Dittu Ram etc. vs Ram Dayal etc.

R.S. Pathak, C.J.—This is a landowners'' second appeal arising out of proceedings u/s 11(1) of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953.

The tenants applied u/s 11(1) of the aforesaid Act for acquisition of proprietary rights. In opposition to the application the landowners raised a number of pleas, among them being that the tenants were liable to ejectment u/s 54(1)(g) of the Act. The Compensation Officer rejected the defence set up by the landowners and allowing the application of the tenants he granted them proprietary rights on payment of compensation. An appeal filed by the landowners has been dismissed by the learned District Judge. And now this second appeal.

Section 11(1) of the Act entitles a tenant to apply for the acquisition of the right, title and interest of the landowner in the land of tenancy held by him under a landowner. The proviso to Section 11(1) reads:

Provided that a tenant not having a right of occupancy shall not be entitled to acquire the right, title and interest of the landowner in the land of the tenancy from which he is liable to ejectment under Clause (d) or Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 54.

Section 54(1) (g) reads:

''54(1) A tenant not having a right of occupancy shall not be liable to ejectment from his tenancy except on any one or more of the following grounds, namely-

...

...

(g) that the landowner under whom he holds his tenancy, having under his personal cultivation less than five acres of land desires to bring the land of the tenancy under his personal cultivation:

Provided that-

(iii) the landowner shall-

(a) within six months immediately after the commencement of this Act specify in the prescribed manner the land or lands, of the tenancy from which he desires to eject the tenant

(b) .... start proceedings for such ejectment before 30th September, 1956:

...

The learned District Judge has found that the tenants were not liable to ejectment u/s 54(1)(g) because the landowner did not take the proceedings contemplated by Sub-section (iii) of the proviso to Section 54(1) (g) of the Act within time. In order to benefit by Section 54(1)(g) the landowner was obliged by the statute to specify, within the prescribed time, the land of the tenancy from which he desired to eject the tenant. He was also obliged to start proceedings before September 30, 1956. Admittedly in the present case the landowners did not take those proceedings within the period specified. It is urged on behalf of the landowners that it was not possible to comply with that provision because the decision of the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar and Others Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, declared the Act invalid, and in the interregnum before the Act was revalidated in 1958 the time for complying with the requirements of Section 51(1)(g) had expired. The submission cannot be accepted. It appears that the decision in Shree Vinod Kumar (supra) was rendered by the Supreme Court on October 10, 1958. That was long after the period specified in Clause (iii) of the proviso to Section 54(1) (g), had already come to a close. If the landowners were so mindful they could have taken proceedings before those dates. They could not have anticipated that the Act would be declared ultra vires by the Supreme Court subsequently. The circumstance that the Supreme Court subsequently held the Act invalid can hardly serve as an excuse. The first contention is rejected.

The second contention on behalf of the landowners is that it was not reasonably possible to comply with the requirements of Clause (iii) of the proviso to Section 54(1) (g) for the reason that the relevant clause was inserted in the Act by the Himachal Pradesh Act of 1955, and the ''prescribed manner'' mentioned in that provision was prescribed by the rules only on September 20,1955, thus leaving hardly any appreciable time for the landowners to avail of the benefit conferred by Section 54(1) (g). This contention is also without force. The landowners had all the time between September 20, 1955, and March 1, 1956, in which to take the proceedings contemplated by Clause (Hi) of the proviso. It is difficult to accept that what was required of the landowners by the provision could not be completed within that period.

My attention has also been invited to Rules 15 and 16 of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Rules, 1955, which set out the procedure for an application to be made by a landowner intending to make a reservation of land and empower the Collector to pass necessary orders on such application. Reference has been made to Section 140 of the Act under which those rules purport to have been made. Section 140 empowers the State Government to make rules prescribing for a number of matters. Clause (a) relates to the form and manner in which an application for reservation of land will be made by the landowner, Clause (b) relates to the form of notice and the manner in which the notices may be served, Clause (c) speaks of the manner in which the inquiry may be held and Clause (d) sets out the manner in which compensation may be paid. It is urged that by empowering the Collector to make an inquiry into the application made by a landowner for the reservation of land and appointing him the sole authority to determine that application the rule-making authority has acted in contravention of Section 140. It seems to me that it was open to the State Government to appoint the Collector for considering and determining such an application. There is nothing in Section 140 or anywhere in the policy of the Act precluding the State Government from doing so. The order made by the Collector is always open to judicial scrutiny and it cannot be said that because the Collector has been given a wide discretion under Rule 16 in the matter of deciding such application the conferment of such authority is in breach of Section 140 of the Act.

It is also urged that the empowering the Collector by Rule 16 to make an enquiry into such application, the State Government itself should have indicated the nature of the enquiry to be made by the Collector. That, it is said, is what is contemplated by Section 140 (c) of the Act. It is difficult to spell out any such limitation on the powers of the State Government. The State Government could reasonably have contemplated that the nature of the inquiry should be left to the Collector because he was the appropriate authority to determine what was the scope and extent of the enquiry called for by the particular application before him. As I have already pointed out, the proceedings taken by the Collector are subject to judicial scrutiny, and that is an efficient safeguard against any arbitrary enquiry by the Collector.

The last contention on behalf of the landowners is that the benefit of Section 11(2) of the Act was available to the landowners inasmuch as some of them were aged people, widows and minors who were incapable of earning their livelihood. It appears that the contention was raised before the Compensation Officer and he has considered the matter. In his order, the Compensation Officer has referred to the want of evidence in support of that contention, and he has accordingly held against the landowners. When the case was taken in appeal, it seems that this finding of the Compensation Officer was not challenged in the oral submissions made before the learned District Judge. Accordingly, the appellate order contains no finding on this point. Notwithstanding that, learned Counsel for the landowners has been allowed to raise the plea, but having regard to the paucity of material on the record he has been unable to sustain the contention. The oral evidence on the record refers merely to aged people, widows and minors without indicating specifically who they are, and in the case of the aged and the alleged minors, what are their respective ages. There is nothing to show that any of the persons who are said to suffer from old age were burdened by some mental or physical infirmity which prevented them from earning their livelihood. In the absence of adequate evidence to support that contention, it must be rejected.

There is no force in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.