Dr. Pramod Chandra, Dr. (Mrs.) Uma Chandra, Rahul Chandra and Atul Chandra vs The State of Uttar Pradesh

Amar Saran, J.—Heard Sri ABL Gaur, Senior. Advocate learned Counsel for the applicant, Sri Gaurav Kakkar learned Counsel for opposite party No. 2, and learned AGA and perused the record.

This application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the charge-sheet in Crl. Case No. 200 of 2004, under Sections 307/498A IPC 307/498A IPC and % DP Act and also the orders dated 8.10.2004 in S.T. No. 619 of 2004 (State v. Pramod Chandra), orders dated 13.7.04 in S.T. No. 368 of 2004 (State v. Atul Chandra) and in S.T. No. 163 of 2004 (State v. Rahul Chandra), and in S.T. No. 165 of 2004 (State v. Uma Chandra) passed by the CJM, Bulandshahr refusing to discharge the applicant Pramod Chandra or framing charges against the other accused applicants.

This case was remanded by the Apex Court by an order dated 18.9.2006 in Crl. Appeal No. 975 of 2006, arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 1052 of 2005 (Jyoti Gupta and Anr. v. State of U.P.) after setting aside the earlier order dated 28.10.2004 passed by this Court, in the instant Criminal Misc. Application. A direction was issued by the Apex Court that the Chief Justice may place the matter for early hearing and disposal before the bench concerned.

After an order was passed on 3.4.2008 for peremptory listing of this case in the next cause list, it has finally been heard and is being disposed of today.

Three orders, all dated 13.7.2004, framing charges under Sections 498A, 307 read with 149 IPC and � DP Act against the applicant, Uma Devi, the mother-in-law of the victim Jyoti Gupta, applicants Rahul Chandra and Atul Chandra, who are Devars of Smt. Jyoti, and another order dated 8.10.2004 refusing to discharge applicant Dr. Pramod Chandra, father-in-law of Jyoti, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 2, Bulandshahr, in ST No. 619 of 2004, were challenged by means of this application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. Earlier an ex parte order was passed by a Single Judge without issuing notice to the complainant at the initial stage on 28.10.2004 after hearing the applicants'' counsel and the learned AGA which observed that after considering the submissions of the learned Counsel for the applicants that the nature of injuries do not make out a case u/s 307 IPC, and that conflicting versions of the incident had been given by the injured victim in her statements u/s 161 Cr.P.C., hence the orders dated 13.7.2004 and 8.10.2004 framing charges as above passed by the lower court were being set aside and the case was being remanded to the learned Addl. Sessions Judge to re-consider the matter and to pass fresh orders.

This order of the High Court was challenged in the afore-mentioned Crl. Appeal No. 975 of 2006, in which the Supreme Court observed that the High Court, after noticing the submissions of the learned Counsel for the applicants in the High Court and without recording its own reasons, had set aside the order passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr framing charges. It was observed that the High Court had not even noticed the observations made on behalf of the State and that the order of the Magistrate could only have been reversed after recording reasons for such reversal, hence considering the order of the High Court to be an order bereft of reasons, the matter was remanded back to the High Court for a fresh decision on merit.

I may point out that in the impugned order dated 8.10.2004 passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Court No. 2, Bulandshahr, it has been observed that the victim, Smt. Jyoti Gupta was married to co-accused Punit in October, 1998 and Rs. 1,50,000/- was given as dowry in the marriage. At that time, co-accused Punit used to sit with his father, applicant Pramod Chandra, at his medical store. Punit Chandra declared 3 or 4 months after the marriage that the medical store was in the name of the applicant Rahul Chandra, brother of the co-accused Punit and the accused began to harass Smt. Jyoti. After 2 years when Punit separated from the medical shop and opened an optician''s shop she began to sit there to assist him. But as Punit continued to harrass her she sought the intervention of her brother and bhabhi, who assured her that they would help settle the matter with the accused.

Fifteen days prior to the main incident dated 3.1.2004, Punit Chandra and Smt. Uma Devi belaboured Smt. Jyoti and demanded Rs. 2,00,000/- and asked her why she was not bringing the sought sum. Then Jyoti''s bhabhi somehow arranged Rs. 60,000/- but the accused were still demanding Rs. 50,000/- more. Punit used to accuse Jyoti that her daughter Shreya did not resemble anyone in the family.

On 2.1.2004 at 10 pm Jyoti''s husband, accused Punit, father-inlaw, applicant Pramod Chandra, her brothers-in-law applicants Rahul and Atul came to her room and raised a demand for Rs. 1,50,000/-. On her reply that she could not raise the said amount, the applicant Pramod Chandra caught hold of her hair and banged her head on the floor and the other accused also inflicted different kinds of injuries on her. Pramod Chandra called the other accused to bring kerosene oil and to sprinkle the same on Jyoti and to set fire to her, saying that he would subsequently take the plea that this was a case of suicide. However, somehow Jyoti escaped and locked herself in a room. In order to compel her to open the door, the co-accused Punit assaulted their 4 � year old daughter Shreya and even caused injuries to her private parts with a car wind screen wiper. The injuries of Jyoti and Shreya are attested by their medical reports.

It was contended by learned Counsel for the applicant that none of the injuries to Jyoti or Shreya appeared to be dangerous to life. The same contention was raised by means of an application on behalf of the accused before the trial Court where it was argued that no case was made out for framing of charges u/s 307 IPC. After considering the decision of the Apex Court in State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh, the learned trial judge observed that at the stage of Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C. the same standard could not be applied for evaluating the evidence as was to be applied when the trial is finally disposed of and that there was no need for meticulous consideration of the evidence or for examining the probable defence of the accused when the charges are to be framed. At that stage even strong suspicion would suffice. The Supreme Court has eruditely laid down the difference in standard of proof required at the stage of considering the application for discharge u/s 227 or for framing of charges u/s 228 Cr.P.C and at the time of final adjudication of the trial as follows in paragraph 4 of the law report:

Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter u/s 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused comitted the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order u/s 227 or Section 228. then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one u/s 228 and not u/s 227.

(Emphasis added).

Reliance was also placed on the case of Hari Mohan Mandal Vs. State of Jharkhand, for the proposition that for establishing an offence u/s 307 IPC, it was required to be proved that there was an intention to murder and that if some steps were taken in that direction it was not necessary to establish that injuries which were sufficient to cause death had actually been inflicted. In paragraph 11 of the said decision it has been held as follows:

It is sufficient to justify a conviction u/s 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. If the injury inflicted has been with the avowed object or intention to cause death, the ritual nature, extent or character of the injury or whether such injury is sufficient to actually causing death are really factors which are wholly irrelevant for adjudging the culpability u/s 307 IPC. The Section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. Therefore, it is not correct to acquit an accused of the charge u/s 307 IPC merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.

(Emphasis added)

It was further contended by learned Counsel for the applicant that the liability for the offence could only be assigned to the co-accused Punit, the husband of Jyoti who was suffering from mental illness. After considering the aforesaid authorities and the above-mentioned allegations that Dr. Pramod Chandra had caught hold of Smt. Jyoti and banged her head on the floor and called the other co-accused persons to bring kerosene oil for setting fire to Smt. Jyoti to give the intended act the colour of a case of suicide, hence the intention of all the accused to kill Smt. Jyoti was quite apparent. So far as the girl Shreya was concerned, injuries caused by her father Punit in order to force Jyoti to come out of her room were serious and all the other accused persons were present at the same spot, and amply supported Punit and were his co-accomplices who shared the common intention to commit the aforesaid offences. The payment of Rs. 60,000 fifteen days prior to the incident and the demand by all the accused for Rs. 2,00,000 were also mentioned. In these circumstances, the learned trial judge concluded that there were grounds for framing the charge u/s 307 IPC for attempting to murder Smt. Jyoti and, therefore, the charges could be framed against the applicant Pramod Chandra under Sections 149, read with 307 IPC and � of the DP Act. As mentioned above, the other accused have similarly been charged under the said sections. I think no exception can be taken to the conclusions of the-trial judge.

Learned Counsel for the complainant further drew my attention to the gravity of the offence by pointing out that in the FIR and medical evidence it has been mentioned that the fingers of Jyoti and Shreya had been cut off by the accused Punit. Learned Counsel for the complainant further pointed out that in the FIR it has also been mentioned that after the complainant received information about the incident telephonically on 3.1.2004 that Jyoti and Shreya were lying in a grievous condition, then the complainant and his brother Rajneesh immediately rushed to Jyoti''s matrimonial home where they saw them both in a pool of blood, and a finger each of Jyoti and Shreya had been severed and Jyoti disclosed that Punit had cut these fingers which were lying on the floor there.

In view of the aforesaid, there is no illegality in the impugned orders of the learned sessions judge framing the charges, as mentioned above. The applications has absolutely no force and it is rejected.

Learned Counsel for the complaint informs that the proceedings are stalled in the trial court ever since the initial order was passed by this Court 28.10.04 which was set aside by the apex Court on 18.9.2006, and there was a direction for early rehearing and decision of the case on merit by the High Court. It is now directed that the trial court shall make all efforts to conclude the trial within 4 months of the filing of the certified copy of this order before it. The aforesaid observations have been made for the purpose of disposal of this application and the trial court is of course expected to apply its own independent mind whilst disposing of the trial.