High CourtsSingle Bench

Divisional Manager, Jksfc Doda vs Mohd. Amin

Jammu And Kashmir High Court · Decided on 23 March 2021 · Citation: (2021) 03 J&K CK 0053

HON’BLE JUDGES
Javed Iqbal Wani, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 — Section 3, 4 · Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Condonation Civil No.133 Of 2016, IA No. 01 Of 2016
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Judgment

33 paragraphs · 1,893 words
1.

This order shall dispose of the application seeking condonation of delay of 92 days in filling an appeal against the award dated 15.06.2016, passed by Assistant Labour Commissioner, Doda (for brevity „Commissioner‟), in File No. 91-I, filed under Section 3 of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 (for brevity the „Act‟)

2.

The background facts those emerge from case in hand are that a claim petition came to be filed by the non-applicant/respondent herein who is alleged to have received injuries arising out of and in the course of employment with the applicant herein while working as a labourer on 19.03.2006.

3.

The claim petition is stated to have been objected by the applicant herein before Commissioner on the ground that the respondent herein is not entitled to any compensation while denying the accident and liability to pay compensation. The Commissioner is stated to have passed the award dated 25.02.2017 amounting to Rs. 1,62,745/- in favour of the respondent along with an interest @ 12% per annum under Section 4 of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923.

4.

The aforesaid award (supra) is questioned in the appeal accompanying the instant application.

5.

The applicant in the instant application has spelt and detailed out the cause and reason for not filing the appeal well within prescribed time limit and have offered an explanation thereof. The application in extenso is extracted and reproduced hereunder:-

"1. That after the passing of the award, the awarded amount could not be deposited before the Assistant labour Commission for the purpose of filing the appeal which is he requirement under the Employees Compensation Act due to financial crunch in the J&K State Forest Corporation due to non sale of timber in Kashmir in view of prevailing situation since June 2016. It is also needs to make that even the employees of the corporation have suffered badly because of the non-payment of salaries.

3.

That be that as it may, the amount could be deposited on 12.11.2016, and immediately the present appeal is being filed.

5.

That there exists good and sufficient cause for condoning the delay for the purpose of filing the appeal."

6.

The affidavit supporting the said application being relevant and germane is also extracted and reproduced hereunder:-

"I, Parvez Malik Age 51years Divisional manager, J&K State Forest Corporation Ext. Division Bhaderwah do hereby solemnly, affirm and declare on oath as under

1.

That the deponent is well conversant with the facts and circumstances of the case and is competent to swear this affidavit.

2.

That the accompanying petition has been drawn and drafted by my counsel on my instructions.

3.

That the facts stated in the accompanying petition are true and correct on the basis of information received/record."

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

7.

Before proceeding to analyze the application and grounds urged therein for condonation of delay it would be appropriate and advantageous to refer to the legal position enunciated by the Apex Court on the subject of condonation of delay.

8.

The law on the subject of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is no more res integra and there is a long line of decisions rendered and delivered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court on the said subject.

9.

It is established that the law being limitation has to be applied with all its rigor prescribed by a statute. Although Section 5 of J&K Limitation Act Samvat , 1995 provides for extension of the period of limitation in certain cases, and appellant/applicant seeking such extension is required to satisfy the court that there has been a sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed period.

10.

The Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and others and Bherulal, 2020 (10) SSC 654, at paras 3 and 5 has observed as under: -

"3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the Government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [LAOv.Katiji]. This position is more than elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012) 3 SCC 563 where the Court observed as under:-

"27) It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28) Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

29) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red- tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30) Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay." Eight years hence the judgment is still unheeded.

4.

5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be propounded that if there is some merit in the case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by. If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any case. It is really a bar of limitation which can even shut out good cases. This does not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case to condone the delay."

11.

The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswam vs. Bhargavi Amma, 2008 (8) SCC 321, at para 13 (iii) enunciated besides others the following principle qua an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:-

5.

"(iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation."

12.

A Reference to the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1998 SC 2276, titled as P. K. Ramachadran v. State of Kerala would also be appropriate and advantageous, wherein at para 6 following is noticed.

6.

"Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs."

13.

Keeping in mind the above legal position enunciated by the Apex Court and while analyzing the explanation offered by the applicant in the application in hand it manifestly is demonstrated that no explanation worth the name has been offered by the applicant for seeking condonation of delay.

14.

The application in hand seemingly is filed with the impression that in seeking condonation of delay, the expression „sufficient cause‟ would receive as liberal construction in favour of the appellant-applicant being an agency of the Government. It is however, manifest and without any doubt that the explanation offered by the applicant in the application in hand cannot by any sense of imagination said to be sufficient, plausible, and cogent. The explanation per se is cryptic and casual. Even the affidavit accompanying the application in support thereof is a stereotyped one.

15.

As has been noticed above, the application in hand is seeking condonation of delay in filing of an appeal against an award passed under the Workman‟s Compensation Act, 1923 which is a piece of welfare legislation intended to provide immediate relief to an injured workman or the dependants of a deceased workman who is injured or meets his death by an accident arising out of an in the course of his employment. The Act lays down the scheme for determination of the compensation payable to the injured workman or dependants of the deceased workman which is less time consuming, hassle free and intended to ensure that the claim is dealt with and disposed of with the proper dispatch. Underlying object is that the injured workman or dependants of a deceased workman should not be left high and dry without any source to fall back upon. It is as part of the said object, that the employer against whom an award is made is required o deposit the compensation with the Commissioner under the Act, and the employer is deprived of right to file appeal against the award unless and until the employer in the first instance makes deposit of the compensation amount with the Commissioner under the Act. The purpose again is to ensure that the payment of compensation determined by the Commissioner under the Act, is paid/disbursed to the workman is not thwarted by procedural wrangles and further litigation and very purpose of the Act frustrated.

16.

A claim lodged before the Tribunal and an award passed thereon in such cases aims at providing cheap and speedy remedy and justice by way of compensation to a victim. A justice oriented approach thus, in such matters is possible if the courts lean against the casual and non-diligent approach and unbecoming conduct of the applicants seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeals against such awards, unless, a sufficient cause is shown in tune and line with the principles and propositions laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court. The said principle of „sufficient cause‟, however, as noticed above is missing in the instant case.

17.

Viewed in the context what has been observed, considered and analyzed hereinabove, the application in hand is found to be without any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed, as a consequence whereof the accompanying appeal shall also stand dismissed.