Dr. Pranvir Singh vs Union of India

A.K. Sikri, J.—The petitioner herein was appointed as Assistant Divisional Medical Officer in the year 1986. He was promoted as Divisional Medical Officer on the recommendation of the DPC, w.e.f. 2.2.1991. At that time, he was working at Central Railway Hospital, Gwalior. Thereafter he was transferred to Northern Railway Head Quarters, Baroda House, New Delhi at his request on 15.6.1992. During 1993-94 the petitioner was posted in Delhi-Shahdara Health Unit He was communicated the following adverse remarks vide letter dated 11.7.1994 which pertains to the year ending 31st March, 1994 i.e. for the period 1993-94.

The Union in all PNM kept complaint about non-attendance of emergency cases at TKD.

Level of knowledge of function fair, usually work diligently but could apply himself better.

Large number of complaints from Health Unit by patients and in media.

The petitioner made a representation against the aforesaid remarks apart from alleging that the remarks were the outcome of mala fides on the part of Dr. D. P. Sharma, Chief Medical Superintendent, Delhi who was his Reporting Officer. He also submitted that there was no material on the basis of which these remarks could be made. Another important plea raised by him was that he was never put to notice in the entire year regarding the aforesaid short-comings and was counseled. The representation of the petitioner was rejected by the Appellate Authority vide orders dated 16.2.1995 in the following manner:

The points made are mainly to improve the officer''s working than as adverse remarks in his record.

It is strange that on the one hand, the Disciplinary Authority had communicated the remarks vide letter dated 11.7.1994 clearly terming it as ''adverse remarks'', the Appellate Authority rejected the appeal observing that the remarks were given only to improve his working and they were not adverse remarks. It cannot be disputed that the remarks were entered into in his Confidential Report as is clear from the communication dated 11.7.1994 itself and are adverse in nature. Therefore the manner in which the Appellate Authority side tracked the issue and passed a perfunctory order terming it not as adverse remarks cannot be appreciated.

Be as it may, after the aforesaid reply received from the Appellate Authority, petitioner challenged the same by filing an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal u/s 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act. The Tribunal vide judgment dated 26.3.1998 has rejected his application. This order is impugned in the present writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Perusal of the order of the learned Tribunal would bring out two important aspects which are as follows:

(1) Though the Tribunal agreed that there was no written complaints against the petitioner herein as no such written complaints could be shown by the respondents, it was observed that it is not necessary that there have to be written complaints as complaints can be made orally as well.

(2) The Tribunal had, on an earlier occasion, directed the

respondent to produce the original records, however, instead of proceeding those records, the respondent had produced the copies of the letters dated 19.4.1994, 12.5.1994 and 8.9.1994 which are the communications addressed to the petitioners

The Tribunal took into consideration these letters written by CMS, Delhi to the petitioner on the basis of which it concluded that repeated counselling was given to the petitioner to improve the working of the Health Unit (Shahdara).

We are of the opinion that the approach which the learned Tribunal has taken on both counts is not sustainable in law. The Tribunal has been influenced by the communication dated 19.4.1994, 12.5.1994 and 8.9.1994 addressed by the CMS, Delhi to the petitioner. However the important factor which did not occur to the Tribunal was that these letters pertain to the year 1994-95 whereas the Tribunal was dealing with the adverse remarks recorded in the year 1993-94. Therefore these letters were totally irrelevant for the period in question with which the Tribunal was dealing with. Apart from these letters, as pointed above, the respondents had not produced any records to substantiate the recording of the aforesaid ACRs. In this context the question of receiving alleged oral complaints and counseling becomes all the more important. It is not in dispute that no written complaints were received or could be produced by the respondent if there were oral complaints received by the respondents, as alleged, it was all the more necessary to bring those oral complaints to the notice of the petitioner to counsel him. Admittedly, this was also not done. Thus after the expiry of the year, the petitioner was communicated the aforesaid remarks by letter written in July, 1994. There, thus, appears to be no material to justify these adverse remarks.

Learned counsel for the respondent, could not dispute that the letters which are the basis of the judgment of the Tribunal are for the subsequent period and could not have relied upon by the respondents to justify the adverse remarks for the year 1993-94. At the most that was the material for the year 1994-95 but we are not dealing with any remarks for that year. In these circumstances, we, allow this writ petition and set aside the impugned judgment dated 26.3.1998 of the learned Tribunal and direct expunction of the remarks communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 11.7.1994. The department shall take further action for review of DPC etc. without taking into consideration those adverse remarks.