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Judgment
N. Paul Vasanthakumar, J.—Prayer in the writ petition is to quash the resolution item No. 60 dated 6.9.2007 passed by the Syndicate of
Madurai Kamaraj University placing the petitioner under suspension pending enquiry into charges framed against him subject to the approval of the
Chancellor of Madurai Kamaraj University.
The case of the petitioner is that he formed an association, a registered Public Charitable Trust called ''Centre for Entrepreneurship
Development'' (hereinafter called ''CED''), which was registered in the year 1990, originally functioned under the Department of Entrepreneurship
Studies of Madurai Kamaraj University. According to the petitioner, the Syndicate passed a resolution on 25.10.1993 de-linking CED from the
University and the said CED became an independent body. The Syndicate also passed a resolution on 30.11.1993 permitting the petitioner to
continue to serve as Honorary Secretary of the said Trust and according to the petitioner the said resolution was withdrawn only on 25.8.2006.
Due to the activities of the petitioner in the said Trust, the Syndicate passed resolution against the petitioner and the said actions were challenged
by the petitioner and one Lakshmanan before this Court in W.P.Nos.10711 of 2005, 7733 and 8120 of 2006 and W.A. No. 94 of 2006 and a
Division Bench of this Court by common Judgment dated 25.6.2007 dismissed the writ petitions filed by the petitioner.
According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, as against the said judgment, SLP No. 14746 of 2007 was filed and without ordering notice
to the University, the counsel for the University was directed to file counter. When the matter was pending before the Supreme Court, the
University resorted to pass the impugned resolution placing the petitioner under suspension subject to the approval of the Chancellor. The said
order is challenged in this writ petition on the ground that interim suspension is not warranted since the events took place way back in the year
1999 and the jurisdictional issue of the respondent University being pending before the Supreme Court, there is no justification at this point of time
to pass the impugned resolution and there is no necessity to pass the order of suspension since the petitioner is on leave and the action of the
Syndicate is vindictive and stigmatic in nature.
I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the documents filed.
The Division Bench of this Court in paragraphs 26 to 31 of the Judgment dated 25.6.2007 held as follows:
The number of litigations initiated by the petitioner and Jayaraman also would reveal the fact that they are always trying to put some stumbling
blocks in the process of initiation of action against them by the University, going upto the extent of denying the right and jurisdiction of the
University to launch any action against them, which was rejected by this Court.
A bare perusal of the audit report, which is the root cause for initiation of action against the petitioner and Jayaraman, would reveal the fact of
embezzlement of funds of the University. When the very creating of the Trust, while the petitioners were occupying high positions in the University,
appears to be for their self-enrichment and when such serious allegations of misuse of power, misappropriation, embezzlement and diversion of
public funds by the petitioners are made against them, it is but appropriate for the University to probe into the matter to unearth the true facts of the
case.
Prima facie, there are materials to show that petitioners Lakshmanan and Jayaraman have misused their official positions for creating the Trust
and acting much against the interest of the University, betraying the trust reposed on them. In the light of the above discussion, we are unable to
either appreciate or accept the contention of the petitioners that they are victimised.
The learned single Judge, has considered all the aspects of the case regarding constitution of the Enquiry Committee by the Vice Chancellor in
proper perspective and dismissed W.P. No. 730 of 2006, by the order dated 20.9.2006. We do not find any illegality or perversity in approach
by the learned single Judge. Therefore, the interference sought for by the appellant in W.A. No. 394 of 2006 is uncalled for and accordingly, W.A.
No. 394 of 2006 is dismissed.
Though it is contended on behalf of the petitioner in W.P. No. 10711 of 2005 that CED is an autonomous body, there is no scrap of material
on record to show that the University has accorded the status of autonomous body to the CED. On the contrary, there is voluminous material on
record to prove that even after de-linking, CED is making use of the name, fame and banner of the University and when the reputation of the
University is at stake at the hands of its own employees, either working or retired, under the garb of CED, it cannot be said that the University
cannot interfere with the affairs of the CED being run by Dr. M. Lakshmanan with the help of his stooges like Mr. Jayaraman. Therefore, the relief
sought for in W.P. No. 10711 of 2005 cannot at all be granted and it deserves outright rejection.
Since the properly constituted Enquiry Committee has found that there are prima facie materials to proceed against the petitioner Jayaraman
and further, on perusal of the entire materials placed on record, as has already been adverted to supra, this Court is also able to find some prima
facie material as against the petitioner to initiate action against him to unearth the true facts, it is unsafe to allow him to continue as Head of
Department and hence, the 1st respondent has rightly removed the petitioner from the position of the Head of Department on account of the
continuing investigation into the grave charges levelled against him in connection with public funds, in which, this Court is unable to find any motives
to be attributed to the University and hence the reliefs sought for by the petitioner in W.P.Nos.10711 of 2005, 7733 of 2006 and 8120 of 2006
cannot be granted thereby giving a deep burial to the fact finding process and nipping the investigation process at the budding stage itself without
allowing it to reach its logical ends, and hence these writ petitions also deserve to be dismissed.
From the above extracted portion it is evident that the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the Enquiry Committee found that there are
prima facie materials to proceed against the petitioner and this Court also found some prima facie materials against the petitioner to initiate action
against him to unearth the true facts. The motive attributed against the University was not accepted by this Court. The said findings having not been
stayed by the Supreme Court in spite of the specific prayer made, I am of the view that the respondent University is entitled to proceed with the
matter and pending enquiry into the charges it is the prerogative of the University to place the petitioner under suspension subject to the approval of
the Chancellor.
From the resolution it could be seen that on review of the audit objections relating to the year 2003 concluded on 20.9.2005, there is prima
facie case to proceed against the petitioner for misappropriation of public funds, cheating and breach of trust and therefore it was recommended to
initiate necessary departmental action. The Vigilance and Anti Corruption Department is now investigating into the charges against the petitioner as
to the audit objections regarding the accounts of DES alleging among other things, leakage of revenue towards course fees collection of Rs.
106.28 lakhs and Rs. 25,00,000/- and the explanation offered by the petitioner for the audit objection on 26.9.2006 was not found satisfactory.
Charges were framed against the petitioner through show cause notice dated 3.8.2007 for which the petitioner submitted explanation on
10.8.2007 and the same was also found not satisfactory. Therefore the Syndicate found sufficient cause to suspend the petitioner in the interest of
the University and passed the impugned resolution.
The power of the Syndicate to suspend and dismiss the University Lecturers, University Readers, University Professors, Teachers and servants
of the University is found in Chapter XI Rule 2(8). The power of suspension includes the power of interim suspension and the same is well settled
principle of law as per various decisions of the Supreme Court.
The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that suspension is not warranted cannot be countenanced in view of the fact that whether
to suspend a person or not is the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority, here in this case the Syndicate. The contention that because the petitioner
is on leave, there is no necessity to place the petitioner under suspension also cannot be accepted, as taking leave by the petitioner has nothing to
do with the exercising of power of suspension by the competent authority. The vindictive nature adopted by the Syndicate as propounded by the
petitioner is already repelled by this Court in the Division Bench judgment cited supra.
The contention that the said findings cannot be taken as the basis for passing the impugned resolution cannot be sustained because of the
pendency of SLP, as admittedly the said findings are not stayed by the Supreme Court. The impugned suspension order having been passed
pending SLP, it is always subject to the results of the orders to be passed in the SLP. Hence on the said ground the impugned order of suspension
cannot be quashed.
The power of the department to place an officer under suspension pending enquiry into the disciplinary proceeding is well settled.
(a) In the decision reported in P.R. Nayak Vs. Union of India (UOI), , the Supreme Court considered the power of suspension conferred in Rule
3 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, and held that when the rule provides for passing an order of ad-interim suspension
of an employee during pendency of the enquiry, in respect of certain charges, is well within the power. In the said case, the pending enquiry into the
charges were only contemplated and in fact, charges were not pending on the date of suspension. Taking note of the said fact, the Supreme Court
held that the order of suspension being contrary to Rule 3 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, the suspension order was
unsustainable.
(b) The above decision of the Supreme Court was followed by me in the decision reported in M.K. Dange Vs. Chairman-cum-Managing Director,
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, The Director (Finance), Oil and Natural Gas Corporation and The General Manager (F and A), Oil and Natural
Gas Corporation,
(c) The power to suspend an employee provided in express terms either in the contract or in the statute, came up for consideration before the
Supreme Court in the decision reported in The Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi and Others Vs. Hotel Workers'' Union, . In paragraph
10, the Supreme Court held thus,
The first question therefore that falls for consideration is the extent of the power of the employer to suspend an employee under the ordinary
law of master and servant. It is now well settled that the power to suspend, in the sense of a right to forbid a servant to work, is not an implied
term in an ordinary contract between master and servant, and that such a power can only be the creature either of a statute governing the contract,
or of an express term in the contract itself. Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such power either as an express term in the contract or in the rules
framed under some statute would mean that the master would have no power to suspend a workman and even if he does so in the sense that he
forbids the employee to work, he will have to pay wages during the so-called period of suspension. Where, however, there is power to suspend
either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the
relation of master and servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. These
principles of the ordinary law of master and servant are well settled and have not been disputed before us by either party. Reference in this
connection may be made to Hanley v. Pease and Partners Ltd. 1915-1 KB 698, Wallwork v. Fielding 1922-2 KB 66, Secretary of State v.
Surendra Nath ILR (1939) 1 Cal 46 : AIR 1938 Cal. 759 and Rura Ram Vs. Divisional Supdt., N.W. Rly., Lahore, .
(d) Again in the decision reported in R.P. Kapur Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, , the Supreme Court held that the authority entitled to
appoint a public servant would be entitled to suspend him pending departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending criminal proceeding, which
may eventually result in departmental enquiry against him.
(e) In Balvantray Ratilal Patel Vs. The State of Maharashtra, a question arose as to whether a person, who was placed under suspension pending
further orders due to pendency of criminal case, gets automatically restored into the service if the criminal case ended in acquittal. The Supreme
Court held that even after the acquittal, a fresh order revoking the order of suspension should be passed by the department and there is no
automatic revocation of suspension arises.
From the above referred decisions it is evident that the power exercised by the respondents in placing the petitioner under suspension pending
enquiry into the charges is justified in the interest of the University.
There is no merit in the writ petition and the writ petition is dismissed in limine. Connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed.