Dr. Miss. M. Koshi and another vs Vincent

Natarajan, J.—The first two accused in C.C. No. 2281 of 1976 on the file of the Judicial Second Class Magistrate''s Court, Triuvallur, have

moved this court to quash the proceedings as against them in the said case. The complaint in that case was filed by the respondent herein and four

persons were arrayed as accused. The complaint has been taken on file by the Magistrate under S. 504, I.P.C.

The petitioners 1 and 2 are respectively the Superintendent and the Nursing Superintendent of the Mission Hospital, Ekkadu, Tiruvallur Taluk. It

appears that one Theodore was the Business Manager of the Hospital. For some irregularity in his service, Theodore was suspended and a new

man was appointed in his place. Enraged at that, Theodore is said to have instigated the respondent herein and some others to trespass into the

hospital and prevent the petitioners and other members of the hospital staff from discharging their duties. It is further stated that the police came to

the rescue of the petitioners and others and subsequently the police have filed a charge-sheet against the respondent and the other miscreants for

the offences committed by them.

During the pendency of that case, the petitioners and the accused 3 and 4 in the case are said to have criminally insulted the respondent near the

bus stand situate opposite to the Ekkadu Hospital. The first petitioner herein is said to have remarked; . The second petitioner it then said to have

derisively stated: . This was followed by the remarks of the accused 3 and 4 in the following words: . Lastly, the second petitioner is said to have

remarked .

The respondent averred in his complaint that on account of the provocative utterances by the petitioners and the accused 3 and 4 in the case he

became wild and would have broken public peace or committed an offence but for some of the persons standing close by pacifying him and

advising him to calm himself.

Mr. Sam V. Chelliah, the learned counsel for the petitioners, contends that the case against the petitioners is a fabricated one and is a counter-

blast to the charge-sheet laid by the police against the respondent and others for the offences committed by them in Ekkadu Hospital. Ho further

argues that the first petitioner being the Superintendent of the Hospital would never have uttered the words attributed to her and that the

respondent is wantonly vilifying her to humiliate her. These contentions cannot be gone into at this stage, for, they are matters which have to be

evaluated after evidence has been recorded in the case.

The further argument of Mr. Sam V. Chelliah is on a question of law and the argument runs on the basis that even if the utterances attributed to

the petitioners 1 and 2 are true, yet, they would not attract the operation of S. 504, I.P.C. The Section reads as follows:

Whoever intentionally insults and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing It to be likely that inch provocation will cause him

to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to

two years, or with fine, or with both.

From the wording of the Section, it is seen that the insult must be an intentional one and the insulter must intend or know it to be likely that by

means of the provocation given by him the person affected by the insult would break the public peace or commit an offence. The punishment

provided for the offence is a fairly stiff one, viz., imprisonment of either description for a terra which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with

both. It is the same as for the offence of criminal intimidation as provided for under S. 506 (Part I) I.P.C.

Continuing his argument that the word said to have been uttered by the petitioners 1 and 2 would not per se constitute criminal insult, as

conceived under S. 504, I.P.C., Mr. Chelliah further contends that words of gross abuse or vulgar abuse ought not to be mistaken with words of

Criminal insult; which alone are made punishable under S. 504, I.P.C. In support of his contention he places reliance on three decisions. In Philip

Rangel v. Emperor a share-holder of a Co-operative Bank was prosecuted under S. 504, I.P.C. for having shouted the words, ""you damn bloody

bastards and cads"" against the other members assembled at the meeting. While holding that the words used by the accused therein would not

amount to an insult, Beaumont, C.J., speaking for the Division Bench, held that for sustaining a charge under S. 504, I.P.C., the words used by the

accused must amount to something more than what in English Law is called ""mere vulgar abuse"".

In In re: Kuppuswami Aiyar was a case where a Process Server, who entered a wrong house to serve a process was scolded by the owner as

Badava, rascal"" and asked to get out. Kumaraswami Sastri, J., held that the words would not amount to the commission of an offence under S.

504 , I.P.C. and observed that a mere abuse by itself will not constitute an offence.

In Subbiah v. Venkata Subbamma Horwill, J., observed as follows:

An insult, even if a gross one is not an offence in itself under S. 504. What is punished under the section is something very much graver than that.

Having regard to the ratio in these cases, it has to be conceded that a mere derogatory remark or even words of abuse will not by themselves

constitute intentional trawl as contemplated under S. 504, I.P.C. A person charging another with the commission of aft offence under this section

has to prove that he was intentionally insulted and the person giving the insult had thereby intended or had every reason to know that by such insult

the person affected by the insult would be provoked and on account of the provocation he will break the public peace or commit an offence.

When the words used by a person do not ex facie amount to an insult, bat only amount to decrying a person or ridiculing him, then it has to be held

that those words can never amount to intentional insult which alone is made punishable under this Section. Viewed in that perspective, there can be

no doubt whatever that the words said to have been uttered by the first petitioner can never amount to words of intentional insult. All that she is

said to have remarked is that fellows who were not even having an assured supply of gruel were putting on airs and adopting defiant postures. At

best that was only a derogatory remark made against the respondent and by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the first petitioner had

intended by the use of such words, assuming that she had uttered them, that the respondent should lose his balance and get provoked and either

break the peace or commit an offence. It has, therefore, to be held that even if the respondent''s averments in the complaint are fully true, yet the

case cannot be taken cognizance of against the first petitioner. Accordingly, the proceedings against the first petitioner in the respondent''s

complaint will stand quashed.

So far as the utterances made by the second petitioner is concerned, I do not express any opinion. It is open to her to canvass before the trial

Magistrate her contentions that she never made any remarks against the respondent and secondly, even if she made any such remarks, they were

not with a view to intentionally insult him.

In the result, the petition will stand allowed as far as the first petitioner is concerned and the petition will stand dismissed as far as the second

petitioner is concerned.