High CourtsDivision Bench

Director, Indian Veterinary Research Institute (IVRI) and Another vs Ashok Kumar

Uttarakhand High Court · Decided on 26 May 2011 · Citation: (2011) 05 UK CK 0158

HON’BLE JUDGES
Barin Ghosh, C.J · Servesh Kumar Gupta, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 — Section 14(2)
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Special Appeal 78 of 2011

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Judgment

10 paragraphs · 817 words

Barin Ghosh, C.J.—The subject-matter of challenge in the writ petition, filed by the Respondent, was an order dated 15.4.2010, by which he was transferred from one place to another. On 17.9.2010, that order was stayed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. Subsequently, on 8.10.2010, another learned Single Judge, dealing with the writ petition, directed the Appellants to permit the Respondent to work as Upper Divisional Clerk, IVRI Campus Mukteshwar till the next date of listing. The learned Judge further directed the Appellants to make payment of salaries to the Respondent. Those orders were interim orders.

2.

Any order passed by a Court, whether interim or final, is binding on the parties to the lis, until the same is vacated or set aside. An order of a Court may be set aside by a superior Court. An interim order passed by a Court may be vacated by the selfsame Court. On 25.2.2011, when the writ petition was taken up for consideration, it transpired to a learned Single Judge of this Court that the grievances raised in the writ petition should be sorted out first through the Central Administrative Tribunal as the Appellant-employer is notified u/s 14(2) of the Central Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. Learned Single Judge, accordingly, dismissed the writ petition with liberty to the Respondent to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal. After having done so, the learned Judge recorded as follows:

It is, however, made clear that the Petitioner would be entitled to receive the salary till today pursuant to the interim order passed by this Court.

3.

Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal has been filed.

4.

It is being contended that the interim orders stood merged with the final order, and when the final order rejected the writ petition, there could not be any direction for payment, as was directed.

5.

As aforesaid, an interim order is an order binding on the parties. The interim orders stood vacated only on 25.2.2011, when the writ petition was dismissed with liberty to the Respondent to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal. The order merely clarified that the interim order passed, which stands vacated upon passing of the final order, was alive until the final order was passed. Accordingly, the respective rights and liabilities of the parties under the interim orders continued to remain operative until the same was vacated. We have not been persuaded to take a view that what the learned Single Judge did, by incorporating the sentence extracted above in the order under the appeal, was not permissible.

6.

The learned Counsel for the Appellants cited the judgment of the Hon�ble Allahabad High Court rendered in the case of Sri Ram Charan Das Vs. Pyare Lal, . In that judgment itself, the Hon�ble Allahabad High Court has held that the interim orders merge with the final order passed in the proceedings, but has not held that if the final order is not in tune with the interim orders, the interim orders stand obliterated from the date the interim orders were passed.

7.

Learned Counsel for the Appellants also cited judgment of Hon�ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. Vs. Church of South India Trust Association CSI Cinod Secretariat, Madras, . In that case, a quasi judicial proceeding, under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1986, stood concluded by an order of the appellate authority constituted by and under the said Act. Delhi High Court passed an order staying the order of the appellate authority. The question that was decided by the Hon�ble Supreme Court in that case was whether by reason of the order of stay, so granted by the Delhi High Court, the proceedings before the appellate authority stood automatically revived or not. The Hon�ble Supreme Court held that there is a distinction between quashing of an order and staying an order and clarified that when an order is quashed, the order is obliterated and, accordingly, the proceedings closed thereby are revived, but when the order is stayed, the effect of the order is kept in suspension. This judgment, according to us, therefore, is not of much help to the Appellants.

8.

The next judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the Appellants is also a judgment of the Hon�ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of AIR 1997 993 (SC) . In that case, the Court was concerned in regard to enforcement of an undertaking given in a writ petition after the writ petition was dismissed. The Court felt that when a loss has been caused to the State and to the people of the State on the basis of such an undertaking, it is the obligation of the Court to ensure that such loss is recovered by enforcing the undertaking. This judgment too, according to us, is of no help to the Appellants.

9.

We, accordingly, dismiss the appeal without any order as to costs.