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Judgment
16 paragraphs · 1,243 wordsS.D. Anand, J.—The plea raised by the respondent-landlord for eviction of the petitioner-tenant from the tenanted premises came to be negatived by the learned Rent Controller. However, fortune favoured the respondent-landlady in appeal and the learned Appellate Authority reversed findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller, allowed the ejectment petition and further ordered ejectment of the petitioner-tenant from the tenanted premises aforementioned.
The petitioner-tenant is in revision against it.
The respondent-landlady had raised a plea for eviction action on an averment of personal bonafide becessity. The plea, averred in the context, was that the premises are required for personal bonafide necessity inasmuch as her husband, who had superannuated from service, would like to run an estate agent''s business therein.
The learned Rent Controller got swayed by the fact that the husband of the respondent-landlady being aged more than 80 years of age and having never had any experience in business, the projected need could not be said to be bonafide, particularly when the husband of the respondent-landlady did not enter the witness box. In that context, the learned Rent Controller drew sustenance from the fact that the husband of the respondent-landlady had retired from a senior placement, it was unlikely that he could function as an estate agent.
In appeal, the learned Appellate Authority held that the entire reasoning noticed by the learned Rent Controller was inappropriate because the age of the husband of the respondent-landlady did not debar him from running the business of an estate agent which (business) would not require much of physical movement. Reliance, in the context, was also placed upon the fact that the landlady had herself entered the witness box and testified the above projected need. Learned Appellate Authority also noticed that longevity in human beings having gone up, it cannot be said that a person of the age group of the husband of the respondent-landlady could not run the indicated business.
It was also noticed that there is no evidence on the file to prove that the husband of the respondent-landlady is suffering from any ailment which could disable him from doing the projected business.
The outer limit, within which a Revisional Court can undertake the adjudicatory exercise, was provided by the Apex Court in judicial pronouncements reported as Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Limited 1999 (1) PLR 805 and Shamshad Ahmad and Others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) through LRs. and Others, . On perusal thereof, it can safely be culled out that "a reappraisal of evidence can be made, but that should be for the limited purpose to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact finding court is wholly unreasonable." The constriction of revisional powers noticed, the adjudicatory exercise is undertaken as under:
It was vehemently argued on behalf of the petitioner-tenant that the husband of the respondent-landlady being in advance age of 80 years could not be expected to be physically fit to run any business.
Though it can safely be inferred from the material obtaining on the file that the husband of the respondent-landlady had touched the age of 80 years, it is equally apparent that there is no evidence to prove that he has any disabling health condition or that he is suffering from any ailment on account whereof he may not able to run the business of an estate agent. Even though the husband of the respondent-landlady did not enter the witness box, it cannot be said that the petition suffers from want of bonafides. The respondent-landlady herself entered the witness box, as her own witness, and made a forth right deposition qua the personal bonafide necessity for running the indicated business by her husband. By the very nature of things, an estate agent would essentially be functioning from office. In that view of things, it cannot be said that the age of the husband of the respondent-landlady would impede the running of the projected business by him.
Reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner upon M.L. Khurana v. H.S. Chopra 1993 (2) R.C.R. (Rent) 305, Raj Kumar Vij v. Hem Raj Singla 2008 (1) R.C.R. (Civil) 44 and Manohar Lal v. Smt. Pushpawati Jain 1993(1) R.C.R. (Rent) 592 is misconceived. Those case were based upon their own peculiar facts and circumstances and have no parallel to the present case.
In M.L. Khurana''s case (supra), the landlord was proved to have been living at Jabalpur with his son. He raised a plea for vacation of his house at Delhi by averring that he wanted to shift over there because his four brothers and one sister were living over there. It was found, as a fact, that there was want of evidence to prove that sons of the landlord also wanted to shift from Jabalpur to Delhi. It was under those circumstances that Delhi High Court held that the refrain on the part of the landlord in entering the witness box could validly give rise to an inference against him because "it could only be known to the mind to the landlord whether he would prefer to continue to live in Jabalpur where his sons are living or whether he would like to shift to Delhi and live in his own house."
In Raj Kumar Vij''s case (supra), it was the attorney (GPA) who entered the witness box and deposed to the averment regarding personal bonafide necessity of the landlady.
In Manohar Lal''s case (supra), an adverse inference was drawn against the landlady on account of her not appearing as a witness because it was proved that she was living at Chandigarh with her married son and grand children. The Court held that "it is her state of mind which has to be established by leading evidence to show that she would like to live away from her married sons and grand children. It was incumbent upon landlady to have appeared in witness box and made clear her state of mind."
There is plethora of law on the point that the Courts ought to give to the landlord to decide what he would like to do with the premised owned by him. Ofcourse, if there is proof of want of bonafides in raising a plea for ejectment, the Courts would negative it. At the same time, if there is a preponderance of evidence supporting the plea for the projected need, the Court would like to lean in favour of the grant of the plea.
The plea, on behalf of the petitioner-tenant, that (the husband of the) respondent had no experience in the projected business whatsoever and would not be able to run it is neither here nor there. The projected business is not of the category wherein any expertise would be required. It is in evidence that the husband of the respondent-landlady retired from a fairly senior placement. He must have, in the course of the job, dealt with large number of people. Every job of that category involves interaction with the public. If a person has had that long experience in such a job, it is inferred that he would be able to run the business of estate agent. The plea shall stand repelled accordingly.
In the light of foregoing discussion, the petition is held to be denuded of merit and is ordered to be dismissed. The petitioner shall have two months'' time from today to vacate the premises aforementioned.
