Divakar Singh vs A. Ramamurthi Naidu

Upon the finding that the Sub-Inspector of Guntur conducted the search there can be no question of defendant''s jurisdiction over the place

searched. The finding is objected to on the ground that no specific issue was raised on the point, but the plea that the defendant did not himself

conduct the search, but only searched the house as the Sub-Inspector''s assistant was specifically raised in the written statement and comes within

the scope of issue I. Even otherwise it is questionable whether defendant, as investigating Police Officer, was not attached to Guntur Police station

by the orders of his superiors but this point does not seem to have been considered.

The contention chiefly relied on by Mr. Ramadoss is that the search was wholly illegal inasmuch as Section 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code

does not give authority to search for stolen property. This is a somewhat startling proposition put in this way, and it is based on the rulings in

Bajrangi Gope v. Emperor ILR (1910) C. 304 and Prankhang v. King Emperor 16 C.W.N. 1078. These two cases were considered in Bissar

Misser v. Emperor ILR (1913) C. 261 where it was held that they were only authority for the proposition that Section 165, Criminal Procedure

Code does not authorise a general search for stolen property, as opposed to a search for specific stolen property. This latter form of search, which

is the form in the case now under our consideration, was expressly held to be legal and it was remarked that its legality had never been questioned

since the case decided in Mahomed Jackariah & Co. v. Ahmed Mahonted ILR (1887) C 109. We agree in their view and hold that the present

search was not illegal. It has been found to have been made bona fide and therefore plaintiff is not entitled to damages. Another contention is put

forward that when a report of investigation has been sent in u/s 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code the Police have no further powers of

investigation, but this argument may be briefly met by the remark that the number of investigations into a crime is not limited by law and that when

one has been completed another may be begun on further information received.

The second appeal is dismissed with costs.