Divisional Controller NEKRTC Vijayapur Division, Kalaburagi vs Rangu Kusaba Lamani

Raghvendra S. Chauhan, J.—The North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation (NEKRTC), petitioner, has challenged the legality of the order dated 21.10.2015 passed by the Labour Court, Vijayapur, whereby the learned Labour Court has allowed the application filed by the respondent, Mr. Rangu under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (''the Act'' for short).

Briefly the facts of the case are that, Sri. Rangu, respondent before this Court, had entered into the service of the petitioner-corporation as a driver in the year 1991. Subsequently, he was dismissed from service on 24.05.2013, Since he was aggrieved by the dismissal order, he raised a labour dispute in the form of KID No. 14/2013. By order dated 08.08.2014, the Labour Court has set aside the dismissal order, and directed the petitioner-corporation to reinstate the respondent in service with continuity of service, and all other consequential benefits only for the purpose of working out the terminal benefits. However, despite publication of the award, the petitioner-corporation did not honour the award. Therefore, the Government had issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner-corporation. Initially, the respondent had filed an application namely, Application No. 6/2015 under Section 33-C (2) of the Act for seeking prospective wages for the period from 08.08.2014 to 28.02.2015. The said application was allowed by the learned Labour Court. However, as the petitioner-Corporation did not pay the salary of the respondent for the further period from 01.03.2015 to 31.07.2015, subsequently, the respondent filed a second application namely, Application No. 24/2015 under Section 33-C (2) of the Act. The said application has been allowed by the learned Labour Court. Hence, the petition before this court.

Mr. Subhash Mallapur, learned counsel for the petitioner-corporation, has vehemently contended that the Corporation had clearly pleaded before the learned Labour Court that the Corporation had issued a call letter, dated 08.04.2015, which was duly served upon the respondent. But in spite of the call letter directing the respondent to join the services, the respondent failed to do so. This particular aspect has been ignored by the learned Labour Court on the basis of conjunctures and surmises. Therefore, the learned Labour Court is unjustified in concluding that the call letter dated 08.04.2015 was not served on the respondent.

Secondly, the Corporation has already paid salary for a period from 01.03.2015 to 01.04.2015 to the respondent. Despite this fact, the learned Labour Court has directed the Corporation to pay salary for the month of 1 March, 2015 to the respondent. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the impugned order deserves to be set aside by this court.

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned order.

A bare perusal of the impugned order clearly reveals that although the petitioner-corporation had claimed that the call letter dated 08.04.2015 was served upon the respondent, but it failed to prove the said fact. Despite the fact that the Corporation had submitted postal receipt and postal acknowledgement as Exs.R6 and R7, the Corporation failed to prove the fact that the acknowledgment receipt contained the respondent''s signature. Most importantly, even the respondent was not confronted with the postal acknowledgement receipt during the course of cross-examination.

Furthermore, the learned Labour Court has noticed the fact that since the petitioner-corporation had failed to implement the award, it was issued a show-cause notice. Although the petitioner-corporation claimed before the Labour Court that a reply to the show-cause notice was given, but even the reply had not been submitted before the learned Labour Court. Thus, the learned Labour Court was justified in concluding that a material document had been withheld from its purview. Hence, the learned Labour Court was justified in drawing an adverse inference against the petitioner-corporation. Thus, the learned counsel for the petitioner is unjustified in claiming that the learned Labour Court has drawn its conclusion on the basis of conjunctures and surmises.

A bare perusal of the impugned order also reveals that the petitioner-corporation did not take any stand with regard to the payment of salary for the month of March, 2015 to the respondent. Thus it is new plea raised by the learned counsel. Naturally, a new plea that too a plea based on facts cannot be raised before this court for the first time. Therefore, the said contention raised by the learned counsel is clearly unacceptable.

This court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order. Hence, the petition is devoid of any merit; it is, hereby, dismissed.