Dr. Gurdit Singh and others vs The State of Punjab and others

C.G. Suri, J.—By this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, some owners have challenged the proceedings for the acquisition of their lands by the State of Punjab, respondent No. 1, under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended from time to time in its application to the said State. This Act would hereafter be referred to in this judgment briefly as ''the Act''.

The impugned notification (Annexure ''B/1'') u/s 4 of the Act recites, amongst other things, that the land is likely to be needed by the Government at public expense for the public purpose of construction of godowns for the storage of foodgrains at Nabha. The impugned declaration (Annexure ''B/2'') u/s 6 of the Act also mentions the same public purpose and source of funds. Action u/s 17 of the Act was taken on the grounds of urgency and provisions of Section 5A were dispensed with. The acquisition was described to have been made under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 17, as inserted in the Act by a Punjab amendment. Even though the Food Corporation of India, respondent No. 2, is not mentioned in these notifications, it has been admitted in a return filed on behalf of the respondents that the acquisition had been made by respondent No. 1 for construction of godowns for storage of stocks of food-grains belonging to respondent No. 2. Even though the petitioners were shown in the revenue records as the owners, Shrimati Narinder Kaur, respondent No. 3, had been found in possession of the land. It was, however, averred by the respondents that the acquisition was being made for a public purpose at State expense and that the entire funds for the project were to be borne by the Central Government under a crash program launched by the Food Ministry through the agency of the Food Corporation of India. The department wanted to proceed with the construction work immediately in the national interest and to complete it before the Rabi harvest to avoid wastage of foodgrains for want of adequate storage facilities. It was denied that the land had been acquired for any company. The acquisition had been made under S. 17 (2) (c) and action had been taken under the emergency provisions of the Act, as amended in its application to the State of Punjab and that the President of India was fully satisfied with regard to the existence of the conditions which justified the invocation of these emergency provisions.

The following, amongst other, provisions of the Act, as amended in its application to the State of Punjab, may be kept in mind while discussing the various aspects of the controversy that has been raised in the present case:-

Definitions. In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context,-

(a) xx xx xx

(b) xx xx xx

(c) xx xx xx

(d) XX XX XX

(e) the expression "Company" means a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882, or under the (English) Companies Acts, 1862 to 1890, or incorporated by an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or by an Indian Law; or by Royal Charter or Letters Patent; and includes a society registered under the Society Registration Act, 1860, and a registered society within the meaning of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 or any other law relating to Cooperative Societies for the time being in force in any State.

(ee) xx xx xx

(f) xx xx xx

(g) xx xx xx

Publication of Preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon.

(1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published in the official Gazette, and the Collector, shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality.

(2) xx xx xx xx xx xx

Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.

(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the Appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any made u/s 5A, sub-section (2) that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders:

Provided that no such, declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property Is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.

(2) xx xx xx

(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be; and, after making such declaration, the appropriate Government may acquire the land in manner hereinafter appearing.

xx xx xx

PART VII ACQUISITION OF LAND FOR COMPANIES.

(This Part as amended in Punjab comprises of Sections 36 to 44-B).

38-A. Industrial concern to be deemed Company for certain purposes.

An industrial concern, ordinarily employing not less than one hundred workmen owned by an individual or by an association of individuals and not being a Company, desiring to acquire land for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the concern or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith shall, so far as concerns the acquisition of such land, be deemed to be a Company for the purposes of this part, and the references to Company in Sections 5A, 6, 7, 17 and 50 shall be interpreted as references also to such concern.

Previous consent of appropriate Government and execution of agreement necessary.

The provisions of Sections 6 to 37 (both inclusive) shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any Company, unless, with the previous consent of the appropriate Government, nor unless the Company shall have executed the agreement hereinafter mentioned.

xx xx xx

The material thing to be noticed at this stage is that there is nothing said in the impugned notification or declaration that the land is being acquired for any corporation or company so as to attract the replication of Part VII of the Act to the proceedings. I may mention this fact here because the Supreme Court ruling in the case of Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji and Another Vs. The State of Bombay (Now Gujarat) and Others, could be distinguished on this ground, The language of Section 4 (1) of the Act suggests that a notification under that section need mention only the public purpose for which the acquisition is being made while it is at the stage of the declaration u/s 0 that it can be specified whether the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company. The proviso to sub-section (1) of this section for the first time requires a mention of the source of the funds out of which the compensations for the acquisition have to be paid.

The impugned notification (Annexure ''B/1'') makes it clear that the land is going to be acquired by the Government at public expense and for a public purpose. This recital also appears in the declaration (Annexure ''B/2'') made u/s 6 of the Act and according to sub-section (3) of the said section, the declaration shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated.

The Supreme Court decision in Valjibhai Muljibhai''s case (supra) had been cited before two different Benches of this Court. This ruling had been distinguished by both the Benches but with altogether different results; Appeals against both these conflicting decisions are pending either in the Supreme Court or before the Letters Patent Bench, The bearing of this writ petition had, therefore, been postponed on the application of respondent No.) 3 for awaiting the decision of the Supreme Court. The petitioners, however, appear to be in a hurry and want early hearing of the case without waiting for the decision of the appeal pending hi the Supreme Court against the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Raja Ram Baru Ram and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others, . The hearing of the appeal filed against my judgment in the case of Moola Devi v. State of Haryana, Civil Writ No. 514 of 1970. decided on 29-5-1970 (Punj.) has also been stayed by the Letters Patent Bench, in view of the eagerness shown by the petitioners however, it was not considered desirable by me that the present case should go on being adjourned indefinitely to await the decision of the Supreme Court in Raja Ram''s case (supra). I am told that an appeal filed against my decision, to proceed on with the hearing of this case has been dismissed by the Letters Patent Bench.

When 1 decided Moola Devi''s case (supra), the Division Bench ruling of this Court in Raja Ram''s case (supra) was not brought to my notice. My decision being of a later date could not naturally come to the notice of the Division Bench that had decided Raja Ram''s case (supra) more than three months earlier.

In Valjibhai Muljibhai''s case (supra), the Hon''ble Judges of the Supreme Court were pleased to hold that a State Transport Corporation having been incorporated by an Indian Law was a company within the meaning of Section 3 (e) of the Act, Certain provisions of the Act of Incorporation which were taken into consideration for holding the corporation to be a company were that it had been appointed by the State Government by an Act and was a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal and could sue and be sued in its own name. For holding the corporation to be a company, the Hon''ble Judges of the Supreme Court had not entered into any discussion as to whether or not the corporation had any fluid or fluctuating body of shareholders or as to bow it would differ from a firm or a partnership. This Supreme Court decision having been brought to the notice of the Division Bench that decided Raja Ram''s case (supra), it was held, amongst other things, that the Food Corporation of India which had been similarly incorporated by an Indian law and which had perpetual seal and succession etc. was not a company. Placed in a situation where I have either to follow a Supreme Court dictum or the contrary diction of a Bench of this Court, however large or full, it may appear apparent that 1 do not have much of in option. It would, be too much for me to say that the Hon''ble Judges of the Supreme Court had not really meant what they had actual If said in clear enough terms. It is not for me to suggest that if any provisions of law or ruling or any other matter bearing on the controversy had been brought to the notice of the Hon''ble Judges of the Supreme Court, the decision in Valjibhai Muljibhai''s case might have been different In Smt. Somavanti and Others Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, , it was observed by the Supreme Court that the binding effect of a decision does not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered therein, or not, provided that the point with reference to which an argument was subsequently advanced was actually decided. Similarly in the case of Ballabhadas Mathurdas Lakhani and Others Vs. Municipal Committee, Malkapur, it was observed by the Hon''ble Judges of the Supreme Court that where a decision was binding on a High Court, it could not ignore it because it thought that the relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the higher Court.

Where a piece of legislation gives a statutory definition fox a word of expression, then while interpreting the provisions of that piece of legislation, we have to give, that word or expression, whenever it exists in the Act, the meaning assigned to it by the definition or the interpretation clause unless otherwise indicated by the subject or context. Cases decided under different Acts or cases coming from States where the Act has not been similarly amended as in Punjab cannot be taken as a safe guide if the provisions of law under consideration are materially different or not in pari materia. Clause (e) of Section 3 of the Act begins; "the expression ''Company'' means a Company............". if the word ''Company'' at both places can be given the statutory or defined meaning as was done by the Hon''ble Judges of the Supreme Court in Valjibhai Muljibhai''s case (supra), then we would hardly have any justification for running to the judicial dictionaries or the dictionaries compiled for the laity or what the uninitiated understand by the word in common parlance. Section 38A of the Act, which was inserted by an amendment, clearly shows that even an industrial concern owned by an individual without any incorporation or registration could be deemed to be a Company for the purposes of Part VII of the Act. A declaration u/s 6 would be subject to the provisions of Part VII in cases where an acquisition is made for a Company. Any academic discussions in school or college books as to how a company differs from a firm or partnership would be besides the point. Statutory definitions are known to have given a word or expression a meaning which is different from or the exact opposite of its dictionary meaning or what it may connote in common parlance.

The definition of the expression ''foreign liquor'' in the Punjab Excise Act or the rules framed thereunder has been made to include sophisticated types of liquors made in our own country by licensed distilleries or breweries of repute even though this liquor had never crossed any inter-State or international borders. The expression ''country-made liquor'' could, however, include illicit liquor made in a foreign country. I am reminded of a case of murderous assault which I tried while I was posted in the border district of Amritsar. It had come in evidence that there is an Indian village on this side of Indo-Pakistan border with a name associated with the White Slave Traffic. Just across the border, there is a Pakistani village though I do not remember its name. Residents of both these villages are known to be engaged in smuggling of goods across the border. There is a picket of the Border Security Force in the vicinity. The activities of all these persons are mainly nocturnal and during the day time they have all the leisure and hold informal meetings over a game of cards or sharing of refreshments etc. One can well imagine that the residents of the Indian village bring to a party meet sophisticated types of liquor made in India. Their Pakistani counterparts bring some liquor distilled in an illicit manner in their territory. There is a raid by the district police and excise staff and both types of liquor are recovered. Our own sophisticated stuff which can compare favorably with the choicest brands we disown as ''Foreign liquor'' while the poison brawn in the hostile enemy territory we own up as ''country-made''.

In a get together of my brother Judges, I had thoughtlessly made the statement that for the purposes of a piece of legislation it was open to the Legislature to define day as night and vice versa. Having made that statement in an off hand manner, I started wondering whether I could make it good. One has only to give his imagination free reins and to conjure up an environment in which such a contrary definition could begin to have rational meaning. I would ask one to imagine a very busy foreign airport where numerous flights keep landing and taking off round the clock. The airport authorities have decided to air condition the entire building comprising of a number of lounges and reception rooms etc. The inside of the building is a small world by itself. The airconditioning of the building requires that the openings have to be sealed against outside light and air. To keep the inside of the building lighted up, artificial means like electric supply have to be resorted to. A person who has stayed for an appreciable length of time inside this building would lose all count of the hours of the day and night outside the building.

The law of crimes very often provides a severer penalty for an offence if committed during night than would have been the case if the offence had been committed during day time. The airport, authorities could provide that if such an offence is committed inside the port building, it would be taken to have been committed during the day while there is regular electric supply but would be taken to have been committed during the night while there is a temporary electrical break-down. This statutory definition could make the offence committed after sunrise and before sunset more severely punishable if it had been committed during an electrical break-down. Any person in the street would find it difficult to comprehend why this offence committed during the day is being described to have been committed during the night. Unless the Courts, while interpreting the provisions of a piece of legislation, enter the Legislature''s world of make-belief, they could be held responsible for helping the legislators to enact the funniest comedies of errors in their own Court-rooms.

There is nothing in the Act which makes it incumbent that an acquisition should be made either for a Government department or for a company or for a local authority. The State can make an acquisition for a public purpose and all that would be necessary in such a case would be that a part of the funds should originate wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. As long as a public purpose is served by an acquisition, it may seem hardly to matter whether a private company has been benefited in the process. Reference could in this connection be made to the Supreme Court decision in Smt. Somawanti''s case (supra). The two rulings of the Supreme Court in R.L. Arora Vs. State of U.P., and R.L. Arora Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, , are very illustrative on the subject. Proceedings for the acquisition of Arora''s lands had been started by the Government under Part VII of the Act. The first writ petition filed by Arora to challenge the proceedings succeeded and led to the extensive amendments of the Act and insertion of Section 38A and clause (aa) of sub-section (1) of Section 40 in Part VII. These amendments had the effect of validating the proceedings and the second writ petition filed by Arora had, therefore, failed. These rulings may not be very helpful in deciding cases from States which had not carried out similar amendments in the Act. Moreover, this acquisition has been made under clause (c) of Section 17 (2) which is not ejusdem generis with the two earlier clauses of that sub-section as has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in The Printers House Private Ltd. Vs. Misri Lal Dalip Singh and Others, , and also by the Supreme Court in Jage Ram and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, . The discussion whether or not the land is waste or arable, therefore, ceases to have any relevancy. In the case of Printers House Private Ltd. (supra), land was allowed to be acquired by the Government even though owners had set up machinery and factory costing lakhs of rupees on that land. Unless it is shown that there was colorable exercise of power by the Government, the Court cannot go behind the declaration u/s 6 and find out in a particular case whether the purpose for which the land was needed was a public purpose or not.

Where the Government had contributed money towards cost of land sought to be acquired, it is not necessary to proceed with the acquisition under Part VII of the Act. Nobody can dispute the fact that in these days of food scarcity, the procurement and scientific storage and distribution of foodgrains by the Government would serve a public purpose. As regards the source of the funds, it has been mentioned in the return filed by the respondents that the funds for the construction of the godowns had been supplied by the Central Government. In a written statement filed by the respondents in compliance with this Court''s orders dated 18-1-1974, it has again been reiterated that the construction work had been undertaken by the Central Public Works Department and had been started within 15 days of the taking of the possession of the land at the instance of the Food Corporation of India. The Central Government was described to have spent about Rs. 15 lakhs on the construction of these godowns before these were handed over to the Food Corporation. In Smt. Somawanti''s case (supra), the Government had made a token contribution of Rs. 100 from their own funds after the declaration u/s 6 had been made. The contribution had been made during the pendency of the writ petition filed by the land-owners to challenge the acquisition proceedings. The benefit of the acquisition was to go mainly to a private company manufacturing public utility goods. Almost the entire funds were to be provided by the company. In spite of these facts, the acquisition under the general provisions of the Act was upheld by the Supreme Court on the ground that a part of the funds had come from a public exchequer. All that is necessary for the Government to prove is that an infinitesimal part or a microscopic fraction of the total expense of acquisition had come from the public revenues.

In the present case, the respondents have filed affidavits that funds to the tune of lakhs of rupees had been contributed by the Government. The Supreme Court decision in Valjibhai Muljibhai''s case (supra) has no bearing on the facts of the present case. The declaration in Valjibhai Muljibhai''s case had recited that the acquisition was being made for a company. This declaration had made it necessary for the Government to take action under Part VII. The acquisition proceedings were struck down on the ground that the provisions of this part had not been complied with. When the question of compliance with the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act arose, the Hon''ble Judges of the Supreme Court held that because the funds had been earmarked or diverted through a particular channel, these had acquired the character of the funds of the company and that there was a proper compliance of the said proviso. It was, however, the common case of the parties that the initial source of the funds was the public exchequer. Even if the funds were earmarked for the Corporation and had become their funds, it cannot be said that the public exchequer was not the poorer by that amount. A done may become an absolute owner of the property under a gift but that would not imply that there had been no diminution in the donor''s property. Smt. Somawanti''s case (supra) is a complete answer to the argument that no part of the funds had in the present case come from the public revenues or that the proceedings are vitiated because the benefit of the acquisition would go to the Food Corporation of India which would come within the definition of a Company given in Section 3 (e) of the Act on the basis of the ratio of the Supreme Court ruling in Valjibhai Muljibhai''s case (supra). Since the acquisition is not declared to have been made for any company but for a public purpose at public expense, this Supreme Court ruling has no application to the facts of the present case. I, therefore, find that there is no valid challenge to the acquisition proceedings in the present case.

This writ petition must also fail on the ratio of a Full Bench decision of this Court in Murari Lal Gupta Vs. The State of Punjab and Another, Though an application for stay had been filed with the writ petition, it had not been seriously pressed. The order passed by the Motion Bench in the connected Civil Writ No. 528 of 1969 had stayed petitioner''s dispossession from buildings only but there was no restraint put on the respondents* right to continue with the construction work of the godowns on the vacant land belonging to the present petitioners. According to the return filed by the respondents in compliance with this Court''s orders dated 18-1-1974, the construction work of the godowns had been allowed to continue unhampered during the pendency of this writ petition and the Government had incurred an expense of about Rs. 15 lakhs. The following observations of the Full Bench in Murari Lal Gupta''s case would, therefore, be fully applicable:-

There is an additional ground why I am of the view that we should not interfere with the impugned notifications in these proceedings, It is the case of the Government that after acquiring the land under the first notification, dated 9-8-1962. since the matter was of urgent nature, they constructed buildings worth about Rs. 60.000 thereon. The petitioner filed the first writ petition challenging the previous notification on 21-11-1962, that is, after about 31/2 months. Even then no stay order prohibiting the respondents from making any constructions on the land was obtained by him. It was for the first time on 29-10-1963, when the previous case was referred to a Division Bench, that the petitioner got the stay order. It means that no stay was obtained for about 15 months after the issue of the first notification, with the result that during this period the Government went on making constructions on the land in question. The acceptance of the writ petition at this stage will result in a great toss to the Government and so far as the petitioner is concerned, he will get the proper compensation for his land and would thus suffer no loss.

Shri Bhandari, the learned counsel for the petitioners, argues that these observations were mere obiter dicta by the Full Bench. I am, however, of the view that this was one of the two grounds on which the writ petition could be dismissed. The mere fact that the discussion of this ground had been relegated to the second place would not imply that the reasons given are obiter dicta or that they would not have, by themselves, led to a dismissal of the writ petition. Shri Bhandari''s argument in the present case also proceeded on the assumption that his challenge to the proceedings on the first ground was going to succeed in view of; the Division Bench ruling in Raja Ram''s case (supra). His misplaced optimism may seem to take the wind out of his argument about the inapplicability of the Full Bench decision.

The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs.