AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
By this petition the petitioners have prayed for a direction to the respondents not to terminate the contractual services of the petitioners and have
further sought a direction to continue the petitioners on the post of Data Entry Operator after 30.6.2019.
The case of the petitioners is that they were appointed on the post of Data Entry Operator on contract basis at different point of times between 2007
to 2015 and their contractual appointment was extended and is going to expire on 30.6.2019, therefore, they should be granted the relief as prayed for.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the CEO has already sent the communication dated 10.6.2019 (Annexure P/7) to extend
the petitioners’ contract for six months and that in terms of the decision of the Cabinet dated 29.5.2018, the contract appointees have a right to
continue.
As against this, learned counsel for the respondent on instructions has opposed the petition.
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record, it is noticed that the period of contract appointment of the petitioners is
already over. They are seeking mandamus to extend the period of contract and allow them to work even though the contractual period has come to an
end. Services of contract employee are governed by the terms of the contract and no legal right exists in favour of the petitioners to pray for such a
direction.
This Court by order dated 30.8.2017 passed in WP No.5430/2017 considering the similar controversy and taking note of the earlier judgments on the
point has held as under:-
“6. The petitioners being contract appointees have limited rights and their contract can always be terminated as per terms of the contract.
Supreme court in the matter of Gridco Limited and another Vs. Sadananda Doloi and others reported in (2011) 15 SCC 16 while considering the
issue of termination of contract appointment has held as under:-
It is also evident that the renewal of the contract of employment depended upon the perception of the management as to the usefulness of the
respondent and the need for an incumbent in the position held by him. Both these aspects rested entirely in the discretion of the Corporation. The
respondent was in the service of another employer before he chose to accept a contractual employment offered to him by the Corporation which was
limited in tenure and terminable by three months' notice on either side. In that view, therefore, there was no element of any unfair treatment or
unequal bargaining power between the appellant and the respondent to call for an over-sympathetic or protective approach towards the latter.
We need to remind ourselves that in the modern commercial world, executives are engaged on account of their expertise in a particular field and
those who are so employed are free to leave or be asked to leave by the employer. Contractual appointments work only if the same are mutually
beneficial to both the contracting parties and not otherwise.â€
In the matter of Gridco Limited and another (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the earlier judgments on the point and in paragraph 38
has noted the shift in the legal position and held that with the development of law relating to judicial review of administrative actions, a writ court can
now examine the validity of a termination order passed by public authority. Setting down the parameters of the judicial review in such matters, it has
been held that the writ court is entitled to judicially review the action and determine whether there was any illegality, perversity, unreasonableness,
unfairness or irrationality that would vitiate the action, no matter the action is in the realm of contract. But that judicial review cannot extend to the
Court acting as an appellate authority sitting in judgment over the decision. In clear terms it has been held that the Court cannot sit in the armchair of
the administrator to decide whether a more reasonable decision or course of action could have been taken in the circumstances.
In the matter of Satish Chandra Anand Vs. The Union of India, reported in AIR 1953 SC 25 0the Four Judges Bench of Supreme court has laid
down that the termination of contract appointee after notice as per contract is neither a dismissal nor removal from service or reduction in rank but is
an ordinary case of a contract being terminated by notice under one of its clauses and in such cases the remedy of writ is misconceived and if such an
appointee has been denied any right under the contract, assuming he has any, then he should pursue in the ordinary Courts of the land such remedies
for a breach as are open to him.
It is also settled that if the order of termination of a contract apppointee is in innocuous and not on the basis of any allegation, no opportunity of
hearing is necessary (See: Brahamdutta Gupta Vs. State of MP & others, reported in 2004(2) MPLJ 306).
In the matter of Vidyavardhaka Sangha and another Vs. Y.D. Deshpande and others reported in (2006) 12 SCC 482 in similar case where the
contract appointment was for a fixed tenure the Supreme court has held as under:
“4. It is now well-settled principle of law that the appointment made on probation/ad hoc basis for a specific period of time comes to an end by
efflux of time and the person holding such post can have no right to continue on the post. In the instant case as noticed above, the respective
respondents have accepted the appointment including the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment orders and joined the posts in question and
continued on the said posts for some years. The respondents having accepted the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment order and allowed
the period for which they were appointed to have been elapsed by efflux of time, they are not now permitted to turn their back and say that their
appointments could not be terminated on the basis of their appointment letters nor they could be treated as temporary employees or on contract basis.
The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents to the said effect has no merit and is, therefore, liable to be rejected. It is also well-
settled law by several other decisions of this Court that appointment on ad hoc basis/temporary basis comes to an end by efflux of time and persons
holding such post have no right to continue on the post and ask for regularisation, etc.â€
In the matter of State of Karnataka Vs. Umadevi reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 has held that if the appointment is contractual in nature, it comes to
an end at the end of the contract. In paragraph 53 as a one time measure the State Government and its instrumentality were directed to regularise the
service of such irregularly appointed who had worked for more than 10 years on duly sanctioned post and it was very categorically held that there
should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the
constitutional scheme.â€
The Principal Seat in the matter of Rajendra Prasad Bakoriya Vs. State of M.P. and others vide order dated 26.8.2016 passed in WP No.8150/2011
and in the matter of Shivratri Barmaiya Vs. State of M.P. and others vide order dated 11.11.2016 passed in WP No.15502/2016 has held that the writ
petition against the termination of contract appointment after tenure is over is not maintainable.
So far as the Cabinet decision dated 29.5.2018 is concerned, the said decision runs counter to the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which
are binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution, specially the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi (supra). Hence the
petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of it.
So far as the reliance of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the communication dated 10.6.2019 is concerned, it has been pointed out by learned
counsel for the State that similar recommendations have already been rejected by the Commissioner, Cooperative and Registrar vide order dated
28.5.2019. Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Hargurpratap Singh Vs. State of
Punjab and others reported in (2007) 13 SCC 292 but in that case one ad hoc appointee was sought to be replaced by another, which was not
approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but no such factual position in the present case has been pointed out. He has also placed reliance upon
order of the Division Bench dated 5.2.2018 passed in WA No.418/2017 in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Puneet Mohan Khare but that was also a
case where one contract appointee was sought to be substituted with another contract appointee, but in the present case no such material exists.
Having regard to the aforesaid, I am of the opinion that no case for any interference in the present writ petition is made out. The petition is accordingly
dismissed.
C.C. as per rules.