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Judgment
18 paragraphs · 1,676 wordsHuluvadi G. Ramesh
Petitioners in WP 41602-603/12 have questioned the power of the Chancellor quashing/cancelling the nomination to the Executive Council of the Vishveswaraya Technological University (VTU) and petitioners in WP 42139/2012 and other connected matters are challenging the appointment of respondents 6 & 7 in the place of petitioners to the Executive Council of the VTU in the meeting held on 21.9.2012 in which certain resolutions are said to have been deliberated regarding appointment of Registrar (Administration) and Registrar (Evaluation). According to the petitioners, as per the resolution passed, the Vice Chancellor/3rd respondent has signed the appointments as per Resolution 7.1 and there was no ruckus in the meeting of the Executive Council. As the appointments went against the wishes of the Vice Chancellor that too when the appointment of the Registrar (Evolution) was not according to the recommendation of the Vice Chancellor but it was by the majority decision of the Executive Council, the Vice Chancellor came with a plea that there was ruckus created by the petitioners in the Executive Council meeting and accordingly reported the same to the Chancellor on 25.9.2012 after four days, to get rid of the petitioners, to get a favourable report in his favour. These petitioners could not have been removed from the Executive Council when once they were appointed/nominated by the Chancellor and the Chancellor has no authority to remove them and also no provision is provided under the VTU Act as such, removal of the petitioners by the order of the Chancellor that too on the false report of the Vice Chancellor is non-est and the Executive Council meeting held on 21.9.2012 was in order. As such, the order if any, passed by the Chancellor is not binding on the nominees/appointees. The decision for removal has to be taken by the Executive Council and not by any other authority. Accordingly, in support of his argument, counsel representing the petitioners has relied upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of K.R. Shivadatta Vs. Selection Committee to Govt. Medical Colleges & Anr. - 1972 (1) KLJ 5 to contend that the Selection Committee has no power to review the selection once made and argued that the cancellation of the selection once made cannot be justified under S. 16 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1916. Counsel has also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Lachmi Narain and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , particularly paragraphs 59 and 60, to contend that power once exercised gets exhausted.
Per contra, counsel representing the respondents has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Bool Chand Vs. Chancellor, Kurukshetra University - AIR 1968 SC 292 to contend that power to appoint implies power to terminate. Counsel has also relied upon several other decisions in this regard. It is also the argument of the counsel that S. 19 r/w S. 50 of the Act does provide for exercise of power by the Chancellor for appointment and removal of the members of the Executive Council.
At this juncture, learned counsel referred to S. 11 of the Act, which reads as under :
S. 11 : The Chancellor :
The Governor of the State of Karnataka shall, by virtue of his office, be the Chancellor of the University.
The Chancellor shall be the Head of the University and shall, when present, preside at any convocation of the University.
No honorary degree shall be conferred by the University upon any person without the explicit approval of the Chancellor.
The Chancellor can exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be conferred on him by this Act of the Statutes.
According to the counsel, the Act itself provides for removal and power is available to the Chancellor. Accordingly, he submitted pursuant to the report of the Vice Chancellor and the concerned members of the Executive Council, as per requirement, after notice is given to the petitioners, decision is taken for removal. Referring to S. 15 and 16 of the General Clauses Act also, it is contended that even in the absence of any such power, the General Clauses Act supplements the VTU Act to exercise such power and S. 16 specifically empowers the Chancellor being the Appointing Authority, to remove a person.
In reply, petitioners'' counsel argued, once power is exercised by the Chancellor in nominating and nomination/appointment is made, there his power ceases and it has to be dealt only by the Executive Council itself regarding removal and Chancellor has no power to remove the petitioners who are nominated as members of the Executive Counsel. Regarding interpretation of the General Clauses Act, petitioners'' counsel has relied upon the case of K.R. Shivadatta, cited supra in which case, a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with selection committees power vis-a-vis S. 16 of the Mysore General Clauses Act and it was held, as per Rules selection committees power and functions ceases on the publication of the list of selected candidates and thereafter, it has no power for cancellation of seats.
In another judgment of the Delhi High Court relied upon by the petitioners'' counsel in the case of M.L. Sondhi Vs. Union of India and Others, , with regard to S. 16 of the General Clauses Act which is on par with S. 16 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, in case of appointment to Society it is observed, when the Constitution of the Society did not specifically allow or prohibit the removal of its Chairman, it has to be held the rules of natural justice do not require that an opportunity to be heard must be given to a nominee whose removal may be as arbitrary and unilateral as his appointment. There are no others reasons envisaged in the General Clauses Act for curtailing the general right of appointment, suspension and removal.
Counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the case of Mohan Singh and Others Vs. International Airport Authority of India and Others, regarding conditional delegation. The decision in the case of Bangalore Development Authority and Others Vs. R. Hanumaiah and Others, has also been relied regarding power to withdraw the acquisition notification. Another judgment relied upon in this regard is the case of Hindurao Balwant Patil and Another Vs. Krishnaro Pashuram Patil and Others, .
For a better understanding, it would be apt to refer to S. 11, 50, 29, 30 & 20(k) of the Act.
In the case on hand, as per the Act itself, S. 10 provides for the Officers of the University consisting of the Chancellor and the powers of the Chancellor is also defined under S. 11. As noticed, The Governor being the head of the State is also the head of the University as Chancellor by virtue of his office. Under S. 11(4) the Chancellor can exercise such powers and perform other duties as is defined in the Act and the Statutes. S. 20(k), as argued by the petitioners'' counsel, regulates and determines the matters concerning the University in accordance with the Act and the Statutes and to exercise such powers and discharge such duties as may be conferred on it by the Statutes. S. 19(1) defines the university authorities i.e., Executive Council and (2) the Academic Senate. S. 19(2) provides power to the Chancellor to constitute the Executive Council. So, the power of appointment as per S. 19(2) is with the Chancellor i.e., the Governor. S. 50 deals with disputes as to the constitution of the University authorities. On such reference to the Chancellor, the Chancellor after taking such advice, decides the question and his decision shall be final. Without reference to S. 16 of the General Clauses Act as is noted, S. 19(1) & (2) provides for appointing power of the Executive Council. Similarly, S. 50 also provides to take a decision against the University Authorities or any matter referred to therein.
Thus, a report appears to have been given by the Vice Chancellor to the Chancellor on 25.9.2012 as per requirement under S. 50. The Chancellor is shown to have exercised his power, whose exercise of power shall be final in the sense, S. 50 itself contemplates for a decision to be taken by the Chancellor against the university authorities.
No doubt petitioners are persons nominated by the Chancellor as members of Executive Council. Under S. 50, the Chancellor has exercised his power against the university authorities viz., members of the Executive Council and of course, various decisions have been referred to by both the parties with regard to following the principles of natural justice. Be that as it may. Notice is said to have been ordered to the petitioners and decision has been taken. What has been argued throughout by the petitioners'' counsel is, Chancellor has no power as such once he has exercised power under S. 19(2) of the Act and he is barred from exercising the power of removal. But, S. 50 is very much clear and it empowers the Chancellor to take action against the university authorities. Under S. 19(1) the Executive Council being an authority under the University, on exercising his satisfaction, the Governor/Chancellor has exercised the power in the matter of removal and simultaneously nominating some other members.
So far as nomination of other members - as to their qualification is concerned, if there is any challenge, the same can be considered by the Chancellor on such petition being made to him. For the present, there is no illegality in the exercise of power by the Chancellor as per S. 19(1) & (2) and S. 50 of the Act. So also with respect to nominating other members. If the petitioners intend to point out any irregularity in the appointment of some of the members who are nominated, the same could be pleaded before the Chancellor who can hear the petitioners and pass appropriate orders. Thus, both the petitions being devoid of merits, are dismissed.
