DIRECTOR, TELEGRAPH TRAFFIC vs N.ANANDA KUMAR

THE opposite parties in CDC No. 61/1991 on the file of the Chittoor District Forum presented the appeal FA. SR. No. 8140/1992 on 19.2.1992 questioning the order dated 8.11.1991 allowing the complaint of the respondent in the appeal and awarding compensation of Rs. 5,000/- payable by the opposite parties and costs of Rs. 100/-.

THE appeal was presented with a delay of 53 days and IA. No. 365/1992 is for condoning the delay. In the affidavit in support of that application it was admitted that a copy of the order of the District Forum was received on 28.11.1991 and what happened thereafter occasioning the delay was explained as follows: "Immediately after obtaining the carbon copy of the said order, the matter was referred for the opinion of the Director of Telegraph Traffic, Hyderabad for filing an appeal in the State Commission and he accordingly sent all the papers to the Chief General Manager Telecommunications, Andhra Pradesh Circle, Hyderabad on 5.2.1992 who in turn sent the entire record to Mr. B. Narayana Reddy, Additional Standing Counsel for Union of India, High Court of Andhra Pradesh for preparation of memorandum of grounds and suspension petition, etc., on 17.2.1992. Accordingly, the Additional Standing Counsel prepared memorandum of grounds under the suspension petition and condone delay petition and sent the same for approval of the Chief General Manager, Telecommunications, Andhra Pradesh Circle, Hyderabad on 18.2.1992. THE Chief General Manager has in turn sent the papers on 19.2.1992 and accordingly the appeal was filed on 19.2.1992.....".

No explanation whatsoever was given for the delay in sending the papers to the Chief General Manager, Telecommunications, Andhra Pradesh Circle, Hyderabad on 5.2.1992 when the order itself was admittedly received on 28.11.1991. In the circumstances, we do not find any sufficient cause made out for condoning the delay in presenting the appeal. FA.IA. No. 365/1992 is therefore dismissed. Consequently the appeal FA.SR. No. 8140/1992 is rejected. We have examined the order of the District Forum from the point of view of Section 17(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (''the Act'' for short) to satisfy ourselves whether the said order is vitiated by any illegality or material irregularity. The complainant approached the District Forum complaining that the telegram booked at 10.40 a.m. on 25.5.1991 at Chittoor reached him at Rajampet only on 27.5.1991 at 3.30 p.m. i.e., after more than 2 days or nearly 53 hours. That telegram sought to communicate to him that his mother was seriously ill. Thereafter two telegrams booked on 26.5.1991 at 13-20 hours and 20.05 hours were communicating to him that his mother died also reached him only on 27.5.1991 at about 4.00 p.m. He was at that time at Rajampet in Cuddapah District working as Munsif Magistrate. The District Forum found that there was deficiency in service on the part of the appellants in not seeing to it that the messages were immediately communicated to the complainant. No doubt the learned Counsel for the appellants submits that telegraphic messages could not be transmitted because the lines were faulty and inspite of efforts made by the department they could not succeed in seeing that the messages were communicated immediately. If the lines were faulty it was the bounden duty of the Telegraph Department to inform the public who come to book telegrams about the same and apprise them about the uncertainties and the delays. On the facts of the present case we find that even though according to the appellants the lines were not in order, the telegrams were booked by them not merely on 25.5.1991 but also on the next day i.e. on 26.5.1991. If the persons wanting to send the messages were informed about the faulty lines they could have resorted to other ways of trying to reach the complainant. In tlie present case Rajampet is in the neighbouring Cuddapah District. On the facts of the present case we are satisfied that there are no illegalities or material irregularities vitiating the finding of the District Forum that there was deficiency in service on the part of the authorities concerned.

The learned Counsel for the appellants submits that the complainant does not fall within the definition of the expression ''consumer'' because he did not book the telegrams and he did not pay any consideration. But it cannot be disputed that he was the beneficiary and it was not necessary that he should himself pay the consideration. It is not the case of the appellants that they were performing any free service without receiving any consideration when the messages in question were booked for telegraphic communication and charges were undoubtedly paid; that forms the consideration in the present case. Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act includes within the meaning of consumer "any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised".

IN M/s. Spring Meadows Hospital (Noida) & Anr. v. Harjol Ahluwalia & Anr., I (1998) CPJ 1 (SC)=III (1998) SLT 684 (SC)=1998 (1) CPR 1 (SC)=(1998) 4 SCC 39, tlie Supreme Court held that the Act gives a comprehensive definition of consumer and that "the Act being a beneficial legislation intended to confer some speedier remedy on a consumer from being exploited by unscrupulous traders, the provisions thereof should receive a liberal construction". With particular reference to Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act the Supreme Court further elucidated as follows: "IN the said clause a consumer would mean a person who hires or avails of any services and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services. When a young child is taken to a hospital by his parents and the child is treated by the doctor, the parents would come within the definition of consumer having hired the services and the young child would also become a consumer under the inclusive definition being a beneficiary of such services. The definition clause being wide enough to include not only the person who hires the services but also the beneficiary of such services which beneficiary is other than the person who hires the services, the conclusion is irresistible that both the parents of the child as well as the child would be consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act and as such can claim compensation under the Act".

We are therefore satisfied that the complainant in the present case falls within the definition of ''consumer'' under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act. The only other question is whether the District Forum erred in awarding compensation of Rs. 5,000/- for mental agony etc. There can be no doubt that the complainant must have been totally upset and deeply grieved irreparably because he could not see his mother before she expired which in all probability he would have been able to do if the telegram dated 25.5.1991 readied him on the same day without delay. Because the subsequent telegrams also did not reach him he could not even see the body of his mother because he could not go to Chittoor before cremation as his mother expired before noon on 26.5.1991. We are satisfied that the facts of the present case justify compensation of Rs. 5,000/- to the complainant for mental agony and suffering, though a poor recompense. We are therefore satisfied that there are no grounds for interference with the order of the District Forum under Section 17(b) of the Act. Appeals dismissed. __________________