to the courts to

obtain report from such persons as it thinks fit when any question involves with the scientific investigation. The powers under Rule 10-A which are to

be exercised by the Court can very well be used by NGT to obtain reports by experts. NGT as per the statutory scheme of NGT has to decide several

complex questions pertaining to pollution and environment. The scientific investigation and report by experts are necessary requirements in appropriate

cases to come to correct conclusion to find out measures to remedy the pollution and environment. We do not, thus, find any dearth of jurisdiction in

NGT to appoint a committee to submit a report. We may further say that while asking an expert to give a report, NGT is not confined to the four

corners of Rule 10-A rather its jurisdiction is not shackled by strict terms of Order 26 Rule 10-A as per Section 19(1) as noticed above.â€​

The court also took note of Rule 24 of the National Green Tribunal (Practice and Procedure) Rules, 2011 (framed under Sections 4(4) and 35 of

the NGT Act).29 This court then held as follows:

“160. Rule 24 empowers the Tribunal to make such orders or give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its order or to

secure the ends of justice. Rule 24 gives wide powers to the Tribunal to secure the ends of justice. Rule 24 vests special power to the Tribunal to pass

orders and issue directions to secure the ends of justice. Use of words “mayâ€, “such ordersâ€, “gives such directionsâ€, “as may be

necessary or expedientâ€, “to give effect to its ordersâ€, “order to prevent abuse of processâ€, are words which enable the Tribunal to pass

orders and the above words confer wide discretion.

The object for which the said power is given is not far to seek. To fulfil the objective of the NGT Act, 2010, NGT has to exercise a wide range

of jurisdiction and has to possess wide range of powers to do justice in a given case. The power is given to exercise for the benefit of those who have

right for clean environment which right they have to establish before the Tribunal. The power given to the Tribunal is coupled with duty to exercise

such powers for achieving the objects. In this regard reference is made to the judgment of this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. CIT [L. Hirday Narain

v.CIT, (1970) 2 SCC 3s55] , wherein this Court was examining provision empowering authority to do something. This Court laid down in para 14:

(SCC p. 359)

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

We, thus, are of the considered opinion that there is no lack of jurisdiction in NGT to direct for appointment of committee or to obtain a report

from a committee in the given facts of the case.â€​

29 The said rule reads as follows:

“24. Order and directions in certain cases. â€" The Tribunal may make such orders or give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to

give effect to its order or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice.â€​

The power and jurisdiction of the NGT under Sections 15(1)(b) and (c) are not restitutionary, in the sense of restoring the environment to the

position it was before the practise impugned, or before the incident occurred. The NGT’s jurisdiction in one sense is a remedial one, based on a

reflexive exercise of its powers. In another sense, based on the nature of the abusive practice, its powers can also be preventive.

As a quasi-judicial body exercising both appellate jurisdiction over regulatory bodies’ orders and directions (under Section 16) and its original

jurisdiction under Sections 14, 15 and 17 of the NGT Act, the tribunal, based on the cases and applications made before it, is an expert regulatory

body. Its personnel include technically qualified and experienced members. The powers it exercises and directions it can potentially issue, impact not

merely those before it, but also state agencies and state departments whose views are heard, after which general directions to prevent the future

occurrence of incidents that impact the environment, are issued.

Courts in the US, notably the US Supreme Court, have been faced with problems arising from regulatory adjudication. The scope of such decision

making which resembles an adjudicatory outcome by courts, was considered in Securities Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp. 332 U.S. 194

(1947). This case arose from an order of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) refusing to approve a utility company's bankruptcy

reorganization plan, due to that plan's favourable treatment of management's stock purchases during the reorganization period. The SEC originally had

based its disapproval on its understanding of general corporation law principles. The Supreme Court initially struck down that decision as a misreading

of the principles. On remand, the SEC reaffirmed its rejection of the reorganization plan. But this time, the SEC relied on its interpretation of the

standards of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. When the Supreme Court decided the appeal for the second time, it affirmed the SEC's

order. The court clarified that SEC would be allowed to establish such an interpretation by means of a particularized order rather than a general

regulation and observed that:

“Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some

principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its important

functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one

form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity. In other words, problems may arise in a case which the administrative

agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of a relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had

sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or the problem may be so

specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule. In those situations, the agency must retain

power to deal with the problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective. There is thus a very definite place for the case

by case evolution of statutory standards. And the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies

primary in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.â€​

Similar observations were made by this court in PTC India v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission 2010 (4) SCC 603. The court stated as

follows, after analysing the provisions of the Electricity Act 2003:

“49. On the above analysis of various sections of the 2003 Act, we find that the decision-making and regulation-making functions are both assigned

to CERC. Law comes into existence not only through legislation but also by regulation and litigation. Laws from all three sources are binding.

According to Professor Wade, “between legislative and administrative functions we have regulatory functionsâ€. A statutory instrument, such as a

rule or regulation, emanates from the exercise of delegated legislative power which is a part of administrative process resembling enactment of law by

the legislature whereas a quasi-judicial order comes from adjudication which is also a part of administrative process resembling a judicial decision by a

court of law.

Applying the above test, price fixation exercise is really legislative in character, unless by the terms of a particular statute it is made quasi-judicial

as in the case of tariff fixation under Section 62 made appealable under Section 111 of the 2003 Act, though Section 61 is an enabling provision for the

framing of regulations by CERC. If one takes “tariff†as a subject-matter, one finds that under Part VII of the 2003 Act actual

determination/fixation of tariff is done by the appropriate Commission under Section 62 whereas Section 61 is the enabling provision for framing of

regulations containing generic propositions in accordance with which the appropriate Commission has to fix the tariff. This basic scheme equally

applies to the subject-matter “trading marginâ€​ in a different statutory context as will be demonstrated by discussion hereinbelow.â€​

The NGT’s directions, though placed in the context of its adjudicatory role, have a wider ramification in the sense that its rulings constitute the

appropriate norm which are to be followed by all those engaging in similar activities. Therefore, its orders, contextually in the course of adjudication,

also establish and direct behaviour appropriate for future guidance. In these circumstances, given the panoply of the NGT’s powers under the

NGT Act, which include considering regulatory directions issued by expert regulatory bodies under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution)

Act, 1974, the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and the Biodiversity Act, 2002 it has to be held that general directions for future

guidance, to avoid or prevent injury to the environment for appropriate assimilation in relevant rules, can be given by the NGT.

Turning next to the question of the correctness of the general directions contained in Para 17(e) of the NGT’s order, this court has no manner

of doubt that such directions were improper and not justified in the facts of this case. What the NGT had before it, was the report of the SDM and a

report commissioned about the nature of the incident. Based on these limited inputs, the tribunal concluded-without any rationale and based on no

scientific or technical evidence, or experts’ opinion, that development and construction should not be carried out within 100 feet of a “lowest

slope i.e. incline of any hill within its territorial limits, as well as hill-topsâ€. The decisions of this court, including the All Dimasa Students Union case

(f.n. 9); Mantri Technoze Pvt. Ltd case (f.n.3); the Hanuman Laxman Aroskar case (f.n. 4) and the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board case (f.n. 2)

all show that the NGT resorted to the appointment of technical and scientific experts in the relevant field, who studied the issue, made site inspections

and furnished reports. Such reports were subjected to discussion by the parties before the NGT, who were also given the opportunity of objecting to or

making representations against such reports. Based on a final consideration of all these materials, and the submissions of parties before it, the NGT

proceeded to issue directions. This procedure was wholly overlooked by the NGT in the present case. As a result, it is held that the said tribunal’s

directions were improper and are procedurally indefensible. The directions contained in Para 17(e) are therefore set aside.

To consider the last issue, i.e. validity of the notification/direction issued by the state government, it is necessary to briefly outline provisions of the

MRTP Act. The MRTP Act was framed and enacted for the purpose of use, planning and development in the regions (of Maharashtra). This was

through the establishment of Regional Planning Boards, New Town Development Authorities and Special Planning Authorities, as the case may be,

for specified “notified areasâ€. The Act provides for the preparation of development plans, appointment of Special Planning Authorities for notified

areas, and creation of new towns for designated areas by means of development authorities. The MRTP Act also enables compulsory acquisition of

land for public purposes in respect of the plans and for purposes connected therewith. The Act provides for an elaborate procedure for preparation of

the regional plan by a Regional Planning Board (“the boardâ€) and development plan by any planning authority. The board has to follow the

procedure contained in Chapter II(C). Section 16 provides the procedure â€" the regional boards have to (after necessary survey) prepare land-use

maps for the region, and prepare a draft regional plan, after which they have to publish a notice about the plan in the Official Gazette, inviting

objections and suggestions from any person with respect to the draft plan. The board has to refer the objections, suggestions and representations

received by it to the Regional Planning Committee (“the committee†hereafter) appointed under Section 10 for consideration and report. The

committee, after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the affected persons has to submit its report to the board, after which the board has

to prepare the regional plan after considering the suggestions, objections and representations and the report of the committee. This is to be submitted

to the State Government for approval. On approval of the plan by the State Government under Section 15, the final regional plan has to be published

under Section 17.

Chapter III deals with the procedure for preparation of development plans by a planning authority. Section 23 provides that the planning authority

should make a declaration of its intent to prepare such a plan and publish the same in the Official Gazette, inviting suggestions or objections from the

public within a period of not less than sixty days from the publication of the notice in the Official Gazette. Thereafter under Section 26, the planning

authority has to prepare a draft development plan, not later than two years from the date of notice published under Section 23, and publish the notice in

the Official Gazette stating that the development plan has been prepared, once again inviting objections or suggestions from any person with respect to

the draft plan within a period of sixty days from the notice. Section 27 provides that the planning authority having regard to, and guided by the

proposals made in the regional plan, shall not carry out any modification therein without prior concurrence of the Regional Planning Board. Section 28

mandates the planning authority to consider suggestions or objections received by it under Section 26(1) and provide a reasonable opportunity of being

heard to any person including the representatives of the Government who may have filed any objections or suggestions, and thereafter modify or

change the plan in such manner, as provided under Section 28(4). Section 29 further provides for modification of the draft development plan, which is

of substantial nature. By this, a planning authority or the Town Planning Officer is required to publish a notice in the Official Gazette inviting objections

and suggestions from any person with respect to the proposed modification not later than sixty days from the date of such notice. The section then

requires the authority concerned to consider all objections and suggestions received by it and give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to any

person including representatives of government departments who may have filed any objections or made any suggestions in respect of the draft

development plan before making such modifications or changes in the draft development plan. Section 30 requires the planning authority to submit the

draft plan to the State Government for approval, within twelve months from the date of publication of the notice under Section 26 that the draft plan

has been prepared. Section 31 provides that the State Government may, after consulting the Director of Town Planning by notification in the Official

Gazette, sanction the draft development plan submitted to it for the whole area, or separately for any part thereof, either without modification, or

subject to such modifications as it may consider proper, or return the draft development plan to the planning authority for modifying the plan as it may

direct, or refuse to accord sanction. It further provides that where the modifications proposed to be made by the State Government are of a substantial

nature, the State Government has to follow the procedure contemplated under Section 28 to give a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the objectors

before finalizing the modification.

Section 37 confers powers on a planning authority to carry out such modification in a final development plan as will not change its character. This

power could be exercised by a planning authority after publishing a notice in the Official Gazette and in such other manner as may be determined by it

inviting objections and suggestions from any person with respect to the proposed modification, not later than one month from the date of such notice.

This section also enjoins the planning authority to serve notice on all persons affected by the proposed modification and, after giving a hearing to any

such persons, submit the proposed modification (with amendments, if any) to the State Government for sanction. Section 40 provides for appointment

of a Special Planning Authority for developing certain notified areas, and Section 40(1)(c) provides that the State Government may, by notification in

the Official Gazette appoint Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority (BMRDA) established under the Bombay Metropolitan Region

Development Authority Act, 1974 to be the Special Planning Authority for developing any undeveloped area specified in the notification as a notified

area. Section 116 then lays down that a Special Planning Authority shall have all the powers of a planning authority as provided in Chapter VII of the

MRTP Act for the special purpose of acquisition of such land in the notified area either by agreement or under the Land Acquisition Act.

So far as plans and developments that were approved before the impugned notification was issued, this court is of the opinion that they cannot be

disturbed and the right of the applicants, be they developers, builders or owners of land or plots, cannot be prejudiced or adversely affected. This is

evident from a ruling of this court in T. Vijayalakshmi v. Town Planning Member (2006) 8 SCC 502. This court stated that town planning legislations

(like the MRTP Act) are regulatory; and that when a development plan is in force during the proposal for its amendment, courts should not interfere

with them on the assumption that the approved plan for building or development, would not be eventually permitted. It was held that:

“Whether the amendments to the said comprehensive development plan as proposed by the Authority would ultimately be accepted by the State or

not is uncertain. It is yet to apply its mind. Amendments to a development plan must conform to the provisions of the Act. As noticed hereinbefore, the

State has called for objection from the citizens. Ecological balance no doubt is required to be maintained and the courts while interpreting a statute

should bestow serious consideration in this behalf, but ecological aspects, it is trite, are ordinarily a part of the town planning legislation. If in the

legislation itself or in the statute governing the field, ecological aspects have not been taken into consideration keeping in view the future need, the

State and the Authority must take the blame therefor. We must assume that these aspects of the matter were taken into consideration by the

Authority and the State. But the rights of the parties cannot be intermeddled with so long as an appropriate amendment in the legislation is not brought

into force.â€​

This court has ruled, that even modification to an existing development plan, under the MRTP Act, under Section 37, is in the nature of a legislative

function. This court had observed under Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Promoters and Builders Assn (2004) 10 SCC 796 speaking of Section 37 (1) that:

“4. Reading of this provision reveals that under clause (1), the Planning Authority after inviting objections and suggestions regarding the proposed

amendment and after giving notice to all affected persons shall submit the proposed modification for sanction to the Government. Deliberation with the

public before making the amendment is over at this stage. The Government, thereafter, under clause (2) is given absolute liberty to make or not to

make necessary inquiry before granting sanction. Again, while according sanction, the Government may do so with or without modifications. The

Government could impose such conditions as it deems fit. It is also permissible for the Government to refuse the sanction. This is the true meaning of

clause (2). It is difficult to uphold the contrary interpretation given by the High Court. The main limitation for the Government is made under clause (1)

that no authority can propose an amendment so as to change the basic character of the development plan. The proposed amendment could only be

minor within the limits of the development plan. And for such minor changes it is only normal for the Government to exercise a wide discretion, by

keeping various relevant factors in mind. Again, if it is arbitrary or unreasonable the same could be challenged. It is not the case of the respondents

herein that the proposed change is arbitrary or unreasonable. They challenged the same citing the reason that the Government is not empowered

under the Act to make such changes to the modification.

Making of DCR or amendments thereof are legislative functions. Therefore, Section 37 has to be viewed as repository of legislative powers for

effecting amendments to DCR. That legislative power of amending DCR is delegated to the State Government. As we have already pointed out, the

true interpretation of Section 37(2) permits the State Government to make necessary modifications or put conditions while granting sanction. In

Section 37(2), the legislature has not intended to provide for a public hearing before according sanction. The procedure for making such amendment is

provided in Section 37. Delegated legislation cannot be questioned for violating the principles of natural justice in its making except when the statute

itself provides for that requirement. Where the legislature has not chosen to provide for any notice or hearing, no one can insist upon it and it is not

permissible to read natural justice into such legislative activity. Moreover, a provision for “such inquiry as it may consider necessary†by a

subordinate legislating body is generally an enabling provision to facilitate the subordinate legislating body to obtain relevant information from any

source and it is not intended to vest any right in anybody. (Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. [(1987) 2 SCC 720], SCC paras 5 and 27. See

generally H.S.S.K. Niyami v.Union of India [(1990) 4 SCC 516] and Canara Bank v. Debasis Das [(2003) 4 SCC 557: 2003 SCC (L&S) 507].) While

exercising legislative functions, unless unreasonableness or arbitrariness is pointed out, it is not open for the Court to interfere. (See generally ONGC

v. Assn. of Natural Gas Consuming Industries of Gujarat [1990 Supp SCC 397].) Therefore, the view adopted by the High Court does not appear to

be correct.

This issue was again underscored by this court in Machavarapu Srinivasa Rao v. Vijayawada, Guntur, Tenali, Mangalagiri Urban Development

Authority, (2011) 12 SCC 154 where it was held as follows, in respect of provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Urban Areas) Development Act, 1975:

“20. An analysis of the above-noted provisions shows that once the master plan or the zonal development plan is approved by the State

Government, no one including the State Government/Development Authority can use land for any purpose other than the one specified therein. There

is no provision in the Act under which the Development Authority can sanction construction of a building, etc. or use of land for a purpose other than

the one specified in the master plan/zonal development plan. The power vested in the Development Authority to make modification in the development

plan is also not unlimited. It cannot make important alterations in the character of the plan. Such modification can be made only by the State

Government and that too after following the procedure prescribed under Section 12(3).â€​

In a decision which concerned change in development plan under the MRTP Act, this court observed that any changes in a development or master

plan involve consultations and a high degree of expertise, in MIG Cricket Club v. Abhinav Sahakar Education Society (2011) 9 SCC 97 :

“28. It is well settled that the user of the land is to be decided by the authority empowered to take such a decision and this Court in exercise of its

power of judicial review would not interfere with the same unless the change in the user is found to be arbitrary. The process involves consideration of

competing claims and requirements of the inhabitants in present and future so as to make their lives happy, healthy and comfortable. We are of the

opinion that town planning requires high degree of expertise and that is best left to the decision of the State Government to which the advice of the

expert body is available. In the facts of the present case, we find that the power has been exercised in accordance with law and there is no

arbitrariness in the same.â€​

Now, under the provisions of the MRTP Act [Section 14 and 22], regional plans and development plans have to take into account features such as

soil conservation, preservation of natural features, prevention of flooding etc, while factoring planning for each city or area concerned. In turn, such

regional and development plans would constitute the blueprint for local town planning authorities to grant or refuse permission to individual applicants.

In these circumstances, the use of Section 154 of the MRTP Act, in the present case, in fact amounted to a modification of all plans - regional,

development, etc. Such modification (by way of absolute prohibition in construction) was not preceded by any manner of public consultation, much less

previous invitation of objections or consideration of the views of affected parties. It is in this background that one has to consider the argument of the

state, which found favour with the High Court, that such notification was issued in public interest.

The unamended Section 154 of the MRTP Act read as follows:

“154 Control by the State Government

(1) Every Regional Board, Planning Authority and Development Authority shall carry out such directions or instructions as may be issued from time to

time by the State Government for the efficient administration of this Act.

(2) If in, or his connection with, the exercise of its powers and discharge of its functions by the Regional Board, Planning Authority or Development

Authority under this Act, any dispute arises between the Regional Board, Planning Authority or Development Authority, and the State Government,

the decision of the State Government on such dispute shall be final.â€​

Section 154 (1) was amendment by a substitution (with effect from 22.04.2015). The new provision [Section 154 (1)] reads as follows:

“154. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules or regulations made thereunder, the State Government may, for implementing

or bringing into effect the Central or the State Government programmes, policies or projects or for the efficient administration of this Act or in the

larger public interest, issue, from time to time, such directions or instructions as may be necessary, to any Regional Board, Planning Authority or

Development Authority and it shall be the duty of such authorities to carry out such directions or instructions within the time-limit, if any, specified in

such directions or instructions.â€​

Directions can be issued “notwithstanding†any other provisions of the Act, “for implementing or bringing into effect the Central or the

State Government programmes, policies or projects or for the efficient administration of this Act or in the larger public interest, issue, from time to

time.†No doubt, the non-obstante clause has an overriding effect on other provisions of the Act. However, if one keeps in mind that the preparations

of regional and development plans are in terms of specific provisions which outline detailed procedures that have to be necessarily followed, in the

absence of which, time and again courts have intervened and held that such modifications (without following prescribed procedure or without

prescribed consultations) are illegal, the power has to be resorted to for good and adequate reasons. The direction, impugned in the present case, on

the face of it, is not premised on any central or state government programmes, policies or projects. The impugned notification reads as follows:

GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASHTRA

URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT

Madam Cama Road

Hutatma Rajguru Chowk

Mantralaya, Mumbai 4000032

Government Resolution No. TPS-1817/ANS-90/97/UD-13

dated 14 November 2017

The Development schemes are prepared for area in jurisdiction of planning authorities under the Maharashtra Regional Development and Town

Planning Act, 1966. In the context of unauthorised constructions undertaken by hill cutting, at Katraj Ghat District Pune, the Hon'ble National Green

Tribunal, Pune has, by order dated 19 May 2015 in Application Number 4/2014, issued orders and instructed to inform all Mahanagar

Palik/Nagarpalika in the state not to give any development permission for constructions on the hilltop and 100 feet distance from the hill slopes. A

provision already exists in development control regulations that no development is permissible on the hilltop and no hill slopes having a gradient of more

than 1:5. Considering the order dated 19 May 2015 of the Hon'ble National Green Tribunal in exercise of powers under section 154 of the

Maharashtra Regional Town Development and Town Planning Act 1966 the following the directions were issued to all planning authorities in the state:

DIRECTIONS

The planning authorities while preparing development plan for area in their jurisdiction or amending them in respect of undeveloped portion abutting

the hills upto 100 feet should be shown as No development/Open space Reservation.

In the event the 100 area abutting hills, has already been developed, in that area no permission be granted for additional FSI or TDR.

In the event the 100 feet area abutting hills is under No Development Zone as per sanctioned Development plan, then while granting permission for

Development for further 100 feet area abutting/contiguous thereto should be permitted only for non-buildable purposes such as open space, road et

cetera.

In the name of and by order of the Hon'ble Governor State of Maharashtraâ€​

There are several authorities for the proposition that though an administrative order need not necessarily comply with principles of natural justice

such as granting hearing, yet, administrative decisions or orders have to be based on some reasons. In Shri. Sitaram Sugar Mills Company v. Union of

India, (1990) 3 SCC 223 (which concerned the zoning regulations for the purpose of levy sugar under the relevant statutory order, in terms of the

Essential Commodities Act), the Supreme Court held as follows:

“Power delegated by statute is limited by its terms and subordinate to its objects. The delegate must act in good faith, reasonably, intra vires the

power granted, and on relevant consideration of material facts. All his decisions, whether characterised as legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial,

must be in harmony with the Constitution and other laws of the land. They must be “reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling

legislationâ€. If they are manifestly unjust or oppressive or outrageous or directed to an unauthorised end or do not tend in some degree to the

accomplishment of the objects of delegation, court might well say, “Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are

unreasonable ultra vires.

A repository of power acts ultra vires either when he acts in excess of his power in the narrow sense or when he abuses his power by acting in bad

faith or for an inadmissible purpose or on irrelevant grounds or without regard to relevant considerations or with gross unreasonableness.â€​

In Cellular Operators Association v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, (2016) 7 SCC 703 this court held that subordinate regulatory

legislation, can be set aside in judicial review, if they show no rationale or are arbitrary:

“62. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that the Quality of Service Regulations and the Consumer Regulations must be read together as part of a

single scheme in order to test the reasonableness thereof.

The countervailing advantage to service providers by way of the allowance of 2% average call drops per month, which has been granted under the

2009 Quality of Service Regulations, could not have been ignored by the impugned Regulation so as to affect the fundamental rights of the appellants,

and having been so ignored, would render the impugned Regulation manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable.

Secondly, no facts have been shown to us which would indicate that a particular area would be filled with call drops thanks to the fault on the part

of the service providers in which consumers would be severely inconvenienced. The mere ipse dixit of the learned Attorney General, without any

facts being pleaded to this effect, cannot possibly make an unconstitutional regulation constitutional. We, therefore, hold that a strict penal liability laid

down on the erroneous basis that the fault is entirely with the service provider is manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable. Also, the payment of such

penalty to a consumer who may himself be at fault, and which gives an unjustifiable windfall to such consumer, is also manifestly arbitrary and

unreasonable. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to go into the appellants' submissions that call drops take place because of four reasons, three

of which are not attributable to the fault of the service provider, which includes sealing and shutting down towers by municipal authorities over which

they have no control, or whether they are attributable to only two causes, as suggested by the Attorney General, being network-related causes or

user-related causes. Equally, it is not necessary to determine finally as to whether the reason for a call drop can technologically be found out and

whether it is a network-related reason or a user-related reason.

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

The reason given in the Explanatory Memorandum for compensating the consumer is that the compensation given is only notional. The very notion

that only notional compensation is awarded, is also entirely without basis. A consumer may well suffer a call drop after 3 or 4 seconds in a voice call.

Whereas the consumer is charged only 4 or 5 paise for such dropped call, the service provider has to pay a sum of rupee one to the said consumer.

This cannot be called notional at all. It is also not clear as to why the Authority decided to limit compensation to three call drops per day or how it

arrived at the figure of Re 1 to compensate inconvenience caused to the consumer. It is equally unclear as to why the calling party alone is provided

compensation because, according to the Explanatory Memorandum, inconvenience is suffered due to the interruption of a call, and such inconvenience

is suffered both by the calling party and the person who receives the call. The receiving party can legitimately claim that his inconvenience when a call

drops, is as great as that of the calling party. And the receiving party may need to make the second call, in which case he receives nothing, and the

calling party receives Re 1 for the additional expense made by the receiving party. All this betrays a complete lack of intelligent care and deliberation

in framing such a regulation by the Authority, rendering the impugned Regulation manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable.â€​

In the present case, the State of Maharashtra has not shown any material or file containing the reasons behind the directive of 14.11.2017. It is not

in dispute that the direction was consequential to, and solely based on the directions of the NGT in Para 17(e). As noticed earlier, those directions

were not based on any scientific evidence or report of any technical expert. Furthermore, even the impugned notification does not specify what

constitutes “hillsâ€, and how they can be applied in towns and communities set in undulating areas and hilly terrain. This is not only vague, but

makes the directions arbitrary as they can be applied at will by the concerned authorities. More importantly, they amount to a blanket change of all

regional and development plans. While such directions can be issued, if situations so warrant, such as in extraordinary or emergent circumstances, the

complete absence of any reasons why the state issued them, coupled with the lack of any supporting expert report or input, renders it an arbitrary

exercise. That they are based only on the NGT’s orders, only underlines the lack of any application of mind on the part of the State, while issuing

them.

For the above reasons, we hold that the impugned judgment of the Bombay High Court cannot be sustained; it is set aside. Consequently, the

directions in the notification under Section 154 (dated 14.11.2017) are hereby quashed.

In view of the above discussions, CA 6932/2015 and CA 5971/2019 are hereby disposed of in terms of the directions in this judgment. The other

appeals by special leave by third parties, against the NGT’s order, and the order of the NGT, are partly allowed in the above terms. There shall be

no order on costs.