AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
No AI summary yet
Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.
Judgment
32 paragraphs · 665 wordsMohammed Nias, C.P., J
The appellant/writ petitioner challenges the dismissal of the writ petition filed for quashing Ext. P8 order of the respondent which did not extend the
benefit of Ext. P1 Government Order to the petitioner while conferring the service benefits due to the petitioner during the period of leave without
allowance availed by the petitioner from 02-03-1993 to 01-03-1995 for pursuing higher studies.
The writ petitioner joined service as a Physical Education Lecturer on 21-02-1992 and is presently working as an Associate Professor in the
Department of Physical Education at N.S.S. College, Changanassery. The petitioner had availed two years leave without allowances from 02-03-1993
to 01-03-1995 as part of a Junior Research Fellowship of the University Grants Commission for doing research in Physical Education. The said period
of two years was not counted as qualifying service by the respondents despite the subsequent Government Order No. G.O. (P) No. 56/2000/H. Edn.
Dated, 15-4-2000 whereby the Government had decided to allow deputation to those teachers who undergo higher studies without financial
commitment to Government and subject to other conditions. Alleging that the petitioner's representation to consider the above said period as qualifying
service was wrongly rejected as per Ext. P8 order dated 01-06-2016, writ petition was filed in 2018, claiming the benefit of the Government Order
referred above and seeking to quash Ext. P8 order passed by the 2nd respondent. The appellant could not have asked for the benefit for reckoning the
period 2-3-1993 to 1-3-1995 as qualifying service in view of the provisions of Rule 88 Part I KSR. The availing of leave as aforesaid was prior to
Ext.P1 order which came into force only on 15-4-2000.
The learned Single Judge by the judgment under appeal dismissed the writ petition holding that the benefit of the Government Order dated 15-4-
2000, which has no retrospective effect, cannot be granted to the petitioner.
Before us, the leaned counsel for the appellant Sri. M.P. Madhavan Kutty submits that the Government Order dated 15-04-2000 has retrospective
effect and that going by the doctrine of fairness, the benefit of Ext. P1 order should have been extended to the petitioner and that the benefit granted
in Ext. P1 is with an objective and it has to be granted to the appellant as well on the ground of equity. The appellant also relies on the judgment in
Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) I, New Delhi v. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd. [2014 KHC 4589] and Vijay v. State of Maharashtra and Others
(2006 KHC 985) in support of his contention.
It is to be noted that the representation of the petitioner, Ext. P5 dated 6-3-2015 could have been rejected on the ground of laches alone as he was
claiming the benefit of a G.O. issued in respect of leave availed by him from 1993 to 1995. The representation was preferred 15 years after the
Government Order and 20 years after the expiry of the leave period. Even the writ petition was filed three years after the representation. However,
the 2nd respondent rejected it by Ext. P8 holding that the leave availed by the petitioner is well before the issuance of Ext. P1 dated 15-04-2000. The
learned single judge, in our view, has rightly held that Ext. P1 has no retrospective operation. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner
on the judgments referred above also cannot have any application as those cases dealt with the amendment to the Rules which stands on a totally
different footing and there cannot be any doubt to the proposition laid down in the said decisions. Ext. P1 Government order which granted
relaxation to future cases cannot be held to have any retrospective effect at all. The Government Orders cannot be issued in violation of the
Rules and Government Orders have to be in conformity with the prevailing statutory provisions. We find no reason to interfere with the judgment of
the learned Single Judge.
Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is dismissed.
