High CourtsDivision Bench

Dr. Ajoy Das Gupta vs Patna Muncipal Corporation and Another

Patna High Court · Decided on 29 September 2000 · Citation: (2001) 4 PLJR 238

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.K. Chattopadhyaya, J · N. Pandey, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 62 · Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 — Section 151, 151(1), 151(2), 151(3), 152
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Rev. No''s. 1839 and 1948 of 1998 and M.J.C. No. 1558 of 1993
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Judgment

13 paragraphs · 1,238 words

N. Pandey, J.—The first revisional application is against the order dated 23rd April, 1983 of the Additional Judge, Patna in Misc. Case No. 113 of 1983 passed u/s 152 of the Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 (Bihar Act XIII of 1952) (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) whereby he has upheld the annual rental valuation of the holding in question as was fixed by the Municipal Corporation. The second revision application ha� been preferred against the order of the same Court, dated 1.6.1988 in Misc. Case No. 6 of 1988 whereby the review application was dismissed. The third petition was filed for a proceeding of contempt against the Chief Executive Officer of the Patna Municipal Corporation and other authorities.

2.

Facts of these cases are very simple. Admittedly the Petitioner is the owner of the holding No. 344/404, mohalla Rajendra Nagar of this town. According to the Municipal authority, the Petitioner had made certain additions and alterations in the holding in question, therefore, previous assessment of Rs. 3200/- which was made in the year 1972, was ultimately revised to Rs. 4000/- with affect from the year 1978. On Petitioner''s raising objection u/s 151 of the Act, the Chief Executive Officer had called for a report from the Revenue Officer after holding inquiry. But when the report was submitted, he also agreed with the report and rejected the objection. Hence the appeal before the District Judge, Patna u/s 152 of the Act, which was also ultimately rejected.

3.

The main objection of the Petitioner was that the enhancement of the rental valuation was arbitrary since no addition on alteration was made to the holding and further that the demand of the rental as on 9.1.1982 on the basis of the assessment which was made with effect from 1.4.1978 was beyond the period of three years, therefore, barred by limitation.

4.

It appears when the case was placed for hearing before learned Single Judge a question was raised whether in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Rajendra Prasad v. The Patna Municipal Corporation, Patna 1956 PLJR 45, a Civil Revision application against the order of the District Judge passed u/s 152 of the Act was maintainable? Since in the aforesaid case the provision of Section 502 of the Act was not noticed the case was referred to the Division Bench.

5.

The solitary question thus arises for consideration is whether against the order of the District Judge u/s 152, Chapter X of the Act, the High Court can exercise its revisional jurisdiction?

Chapter X of the Act deals with different provisions regarding powers of the authorities for assessing valuation of the holding and imposition of taxation etc. Sub-section (1) of Section 151 of the Act is for investigation of objections by the Chief Executive Officer. Sub-section (2) of the same section further authorizes the Chief Executive Officer or any officer empowered in this behalf by the State Government to hear objections in presence of the objectors on the authorities agent and after determination of the objection, the concerned authority shall pass necessary orders as per Sub-section (3).

6.

Section 152 of this Chapter is the provision to file an appeal before the District Judge, Patna, against the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer u/s 151 of the Act. As per Sub-section (1) of Section 152, the decision of the District Judge shall be final. Therefore, keeping in mind the provisions of Sub-section (1) in the case of Rajendra Prasad (supra), it was held that the order of the District Judge shall be final and cannot be assailed in revision before the High Court.

7.

Learned Counsel contended that having regard to the provisions of Sections 502 and 513 of the Act, it would not be proper to hold that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is excluded in such matters; whereas learned Counsel for the Municipal Corporation contended that in view of the special provision as prescribed u/s 152 of the Act, which is the exclusive remedy of appeal against the order of the Chief Executive Officer u/s 151 of the Act, the general provisions of Chapter XXX of Sections 502 and 513 would not be applicable.

8.

True it is the case of Rajendra Prasad v. The Patna Municipal Corporation, Patna (supra) the provisions of Sections 502 of 503 were not noticed but from a bare reference to those provisions, it would appear that they are not applicable to the orders and proceedings under Chapter X of the Act. In fact, the remedy for appeal against an order u/s 151 of the Act is specifically provided u/s 152 before the District Judge, Patna whose order shall be final whereas u/s 502 of the Act, specific care has been taken that unless it is otherwise expressly provided by the Act, the decision of the District Judge shall be subject to revision of the High Court.

9.

In this case, there is no dispute that against the order of the Chief Executive Officer u/s 151 of the Act, an appeal was filed before the District Judge u/s 152(1) of the Act. From a plain reading of the provisions of Section 152(1) of the Act, it would appear that any person dissatisfied with the order u/s 151 may file an appeal before the District Judge whose order shall be final. Thus, it is manifest that the provisions of Section 152(1) are complete and self-contained. The provisions of Sections 502 and 503 of the Act, therefore, will have no overriding effect to the provisions of Section 152(1). It would appear from Section 502 that the legislature have already taken care that unless it is otherwise expressly provided by this Act, the decision of the District Judge shall be subject to the revision by the court. Therefore, the words "unless it is otherwise expressly provided" u/s 502 would always be subject to the provisions of Sub-section 152, which contemplates that the decision of the District Judge shall be final. The use of the expression "shall be final" will have to be understood in proper context keeping in view the purpose of the Act. Therefore, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court would be impliedly barred in such cases where provisions of the special enactment makes a decision of the appellate authority final and not open to question. As held by the apex court in case of Aundal Ammal Vs. Sadasivan Pillai, , the provisions of special enactment should always be construed in conformity with the legislative intention and scheme of the Act.

10.

I, therefore, taking into consideration the facts noticed above found myself in full agreement with the views expressed by this Court in the case of Rajendra Prasad v. The Patna Municipal Corporation, Patna (supra).

11.

Now adverting to the question whether the demand in question beyond the period of three years was barred by limitation in my view having regard to the views expressed by this Court in the case of Raj Kumar Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and Others , there is no merit in this question as well. Because the period of limitation as held by this Court in the abovementioned case for realization of municipal holdings would be 12 years as prescribed by Article 62 of the Limitation Act.

12.

In the result for the reasons stated above, I find no merit in these cases. They are accordingly dismissed.