Dula Ram vs The Municipal Committee, Hissar

H.R. Sodhi, J.—This Court has been moved by Dula Ram and Jama Ram Petitioners for the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India and the issue of an appropriate writ or direction quashing the notices served on them by the Municipal Committee, Hissar (hereinaffter called the Committee,) whereby they were called upon to demolish the buildings said to have been erected by them without sanction of the latter.

Facts as are necessary for the proper disposal of the writ petition may be stated hereunder. The Petitioners were lessees of the Committee for a number of years and rent notes were executed by them from year to year for a period of 11 months each time. They claim to be holding the sites for more than 20 years but the respondent-committee while denying in its return the exact period of 20 years has not stated for how long the Petitioners have been the lessees. It is a common case of the parties that under each of the two shops, one-half land belongs to the Committee and the other half to Sanatan Dharam Temple which is located on the back side of these shops. The Petitioners allege that the shops covering the two sites belonging to the Committee and the Sanatan Dharam Temple were in existence for the same period of 20 years hut the case of the Committee is that the back half portion belonging to the temple was taken by the Petitioners on rent for the first time in 196 and it was then that they re-erected constructions thereon. Dula Ram indeed continued in possession of the plot as an heir of his deceased father who had obtained the same from the Committee under a resolution dated August 20, 1953 whereas Juma Ram, Petitioner No. 2, was put in possession as lessee under a resolution dated February 2, 1955 and he continued as such thereafter. The rent-notes, according to the Committee, had not been completed in the manner prescribed by law. It is admitted by the Committee that the plots let out by it to the Petitioners had temporary constructions built thereon but the new constructions, which may be described as re erections, were actually raised only 1964 after taking additional area from the Sanatan Dharam Temple. Notices u/s 195 read with Section 35 of the Act were delivered to the Petitioners on behalf of the President of the Committee on April 4, 1964 calling upon them to demolish the unauthorised constructions within a period of four days, failing which action according to law, was threatened to be taken against them. The violation alleged was of Section 189 of the Act which prohibit the construction of a building or re-erection thereof without the requisite sanction. Section 195 is in the following terms:

Should a building be begun or erected or re-erected -

(a) without sanction as required by Section 189(1); or

(b) without notice as required by Section 189 (2); or

(c) when sanction has been refused, the committee may by notice delivered to the owner within six months from the completion of the buildings require the building to be altered or demolished as it may deem necessary within the period specified in such notice; and should it be begun or erected-

(d) in contravention of the terms of any sanction granted; or

(e) when the sanction has lapsed; or

(f) in contravention of any bye-law made u/s 190; or, in the case of a building of which the erection has been deemed to be sanctioned u/s 193 (4), if it contrevenes any scheme sanctioned u/s 192: the Committee may by notice to be delivered to the owner within six months from the completion of the building require the building to be altered in such manner as it may deem necessary, within the period specified in such nonce.

Provided that the committee may, instead of requiring the alteration or demolition of any such building, accept by way of compensation such sum as it may deem reasonable:

Provided also that the committee shall require a building to be demolished or altered so far as is necessary to avoid contravention of a building scheme drawn up u/s 192.

Provided further that if any notice is issued by the Executive Officer under this section on the ground that a building has been begun or has been erected in contravention of the terms of any sanction granted or in contravention of any bye-law made u/s 190 the person to whom the notice is issued may, within fifteen days from the date of service of such notice appeal to the committee and subject to the provisions of Sections 225, 232 and 238, the decision of the committee shall be final." Section 35 vests extraordinary powers in the President or Vice-President of a Committee in case of emergency It enables the President or in his absence the Vice President to direct the execution of any such worker the doing of any act which the committee is empowered to execute or do, if in his opinion there his occurred an emergency involving or likely to involve extensive damage to property of danger to human life or grave inconvenience to the public The expense of executing such work or doing an act required to be done under these emergent powers of the President may be met from the municipal fund but every such action of the President has to be reported to the committee at its next meeting. The President, Vice-President or the Executive Officer as the cafe may be, is however not permitted to act under the emergency section in contravention of any order of the Committee.

There can be no manner of doubt that Section 35 is intended to be used sparingly and only in on unforeseen situation threatening consequences likely to result in extensive damage to property or danger to human life grave inconvenience to the public which cannot be avoided by having resort to the normal requirements of law No copy of the notices referred to above was placed on the record by either of the parties but I have looked into the executive file and a true copy of one of such notices is now marked by me as Annexure ''W'' and the translation thereof as Annexure ''W-l''. There is no indication in these notices as to what was the emergency and how it became necessary for the President to exercise his extraordinary powers to avoid damage to property or danger to human life or grave incontinence to the public. He seems to have issued the notices under advice from the Deputy Commissioner. The Petitioners submitted their replies, copies whereof have been filed as Annexures ''R/1'' and ''R/2'' by the respondent Committee. The case set up by them was that on the sites let out to them, the shops had already been constructed and that at the back of the Committee''s land they took some more land on rent from the Sanatan Dharam Temple. It was stated that they had connected that land with the shops and not undertaken any new construction inasmuch as only repairs of the walls on the old foundations were effected. It was further submitted in reply that the construction was only on that part of the site which belonged to the Committee and if the Committee deemed it fit they were prepared to pay some amount by way of compensation The notices and the replies thereto appear to have been shelved and the emergency that compelled the President to exercise his powers u/s 35 also evaporated since I find that nothing happened till April 1, 1967 when after three years notices u/s 220 were issued requiring the Petitioners to demolish constructions within six hours. The Petitioners again submitted their replies on May 3, 1967. Both of them requested the Committee to accept compensation in such sums as it might think reasonable. Further request was that the action by the Committee in this regard be expedited. Again, the whole matter was thrown in cold storage. The Committee was superseded in the year 1968 and after its supersession, the Secretary of the Committee for the first time under the orders of the Administrator issued fresh notices u/s 220 conveying the same warning about the demolition of the buildings within six hours for the alleged omission of the Petitioners to comply with the notices u/s 195 as were issued on April 4, 1964. No notice in this regard has been produced by either of the parties, but I have seen a copy of the same on the executive file. It was on the receipt of this notice that the Petitioners filed the present writ petition on September 22, 1970 and notice of motion was first issued on September 23, 1970 and demolition ordered to be stayed meanwhile. After hearing Learned Counsel for the Committee, the Motion Bench admitted the petition on October, 14, 1970 and the order staying demolition was allowed to continue to operate.

Mr. C.L. Lakhanpal, Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has advanced the following contentions -

(1) That the original notices u/s 195 read with Section 35, as issued on April 4, 1964, were illegal, ineffective, and void ad initio as conditions precedent to the exercise of powers u/s 35 were non existent and that a notice u/s 195 could only be issued by the Committee and not by the president;

(2) That the respondent-Municipal Committee, which is now represented by an Administrator, abused or at least misused its authority in directing the demolition of the buildings by issuing notices u/s 195 read with Section 35 in the year l964 and then keeping the matter of composition in suspense till notices u/s 220 giving six hours time were issued in the year 967 but the matter again not concluded and fresh notices given u/s 230 in the year 1970 conveying the same warning about the demolition of the buildings within six hours The contention is that the Petitioners had applied for composition and it was the duty of the respondent-committee to have disposed of those applications after giving an opportunity to the Petitioners to be heard, more so when disputed questions of fact were involved and that the deliberate failure of the Committee to take any action for a period of five years amounted, in the present circumstances, to acquiescence on its part in the re erection of the buildings.

(3) That the demolition is sought for purposes extraneous to the object of Section 195 inasmuch as the real motive behind the notices of demolition is to obtain the site for the purpose of widening the road outside Nagori Gate when the same is in lawful possession of the Petitioners as lessees.

(4) That lessee rights of the Petitioners could not be taken away by having recourse to the provisions of Sections 195 and 220.

(5) That the rules of natural justice have not been followed as no opportunity to the Petitioners to show cause against the proposed drastic action by way of demolition of the constructions was afforded. It is submitted that Sections 195 and 220 should be interpreted in conformity with the rules of natural justice which are part of the law of this land, and

(6) That Sections 195 and 220 give unguided, unbridled unchannelised and arbitrary powers to the Committee and being capable of abuse offered Articles 14 and 19 thereof thereby rendering them ultra vires of the Constitution.

Mr. P.S. Jain, Learned Counsel for the respondent committee, has raised some preliminary, objections which may be stated Hereunder: (i) that a joint writ petition is not maintainable in the circumstances of the case,

(ii) that the Petitioners are guilty of suppression of material facts,

(iii) that an alternative remedy by way of appeal u/s 115 of the Act was available and that the Petitioners could in any case file a civil suit challenging the validity of the notices, and

(iv) that the writ petition involves determination of the disputed questions of fact. It was submitted by the Learned Counsel that the lease in favour of the Petitioners had been cancelled and that the Committee did not lose its powers exerciseable u/s 220 simply because of the delay in not demolishing the buldings earlier Reliance in this connection was placed by him on AIR 1945 151 (Lahore) . The correctness of the other contentions advanced on behalf of the Petitioners is also challenged.

I have given my careful thought to the rival contentions and am of the view that the preliminary objections have no merit and that the writ petition must be allowed. I may dispose of the preliminary Objections first It is true that each of the Petitioners has separate legal rights which are alleged to have been infringed by the Committee but there is no invariable rule that a joint application cannot be entertained in such a case Whether a joint petition should be permitted to be pursued or not depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down. The anxiety of this Court must not be so much with regard to the loss in court-fee, but what has to be seen is whether the questions arising for determination, keeping in view the averments of toe Petitioners, can be effectively, completely and conveniently disposed of without introducing diversity and complexity of facts and widening the scope of the enquiry so as to make disposal of the joint application improper or unfeasible, There may arise a case where attack on the individual rights of different persons proceeds on grounds common to those persons and facts on which the rights of the parties are founded are identical necessitating decision on common questions of law. In such a situation, there should be no difficulty in entertaining a joint application.

My attention has been invited to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the Revenue Patwaries Union Punjab, Chandigarh v. The State of Punjab and Others. (1961) 63 P.L.R. 530, where the preliminary objection as to the maintainability of a joint application was upheld. It is a brief judgment and the only indication about the facts is that the writ petition had been filed by a Union of Patwaris acting through its President and Secretary. It was an omnibus petition and the persons whose rights were actually invaded had not filed any such application Gurdev Singh J. followed the rule laid down in the Patwaris Union case in Vinod Kumar v. Municipal Committee Pathankot (1967) 69 P.L.R. 909. It was a case where five person? who were in possession of wooden cabins standing along the G.T. Road, Pathankot joined together in filing a writ petition in challenging the notices of demolition issued by the Municipal Committee Since each Petitioner claimed an individual right in himself to remain in possession of the particular khokha (wooden cabin) which was in his occupation and there were separate proceedings against each of them for demolishing these khokhas, the learned Judge took the view that there was no joint interest in the Petitioners which could entitle them to obtain redress from this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by one application. The learned Judge even refused to treat that application as competent on behalf of one of the Petitioners. The decision of the learned judge must be held to be confined to the facts of that particular case It has also been observed by him that the maintainability of joint petition depends on the facts of each case. The correctness of the Bench decision in Vinod Kumar''s care was doubted by another Division Bench in Jiwan Singh and Others. v. Consolidation Officer, Sunam and Another (1962) 64 P.L.R. 668, where it is observed that there has been a practice of this Court to entertain joint petitions by a number of persons. Reference has been made in the latter case to Annam Adinarayana and Another Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, and Qurabali and Others Vs. Government of Rajasthan and Others, The test adopted in Qurabali case by Modi, J., seems to be that the Petitioners must have locus standi to file a petition and that if the case is ere where under Order 1, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, several persons could join together as a co-plaintiffs, such a course may also be permitted when they file a writ petition. Order 1 rule 1 permits all persons to be joined in one suit as Plaintiffs in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where, if such persons brought separate suits any common question of law or fact would arise. The Court of couse has power to put the Plaintiffs to their election or order separate trials if it finds that the joinder of the several Plaintiffs may embarrass or delay the trial of the suit. I am in respectful agreement with this approach. The test in all such cases must be deemed to be whether the joinder of several persons as co-petitioners in one writ petition would help in effectively and completely adjudicating on their rights arising out of one transaction or series of transactions and involving common question of law or fact or that it introduces unnecessary complexity. In the circumstances of the present case, I find that there is no objection to the two Petitioners joining together in one writ petition as no facts have been alleged which make disposal of the joint application impracticable so as to render it necessary to call upon them to file separate writ petitions.

As regards the objection about the suppression of material facts, the same is equally devoid of substance. The suggestion is that the Petitioners have not stated in the writ petition that notices were served on them in the year 1964 and then in 1967. The averment in the writ petition is that they do not remember to have received any such notices. The other ground of alleged suppression of facts is that the Petitioners never completed their construction about 2(sic) years before the filing of the writ petition and that, in fact back half portion belonging to the Sanatan Dharam Temple was taken by them on rent for the first time in 1964 and that the question of their hiving completed construction on that portion earlier to that year did not therefore, arise. No doubt, the Petitioners have not stated that they received notices in the year 1961 or 1967 but I am not inclined to throw out their application on this omission alone. The conduct of the Municipal Committee respondent is such that it has been playing hide and seek with the Petitioners in as much as it issued notices giving four days time in 1964 and then kept quiet till 1967. Again six hours'' notice was given in 1967 and the matter shelved till 1970. It does not therefore, lie in the mouth of the Committee to take support from any rule of equity when it has not itself been acting with clean hands. In regard to the averment about completion of construction, the Petitioners stated that they had done so 20 years back but the Committee gave an evasive reply. The suggestion of alternative remedy by way of a suit is without any meaning as any such remedy if attempted to be availed of would have been wholly ineffective and useless. The impugned notices requiring the Petitioners to demolish the constructions within six hours were given suddenly and the remedy by way of a suit could not possibly be pursued. There was no remedy available to them under the Act and remedy by way of suit was merely illusory. In such a situation it would be denying justice to the Petitioners to ask them to file such suits I again do not find any force in the last preliminary objection that any disputed questions of fact are involved. It is not necessary for the disposal of the present writ petition to go into any such fact and the writ petition can be disposed of on the admitted ones.

Section 189 prohibits a person from erecting or re-erecting or even commencing election or re-erection of any building without the sanction of a Committee. With regard to the notice to be given to the Committe and other connected matters, when a person has an intention to start election or re-erection of a building, the Committee may frame bye-laws to regulate such erections and re erections. The Committee can call upon the person concerned to furnish information as it may be necessary and then it may sanction or refuse to sanction such erection or re erection. If a building is begun or elected or re-erected without the requisite sanction, the Committee has the power u/s 195 to call upon the owner by delivering to him a notice in writing to alter or demolish the building, as it may think necessary, within a period to be specified in that notice but such period is not to be beyond six months. First proviso to the aforesaid section gives a further power to the Committee to accept by way of compensation such sum as it may deem reasonable instead of directing the alteration or demolition of the building. No right of appeal is provided against such a notice except that when the notice is issued by an Executive Others under this section on the ground that a building has been begun or has been erected in contravention of the terms of any sanction granted or in contravention of any bye-law, the person to whom the notice is issued may, within fifteen days from the date of service of such notice, appeal to the Committee. The decision of the Committee is, however, subject to supervisory control of the Deputy Commissioner and the State Government within the limits provided in Sections 225, 232 and 236 Section 225 gives a right of appeal to the Deputy Commissioner by virtue of an amendment made by the Punjab Act 3 of 1933 against an order of the Committee requiring the alteration or demolition of the building, Section 232 deals with the powers of the Deputy Commissioner to suspend a resolution or order of the Committee, and Section 236 relates to the general powers of the State Government and its officers over the Committee The State Government can require that the proceedings shall be in conformity with law and the rules in force under any enactment for the time being applicable to a Committee. The President has no power under the Act to issue a notice u/s 195 and no rule or bye-law has been brought to my notice which could go to show that the Committee had at any time delegated its functions to the President, He is beyond dispute conferred by Section 35 extraordinary powers exercisable in cases of emergency and the types of emergencies are also enumerated in the said section. There must appear to him a threat of an occurrence of any event involving or likely to involve extensive damage to property or danger to human life or grave inconvenience to the public before he can direct the doing of any act by an inhabitant of a municipality which act in the normal course of events could be directed to be done only by the Committee. The further requirement of law is that any action taken by the President in this behalf has to be reported to the Committee at its next meeting. Neither of the parties produced copies of the notices issued to the Petitioners in April, 1964, requiring them to demolish the buildings. I have looked into the executive file and find that the notices using the same phraseology verbatim were issued on the same day, that is, 4th April, 1964, under the orders of the President in exercise of his emergency powers u/s 35 read with Section 195 of the Act.

It has been noticed above that the Petitioners submitted their representations, dated 7th April, 1964, Annexure R-1 and R-2. A letter dated 10th June, 1964 was addressed by the President to the Deputy Commissioner in which it was mentioned that no new erection on the municipal land abutting on the main road had been made by the Petitioners and that the cases were purely of reelection. It was further stated by him that the two shops were leased out to the Petitioners several years ago and that there was no chance of any blockade of traffic since an electric pole had been fixed by the Electricity Department beyond there shops thereby minimising the chances of an accident In the opinion of the President, it was a fit case for compounding the unauthorised constructions. The files were despatched to the Deputy Commissioner and it is not known what was transpiring for about three years till 1st April, 1967, when it occurred to the Committee to issue notice in terms of Section 220 calling upon the Petitioners to demolish the constructions within six hours as the notices of 1964 had not been complied with. No copies of the notices of 1964 or 1967 were placed on the record by either of there parties but I had them produced from the executive file and they are now marked as W,W I, X XI, Y.Y-I, Z and Z-I, respectively. The Petitioners submitted their replies, copies whereof have been appended with the return of the Committee as Annexures R-3 and R-4, It was pleaded by them that they had made applications earlier as well asking for permission to pay compensation and it was further stated that they were prepared to pay any amount as tax The matter was again put in cold storage by the Committee for reasons best known to its members. The Committee was later superseded in the year 1968, and an Administrator appointed. The Administrator took no action for almost two years and quite abruptly issued fresh notices u/s 220 on 18th September, I920, giving again six hours time to the Petitioners to demolish their unauthorised constructions It is against these notices that the Petitioners have moved this Court for an approbate writ or direction quashing the same.

On a consideration of the rival contentions of the Learned Counsel, I am constrained to hold that the initial notices marked 1 and II issued by the President were basically illegal and without jurisdiction. It was the Committee alone which could take action u/s 195 and no circumstances are shown to have existed which could justify an emergency action u/s 3c of the Act. It is apparent from the letter dated 0th June. 1964, addressed to the Deputy Commissioner by the President that no new construction had been made and that he was for accepting compensation for the alleged unauthorised constructions. There is rot at(sic)iota of material on the executive file nor have any facts been stated in the return of the respondents which could remotely indicate that the erection or re erection of the buildings by the Petitioners involved extensive damage to property or danger to human life or led to grave inconvenience to the public life. On the other hand, the indications are that in the opinion of the President there was no inconvenience to the public what to say of grave inconvenience. The Committee never applied its mind at the time of initial issue of notices in 1964 but endorsed the action of the President after the notices had been issued by him The circumstances stated in Section 35 on the existence of which emergency action could be taken by the President constitute a condition precedent to the exercise of any such power and they were absent when notices were issued in 1964. The initial action of the President being wholly illegal and without jurisdiction, no amount of ratification by the Committee could make it valid. The two jurisdictions, one of the President u/s 35 and the other of the Committee u/s 195 are wholly separate and distinct. Section 195 is not intended to be used in the manner as the President chose to do by invoking the aid of Section 35. Section 195 is drastic in nature and gives vast powers to the Committee, exercise whereof may sometime result in tremendous loss to an inhabitant of the municipality who has deliberately, foolishly or inadvertantly constructed a building in disregard of the statutory provisions or bye-laws relating to the erection or re-erection of such a building. The Legislature while giving this deadly weapon to the Committee has purposely provided a period of six months within which an unauthorised construction could be re-required to be demolished. There is also power with a Committee to accept compensation if it thinks such a course to be more just and reasonable. The object of law is not to permit the Committee to exercise the authority arbitrarily, capriciously or whimsically but is must determine objectively as to which case is fit for demolition and which for composition. The real criterion before the Committee should be the welfare of the people and public convenience. It could not possibly have been the intention of the Legislature that minor or formal breaches of the statutory provisions or bye laws relating to construction of buildings should be visaed with the same amount of penalty as violations of a serious nature adversely affecting public interest where demolition alone could advance the public cause The object of issuing notice fixing a period of time ranging upto six months is to give a reasonable opportunity to the owner of a building to make a representation to the Committee against the proposed action or else to alter or demolish the unauthorised construction as required in the notice The outside limit of six months cannot be held to have been laid down by the Legislature without any meaning and the authority vested in the Committee is not intended to be exercised arbitrarily. There must be some stage in such proceedings when the owner, who is said to have set up an unauthorised construction, gets an opportunity to satisfy the Committee that the construction was not in violation of any provision of law or that the quantum of punishment as proposed was out. of proportion with the alleged offending act of omission or commission. Such action of the Committee is no doubt administrative in nature but looking at the wide powers conferred on its the exercise of which is likely to lead to damage to the private property of an inhabitant of a municipality, it must be regulated and controlled by the rules of natural justice. As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, the concept of rule of law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner". In the circumstances of the present case, the Learned Counsel for the Administrator has not been able to invite my attention to any proceedings in which the Petitioners were given an opportunity to rebut the allegations against them.

I am equally satisfied that the Committee had, as a matter of fact abandoned the proposal for any action to be taken on notices issued in the year 1964. It is to be seen from the executive file that the Committee never considered the matter and the President was throughout for composition and not for demolition of the buildings. No doubt, mere delay in taking further action is not sufficient to warrant an assumption that the notices bad been withdrawn, abandoned or cancelled, as observed in a Division Bench judgment of the Lahore High Court in Manual Sen''s case (supra), but at the same time it has been observed therein that in a proper case when the material is before a Court, the Court can draw an inference of withdrawal, abandonment or cancellation of the notice It is, in my opinion, a fit case where an inference must be drawn that the Committee abandoned the matter of demolition of the buildings. At any rate, exercise of authority on the part of the Committee and the Administrator in issuing notices u/s 195, keeping silent over them and then issuing notices u/s 220 giving only six hours warning but again taking no action thereon till 18th September, 1970. lead irresistibly to the conclusion that the exercise of authority on the part of the Committee and the Administrator was capricious, whimsical and arbitrary, in disregard of the object for which such authority is intended. The ulterior object of the Administrator is clear when in his return it is stated that the site was required for widening the bridge. The correct course for him in order to carry out this purpose was to have cancelled the leases in accordance with law instead of reviving, after lapse of some years, notices for demolition issued in the years 1964 and 1957.

Mr. C.L. Lakhanpal, learned cosnsel for the Petitioners, cites a judgment reported as Corporation of Calcutta Vs. Mulchand Agarwalla, , in support of his contention that the Committee was not competent to order demolition after the lapse of five years. I am afraid the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in this case do not help the Learned Counsel. It was a case under the Calcutta Municipal Act and demolition there could be ordered only by a Magistrate in the exercise of his discretion. The Magistrate refused to exercise discretion after the expiry of five years and in these circumstances on an appeal being taken to the Supreme Court on behalf of the Calcutta Corporation, it was observed that "it is a well-settled principle that when the legislature entrusts to an authority the power to pass an order in its discretion, an order passed by that authority in exercise of that discretion is, in general, not liable to be interfered with by an appellate Court, unless it can be shown to have been based on some mistake of fact or misapprehension of the principles applicable thereto", I am not inclined to agree with Mr. Lakhanpal that their Lordships have laid down a rule of law that in no case a building can be demolished after the expiry of five years. It is a matter depending on the facts of each case and, as already stated above, in the present case the manner of exercise of authority by the respondents was such that demolition directed after 5 years constituted a capricious and arbitrary act amounting to misuse of authority and calling for interference by this Court.

There is yet another approach to the matter. The applications of the Petitioners for compnunding the alleged violations were made as early as the year 1964, but they do not seem to have been disposed of. It was the duty of the respondents to have passed some order to how the unauthorised construction was not trivial or minor in nature and composition would not be in consonance with the spirit of the municipal law. The executive file produced by the Administrator gives no indication if the Committee or the Administrator ever considered this aspect of the matter.

In the result, I am of the opinion that it is a fit case where the writ petition should be allowed and the notices of demolition marked as W, X, Y and Z, and also those issued In the year 1970 giving six hour''s time to the Petitioners to demolish the buildings-quashed with costs. I order accordingly. The costs of the Petitioners are assessed at Rs. 150/-.