High CourtsDivision Bench

Dr. Edward Mathuram and Others vs G.T.S. Abdul Latiff Sahib and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 11 February 1949 · Citation: (1949) 62 LW 311 : (1949) 1 MLJ 447

HON’BLE JUDGES
Govinda Menon, J
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39 paragraphs · 925 words

Govinda Menon, J.—When this petition was taken up for hearing it was noticed that the order of the lower Court is appealable under Order

43, Rule (1)(j) of the CPC and when that was discovered, Mr. Venugopalachari for the petitioner filed an application for leave to convert the civil

revision petition into a civil miscellaneous appeal. As the civil revision petition itself was filed before the expiry of the period of limitation and as no

question of bar of time arises and since the court-fee in the civil revision petition was more than what would have to be paid in a civil miscellaneous

appeal, I allowed the petition and the civil revision petition was converted into a civil miscellaneous appeal, the jurisdictional value of which being

below Rs. 5,000 it is permissible to have the civil miscellaneous appeal disposed of by a single Judge. It is on the basis that the proceedings before

me are in the nature of a civil miscellaneous appeal that I dispose of the case now.

2.

The appellants herein were the decree-holders who obtained a decree for a sum of money against the judgment-debtor. Properties were

attached and sold in pursuance of that decree whereupon the first respondent herein claiming to be a previous purchaser of some items of

properties from the judgment-debtor filed an application under Order 21, Rule 89, Civil Procedure Code, for setting aside the sale. Along with the

deposit of the necessary amount, an application supported by an affidavit was filed. Paragraph 6 of the affidavit is in the following terms:

Without prejudice to my contentions in the appeal and my right to recover it from the decree-holders in the event of my success in appeal, I am

paying towards the decree lest the sale of the properties should be confirmed the amount due under the decree...in full.

The decree-holder objected to this deposit by means of a counter in which it was stated that the deposit was not unconditional and unreserved and

was made under protest. In such circumstances, the decree-holder urged that the deposit was not valid under Order 21, Rule 89, and therefore the

sale should not be set aside. The learned District Judge was of opinion that it was an unconditional deposit even though the paragraph referred to

above stated that the person who deposited the money reserved his right to claim the amount in the case of his success in another appeal. A Full

Bench decision of this Court in L.A. Krishna Aiyar Vs. Arunachalam Chettiar, was cited before the learned Judge, but the learned Judge

distinguished that decision by stating that the intention of the person who deposited the money was only to attack the validity of the sale and such a

mere intention will not disentitle him to take steps under Order 21, Rule 89 to have the sale set aside. I am afraid the learned Judge has not

properly understood the import of the Full Bench decision above referred to. Beasley, G.J., in the Full Bench was following a decision of

Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Unnaithanakath Puthan Veettil Kummakutty alias Kunhutti and Another Vs. Munnodath alias Mangat Manakkal

Karnavan and Manager, Neelakandan Nambudri, . In the latter case, Venkatasubba Rao, J., observes at page 947 as follows:

If the debtor wants to keep a dispute open, he cannot claim the benefit of the section.

What the respondent has done in the lower Court is exactly what was interdicted by Venkatasubba Rao, J. The respondent in paragraph 6 of the

affidavit states that he wants to keep alive the dispute regarding the validity of the assignment in his favour and if he succeeded in the appeal which

was then pending, he would be entitled to claim the money back which has been how deposited. It is very difficult to see how this can be

considered as an unconditional deposit. Mr. Amudachari for the respondent contends that what the Full Bench lays down is only that the person

who deposits the money cannot contend that the money should not be paid over to the decree-holder without security. It is only if a condition is

put upon the payment out of the money to the decree-holder that the principles enunciated in the Full Bench will be applied. I am unable to agree

with Mr. Amudachari that such a distinction can be drawn with regard to the observations of Beasley, C.J., at page 976 of L.A. Krishna Aiyar Vs.

Arunachalam Chettiar, . In discussing the facts of that particular case, reference was made to the circumstance that the deposit in that case was

subject to a condition or under protest and that it was not meant to be taken by the decree-holder unconditionally. In the present case also, the

respondent does not say that the money when drawn out by the decree-holder would remain the decree-holder''s property. The respondent

reserved to himself the right to call back the money and claim it in the event of his success in the appeal that was pending. In my view, the learned

District Judge erred in not applying the Full Bench decision to the facts of the present case and since the deposit under Order 21, Rule 89 is not

valid under the law, the order of the lower Court setting aside the sale is wrong.

3.

The appeal is allowed and the order of the learned District Judge is set aside. The sale stands and is therefore confirmed. The appellants will get

their costs from the respondents both here and in the Courts below.