Director of Settlements, Govt. of A.P., Hyderabad vs V.V.V.R.K. Yachendra

M.S. Liberhan, CJ

The sole grievance made by the learned Counsel for the appellant in this appeal is that the learned single Judge has not taken into consideration the judgement of the Supreme Court pronounced in Civil Appeal Nos.398 and 1385 of 1972 deciding the litigation between the parties finally. He also submits that the self-same parties who were before the Supreme Court are also parties before this Court in the present appeal.

The view expressed by the High Court in the judgment dated 5-9-1969 in WP No.496 of 1965 was challenged in the said appeals before the Supreme Court to be erroneous so far it held that interim payments do not cease with the date of original determination by the Director u/s 39(1) and deposit even on the basis of the language of the relevant Sections as they stood originally before the amendments.

The Honourable Supreme Court has determined the list between the parties with respect to the vires of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Amendment Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the Act No.3 of 1971 and the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Amendment Act, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act No.1 of 1973. The constitutional validity of the Act Nos.3 of !971 and 1 of 1973 was conceded by the Parties. It was also conceded that it may be left open to the landholders and others to get the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act XXVI, 1948, as it stood then, amended.

While disposing of the appeal, the Honourable Supreme Court categorically left the question of computation of interim payments payable to the respondents open to be decided by the authorities concerned in accordance with law. It would be expedient to notice the observations of the Honourable Supreme Court which the appellant claims to be the anchor-sheet to determine the question raised in this appeal which runs thus :

"We, however, leave the question of computation of interim payments payable to the respondents open to be decided by the authorities concerned in accordance with law and the orders passed by the Director and the Board, as the case may be. We, however, make it dear that the period during which interim payments are payable under the abovesaid Act ends with the date of original determination made by the Director u/s 39(1) thereof before the filing of the appeal, if any, and the deposit of the amount so determined."

The State Government was directed to determine the question of computation of interim payments due, if any, to the respondents.

The order dated 21-6-1960 assessing the interim compensation was set aside in WP No.1581 of 1971 decided on 13-10-1972 inter se the parties. The said order dated 13-10-1972 became final and binding between the parties since it was not challenged by either of the parties. It has been categorically found by the learned single Judge that the order dated 21-6-1960 shall be deemed to have been set aside in view of the judgment made in WP No. 1581 of 1971 and in the eye of law it no more survives and would be deemed to be nonest as having been never passed. Mere physical existence of the order on record does not clothe the same with any sanctity or enforceability nor can it be taken note of. Reading the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court, we have no doubt, the plain meaning of the words relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant cannot be given a meaning in the instant case that the interim payments payable under the above said Act and with the date of original determination made by the Director u/s 39(1) thereof before the tiling of the appeal, since the order of the Director of Settlements dated 21-6-1960 deemed to have been quashed in view of the orders dated 13-10-1972 passed in WP No.1581 of 1971 which became final. Consequently, in the present case, there is no order originally determining the compensation u/s 39(1). The Terminus Quo for determining the compensation cannot be taken to be 21-6-1960 as the closing date for awarding the interim compensation. The Honourable Supreme Court has made it discernible that authorities were to determine the compensation afresh by computing the interim payments due. The Terminux Quo for payment of the compensation in terms of the order of the Supreme Court would be the date of original determination which can be stated to be only when the compensation is determined i.e., December 12, 1972 in the instant case. The determination of the compensation made in 1972 cannot be taken back to 1960 when the order determining the compensation was set aside and the setting aside of the said order has been accepted by the parties by not challenging the same and allowing the same to attain finality.

Thus, in view of the observations made above, we find no force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that interim compensation payable by the appellant would be only up to 21-6-1960. Though, initially compensation was determined by order dated 21-6-1960, yet in the eye of law the same has been set aside being nonest. It was deemed to have never come into existence nor did it determine any compensation whatsoever in view of the orders of this Court made in WP No. 1581 of 1971 dated 13-10-1972. Consequently, the order dated 21-6-1960 cannot be clothed with the validity or sanctity of having determined the compensation.

Thus, we find no force in the condition of the appellant. Affirming the findings of the learned single Judge, the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.