Dr. G. Valayya Pantulu vs Government of Andhra (Now Andhra Pradesh)

K. Subba Rao, C.J.—This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuing a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Government dismissing the petitioner from service.

The petitioner was employed by the Madras State as Health Officer, Class I. In April, 1951, her was posted as District Health Officer, Guntur. On the basis of many complaints made against him, the Government directed the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings to make an enquiry about his conduct. The Tribunal framed the following seven charges:

That actuated by corrupt motives and in abuse of your position, you fraudulently claimed and drew travelling allowance for yourself and the; members of your family for the journey from Visakhapatnam to Guntur on the 16th and 17th of May 1951, as if you all travelled by II class, while in fact, one of you all travelled by II Class.

That actuated by corrupt motives, you claimed and drew T.A. for your journey on 15-6-1951 from Guntur to Waltair and for the return Tourney from Waltair to Guntur by deliberately furnishing false certificates and that, for the entire journey from Guntur to Visakhapatnam, you travelled by II Class and that the return journey was performed '' on 17-6-51 and 18-6-51 while in fact for a part of the forward journey i.e., from Guntur to Bezwada you travelled by inter class and the return journey was not performed on the 17th and 18th June, 1951.

That, actuated by corrupt motives you fraudulently claimed and drew full mileage for your journeys on the dates mentioned hereunder performed in a Government Jeep:

12-9-51

Tenali

Pedapalem Tenali.

37 miles.

13-9-51

Tenali

Mopatu Amrathalur Mulpur-Tenali Bhattiprole Tenali

78 miles.

14-9-51

Tenali

Revendrapadu Emani Kollipatta Tenali Sangamjagarlamudi Chebrole Guntur

75 miles.

15-9-51

Guntur

Kosur Guntur

68 miles.

That you received through your camp clerk, Sri P. Kalidas Rs. 75/- as illegal gratification from Sri Aramanda Kotayya, a mill owner of Peddagadalavarru village, in about August 1951 for sending a. report against Sri Katragadda Subba Rao and Dasari Bhagavendam, Mill owners, whose mill worked without the necessary licence, and later when the District Supply Officer on receipt of your report asked some information you did not furnish the information required, and lodged the file, probably in consideration of some illegal gratification received from the latter mill owners.

That actuated by corrupt motive and in abuse of your position, you recommended the issue of licence to Sri Kolla China Veeraiah of Vinjampad for the construction of a rice null in S. No. 625-1 of the aforesaid village.

That in abuse of your position you obtained supply of rice, ghee, milk, eggs, wheat flour, fuel and other articles worth Rs. 6-4-0 through Sri. K. Narasimha Rao, Malaria Sanitary Inspector, Repalle on the night of 15-8-1951, when you camped at Repalle with your camp clerk Sri P. Kalidas and your peon, Sadda Kotaiah and have not paid the amount in spite of demand.

That actuated by discreditable motives and in abuse of your position, you showed undue interest in Srimathi Nagarattamma and her husband Sri S Sangeeta Rao and appointed her as mid-wife in the Maternity and Child Welfare Centre, Parchur and as Sanitary Inspector, Anti-Malarial Scheme, Chira respectively.

A copy of the charges was served on the'' petitioner and he was asked to file a list of witnesses whom he wished to examine and also a list of documents which he wished to exhibit so as to enable the Tribunal to secure the presence of the witnesses and the production of the document at. the time of the hearing. He: was also informed that he might engage a counsel at his cost to defend him in the enquiry. The petitioner filed a list of 28 witnesses to be summoned and produced at the enquiry. P. Ws. 1 to 9 were examined for the department and D. Ws. 1 to 24 were examined for the petitioner.

Exs. P-1 to P-20 were marked for the Department and Exs. D-1 to D-11 (b) were marked for the petitioner. The witnesses examined by the department were duly cross-examined by the Counsel for the petitioner. Thereafter, on 7-3-1953, he filed a written statement denying the various charges levelled against him and also stating that a clique in the office was responsible for foisting a false case on him. The Tribunal, which consisted of two retired District Judges, considered the entire evidence, the written statement filed by the petitioner and the arguments advanced on his behalf and gave definite findings on the charges.

They held that Charge No. 1, first part of Charge No. 2, second part of Charge No. 2, Charge No. 5 and Charge No 7 were established. On those findings, they recommended to the Government for his dismissal from service. The Government, after receiving the report from the Tribunal on 29-7-1953 sent the report of the Tribunal to the petitioner and called upon him to show cause within a month from the date of the receipt of the notice why he should not be dismissed from service. He was also informed that the records connected with the enquiry were kept in the office of the Tribunal and that he might, if he so desired peruse the records at the office of the Tribunal. On receipt of that notice, the petitioner, on 30,-8-1953, submitted to the Madras Government a detailed explanation canvassing the correctness of the findings of the Tribunal.

On 31-5-1954, the Government of Andhra --by 1st October 1953 the Andhra State was formed-and this, officer was allotted to the Andhra State -- after considering they explanation and the other connected records relating to the case, accepted the findings of the Tribunal on the charges framed and also the recommendation made by the Tribunal for his dismissal. They accordingly directed that the petitioner should be dismissed from service forthwith. The petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal to the Governor. On 12-1-1955, the said appeal petition was transferred to the Secretary, Education, Health and Local Administration Department for disposal. Subsequently, that appeal was also dismissed. The present petition was filed to quash the order of the Government dismissing him from service.

Various contentions were raised by Mr. R.V. Rama Rao for the petitioner questioning the validity of the order of dismissal. We shall proceed to consider them seriatim.

It is argued that fair and reasonable opportunity against the action proposed to be taken was not given to the petitioner inasmuch as a material defence witness was not examined and an important material document pertaining to Charge No. 2 was not produced. It is said that Mr. T. Lakshminarayana, Director of Public Health, was in the list of witnesses given by him to the Tribunal, that he was a very important witness to prove that the charges were foisted on him by a clique in the office and that the non-summoning of the witness by the Tribunal denied him ''reasonable opportunity'' under the Constitution.

To appreciate his argument, it is necessary to ascertain why the said witness was required by the petitioner to give evidence and whether his non-examination vitiated any of the findings given by the Tribunal. In the list of witnesses given by the petitioner against serial No. 27, the same of Dr. T. Lakshmi Narayana, M.B.B.S., Adviser on Health Programme, Planning Commission, New Delhi, was mentioned. The purpose for which he was summoned was "to prove that the entire allegations arose on account of the mischief of a group of individuals and to speak of my general integrity."

The petitioner submitted a final consolidated list of defence witnesses. Against item 27, the following entry is found "Dr. T. Lakshmi Narayana to prove the existence of a mischievous group of persons under me and to speak about my general integrity." On 4-12-1952, the Tribunal issued summons to witnesses Nos. 1 to 26. On 17-1-1955, the petitioner made an endorsement giving up witnesses Nos. 17, 20 and 21. It is clear from the order of the Tribunal that Dr. T. Lakshminarayana was not summoned presumably because he was then employed at New Delhi. After examination of the witness, the petitioner filed a written statement wherein, in giving the background, he stated thus:

I was transferred to Guntur as District Health Officer because the administration of the office of the District Health Officer was (considered to be in a most chaotic state by the then Director of Public Health Dr. T. Lakshminarayana who told me personally at an interview about the state of affairs in the said office and instructed me to, set matters right. That was the reason why I was obliged to cite him as a witness. But the Hon''ble Tribunal was not pleased to summon him thinking that it was unnecessary. Within a few days of taking charge at Guntur I appraised the Director of Public Health by a D.O. letter marked ''confidential'' dated 10-8-51 marked as Ex. D-7 (b) in this enquiry wherein I explained the bad state of affairs and the atmosphere prevailing in the said office and also stated about the powerful clique consisting of the Tubewell mechanic, the Head Clerk and the Malaria Sanitary Inspector, who were wielding great power and influence with the party in power and as to how they were running the whole show in that Office.

I also stated all the irregularities that were found by me for which those persons were responsible I respectfully requested the Hon''ble Tribunal to go through Ex. D-7 (b) in detail, as that would afford the necessary background for the present trouble that has been actively engineered by the clique by way of retaliation or wreaking vengeance against me for having taken them to task and not allowing them to do things as they were previously doing.

It will be seen from the aforesaid paragraph in the explanation that Dr. Lakshminarayana''s- presence was required only to satisfy the- Tribunal that he was appointed by the Director in view of the chaotic state of affairs in the District office for the purpose of setting matters right. As regards what happened subsequent to his taking charge and how the powerful clique was responsible for all the irregularities found in the office, he requested the Tribunal to go through Ex. D-7 (b).

The Tribunal considered the alleged background relied upon by the petitioner in paragraph 6 of his explanation. They considered the oral evidence and the documents including Ex. D-7 (b) and found in petitioner''s favour that the Head Clerk, the Sanitary Inspector and the Tube-well Mechanic were inimically disposed towards the petitioner. But they held that there was very little material available to indicate that any of those individuals were responsible for the present charges against the petitioner. They further observed:

While therefore it would be necessary to carefully scrutinise the evidence given by the Head Clerk P.W. 6 and the Sanitary Inspector P.W. 5 and to as carefully scrutinise any evidence that is proved to be due to any of the aforesaid three individuals this contention of the District Health Officer and the clerk that all the charges against them are due to the animosity of these individuals or some of them would be untenable.

The question is whether this conclusion is vitiated by the non-examination of Dr. Lakshminarayana. In other words, was the evidence of Dr. Lakshminarayana intended to show his connection or would his examination in any way have thrown any light on his connection. The purpose for which Dr. Lakshmi Narayana was sought to be summoned was to prove the existence of a mischievous ground of persons under the petitioner and to speak about his general integrity.

In his explanation, the petitioner clarified the position by stating that the reason why he-was obliged to cite Dr. T. Lakshminarayana as a witness in his defence was to speak to the circumstances under which he was appointed as District Health Officer. The Tribunal accepted the case of the petitioner that there was irregularity in the office and that some of the members of the staff were inimically disposed towards, him. What Dr. Lakshminarayana would have spoken to was found in Ex. D-7 (b) itself. The antecedents of the petitioner were not in issue and he was dismissed on the basis of the charges found against him.

Dr. Lakshminarayana, even if he gave evidence, could not have established the connection between him and the clique in the office when the enquiry started against the petitioner. That the petitioner did not feel: aggrieved by the non-examination of Dr. Lakshminarayana is also made clear by his statement made to the Government after the findings There in he brought to the notice of the Government of the back-ground given by him in paragraph 6 of his written statement before the Tribunal and requested the Government to carefully peruse Ex. D-7 (b) before coming to any conclusion.

He did not complain that the Tribunal did not examine Dr. Lakshminarayana for the obvious reason that all he would have deposed to was found in Ex. D-7 (b). We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that the non-examination of Dr. Lakshminarayana, who might have spoken to the antecedents of the petitioner, the circumstances under which he was appointed and the receipts of the reports in regard to the irregularities found in the District Health Office, would not have any material bearing on the enquiry, particularly because all those facts were found in favour of the petitioner.

The next contention is that his application to the President, District Board, for casual leave from 18th to 22nd June 1951 with permission to avail himself of the 23rd and 24th of June was not called for though he expressly asked for it in the list of documents filed by him, and that the non-production of that document caused him prejudice in regard to Charge No 2. Charge No. 2 relates to the drawing of travelling allowance by the petitioner by furnishing false certificates. The relevant part of the charge says that, though he certified that the return journey was performed on 17-6-51 and 18-6-51 the return journey was not performed on 17th and 18th June 1051. But during the trial, the petitioner sought to establish that he was at Visakhapatnam till 21-6-51 as he was ill. The evidence both oral and documentary clearly establish that he was at Visakhapatnam till 21-6-1961.

The argument advanced is that if item 2 in the list of documents, namely, casual leave letter sent by the petitioner was called for, it would have shown that he had stayed at Visakhapatnam because of ill health. The Tribunal relying upon the oral evidence adduced by the petitioner, the telegram sent by him the endorsement on the telegram and the office copy of the order granting leave came to the conclusion that his stay at Visakhapatnam was not due to illness but for other reasons. In view of the clear evidence, the Tribunal refused to rely on the private copy of the letter alleged to have been sent by him requesting leave on the ground of illness.

Learned Counsel contends that, if the original of the private copy was sent for, it would have shown that he was ill and that the Tribunal on perusing it might have come to a different conclusion. Though the alleged original of the copy filed was not specifically sent for, the file containing the telegram sent by the petitioner Ex. P-18 and the office copy of the order granting the petitioner leave Ex. P-18 (a), was produced before the Tribunal and if the application was sent for, it must have been found in the file.

The petitioner also filed the copy at the last stage along with the written statement. The Tribunal, therefore, were justified in holding that the petitioner did not send any application, for, if he sent any such application, the order granting leave would not have been made on the basis of the telegram. The fact that the Alleged application made by him was not specifically called for has not prejudiced the petitioner for the simple reason that there was no such application.

That apart the charge against him was that the petitioner actuated by corrupt motives by deliberately furnishing false certificate claimed that the return journey was performed on 17-6-51 and 18-6-51, though the return journey was not performed on 17-6-51 and 18-6-51. The evidence conclusively established that he was in Visakhapatnam on those days and that he only subsequently left Visakhapatnam by motor car. That evidence established the second part of the second charge against him.

The alleged application may be relevant to the new case set up by him after he came to know that the railway records conclusively destroyed his first version and after he realised that he would be entitled to travelling allowance back to head-quarters from the camping station if he took leave on the ground of illness. We, therefore, hold that the alleged application was not germane to the charge as framed and even otherwise having regard to the conclusive nature of the evidence, such an application was not filed by him.

It is contended that the non-examination of a witness and the non-production of a relevant document vitiate the entire proceedings as it is not possible to predicate to what conclusion the Tribunal would have come if it had examined the witness and had looked into the document. In support of the contention, reliance is placed on a judgment of a Division Bench of this High Court in the State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kameswara Rao 1957 AWR 370 : (S) AIR 1957 AP 794 (A). In that case, the petitioner mentioned the names of 63 witnesses and specified 28 documents.

The Tribunal passed an order summoning only 22 witnesses and refusing to summon other witnesses. Some documents which had a material bearing on charges 2 and 3 were also not sent for. Manohar Pershad J. to whom the case was referred on a difference of view between Umamaheswaram J. and Bhimasankaram J. accepted the following view of Rajamannar C.J.

If the records asked for were really relevant and material for the purpose of defence of the appellant, failure to provide the appellant with them would result in failure of justice because the appellant would have been denied an opportunity to defend himself.

If and how the appellant could have used the entries in the disbursement register was not a matter for the Collector to decide nor is it for us. All that we can certainly say is that the disbursement register was surely relevant and material"

and held that the enquiry, having regard to the circumstances before the learned. Judge, was vitiated by the non-examination of witnesses and the non-production of documents called for. This judgment is authority for the position that, under certain circumstances, the non-examination of the relevant witnesses called for and the non-production of relevant documents asked for by the petitioner would amount to denial of adequate; opportunity to the officer against whom disciplinary action is sought to be taken and that it is not for the Court to predicate the operative effect of the said evidence on the mind of the Tribunal.

But we do not understand this decision as laying down an inflexible rule of law that whenever any document relevant to any link in the chain of facts supporting a charge is not produced, the entire proceedings should be quashed irrespective of the effect of such non-production on the result of the enquiry.

Nor does the decision of another Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Dr. K. Subba Rao Vs. State of Hyderabad (now Andhra Pradesh) lay down any such wide proposition for which the learned Counsel contends. Reliance is placed upon the following passage at p. 163 (of Andh LT) : (at p. 418 of AIR):

But the enquiry officer did not agree to the calling of Messrs. Srinivasan and Ram Lal on the ground that they had nothing to do with the points at issue. The petitioner intended to examine them to establish his case of collusion between the officers concerned to remove him from service on some pretext or other.

It was the definite case of the petitioner that the officers concerned had gone to the extent of defaming him by falsely and maliciously stating that he was mentally unsound and recommending his dismissal. The petitioner could have elicited facts from the said witnesses as regards what happened behind the scenes before a formal enquiry was initiated against him. It was not for the enquiry officer to decide for the petitioner who should be examined and who should not be examined in support of his case.

Several documents relevant to the enquiry were not furnished to the petitioner.... The confidential record which must have contained the correspondence between the various officers and the conclusions tentatively arrived at by them would have disclosed the facts necessary for his defence.

In that case the main defence was that there was collusion between the officers in the Secretariat and the Medical Department and that the Enquiry Officer after making up his mind to remove the petitioner started the enquiry with preconceived notions. The petitioner sought to establish the collusion by examining important witnesses and by calling for the production of relevant document. In that context, the said observations were made,

We do not see any justification in the said remarks to support the contention that even if the non-production of a document demonstrably did not prejudice the petitioner, the Court has no option but to quash the proceedings.

In N.V. Jagga Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh Writ Petn. No. 15 of 1954 (Andh-Pra) (C), though some documents were not produced, the Division Bench of this High Court, of which one of Us was a member, held that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the argument was only an after-thought and that the petitioner was never aggrieved or prejudiced by the non-production of the said documents.

In view of the aforesaid decision, it may be stated that that non-production of such documents and non-examination of such witnesses which may prevent an officer from defending himself properly against charge and thereby cause him prejudice will have the effect of depriving him of reasonable opportunity to defend himself within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. In this case, as we have pointed out, neither the non-examination of Dr. Lakshminarayana nor the non-production of the leave application has either prevented the petitioner from defending himself properly or has caused him any prejudice.

It is then contended that the enquiry by the Tribunal is vitiated by the fact that, in refusing to summon Dr. Lakshminarayana, the Tribunal had not given special or sufficient reasons in contravention of Rule 8(a) of the Madras Civil Service (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules. The material part of that rule reads: "At the enquiry oral evidence shall be heard and the person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish, provided that the Tribunal may, for special and sufficient reason to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness."

In this case, the Tribunal did not record in writing the special and sufficient reason on the basis of which Dr. Lakshminarayana was not summoned. It is true that the rule is a salutary one and it is conceived in the interests of delinquent officers.

Though no reasons are recorded, it is apparent that he was not summoned because, at the time of the enquiry, he was staying in New Delhi and that his evidence was intended to establish a collateral fact which could as well be proved by the official records. We have already found that the non-summoning of the said witness has not prejudiced the petitioner in his defence. If so, the question is whether, under the said circumstances, the mere non-compliance with a statutory rule is a sufficient basis for quashing the order.

In M.V. Joga Rao Vs. State of Madras a Division Bench of this High Court, of which one of us was a member, observed at p. 989 (of Andh LT): (at p. 202 of AIR):

It is true some cases have held that even if the rules have been violated, the civil servant has no right to question the order dismissing him unless by the violation of such rules, no reasonable opportunity is given to him within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules and the Madras Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules are statutory rules and they are as much binding upon the Government as upon the citizen.

It can be reasonably argued that if the Government make an inquiry ignoring the said rules, the High Court can, under Article 226 of the Constitution direct them to make an enquiry according to the rules, though in cases where the High Court is satisfied that no prejudice is caused to the Civil Servant, it may in exercise of its discretion refuse to issue any direction.

The said observations were followed by another Division Bench of this High Court in W.P. No. 15 of 1954 (Andh-Pra) (C), wherein it was held thus:

The rules being statutory rules are as much binding upon the Government as on Government servants. The rules cannot, therefore, be ignored. At the same time every breach of the rule will not entail the quashing of the Government''s order, if the Court is satisfied that the said breach has not caused any prejudice to the Government servant concerned.

After citing the aforesaid passage from the earlier decision, it was observed:

This Court, therefore, will not in the exercise of discretion quash the order of the Government on the basis of a mere infringement of the rule if a reasonable opportunity was given to the Government servant to defend himself and he is not otherwise prejudiced.

Following those rules, we hold that, though the Tribunal should have recorded reasons for not summoning Dr. Lakshminarayana, the infringement of that rule, in the circumstances of the case, had not prejudiced the petitioner, and therefore that in itself is not a ground for quashing the order of the Government.

The next contention is that the Tribunal marked Exs. P-9 (b), P-9 (e), P-10 (b), P-14 (a), P-18(a), D-2(b), D-2(c) and D-9(a) behind the back of the petitioner after the close of the trial and relied upon the said documents in its report without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to explain the said documents. It is not denied by the State that the aforesaid documents were marked after the enquiry. It is clear from the report of the Tribunal that some of the documents so marked were relied upon by the Tribunal for one purpose or other.

Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the King''s Bench Division in R. v. Architects Registration Tribunal; Exparte, Jaggar 1945 2 All ER 131 (E), in support of the contention that the report of the Tribunal based upon such evidence is illegal. Therefore the Tribunal, who dismissed the appeal of an architect received evidence relating to the applicant''s case and improperly declined to communicate the substance thereof to the applicant or to give him an opportunity of rebutting any adverse statements contained therein. The High Court in quashing the order made the following observations at page 139:

The Tribunal had before them, and used, documents which should have been disclosed or documents which the applicant was entitled to see if they were going to be used by the Tribunal.....But they did not in my view do what the authorities say they should have done which was to give a real and effective opportunity to the litigant to deal with or meet any relevant allegations made in these documents........... I am extremely doubtful whether anything short of telling the litigant what the information is and what source it came from would be giving him a real and effective opportunity of dealing with it When that is not done, as it was not done in this case and the Tribunal have before it correspondence of this nature which is not disclosed, and the Tribunal look at that correspondence and base what they call relevant questions upon that correspondence, it seems to me, as I view it, that that is not doing what this Tribunal in its position should have done, namely, if they, looked at the letters at all, to inform the litigant what they contained "and the source from which they came.

This authority clearly lays down that a quasi-Judicial Tribunal cannot rely upon documents not disclosed to the party against whom they are produced and that an order based upon such evidence is liable to be set aside, So stated, the principle is unexceptionable. But, we cannot agree that by reason of every dereliction of duty in this regard, however immaterial or irrelevant such evidence may be to the enquiry, the order is liable to be set aside automatically without due regard to the question whether it has prejudiced the party concerned. Many situations may be visualised when documents, which have been; looked into and relied upon during an enquiry, may have been omitted to be marked by the other side but subsequently the Tribunal gives a formal mark to the same.

It may also be that, a document, which is not really relevant to the question raised but is necessary for complying with a formal requirement was omitted to be marked at the, trial but was subsequently given a number by the Tribunal. In this regarding in other cases. It is the substance that matters and not the form. If the party is aware of the documents relied upon during the trial, the formal marking at a subsequent stage is in itself not a ground for setting aside the order unless it is established that he has been prejudiced by such marking.

That apart, this Court will not interfere with the order of a Tribunal unless the said irregularity has prejudiced the party With this background, we shall proceed to scrutinise the order of the Tribunal with a view to ascertain how each of the documents so marked was re- lied upon by the Tribunal to arrive at the findings which they did and whether such reliance has in any way prejudiced the petitioner. (After considering the documents his Lordship came to the conclusion that the findings are not in any way vitiated by the non-marking of the said Exhibits, at the time of the enquiry.

The next complaint is in regard to the reliance placed by the Tribunal on the memorandum No. 84519 C.S.R. 5 dated 22-12-1950 with-out its being, exhibited in the enquiry. The said Memorandum says that travelling allowance back to headquarters from a camping station would be available even if the officer had been on casual leave at the camping station, provided that casual leave had been. necessitated by illness or indisposition. The Tribunal only relied upon that memorandum to ascertain the reason for the change of front. He claimed in the Travelling Allowance Bill second class fare on the basis that -he: performed the return journey on the 17th and; 18th of June, 1951.

It had been conclusively established that he had crossed the Godavari on 21-6-1951 and the Krishna on 25-6-1951 in his car. That evidence was sufficient to prove the charge against him but, before the Tribunal, he put forward the defence that he took casual leave as he was ill. The Tribunal, on the evidence, accepted his case that he was ill. In that context, the aforesaid observations were made with reference to the said Government Memorandum. Learned Counsel contends that the petitioner had no knowledge, of the said Government order and that he would have explained that fact to the Tribunal if he knew that the Tribunal would rely upon that order.

But, in his objections to the report filed by him before the Government, he did not make any grievance out of that fact. If he was aggrieved, he should have represented to the Government that the Tribunal should not have relied upon-that G.O. in which case, the Government would have considered the report having regard to that objection. Even in his appeal to the Governor against the order of the: Government, he did not attack the finding of the Tribunal on the ground that they relied upon a document not marked or not brought to his; notice. This was only because the petitioner did not feel aggrieved. The present complaint; is only an; after thought.

It is then said that the report is vitiated) by errors apparent on the, face of the record.

The first alleged error pointed put is that the finding on the 5th charge is not based on evidence but on suspicion. The 5th charge relates to the recommendation made by the petitioner to issue license to Sri Kolla China Veeraiah of vinjampad for the construction of a rice mill actuated by corrupt motives. The Tribunal held that the charge was proved. After considering the evidence relevant to the issues and before they gave their findings, the Tribunal made the following observations at the end of para 33 of their report:

Further if there had been any such approach to the D.H.O. which may be deemed to be a legitimate one, the D.H.O. would have necessarily referred to the representations of D.W. 9 in cancelling his prior endorsement and the draft letter to the District Board that had been already approved of by him and in ordering personal inspection, since the records would otherwise indicate some suspicious conduct on his part." The argument of the learned Counsel is based upon an incorrect appreciation of the aforesaid remarks. The discussion of the evidence by the Tribunal under Charge No. 5 shows that, when China Veeriah applied for a licence, the Health Inspector had written definitely that the site was unsuitable, that, in the interests of public life and the development of the village, licence should not be granted, that the petitioner endorsed the remarks of the Inspector on 27-6-51, that before the draft has been fair-copied and despatched to the District Board, the District Health Officer struck out his endorsement and made another endorsement for personal inspection, and that, after making a personal inspection, ho differed from the Health Inspector''s views and granted the application.

The petitioner set up the case that ho changed his view, as P.W. 9, the President of the District Board and the President of the Taluka Congress Committee, intervened and represented to him that the Health Inspector''s remarks were not justified. The Tribunal did not accept the explanation given by the petitioner. In that connection, the Tribunal made the aforesaid remarks to the effect that if P.W. 9 intervened on behalf of the applicant, the petitioner would have stated that fact, as otherwise the records would indicate some suspicious conduct on his part. That was one of the reasons given for rejecting his contention.

The tribunal did not, therefore, base their finding on any suspicious circumstances but only on the evidence adduced in the case. It is not necessary to express our view whether we would have come to the same conclusion as the Tribunal did on the material placed before them. But the Tribunal and the Government have arrived at the finding on the evidence and it is not for us to question its correctness. There are no merits in this objection.

The second error pointed out is that the Tribunal gave a finding on a non-existent charge. This relates to the second part of the second charge. The relevant part of the charge reads:

That actuated by corrupt motives, you claimed and drew T.A. for your return journey from Waltair to Guntur by deliberately furnishing false certificates and that the return journey was not performed on the 17th and 18th June, 1951.

We have omitted that part of the charge relating to his journey from Guntur to Waltair. The charge therefore was that the petitioner, though he did not perform the journey from Waltair to Guntur on 17th and 18th June, 1951, claimed and drew T.A. furnishing false certificates that he did so. Though the charge so framed was clear, during the course of the enquiry, the issue was clouded by the petitioner pleading that ha did not make the journey by train on the aforesaid two dates but only by car at a later date as he was held up by reason of ill-health and that, as a matter of fact, he spent more than II Class fare but he claimed II class fare because he was entitled to that sum only.

This case was a defence to the charge. While he was charged that he claimed travelling allowance by falsely certifying that he travelled on the 17th and 18th June by II Class to Guntur, he, in effect, pleaded that his representation was not true and justified it by stating that he travelled by car at a later stage as he was ill and that he claimed T.A. for a lesser amount in accordance with the rules. The Tribunal, on the evidence, while accepting the plea that he stayed at Visakhapatnam till 21-6-1951 and travelled by car, held that his claim for travelling allowance, as if he travelled on the 17th and 18th of June was neither correct nor permissible.

On that basis, they found that the petitioner had drawn II Class travelling allowance for the return journey from Waltair to Guntur after furnishing false certificates even though he was not entitled to travelling allowance for the return journey for the reason that he had taken casual leave for private reasons and stayed on in the camp station before he undertook the return journey. It is true that the Tribunal could have found against the petitioner on the second part of the charge simply by stating, on the facts disclosed in the evidence, that the petitioner claimed travelling allowance on the false representation that he travelled by II Class on the 17th and 18th while, as a matter of fact, he did not travel on those days.

But the Tribunal went further and considered the defence set up by the petitioner to that charge, namely that though he made a false representation, he could legally claim that amount as he was ill during his stay at Visakhapatnam. The Tribunal did nothing more than reject his defence and found against him on the second part of the second charge. Even in his objections filed before the Government, the petitioner did not complain that the finding was given on the charge in regard to which he was not tried.

The Government, after examining the explanation, accepted the finding; in the appeal filed by him to the Governor the petitioner did not complain that the finding is on a charge on which'' he was not tried. As we have pointed out for the reasons stated already, we cannot say that the Tribunal gave a finding on a charge for which the petitioner was not tried.

The next alleged error is that neither the Tribunal nor the Government considered the telephone message given by the Minister in charge, of Public Health to the petitioner. This contention is raised in regard to charge No. 7. The material part of the charge, with which we are now concerned, is that the petitioner actuated by discreditable motives and in abuse of his position appointed Sri Sangeetha Rao as Sanitary Inspector in the Malaria Scheme, Chirala. On that issue, the Tribunal held that the petitioner had acted mala fide in appointing Sangeetharao as temporary Sanitary Inspector in the Anti Malaria Scheme. Ex. D-9(c) is the phone message received from the Health Minister to the effect that the said Minister wanted the Malaria Sub-Inspector Sri K. Narasimha Rao to be retained at Repalle.

It is said that, if this message had been considered, the Tribunal might have been convinced that Narasimharao was a very influential man, who could bring to bear upon the Department pressure from ministerial level. We do not see any connection between this message and the finding on the 7th charge. The Tribunal on the evidence held that the petitioner appointed Sri Sangeetha Rao as a temporary Sanitary Inspector in the Anti Malaria Scheme in spite of the genuine grievances of the incumbent Sri K. Narasimha Rao. The pull if any Narasimha Rao had with the Minister has no bearing on the finding. Indeed, the facts of the case show that in spite of the telephone message Narasimha Rao was transferred.

It is then said that in arriving at a finding on the charge the Tribunal did not consider the evidence of D.W. 12 Dr. V. Somasundaram to the effect that there is no rule or G.O. prohibiting a Sanitary Inspector to take up Malaria duties without being specially trained on malaria work and that a person, who has undergone field assistant''s training can certainly take up malaria work. But the Tribunal in their report did not base their conclusion on the ground that Sri Sangeetha Rao was not competent to be appointed to the post but only on other grounds. We cannot, therefore, say that the non-consideration of this piece of evidence constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner then argues that the Tribunal has not confirmed to the statutory rules prescribed for disciplinary enquiries. The relevant rules of the Andhra Civil Service (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1953, may be extracted.

Rule 2(a): Corruption shall have the same meaning as ''Criminal misconduct in the discharge of official duties'' u/s 5(1) of the Prevention of Bribery and Corruption Act (Act II of 1947).

Rule 8(a): Nothwithstanding anything contained in Rule 17 of the Madras Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules the following procedure shall be adopted by the Tribunal in conducting enquiries in cases of corruption.

(e) The provisions of the Madras Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules shall apply -

(i) In regard to the procedure to be followed in cases other than those of corruption; and

(ii) In regard to any other matter for which no specific provision has been made in these rules.

It is, therefore, clear from the aforesaid rules that in the case of corruption charge the procedure laid down in Rule 8(a), (b) and (e) of the Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules will have to be followed and in other cases the procedure prescribed by Rule 17 of the Madras Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules will have to be adopted. The argument is that some of the charges do not come under the definition of corruption, and, therefore, the enquiry, which was held in accordance with the Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules is irregular and that the enquiry should have been made under the provisions of the Madras Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules. The relevant rules from both the set of rules may be placed in juxtaposition.

Andhra Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1953. Rule 8:--

Madras Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Rule 17(h)--

Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 17 of the Madras Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, the following procedure shall be adopted by the Tribunal in conducting enquiries in cases of corruption.

(a) As soon as the records relating to allegations of corruption against a Government Servant are received, the Tribunal shall frame appropriate charges, communicate them to the Government Servant concerned together with information as to the date of enquiry into the charges and a list of witnesses likely to be examined in respect of each of the charges. Copies of statements taken by the Special C.I.D. in the course of the Branch of the/investigation shall not be communicated to the Government servant but they shall be furnished to him at the commencement of the enquiry in order to enable him, if necessary, to cross-examine the witnesses. At the enquiry, oral evidence shall be heard and the person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish, provided that the Tribunal may for special and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. After the enquiry has been completed, the person charged shall be entitled to put in if he so desires, a written statement of his defence and argue the case orally. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and a statement of the findings and the grounds thereof.

(b) After the enquiry has been completed the Tribunal shall send its findings and recommendations to the government together with its opinion in ases in which acquittal is recommended, whether the acquittal is honourable acquittal for purposes of fundamental Rule 54(a). Where the tribunal does not express any such pinion it shall be presumed by the government that the acquittal was not honourable one. After the Government are arrived at provisional conclusion regard to the penalty to be imposed, he person charged shall be supplied with a copy of the report of the tribunal and be called upon to show cause within a reasonable time, not ordinarily exceeding one month, against the particular penalty proposed to be Inflicted. Any representation in the behalf submitted by the person charged shall be duly taken into consideration by the Government before final orders are passed.

Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Enquiries Act, 1850, in every case where it is proposed to impose on a member of a service any of the penalties mentioned in clause iv, vi, vii and viii of Rule 8, the grounds on which it is proposed'' to take action shall, except where such action is proposed to be taken on facts which have led to his conviction in a Criminal Court or by a Military Court martial, be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged, together with a statement of the allegations on which such charge is based and of any other circumstances which it Is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case. He shall be required within a reasonable time to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires an oral enquiry or only to be heard in person. An oral enquiry shall be held if such an enquiry is desired by the person charged or is directed by the authority concerned. At that enquiry oral evidence; shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted and the person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called, as he may wish, provided that the officer conducting the inquiry may, for special and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. After the inquiry has been completed, the person charged shall be entitled to put in, if he so desires, any further written statement of his defence. If no inquiry is held and if he had desired to be heard in person, a personal hearing shall be given to him. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and a statement of the findings and the grounds thereof.

The main difference between the two rules are that, in the case of procedure to be followed in cases other than corruption, at the outset the notice indicates the nature of the penalty to be imposed and the officer files a Written Statement within a reasonable time from the date the notice is served and states in the written statement whether he desires an oral enquiry or only to be heard in person whereas, in the case of corruption, the procedure is more elaborate. In the first stage of the enquiry, the Tribunal frames appropriate charges and furnishes him with a copy of it along with a list of witnesses that would be examined.

At the enquiry, oral evidence will be heard and the Officer is given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to examine his own witness. After the enquiry, he is given an opportunity to file a written statement and argue his case orally. After the enquiry is completed, the Tribunal sends its findings and recommendations to the Government. The Government gives him another opportunity to show cause against the particular penalty proposed to be inflicted on him. After the explanation is submitted, the Government considers the matter and passes suitable punishment.

A comparative study of both the provisions show that the procedure in the case of corruption charges is more elaborate and gives every opportunity to the Government servant to prove his innocence. But it is contended that, if the proper procedure was followed and the proposed penalty was indicated to him even at the outset, the petitioner would not have demanded oral enquiry but would have appeared in person before the Departmental superior with a better chance of proving his innocence or at any rate, securing indulgence from the superior.

Throughout the entire enquiry, the petitioner never raised the plea that he should have been tried pursuant to the rules prescribed for charges other than corruption. The procedure followed gave him every opportunity to prove his innocence and, indeed, the procedure followed gave him a more adequate opportunity to prove his innocence than he could possibly hope under the procedure prescribed for charges other than corruption. It is true, as we have already pointed out, that the statutory rules of procedure are as much binding on the Government as on the officer but in cases where the entire procedure was followed without objection by the (sic) we will not interfere in the exercise oft our extraordinary jurisdiction unless grave prejudice was caused to the petitioner.

Instead of grave prejudice to the petitioner, we find from the record that the procedure followed gave him every reasonable opportunity within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. We should not be-understood to have expressed the view that the procedure followed was not the correct one, but we have assumed that fact in favour of the petitioner in dealing with his contention.

Learned Counsel then argues that the show cause notice why the penalty of dismissal should not be inflicted on the petitioner was given by the Madras Government and, therefore, the dismissal order passed by the Andhra Government was illegal. Some of the relevant facts may be recapitulated. The Tribunal was appointed by that Government of Madras. The entire enquiry was held by them. They submitted their (report on 2-4-1953. The Government of Madras issued a notice to the petitioner on 29-7-1953 calling upon him to show cause within a month from the date of the receipt of the notice why he should not be dismissed from service.

The petitioner submitted his explanation to the Madras Government on 30-8-1953. The Andhra State was formed on 1st October, 1953 and presumably all the records pertaining to this case were transferred to the Government of Andhra. The Andhra Government, by their order dated 30-5-1954, dismissed the petitioner from service. The petitioner, thereafter, filed an appeal against the order of the Government to the Governor of Andhra, which was also dismissed.

It is manifest from the aforesaid facts that the entire enquiry upto the stage of giving notice to show cause against the punishment to be inflicted was conducted by the Madras Government and the order of dismissal was made by the Andhra Government. Article 311 of the Constitution says that no person, who is a member of a Civil Service of the Union or an All India Service or a Civil Servant of a State or who holds a Civil Post under the Union or State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed The argument is that the petitioner was appoint ed by the Madras Government, and, therefore he can only be removed by the authority that appointed him, namely, the Madras Government.

Article 311 only says that a member of a civil service of a State cannot be dismissed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. i.e., if the officer is appointed by the Madras Government, he could not be dismissed by a person subordinate to Madras Government. It does not prevent the authority duly and legally substituted in the place of the original authority, who appointed the member of a civil service from dismissing him for in that case the substituted authority is not an authority subordinate to that appointing him.

That apart, Section 58 of the Andhra State Act, 1953, enables the Andhra State to continue proceedings pending in the Madras State before the said Act came into force in respect of a Civil servant, who was allotted to the Andhra State. Section 58 reads:

Section 58: "(1) Every proceeding pending immediately before the appointed day before a Court (other than the High Court), Tribunal, authority or officer --

(a) in any area which on that day falls within the State of Madras or the transferred territory shall, if it is a proceeding relating exclusively to any part of the territories which as from that day are the territories of the State of Andhra, stand transferred to the corresponding Court, Tribunal, authority or officer in the State of Andhra, or

(b) in any area which on that day falls within the State of Madras or the State of Andhra shall, if it is a proceeding relating exclusively to any part of the transferred territory, stand transferred to the corresponding court, tribunal, authority or officer in the State of Mysore.

(2) If any question arises as to whether any proceeding should stand transferred under Sub-section (1), it shall be referred for the decision of the Chief Justice of the High Court at Madras and his decision shall be final.

The disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner was a proceeding pending immediately before the appointed day before the State of Madras. But it is said that the Government of Madras was not a tribunal, officer or authority within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 58. We do not see any reason why the Government of Madras was not an authority within the meaning of that Sub-section. If so, it follows that the present proceedings which were pending in the State of Madras and which related to that part of the territory transferred to the Andhra State stood transferred to the corresponding authority, namely, Government of Andhra. By reason of Section 58, the pending proceeding was transferred to the Andhra Government and the Andhra Government, being the substituted authority, had power to continue the proceedings initiated by the Madras Government and impose punishment on the petitioner. We, therefore, hold that the Andhra Government had power to dismiss the petitioner from service.

Learned Counsel then argues that the show cause notice does not comply with the requirements of law Under Rule 8(a) and (b) of the Andhra Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, after the Government have arrived at a provisional conclusion in regard to the penalty to be imposed, the person charged shall be supplied with a copy of the report of the Tribunal and called upon to show cause within a reasonable time not ordinarily exceeding one month against the particular penalty proposed to be inflicted and that any representations in this behalf submitted by the person charged shall be duly taken into consideration by the Government before final orders are passed.

The contention is that the Government of Madras did not in its notice indicate that it had come to any provisional conclusion in regard to the punishment proposed to be imposed on the petitioner and it did not give reasons why it proposed to dismiss him from service. As the argument turns upon the terms of the notice, it may be convenient to read it:

A copy of the report of the Tribunal for Disciplinary proceedings on the departmental enquiry made by it, on certain charges of corruption on the part of Dr. G. Vallayya Pantulu, M.B.B.S., B.Sc., Health Officer, Class I, is communicated to Dr. G. Vallayya Pantulu, with reference to Rule 8(b) of the Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1948 (extract enclosed). Dr. G. Vallayya Pantulu is called upon to show cause within a month from the date of the receipt of this memorandum, why he should not be dismissed from service.

Dr. G. Vallayya Pantulu is informed that the records connected with the enquiry are kept in the office of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings Fort. St. George, Madras and that he may if he so desires peruse the records at the office of the Tribunal before the expiry of the period of one month specified in paragraph 1 above. Dr. G. Vallayya Pantulu is also informed that on no account will extension of time be granted for the submission of the explanation called for in paragraph 1 above.

It is true that, in this notice, it is not specifically stated that Government has arrived at any provisional conclusion in regard to the penalty to be imposed. Nor does it state specifically the reasons for the proposed punishment. But a fair reading of the notice clearly indicates that the Government has come to a tentative conclusion as regards the punishment to be imposed on the petitioner and its reasons for it. The notice refers to the Tribunal''s report and also to Rule 8(b) of the Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal). Rules and then calls upon the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service.

The notice though it could have been more explicit, leaves no doubt that the Government on the basis of the report has come to a provisional conclusion to impose the penalty of dismissal on the petitioner and therefore has called upon him to show cause why he should not be so dismissed. We are, therefore, satisfied that the notice complies with the requirements of law.

That apart, the objections filed by the petitioner before the Government clearly show that he understood the notice to mean that the! Government had come to a tentative conclusion on the basis of the report for he canvassed minutely the correctness of the reasons given by the Tribunal in respect of their findings under each of the charges framed against him. He did not complain either that the notice was defective, or, that he did not understood the implications of the notice. In the circumstances, even if there is some defect in the form of the notice, the petitioner was not prejudiced by any such defect.

In this context, reliance is placed by the learned Counsel upon a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court, of which one of us was a member, in 1956 ALT 978 : ((S) M.V. Joga Rao Vs. State of Madras the following observations are found:

It is true that reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken includes an opportunity to canvass the correctness of the reasons for taking the proposed action. The authority should necessarily in its order requiring the civil servant to show cause should give not only the punishment proposed to be inflicted on him but also the reasons for coming to that conclusion--If the finding of the tribunal is the basis for the proposed punishment, he can also attack the correctness of the finding by showing that the finding was not based on the evidence or is not supported by evidence.

But it would be unreasonable to compel the authority to have two trials as it were, one upto the stage of the notice contemplated by Article 311 and the repetition of it again after notice, though in a particular: case if the inquiry is vitiated by any of the reasons mentioned above, a further inquiry may reasonably be asked by the Civil, Servant. To put it shortly, the entire proceedings of the inquiry must be looked into carefully to ascertain whether reasonable opportunity within the meaning of Article 311 is afforded to a Civil Servant or not.

The aforesaid observations only indicate that the Government in its notice should give not only the punishment proposed to be inflicted but also the reasons for coming to that conclusion. The aforesaid observations were noticed and accepted by another Division Bench of this Court in The State of Andhra (now Andhra Pradesh) Vs. T. Ramayya Suri As we have pointed out, in the present case, the notice in question clearly indicates that the Government proposed to inflict the punishment of dismissal on the basis of the findings of the Tribunal. We are, therefore, satisfied that the notice is in accordance with law and, that apart, the petitioner was not prejudiced by any irregularities in the notice.

The next argument of the learned Counsel is that one of the constitutional safeguards provided by Article 320(3)(c) of the Constitution of India has been ignored. The material part of that article reads:

The Union Public Service Commission or the State Public Service Commission, as the case may be, shall be consulted -- (c) on all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving under the Government of India or the Government of a State in a Civil capacity, including memorials or petitions relating to such matters.

XX XX XX

Provided that the President as respects the All India Services and also as respects other services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and the Governor or Rajpramukh as the case may be, as respects other services and posts in connection with the affairs of a State, may make regulations specifying the matters in which either generally, or in any particular class of case or in any particular circumstances, it shall not be necessary for a Public Service Commission to be consulted.

It is clear from the aforesaid provisions that one of the constitutional guarantees is that in all disciplinary matters affecting a person including memorials or petitions relating to such matters, the Service Commission shall be consulted unless the-Governor makes a regulation specifying the matters in respect of which it shall not be necessary for the Public Service Commission to be consulted. In terms of the proviso, Regulation No. 18 dated 26-12-1950 was promulgated by the Governor to the following effect:

Nothing contained in Clause 1 shall be deemed to make it necessary for the State Government to consult the Commission in any case --

where the State Government pass orders on the advice of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings.

But on 14-4-1956 the Governor of Andhra in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Clause 3 of Article 320 of the Constitution added the following Regulation 19-A.

Notwithstanding anything contained in Regulations 18 or 19, it shall not be necessary for the Commission to be consulted on any appeal, memorial or petition addressed to the Governor by a person who is or was in the service of the State Government in respect of a matter affecting him as a Government servant."

This Regulation, it is conceded was made subsequent to the disposal of the appeal by the Governor, and therefore must be excluded from consideration. The order of the Andhra Government dismissing the petitioner without consulting the Public Service Commission is saved by Regulation 18 dated 26-12-1950 promulgated by the Governor. But the question is whether the disposal of the appeal filed by the petitioner to the Governor was vitiated by the fact that he disposed of it without consulting the Public Service Commission.

It is contended that, under Article 320(3)(c) the Service Commission shall be consulted in respect of all disciplinary matters and that, under the proviso, the Governor makes a regulation specifying the matters in respect of which the Public Service Commission need not be consulted and if he makes such a regulation, the (matter in respect whereof the said regulation is made, whether the said matter is pending before the Government or an appeal before the Governor, is taken out of the operation of Article 320(3)(c) of the Constitution.

It may be that the Governor, in exercise of the powers conferred on him under the proviso, could have made a regulation taking out any particular matter from the operation of Clause (c). But the question is whether the Governor did it in the particular case. Regulation as promulgated by the Governor, which we have extracted only saves order made by the State Government on the advice of the Tribunal for disciplinary Proceedings.

The regulation does not state that all disciplinary matters in regard to which any authority makes an order on the advice of the Tribunal need not be made in consultation with the Public Service Commission. We must, therefore, hold that the order of the Governor made on'' the appeal filed by the petitioner ignoring the Constitutional safeguard was bad. But this will not preclude the Governor from disposing of the appeal in accordance with law.

The aforesaid consideration of the material before us may be summarised thus, The Government of Madras appointed two retired Judicial Officers to make an enquiry in regard to the conduct of the petitioner. They framed charges, considered the oral and documentary evidence produced before them, noticed the written statement filed by him and submitted an elaborate and detailed report on all the charges along with their recommendation to the Government. The few irregularities pointed out, in our; (view, do not, in any way, prejudice the petitioner.

The Government, after following the procedure prescribed and after considering the objections filed by the petitioner, accepted the report and recommendations of the'' Tribunal and dismissed him. It is not, therefore, possible to say that the petitioner was not given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. The petitioner has not made out any case for quashing the order of the Government.

So far as the Governor''s order on the appeal filed by the petitioner is concerned, though we hold that it was made in violation of one of the constitutional guarantees and, therefore, was bad, he is not answerable to this Court in view of Article 361 of the Constitution of India.

In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate''s fee Rs. 100/-.