Durga Stone Chips vs The State of Jharkhand and Others

R.K. Merathia, J.—Heard.

It is submitted by Mr. Bhawesh Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, that Petitioner was granted mining lease for stone on 27.7.2002. He only did the work of fencing and cutting and did not mine the stone. In the meantime, by order dated 19.12.2004, he was stopped from proceeding with the work on the ground that the land in question falls within the forest area. Accordingly, Petitioner stopped mining. Thereafter, Petitioner collected documents from the forest department, from which it appeared that the mining land in question was not within the forest area. In the meantime, by impugned letter dated 9.2.2007, the mining lease of the Petitioner was cancelled on the ground of not continuing mining activity and not paying the arrear dues within time. It is further submitted that as Petitioner was stopped from doing mining work, the lease could not be cancelled on the said ground and moreover Petitioner was not given opportunity of hearing, before cancellation, as provided in Rule 24 (3) of Jharkhand Mineral Concession Rules, 1972. Counsel for the Petitioner relied on the order dated 6.1.2010 , passed in WPC No. 1862 of 2009.

Mr. Krishna Shankar, learned Counsel for the Respondents, submitted that in the absence of counter affidavit, he is not in a position to say as to whether the lease has been cancelled rightly and whether Petitioner has been given opportunity of hearing before cancellation of lease.

On this, Mr. Bhawesh Kumar submitted that Petitioner has specifically stated that no opportunity of hearing was given to it and moreover from the impugned order also, it does not appear that Petitioner was given any opportunity of hearing.

Prima facie, it appears that Petitioner was not given opportunity of hearing before cancelling the mining lease.

In the circumstances, the said letter of cancellation of lease dated 9.2.2007 will be treated as a notice to show cause.

Petitioner will file its show cause before the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma ( Respondent No. 2), who will pass a reasoned order in accordance with law, as early as possible and preferably within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of such show cause.

It is made clear that this Court has not gone into the merits of the claim of the parties.

With these observations and directions, this writ petition is disposed of.