D.L. Gupta vs State Bank of India and Others

R.B. Misra, J.—Civil review petition No. 6 of 2000 has been preferred for reviewing the order dated 11.8.1999 passed in Civil Writ Petition No. 719 of 1992 D.L. Gupta v. State Bank of India and Ors. and Anr. Review Petition No. 7 of 2000 has been preferred for reviewing order dated 11.8.1999 passed in Civil Writ Petition No. 270 of 1992 D.L. Gupta v. State Bank of India and Anr. The above two Review Petitions have since been preferred against a common order, therefore, these shall also be adjudicated together.

The writ petition No. 270 of 1992 was filed by the writ Petitioner with a prayer to quash the proceedings dated 15.10.1990 and order dated 24.1.1991 seeking direction to the Respondent bank namely State Bank of India to consider his claim for promoting him as M.M.G.S.-III w.e.f. 1.8.1985. An another Writ Petition No. 719 of 1992 was preferred by the writ Petitioner for quashing the orders dated 17.8.1985 and 12.2.1991, seeking direction to the Respondents to withdraw the punishment order and grant the writ Petitioner all consequential benefits including the promotion.

After considering the submissions of the writ Petitioners and rival contentions of the Respondents and after careful scrutiny of the records, this High court by a common order dated 11.8.1999, has been pleased to dismiss both the above writ petitions.

The writ Petitioner has inter-alia made here similar submissions as were made in both the writ petitions and inter-alia has also contended that the writ Petitioner was eligible to be promoted as Officer of M.M.G.S.III w.e.f. 1.8.1985, whereas, this High court has erroneously treated a different date i.e. 27.5.1987 as the date of consideration of promotion and has illegally dismissed the writ petition in derogation to the settled principles of law, ignoring the averments and contentions made in the writ petitions.

In Review Petition No. 7 of 2000, the writ Petitioner has tried to impress that this Court while adjudicating the Writ Petition No. 719 of 1992 has not appreciated the contents of the charge sheet and has failed to appreciate the material on record. There was non-application of mind on the part of the disciplinary authority and appropriate opportunity was not afforded to the writ Petitioner to defend his case before the inquiring officer. Besides this, the inquiry report was not supplied to the writ Petitioner, as such, the impugned order of this Court is illegal and contrary to the law, therefore, the Review Petition is to be allowed and the order dated 11.8.1999 passed in both the above writ petitions is to be rectified and modified accordingly as per the averments, pleadings, grounds and prayers made therein.

It is necessary to see as to whether the prayers made in the present Review Petitions may be brought within the permissible parameters and the relevant provisions of review provided in the relevant statute or not.

(A) Before proceeding further, it may be necessary to reproduce hereunder the relevant provisions of review provided in Civil Procedure Code.

114.Review- Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred.

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of small causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.

Order 47 Rule 1 OF CPC

Application for review of judgment

(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved-

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred.

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the Appellant, or when, being Respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.

(B) In respect of review it is relevant to mention that in Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi, it was held by the Supreme Court that the review is not for the purpose of a re-hearing or for making a fresh decision. The normal principle is that the judgment pronounced by the Court is final. The Supreme Court has observed in para 8 which reads as below:

8 It is well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. Sajjan Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, For instance, if the attention of the Court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, the Court will revise its judgment. Girdhari Lal Gupta Vs. D.H. Mehta and Another, The Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice. O.N. Mohindroo Vs. The District Judge, Delhi and Another, Power to review its judgments has been conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145. In a civil proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in O. XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. (Order XL, Rule 1, Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except ''where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility''. Sow Chandra Kante and Another Vs. Sheikh Habib,

In Sow Chandra Kante and Another Vs. Sheikh Habib, the Supreme Court has held that the review cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and it could be exercised only where a glaring omission or patent mistake has occurred in the order.

In Smt. Meera Bhanja Vs. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, it was held that the review is to be made when there is error apparent on the face of the record.

In Meera Bhanja (Smt.) (supra), the Supreme Court has observed in para-8 as below:

It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the Court under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma Vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma and Others, ; Babboo alias Kalyandas and Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., has made the following pertinent observations (SCC p.390, para-3).

It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of Plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of Appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court,

The Supreme Court has observed in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Others Vs. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, wherein K.C. Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Supreme Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record:

An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior Court to issue such a writ.

Relying on the above judgments the Supreme Court in Smt. Meera Bhanja Vs. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, has held as below:

The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. The review petition has to be entertained only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. An error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. The limitation of powers of court under Order 47 Rule 1, CPC is similar to the jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking review of the orders under Article 226.

In Parsion Devi and Others Vs. Sumitri Devi and Others, the Supreme Court has indicated that the error which is self evident and not to be detected by process of reasoning can hardly be a matter of review.

In this case, the Supreme Court has observed in para-7 which reads as below:

review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. Vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court opined:

What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an ''error apparent on the face of the record). The fact that on the earlier occasion the court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not perse be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an ''error apparent on the face of the record'', for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by ''error apparent''. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.

The Supreme Court in Parsion Devi and Others Vs. Sumitri Devi and Others, has held:

Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter-alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise.

In AIR 2000 SC 1650 Lily Thomas v. Union of India and Ors. the Supreme Court has held that the mistake apparent on the face of the record cannot mean error which has to be fished out and searched. The words "any other sufficient reasons" has been elaborated and it means that "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule" and it was observed in para 52, para 55 and para 57 which reads as below:

52 The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others Vs. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error. This Court in S. Nagaraj and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Another, held: "Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or re-consideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the Courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest Court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the Courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In AIR 1941 1 (Federal Court) the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest Court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Raj under Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh (1836) 1 Moo PC 117 that an order made by the Court has final and could not be altered. ... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, by errors have been introduced, these Courts possess, by Common Law, the same power which the Courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in.... The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have however gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.'' Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under:

''It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a Court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.''

''Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And Clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order 40 had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, ''for any other sufficient reason'' in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order 40, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest in justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice.

The mere fact that two views on the same subject are possible is no ground to review the earlier judgment passed by a Bench of the same strength.

It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment.

Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under O. 40 of the Supreme Court Rules read with O. 47 of the CPC has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the judgment in Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani and others Vs. Union of India and others, . It is not the case of the Petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us were in fact addressed for and on behalf of the Petitioners before the Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed the judgment in Sarla Mudgal''s case. We have also not found any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which is to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgment interpreting Section 494 amounted violation of some of the fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for reviewing the judgment. The words "any other sufficient reason appearing in O. 47, Rule 1, C.P.C." must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule," as was held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki Ram AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Bassellos Catholics v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526 . Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In T.C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa and Another, this Court held that such error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and Others, it was held (para 23):

... it is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? Learned Counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated. Mr. Pathak for the first Respondent contended on the strength of certain observations of Chagla, C.J. in - Batuk K. Vyas Vs. Surat Borough Municipality and Others, that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was not self-evident and if it required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be considered by one-Judge as self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case.

On analysis of the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, it becomes apparent that the scope of review need not be confined to (i) discovery of a new and important piece of evidence and (ii) an error apparent on the face of record, but also to a situation necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason on the strength of the following decisions:

(i) Board of Control for Cricket, India and Another Vs. Netaji Cricket Club and Others,

(ii) The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another Vs. Gokulprasad Maniklal Agarwal and Another,

(iii) Krishna Mohan Jamatia Vs. State of Tripura and Others,

(iv) M.M. Thomas Vs. State of Kerala and Another,

(v) AIR 2000 SC 1650 Lily Thomas etc. v. Union of India and Ors.

(vi) Rajender Singh Vs. Lt. Governor, Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Others,

The Supreme Court in the case of Board of Control for Cricket (supra) has observed that Order 47 Rule 11 of CPC provides for filing an application for review. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason. The Supreme Court further held that a mistake on the part of the Court which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason. What would constitute sufficient reason in O. 47, Rule 1 of the Code is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a Court or even an Advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "cactus curiae neminem gravabit."

In Oriental Insurance Company (supra), Hon''ble the Supreme Court has observed that review was to be allowed by the High Court instead of dismissing on the ground that there was no error apparent on the face of the record, moreso, when the judgment was passed by the High Court relying on erroneous submissions and explanation of the learned Counsel for the parties about the relevant rules by saying that reduction to a lower timescale or to a lower stage in a timescale, was minor instead of major penalty, enabling the High Court to give decision that the promotion of the incumbent was not to be denied for merely imposition of minor penalty on him.

In M.M. Thomas (supra), Hon''ble the Supreme Court has held that if any apparent error is noticed by the High Court in respect of any orders passed by it, the High Court has not only power but a duty to correct it. The relevant paragraph 14 is as below:

High Court as a Court of Record, as envisaged in Article 215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers to correct the records. A Court of Record envelopes all such powers whose acts and proceedings are to be enrolled in a perpetual, memorial and testimony. A court of Record is undoubtedly a superior Court which itself is competent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction. The High Court, as a Court of Record, has a duty to itself to keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law. Hence, if any apparent error is noticed by the High Court in respect of any orders passed by it the High Court has not only power, but a duty to correct it. The High Court''s power in that regards is plenary.

The case of Rajendra Singh (supra), where the writ Petitioner''s claim for grant of senior grade and selection grade was declined by the High Court under ''UGC Career Advancement Scheme'' and his service as teacher was regularized from the date of initial appointment without deciding many important issues by ignoring material on record, the Supreme Court has observed that it was a clear case of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC on the ground of error apparent on the face of record'' and non-consideration of relevant documents, as such, and the rejection of review petition by the High Court was not proper. The relevant paragraph 16 is quoted as below:

The power in our opinion, extends to correct all errors to prevent miscarriage of justice. The Courts should not hesitate to review its owner earlier order when there exists an error on the face of the record and the interest of the justice so demands in appropriate cases. The grievance of the Appellant is that though several vital issues were raised and documents placed, the High Court has not considered the same in its review jurisdiction. In our opinion, the High Courts order in the revision petition is not correct which really necessitates our interference.

In Lily Thomas (supra) the Supreme Court has observed that review means that the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute, however, the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise.

The Supreme Court has further observed that the words ''any other sufficient reason'' appearing in Order 47, Rule 1, CPC must mean" a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule." As was held in Chajju Ram v. Neki Ram AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved b this Court in Moran Mar Bassellos Catholics v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526. Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law.

X X X X X X X X X X 23. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to the determined judicially on the facts of each case (Para 57).

In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. Vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, the Apex Court held as under:

A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out.

In Union of India and Ors. v. Mohd. Nayyar Khalil and Ors. reported in, (2000) 9 SCC 252 the Apex Court rejected the review application which was filed on the ground that the High Court had decided the case placing reliance upon the decision the Supreme Court, the correctness of which had been doubted and the matter had been referred to the Large Bench of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the Larger Bench had taken a contrary view. The review petition was dismissed on the grounds, inter alia, that the situation had not been pointed out by the counsel to the Bench when the matter was initially heard.

The first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review application is that the order, review of which is sought (a) suffers from any error apparent on the face of the record, and (b) permitting the order to stand will lead to failure to justice. (Vide Rajender Kumar and Others Vs. Rambhai and Others, ; Green View Tea and Industries Vs. Collector, Golaghat, Assam and Another, ; and Des Raj (Deceased) through L.Rs. and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another,

In Zahira Habibullah Sheikh and Another etc. Vs. State of Gujarat and Others etc., the Apex Court referred to its earlier judgments in P.N. Eswara Iyer etc. v. Registrar Supreme Court of India (1980) 4 SCC 680 ; Suthenthiraraja @ Santhan and Others etc. etc. Vs. State Through DSP/CBI, SIT, Chennai etc. etc., ; Ram Deo Chauhan @ Raj Nath Vs. State of Assam, ; and Devinder Singh and Others Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, ; and observed that review applications "are not to be filed for the pleasure of the parties or even as a device for ventilating remorselessness, but ought to be resorted to with a great sense of responsibility as well".

A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, In Re: Mahamaya Banerjee, , held that a review under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code is permissible if there had been misconception of fact and / or law by the counsel, as it will fall within the ambit of expression "sufficient reason" in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code. The Calcutta High Court proceeded with the presumption that in order to do justice, which has been denied to a party owing to patently wrong step taken by its counsel, the court can exercise its inherent power to come to its rescue and to do justice. With all due respect, the said judgment does not lay down the correct law for the reason that it is settled legal proposition that inherent powers cannot be used by the Court where a Statute provides for a specific remedy.

Undoubtedly, inherent powers conferred upon the Court either u/s 151 of the Code or any other analogous provision, can be exercised by the Court to do justice or to further cause of justice. (Vide Manohar Lal Chopra Vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, ; Union of India (UOI) Vs. Ram Charan and Others, ; and Vikas Aggarwal Vs. Anubha, However, inherent powers cannot be used by a Court where Statute itself provides for remedy as held by the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra (Supra); Arjun Singh Vs. Mohindra Kumar and Others, ; Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Kanhaya Lal Bhargava and Others, ; Nain Singh Vs. Koonwarjee and Others, ; State of West Bengal and Others Vs. Karan Singh Binayak and Others,

The concept of writ jurisdiction is founded by far on justice, equity and fairness and if the Court has committed a mistake, it should be removed entertaining a review application so that the result may not lead to miscarriage of justice, as rectification of an order stems from the fundamental principles that justice is above all. Provisions of Order XL VII, Rule 1, C.P.C. permits the review even on the mistake of fact or even on ignorance of material fact. The review jurisdiction should be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors if any in the order. The power of review inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. (Vide Shivdeo Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others, ; Babboo alias Kalyandas and Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, ; Union Carbide Corporation, etc., etc. Vs. Union of India, etc. etc., ; S. Nagaraj and Ors. (Supra); Parision Devi and Ors. v. Sumitri Devi and Ors. (Supra); Surjit Singh and others Vs. Union of India and others, ; Revenue Divisional Officer and Others Vs. A. Aruna and Others, ; and Rajender Kumar and Others Vs. Rambhai and Others,

In High Court of Madhya Pradesh v. Mahesh Prakash AIR 1994 SC 2599, the Supreme Court dealt with the similar issue and held as under:

Unless there is clear indication that there has been a misinterpretation of a legal position, it is undesirable and unsafe for one Full Court to revise the decision taken by an earlier Full Court.

In view of above discussion, the law of review can be summarized that it lies only on the grounds mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. The party must satisfy the Court that the matter or evidence discovered by it at a subsequent stage should not be discovered or produced at the initial stage though it had acted with due diligence. A party filing a review application on the ground of any other "sufficient reason" must satisfy that the said reason is analogous to the conditions mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. Under the garb of review, a party cannot be permitted to re-open the case and to gain a full-fledged innings for making submissions, nor review lies merely on the ground that it may be possible for the Court to take a view contrary to what had been taken earlier. Review lies only when there is error apparent on the face of the record and that fallibility is by the over-sight of the Court. If a counsel has argued a case to his satisfaction and he had not raised the particular point for any reason whatsoever, it cannot be a ground of review for the reason that he was the master of his case and might not have considered it proper to press the same or could have thought that arguing that point would not serve any purpose. If a case has been decided after full consideration of arguments made by a counsel, he cannot be permitted, even under the garb of doing justice or substantial justice, to engage the Court again to decide the controversy already decided. If a party is aggrieved of a judgment, it must approach the Higher Court but entertaining a review to reconsider the case would amount to exceeding its jurisdiction, conferred under the limited jurisdiction for the purpose of review. The concept of justice, as explained above, cannot be stretched beyond the permissible limits and, therefore, Courts cannot be persuaded to entertain a review application unless it lies only on the grounds mentioned in the relevant statutory provisions.

In our respectful consideration, both the above review petitions have been filed reiterating the averments and contentions as have been indicated in the respective writ petitions. Learned Counsel for the writ Petitioner could not point out through the averments and contentions made in the present review petitions as to what are the relevant points which could not be taken as a point of consideration for reviewing the order dated 11.8.1999. No specific point has been indicated and nothing particular has been placed before us in both the review petitions which could be considered for the purpose of review. During the course of arguments, learned Counsel for the writ Petitioner has vehemently argued that the impugned order is illegal, erroneous and contrary to law. Nothing more has been brought which may be considered and taken within the four corners of the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. Possibility of a different view if considered afresh on merits, does not fall within the scope of review. In these circumstances both the above review petitions are dismissed.