Diwakar Prasad Mishra And Others vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others

Deepak Khot, J

Considering the similitude of the controversy involved in both the aforesaid cases, they have been heard analogously and are being decided by this common order. However, for the sake of convenience, the facts of WP No. 5244/2012 are being taken into consideration.

The petitioners have filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking following relief:-

I. This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue writ of certiorari and declare the acquisition proceedings/Notification dated 24.10.1997 issued by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 with respect to the land of the petitioner bearing Khasra No. more particularly given in the notification being Annexure P/1, in Village Bagaha, Tahsil Raghurajnagar, Satna to be null and void in the eyes of law and,

II. This Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to issue Writ of Mandamus and direct the Respondent No. 1 to 3 to de-notify the land of the petitioner bearing Khasra No. more particularly given in the notification being Annexure P-1, of Village Bagaha, TehsilRaghurajnagar, Satna; and,

III. This Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to pass any such or the further order this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

In short, the facts of the case are that the respondent No. 4 sought acquisition of the private land in question belonging to the petitioners for the purpose of construction of LPG Tank, Bottling Plant and Administrative Building under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (For short Act of 1894). The total extent of land sought to be acquired was 40.271 hectares as per the notification dated 24.10.1997 (Annexure P/1).

The respondent No. 2 entered into an agreement under Section 41 of the Act with the respondent No. 4 to the effect that respondent No. 4 shall provide Employment to at least one person of the family of Farmers from whom land has been acquired. The said condition is reflected in the Notification dated 14.08.1998 (Annexure P/2).

It is submitted that thereafter the land in question was acquired as per the terms and conditions provided in the Notification dated 24.10.1997 and the compensation was also determined. The petitioners received the compensation. Thereafter, the petitioners came to know that the work at the land acquired has been stopped by the respondent No. 4 because of which the delay in granting employment by the respondent No.4 was caused. Therefore, the petitioners filed WP No. 3111/2001. It is submitted that other aggrieved persons also filed WP No. 1217/2002. The respondents filed return in WP No. 1217/2002 admitting the fact of execution of agreement to the effect that employment is to be given to one of the family members whose land had been acquired. The said petition was disposed of by order dated 03.12.2001 (Annexure P/8) with direction to the respondents to decide the representation of the petitioners therein in respect of entitlement of the petitioners for employment.

It is submitted that the land in question was duly transferred in favour of respondent No. 4, the mutation was also done and the land is still lying recorded in the name of respondent No.4. However, later on, by letter dated 03.05.2002 (Annexure P/9), the respondent No. 4 informed the respondent No. 2 that the project has been scrapped by the management and accordingly the amount so deposited by the respondent No.4 was sought to be refunded. On representation by the petitioners, the respondent No.4 by letter dated 10.06.2002 (Annexure P/10) informed that since the project has been dropped, therefore, there is no question of granting any employment.

It is averred in the petition that the petitioners made several representations to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 that the land acquired be de-notified, but of no avail. Thereafter, in the year 2010 an advertisement was published to the effect that the land acquired for respondent No. 4 is sought to be transferred in favour of respondent No.5 for establishing an industrial area. The petitioners submitted objection before the competent authority stating that the previous acquisition was done for the specific purpose. It was also stated in the objection that the condition of agreement of providing job has also not been complied with and prayed for de-notification of the land in favour of the land owners, but of no avail. Hence, this petition.

The respondents/State has filed return contending that the award has already been filed in the matter as back as on 07.03.1998. The petitioners have received the amount of compensation as against acquisition of their land. It is averred that at no point of time the petitioners have assailed the award dated 07.03.1998 and as such the same has attained finality and the petitioners are claiming that the land in question be de-notified. Therefore, the present petition filed after 15 years of passing of award deserves to be dismissed.

It is submitted that the land was acquired for the public purpose for establishing LPG Tank, Bottling Plant and Administrative Building of Indian Oil Corporation. However, since the said project has been dropped by the IOCL and surrendered the land to the State, therefore, presently the respondents are developing Industrial Area on the land in question which is also a public purpose. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim that their land may be de-notified because purpose of acquisition is not existing.

It is submitted that in the present case the award was passed on 07.03.1998 and the petitioners have also received the amount of compensation and they have filed the present petition after about 15 years. Under such circumstances, the award has attained finality in absence of any challenge and prayed for dismissal of the petition.

The respondent MPAKVN has also filed reply reiterating almost same facts as mentioned in the return filed by the respondents/State, however, it has been submitted that the land in question has been transferred to the MPAKVN after surrender of the same by the IOCL to establish an industrial area. Now the name of the MPAKVN is duly recorded in the revenue record and the MPAKVN has invited tenders for establishing industries.

It is submitted by the learned senior counsels for the petitioners that the order dated 20.11.2023 passed by the coordinate Bench in WP No. 9227/2017 arising out of the same acquisition proceedings is not completely applicable in the present case in hand because there are certain legal issues, which have been left to be considered by the Court. It is submitted that the coordinate Bench has not considered the effect of the agreement which became the part of the Act under Sections 41 and 42 of the Act of 1894, which stipulates condition that the family members of the petitioners shall be given employment by the company for whom the acquisition has been done by invoking Urgency Clause. According to the said agreement, which became the part of the statute, that has to be complied with by the State as now the company has found that the project is not viable. The land in question, which has been acquired by the respondents, has been transferred to the other corporation of the State i.e. Madhya Pradesh Audyokik Kendra Vikas Nigam (MPAKVN), which, in turn is trying to establish industries by calling tenders from the various industry establishments on auction purchase basis, which will amount to creating profit out of the land. The said purpose cannot be said to be a public purpose for which the land has been said to be acquired.

It is submitted that these facts have not been considered by the coordinate Bench while deciding the writ petition of one of the persons from whom the land has been acquired for the same purpose. It is further submitted that two of the petitioners who had represented in the matter, their petition has been decided by the order, which is under challenge in the writ appeal; that has also been dismissed only on the ground of delay and laches. As the merits of the case has not been considered, therefore, this Court can very well adjudicate the points, which have been left by the coordinate Bench to consider and pass an order on merits ordering re-notification of the acquisition of the land in question.

Shri Gulati, learned senior counsel, has also specifically submitted that as the State had filed only a short return and all the averments of the petition have not been denied specifically, therefore, taking note of Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs. Abhishek Shukla reported in (2009) 5 SCC 368 has observed that such averments should be deemed to be admitted. It is further submitted that as it is clear that MPAKVN is now further going to allot the small plots of land to the industries, which is not permissible as per the agreement executed between the IOCL and the State, therefore, it should be treated to be changing the purpose of land for which it was acquired.

Shri Kochar, counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that as the agreement was executed between the IOCL and the State, the clauses of the agreement are binding on the MPAKVN also in the same terms as of IOCL.

Per contra, learned Advocate General of the State has submitted that the land was very much acquired for the purpose of installing a bottling plant, which is an industrial public purpose, however, as the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOCL) has requested and written that the project is not viable for them after the acquisition was over, keeping in mind that the people may be benefited by the acquisition, the land has been allotted to MPAKVN to establish industries in the area to generate employment for the people at large. It is further submitted that the agreement which has been relied on by the petitioners also contains several other stipulations, specifically Clauses 8 and 12, which speak that in case the land is returned by the IOCL to the State, it vests in the State and no claim whatsoever shall be made by the IOCL. It is further submitted that the agreement is bipartite and is enforceable only against the the parties by whom it has been executed. The only concern of the petitioners is that in the said agreement there is a Clause 4 which speaks about the employment to the family members of the affected persons and all the clauses are to be read in conjunction and not to be read independently. It is submitted that once the coordinate Bench has taken view that the industrial establishment is also a public purpose, therefore, following the judicial precedent, this Court is also follow the orders passed by the coordinate Bench. It is further submitted that as the petition of the two of the petitioners has already been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches against which writ appeal is pending, therefore, the petition of the petitioners be also dismissed on the same ground.

Shri Kochar counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the present petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches because in 2010 itself when the petitioners came to know that the land is being allotted to MPAKVN for establishing industries against the purpose for which the acquisition was made, the petitioners had made representation and thereafter in 2012, the petition has been filed. Therefore, the petition of the present petitioners does not suffer from delay and laches and can be entertained on merits of the case.

Learned counsels have invited attention of this Court towards the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and another vs. G. Jayarama Reddy and others reported in (2011) 10 SCC 608 to state that in case the State proposes to allot the land against the purpose for which acquisition was made then such notification is to be quashed in the light of the judgment.

Learned Advocate General has placed reliance on the order passed by the coordinate Bench in WP No. 9227/2017-Geeta Devi and others vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others decided on 20.11.2023 and submitted that the question of public purpose has already been decided and observed in the order. It is further submitted that if the land has been acquired for one public purpose, which was not found to be viable then it can be used for any other public purpose because the notification was made for the public purpose. It is submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Indor Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129 distinguishing the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels Limited (supra) has held that in that case the land acquired was allotted to individuals. In the case in hand, the land has not been transferred or allotted to the private individuals, therefore, the judgment cited by the petitioners herein is misplaced. Therefore, it is submitted that the State has not diversified the land for any other purpose than the public purpose and accordingly prayed for dismissal of the petition.

Shri Adhikari, senior counsel appearing for the IOCL has submitted that the agreement was executed between the State and the IOCL and it was found by the IOCL that the project was not viable, therefore, the Collector on their request has written to the State to refund the money. The land has been returned to the State in terms of Clauses 8 and 12 of the agreement. Therefore, now there is no question of any employment by the IOCL.

It is further submitted that some of the petitioners had earlier approached this Court for employment in lieu of the acquisition by filing WP No. 3111/2001; that was disposed of with direction to consider the case of the petitioners. However, review been filed for reviewing the order passed in WP No. 3111/2001, the Court in MCC No. 85/2002 vide order dated 15.03.2002 had clarified that the order was only for consideration and not for giving employment by the IOCL on application and as the project has been dropped. Therefore, it is submitted that the period of limitation would commence from 2001 when the petitioner had filed the petition and not from 2010.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

23 . The first question, which has been raised, which requires consideration by this court, is that whether the petition does not suffer with delay and laches and can this court take a different view than the view taken by the coordinate Bench in WP No.9227/2017 vide order dated 20.11.2003 and in present petition while dismissing the petition for two of the petitioners on the ground of delay and laches. This court while dismissing the present petition for two of the petitioners has held that as the award has been passed in the year 1997, the compensation in view of acquisition has already been paid, the petitioner had not availed the remedy of reference for enhancement of compensation, present petition has been filed in the year 2012, therefore, the petitioner cannot allow to blow hot and cold by retaining money, on the other hand, challenging the acquisition of land in question and most importantly delay and laches have not been explained.

The coordinate bench of this court in the case of Geeta Devi (Supra) has observed that after delay of almost 15 years, the petition in the year 2017 cannot be entertained. The acquisition proceeding has attained finality, the award has been passed and the amount of compensation has also been paid to the land owners, therefore, petition found to be barred by delay and laches and accordingly dismissed.

The petitioners herein have submitted that the present petition cannot be said to be suffered by delay and laches because the notification under section 4 of the Act was issued on 06.10.1997. On 24.10.1997, the declaration was made. In 1998 the land was acquired. On 14.08.98, an agreement under Section 41 of the Act was published and after publication of the agreement, the land acquired was transferred in favour of respondent No. 4 and the name of respondent No. 4 was recorded in the year 1998. Similarly situated persons knocked the doors of this court by filing WP No. 3111/2001 on the question of non-granting benefit of employment. The said petition was disposed of by this court. The other aggrieved persons have also filed writ petition i.e. WP No. 1217/2002 raising the same grievance for not granting the benefit of employment as despite of the direction of the Court to decide their representations for grant of employment, the grievance subsisted till 24.06.2010 when a public notice and notification was published by which the petitioners came to know that the land in question is to be transferred to respondent No. 5 from respondent number 4. The petitioners submitted objections on 06.09.2010. The petitioner submitted objections in the said proceedings also, as the objections were submitted against the change of use of the land. In 2010-11, an application under Right to Information Act was filed, which was replied vide covering letter dated 29.10.2011 (Annexure P/13) wherein it is stated that no proposal was pending for allotment of the land in question in favour of respondent No. 5. Again, by letter dated 10.01.2012 (Annexure P/14), the petitioners came to know under RTI that the respondent No. 5 has done all the formalities to get the transfer of the land in question. Thereafter, a news item was published on 11.01.2012 that the land is being transferred for industrial purpose and on 27-03-2012, the petition has been filed. When the chronology of the events and facts are considered to address the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties, it is found by this court that admittedly the award was passed in the year 1998, an agreement Annexure P/2 was made part of the Act in the year 1998. The petitioners and other similarly situated persons have raised grievance by filing writ petition in 2001 and thereafter in 2002 in WP No. 3111/2001 and WP No. 1217/2002, Annexures P/6, P/7 and P/8. On review being filed i.e. MCC No. 85/2002, this court vide order dated 15.03.2002 had clarified that the order was only for consideration and not for giving employment by the IOCL and in the said review petition itself it was disclosed that the IOCL has proposed to return the land as the project for which it was acquired was found to be not viable. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this court, for the first time the petitioners came to in the year 2002 that the land which has been acquired for the IOCL has been proposed to be returned. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioners were not aware of the fact that the project was found to be not viable, therefore the transfer was proposed, as it is clearly observed in the order dated 15-03-2002 that the project has been dropped. Therefore the creation of cause of action by the petitioner in the year 2010 to file the present petition is found to be not based on the actual facts of the case. Admittedly, the award was passed in the 1998 and the compensation was granted and possession was taken over at the relevant point of time. Once the affected persons have received the compensation and handed over the possession then the scope of interference to challenge the award is very limited. It is profitable to take reference of the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra), which is quoted here under:

"350. In Jasveer Singh v. State of U.P. [Jasveer Singh v. State of U.P., (2017) 6 SCC 787 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 642] , the writ petition was filed in which the High Court had directed [Jasvir Singh v. State of U.P. , 2015 SCC OnLine All 8469] the redetermination of the compensation. In that case the matter was remanded by this Court to consider the additional compensation under Section 23(1-A). Thereafter a submission was raised in the High Court under Section 24. This Court held that the challenge could not have been entertained. This Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 789-90, paras 2-3)

"2. On 19-12-2005 the appellants filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking quashing of the acquisition proceedings which was decided by the High Court on 3-12-2010 [Jasvir Singh v. State of U.P. , 2010 SCC OnLine All 3300] directing redetermination of compensation. The said order was set aside by this Court on 16-10-2012 in State of U.P. v. Jasveer Singh [State of U.P. v. Jasveer Singh, 2012 SCC OnLine SC 1216] . It was observed that : (Jasveer Singh case [State of U.P. v. Jasveer Singh, 2012 SCC OnLine SC 1216] , SCC OnLine SC paras 3-5)

'3. After considering the pros and cons, without entering into serious controversies and making any comment on the merit of the case, we are of the considered opinion that in view of the judgment and order of this Court dated 26-11-2010 [State of U.P. v. Jasvir Singh, (2011) 4 SCC 288 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 224] , which was passed in the presence of the counsel for both the parties, the High Court ought not to have heard the matter at all. Thus, the judgment and order [Jasvir Singh v. State of U.P. , 2015 SCC OnLine All 8469] impugned before us have lost its sanctity. Therefore, the same is hereby set aside.

However, in order to meet the ends of justice, we remand the case to the High Court to hear the writ petition afresh expeditiously preferably within a period of six months from the date of production of the certified copy of the order before the Hon'ble Chief Justice. The matter may be assigned to any particular Bench by the Hon'ble Chief Justice for final disposal. The parties shall be at liberty to raise all factual and legal issues involved in the case. The High Court is requested to deal with the relevant issues in detail.

More so, if the respondents are so aggrieved regarding withdrawal of their appeals, which had been remanded by this Court for determining the entitlement of interest under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and an application is made by the respondent to revive the same, the High Court may consider and decide the said application in accordance with law. All the matters shall be heard simultaneously by the same Bench if the appeals are restored.'

Thereafter, the High Court considered the contention of the appellants that the award in respect of compensation was no award in the eye of the law and though the possession was taken long back and railway line had been laid out, the acquisition proceedings were liable to be set aside, and compensation was liable to be awarded at present market rate. The High Court rejected the said plea vide judgment dated 30-5-2014 in Jasvir Singh v. State of U.P. [Jasvir Singh v. State of U.P. , 2014 SCC OnLine All 8465 : (2014) 105 ALR 502] It was observed that objection of the appellants against the award had already been considered and remand by the Supreme Court on 12-9-2005 [Jasvir Singh v. LAO, (2011) 4 SCC 394 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 279] was only in respect of statutory benefits. For the first time plea was sought to be raised in the writ petition against validity of acquisition which was impermissible in view of the law laid down by this Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC 285] , Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 4 SCC 695] , Sawaran Lata v. State of Haryana [Sawaran Lata v. State of Haryana, (2010) 4 SCC 532 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 220] and Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agarwal [Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agarwal, (2011) 5 SCC 394 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 747] . The judgment of this Court in Royal Orchid Hotels v. G. Jayarama Reddy [Royal Orchid Hotels v. G. Jayarama Reddy, (2011) 10 SCC 608 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 842] , was distinguished as that case related to the fraudulent exercise of power of eminent domain. The High Court concluded : (Jasvir Singh case [Jasvir Singh v. State of U.P. , 2014 SCC OnLine All 8465 : (2014) 105 ALR 502] , SCC OnLine All paras 45-47)

'45. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the writ petition is highly barred by laches and deserves to be dismissed on the ground of laches alone.

As has been observed above, the petitioners' main grievance is for enhancement of compensation, for which the petitioner has already filed First Appeal No. 880 of 1993 and First Appeal No. 401 of 1998 which appeals are being allowed by order of the date, we see no reason to entertain the writ petition.

Although various submissions on merits challenging the entire acquisition proceedings have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, but we having taken the view that the writ petition is highly barred by laches, we do not find it necessary to enter into the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners on merits.' "

366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition.

From the above enunciation of law, two factors, which may give rise to the challenge, are that non-payment of compensation or if the possession is not handed over within stipulated time. In the present case in hand, both of these two ingredients are not favouring the petitioners.

The Hon'ble Apex Court in Mary Pushpam vs. Telvi Curusumary and others reported in (2024) 3 SCC 224 has held as under:-

"20. The legal position on coordinate Benches has further been elaborated by this Court in State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd. [State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 26] : (SCC p. 157, paras 339-340)

"339. Judicial discipline envisages that a coordinate Bench follow the decision of an earlier coordinate Bench. If a coordinate Bench does not agree with the principles of law enunciated by another Bench, the matter may be referred only to a larger Bench.

(Emphasis supplied)"

The Larger Bench of this Court in Jabalpur Bus Operators Association and others vs. State of M.P. and others reported in 2003(1) MPLJ 513 has held as under:-

"9. Having considered the matter with broader dimensions, we find that various High Courts have given different opinion on the question involved. Some hold that in case of conflict between two judgments on a point of law, later decision should be followed; while others say that the Court should follow the decision which is correct and accurate whether it is earlier or later. There are High Courts which hold that decision of earlier Bench is binding because of the theory of binding precedent and Article 141 of the Constitution of India. There are also decisions which hold that single Judge differing from another single Judge decision should refer the case to larger Bench, otherwise he is bound by it. Decisions which are rendered without considering the decisions expressing contrary view have no value as a precedent. But in our considered opinion, the position may be stated thus-

With regard to the High Court, a single Bench is bound by the decision of another single Bench. In case, he does not agree with the view of the other single Bench, he should refer the matter to the larger Bench. Similarly, Division Bench is bound by the judgment of earlier Division Bench. In case, it does not agree with the view of the earlier Division Bench, it should refer the matter to larger Bench. In case of conflict between judgments of two Division Benches of equal strength, the decision of earlier Division Bench shall be followed except when it is explained by the latter Division Bench in which case the decision of latter Division Bench shall be binding. The decision of larger Bench is binding on smaller Benches.

In case of conflict between two decisions of the Apex Court, Benches comprising of equal number of Judges, decision of earlier Bench is binding unless explained by the latter Bench of equal strength, in which case the later decision is binding. Decision of a larger Bench is binding on smaller Benches. Therefore, the decision of earlier Division Bench, unless distinguished by latter Division Bench, is binding on the High Courts and the subordinate Courts. Similarly, in presence of Division Bench decisions and larger Bench decisions, the decisions of larger Bench are binding on the High Courts and the subordinate Courts. No decision of Apex Court has been brought to our notice which holds that in case of conflict between the two decisions by equal number of Judges, the later decision in binding in all circumstances, or the High Courts and subordinate Courts can follow any decision which is found correct and accurate to the case under consideration. High Courts and subordinate Courts should lack competence to interpret decisions of Apex Court since that would not only defeat what is envisaged under Article 141 of the Constitution of India but also militate hierarchical supremacy of Courts. The common thread which runs through various decisions of Apex Court seems to be that great value has to be attached to precedent which has taken the shape of rule being followed by it for the purpose of consistency and exactness in decisions of Court, unless the Court can clearly distinguish the decision put up as a precedent or is per incuriam, having been rendered without noticing some earlier precedents with which the Court agrees. Full Bench decision in Balbir Singh's case (supra) which holds that if there is conflict of views between the two co-equal Benches of the Apex Court, the High Court has to follow the judgment which appears to it to state the law more elaborately and more accurately and in conformity with the scheme of the Act, in our considered opinion, for reasons recorded in the preceding paragraph of this judgment, does not lay down the correct law as to application of precedent and is, therefore, overruled on this point.

After having answered the reference, writ petitions be placed before the single Judge for decision on merits."

Therefore, this court is in agreement with the orders passed in the present petition and the order passed in the case of Geeta Devi (supra) that the petition suffers from delay and laches.

It is also apposite to mention here that since this Court is in agreement with the orders passed by the coordinate Bench in the case cited hereinabove, therefore, as per the settled principle of law, this Court has to follow orders of the coordinate Bench. However, in case of conflict between the decisions of the coordinate Bench and this Court, the matter has to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice.

The other question in regard to non-granting of benefit of employment as per the agreement-Annexure P/2, Clause 4 makes the entire award nullity. The other ground has been raised that as the agreement-Annexure P/2 has been executed between the parties, which became the part of the Act under Sections 41 and 42 of Act of 1894, therefore, non-compliance of the said agreement would amount to frustrating the very purpose of the acquisition, which results into award as nullity. When it is found that the agreement Annexure P/2 contains several other clauses which deal with contingency that in case the IOCL could not run the project and the land is not used for the purpose for which it was acquired then the land and the house appurtenant thereto shall vest in the government for which the IOCL shall not be entitled for any compensation. In the present case in hand, as the land has been returned back by the company, which is clear from Annexure P/9 dated 03.05.2002 that the land was returned to the State, therefore the land as per Clause 12 of the agreement vested in the State. The question in regard to whether after revesting of the land, the petitioner can claim that due to subsequent events of transferring the land to respondent No.5 would change the public purpose for which the land was acquired, it is found that the this court in the case of Geeta Devi (supra) has already answered the said argument in para 6, 7 of the order, which are reproduced as under:-

"6. Initially the land was acquired for a particular project, which was to be established by the respondent No. 4, but some how that project failed and it could not be established. Therefore, the State granted the said land to respondent No. 5 for establishing an industrial area and respondent No. 5thereafter allotted the land to the industrialists, who were willing to start industries in the said area. Although in the year 2001 a petition i.e. WP No.311/2001 was filed by some of the land owners raising grievance that despite acquisition of their land, the condition of acquisition was not complied with by the respondent No. 4 and employment to the family members, whose land was acquired, has not been provided. The writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 03.12.2001 (Annexure P/7) directing Indian Oil Corporation (for short IOC) to take a decision within a period of three months and thereafter IOC vide order dated 03.05.2002 (Annexure P/8) refused to grant any appointment saying that the project for which the land was acquired and agreement was executed that was dropped and therefore acquisition was not done in their favour and as such question of granting employment to the land owners did not arise. After2002 nothing was done and in 2017 this petition was filed by the petitioners claiming that the employment be provided or land be returned to them as they are ready to deposit the amount of compensation.

I have heard the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. It is true that initially as per the notification the land was acquired for the public purpose i.e. for installing LPG Tank and Bottling Plant for respondent No. 4 and an agreement was also executed between the State and respondent No. 4, but that agreement could not be implemented for the reason that the project for which the land was acquired was not implemented and that proposal was dropped by respondent No. 4 and thereafter the land was vested in the State was given to respondent No. 5 for developing the industrial area. The respondent No. 5 thereafter allotted the land to the individuals, who were inclined to install the industries in that area. In my opinion, the petition suffers from delay and latches reason being when in 2002 it came to the knowledge of the petitioners that employment could not be given because IOC had dropped the idea for installing the project for which land had been acquired, the petitioners should have raised the grievance immediately thereafter, but they remained silent and in the meantime further development took place and the State granted the land to respondent No. 5 who developed the industrial area over the said land but nobody knows and it is also not on record as to whether any agreement was executed between the respondent No.5 and State on the same terms and conditions for which the land was acquired. Thus, after a delay of almost 15 years, the petition in 2017 cannot be entertained. The judgment on which the petitioners have placed reliance is not applicable in the present case for the reason that the Supreme Court in that case dealt with the situation in which the land was acquired for public purpose and was later on given to an individual. The acquisition proceeding was assailed and that was set aside by the Court quashing notification issued under Section 4(1)and (6) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. However, here in this case the acquisition proceeding has attained finality, award has been passed, the amount of compensation has also been paid to the land owners. Therefore, in my opinion, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed on the ground of delay and latches."

In addition to it, in the considered opinion of this court, that the MPAKVN is also one of the component of the State, which is involved in creating industrial sectors for the state, which generates employment to public at large. Therefore, if the state has taken the view to transfer the land to the Industrial Development Corporation with broad object of giving employment to those who are affected by establishing industry then it cannot be said to be a change of purpose on the basis of which it can be said that the entire acquisition proceeding is vitiated.

It is submitted by the counsel for the petitioners that the MPAKVN is an agency which grants lease to the industrial establishment on payment of premium and lease, therefore, the said establishment would earn profit out of the land which has been acquired. Therefore, in the light of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels (supra), the entire proceeding of the acquisition is vitiated and the land should to returned back to the petitioners.

In the case of Royal Orchid Hotels (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-

"36. The next question which merits examination is whether the High Court was justified in directing restoration of land to Respondent 1. In Behroze Ramyar Batha v. Land Acquisition Officer [Behroze Ramyar Batha v. Land Acquisition Officer , (1992) 1 Kant LJ 589 : ILR 1991 Kant 3556] , the Division Bench of the High Court categorically held that the exercise undertaken for the acquisition of land was vitiated due to fraud. The Division Bench was also of the view that the acquisition cannot be valid in part and invalid in other parts, but did not nullify all the transfers on the premise that other writ petitions and a writ appeal involving challenge to the acquisition proceedings were pending. In Annaiah v. State of Karnataka [Annaiah v. State of Karnataka, WPs (C) Nos. 19812-16 of 1990 order dated 18-9-1991 (Kant)] the same Division Bench specifically adverted to the issue of diversification of purpose and held that where the landowners are deprived of their land under the cover of public purpose and there is diversification of land for a private purpose, it amounts to fraudulent exercise of the power of eminent domain."

To deal with the question, it is be profitable to refer to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) quoted hereinabove wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the question and held that in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels (supra), the state has proposed to diversify the land to individuals which cannot be said to be a public purpose, but in the present case the land has been transferred to respondent no.5, one of the component of the State involved in creating industrialization with a broader object to generate employment to public at large, which cannot be assumed to be not a public purpose.

The agreement which has been executed between the State and IOCL is bipartite agreement, which can be enforced against the parties of the agreement. The petitioners are not party to the agreement. However, reference has been made upon Clause 4 of the agreement, which contains the condition that the IOCL shall give employment to one of the family members of the affected family. As it is already observed by this Court that as the land has been returned back finding that the project is not viable, the IOCL cannot be compelled to grant employment. The said grievances were raised by the petitioners in the earlier round of litigations in WP Nos. 3111/2001 and 1217/2002 and in MCC No. 85/2002. Therefore, on the said pretext, the acquisition cannot be said to be vitiated because the land has been vested in the State Government after return from the IOCL. The agreement does not stipulate that if the IOCL close down the project, the land will return to the persons from whom the acquisition is made. In absence of any such clause, the petitioners cannot take benefit of the agreement stating it to be a part of the Act under Section 41 and 42 of the Act because that is not going to give any consequential relief to the petitioner as the land has been found to be acquired in consonance of law by granting due compensation and taking over possession at the relevant point of time.

Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, no case is made out to quash the entire proceeding of the acquisition. However, it is observed that the State was supposed to facilitate employment to one of the members of the affected families due to acquisition of their land, therefore, when the acquisition is intact, the State must facilitate the employment to one of the family members of the petitioner through respondent No.5 by making arrangements with the industrial units proposed to be established on the acquired land.

With the aforesaid, the petition is dismissed.