High CourtsFull Bench(1992) 12 P&H CK 0022

D.L. Katyal Accounts Executive vs The Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 17 December 1992 · Citation: (1993) 1 ILR (P&H) 321 : (1993) 103 PLR 382

HON’BLE JUDGES
R.S. Mongia, J · N.K. Kapoor, J · J.S. Sekhon, J
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ Petition No. 5567 of 1989

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

18 paragraphs · 1,358 words

R.S. Mongia, J.—The petitioner is an employee of the Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited, Dundahera (Gurgaon) (in short I.D.P.L.). A departmental enquiry was initiated against him, while he was working as Accounts'' Executive, under Rule 5 of the I. D. P. L. Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978, for imposing a major penalty The enquiry was conducted by Senior Personnel Manager, I.D.P.L., who submitted his report to the Punishing Authority, i.e. the Director, Finance. The Punishing Authority, vide order dated 26th May, 1988 (Annexure P. 3) imposed the punishment of reduction of pay to the lower stage in the time scale for a period of two years The petitioner remined unsuccessful before the Appellate Authority. The present writ petition was filed challenging the orders of imposition of punishment and rejection of appeal.

2.

The Motion Bench admitted the writ petition on 26th April, 1989, by passing the following orders :-

"Cites J. C. Mehta, S. E. P.G.I. v. P.G.I. Chandigarh 1984 (4) S. L. R. 768. Admitted to D. B. To be heard alongwith L.P.A. No. 1150 of 1988."

3.

L.P.A. No. 1150 of 1988 was an appeal filed by the P. G. I. against the judgment in J. C. Mehta''s case, which was relied upon by the petitioner at the time of admission. The said letters Patent Appeal was allowed and the judgment of the learned Single Judge was reversed. The judgment of the Letters Patent Bench is now reported as 1991(1) SLR. 127. The present petition somehow was not heard alongwith the said Letters Patent Appeal.

4.

After the judgment, the writ petition came up for hearing before a Division Bench. An argument was raised on behalf of the petitioner that the writ petition deserves to be allowed in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and others Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, notwithstanding the judgment of the Letters Patent Bench in L. P. A. No. 1150 of 1988 1991(1) S.L.R. 127.

5.

In Mohd. Ramzan''s case (supra), it has been decided that in confirmity with the Rules of natural justice, it is incumbent that before final decision is taken by the punishing Authority, a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer must be supplied to the delinquent official. Since, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the enquiry report had not been supplied, the order of punishment was vitiated. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted before the Division Bench that the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohd Ramzan''s case (supra) would only apply prospectively and would not effect the orders of punishment passed prior to the date of the judgment. He relied upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ramzan''s case (supra) :-

"There have been several decisions in different High Courts which, following the Forty-Second Amendment, have taken the view that it is no longer necessary to furnish a copy of the inquiry report to delinquent officers. Even on some occasions this Court has taken that view. Since we have reached a different conclusion the judgment in the different High Courts taking the contrary view must be taken to be no longer laying down good law. We have not been shown any decision of a coordinate or a larger Bench of this Court taking this view. Therefore, the conclusion to the contrary reached by any two judge Bench in this Court will also no longer be taken to be laying down good law, but this shall have prospective application and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground."

6.

The judgment in Mohd Ramzan''s case (supra) was delivered on 20th November, 1990, and, since, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, the order of punishment in this case was passed prior to that, i.e. 26th May, 1988, the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan''s cane (supra) would not be applicable.

7.

Learned counsel for the petitioner cited a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Madan Lal v. Registrar Cooperative Societies, Punjab 1991 (5) S. L. R. 430, which held that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ramzan''s case (supra) would also be applicable to the matters which were sub-judice in some Courts of Law on that date, The Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the Division Bench judgment in Madan Lal''s case (supra) needed reconsideration by a Larger Bench in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Mohd Ramzan''s case, referred to above. The Division Bench hearing the present petition, vide order dated 24th January, 1992, referred the matter to a Larger Bench as to whether Madan Lal''s case (supra) laid down correct law or not. That is how we are seized of the matter.

8.

It has been fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the controversy, which was sought to be settled by the Full Bench, has since been set at rest by the Supreme Court itself. In Writ Petition No. 145 of 1989, decided on 6th March, 1991. (P. Viswanathan v. Union of India and Ors., C. W. P. 145 of 1989), the Apex Court observed as under :-

"Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that since a copy of the inquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner the order of termination is vitiated. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan AIR 1991 S.C. 491. It is true that this Court has held that if inquiry report is not supplied to the delinquent employee before passing the order of punishment the order would be rendered illegal. But the decision of this Court is given a prospective effect, it will not effect the orders passed prior to the date of rendering the judgment (November 20, 1990) as would be clear from para 17 of the judgment."

In S L.P. No. 4155 of 1992, decided on 9th September, 1992, the Apex Court, after quoting the above mentioned para, (i. e. para 17) in Mohd. Ramzan''s case regarding its prospective application, observed as under:-

"The judgment in Mohd. Ramzan''s case was delivered by this Court in November 20, 1990 The respondent was dismissed from service by the order dated February 2. 1989 It is, therefore, obvious that the respondent cannot take advantage of the law laid down by this Court in Mohd Ramzan''s case. The High Court therefore, fell into patent error in quashing the dismissal order."

9.

Another Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Bhagirath Gramin Bank v. Brijinder Kumar Srivastava, SLP No. 7631 of 1992, decided on 23rd October, 1992. again after noticing the above quoted para from the Judgment of Mohd. Ramzan''s case (supra), observed as under :-

"Now the judgment in Mohd, Ramzan''s case was delivered on November 20, 1990, whereas the respondent was dismissed from service before that date on January 15, 1987. If the doctrine of prospective application is invoked, it is obvious that the benefit of the judgment cannot go to the respondent delinquent."

10.

In view of the observations of the Supreme Court, as noticed above, it cannot be but held that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ramzan''s case is to apply prospectively. With due respect to the learned Judges of the Division Bench in Madan Lal''s case (supra), we hold that the same does not lay down correct law.

11.

In view of what has been stated above, the impugned orders in the present case cannot be set aside on the ground that enquiry report had not been supplied to the petitioner before the Punishing Authority passed the impugned order.

12.

The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that apart from the above point, there are certain other points also in the case, on the basis of which the impugned order cannot be sustained. Keeping in view the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, we remit the case to the Division Bench (as initially the case was admitted to DB), for deciding any other point that may be raised by the petitioner.