High CourtsSingle Bench

E. Subramaniyan vs J.N. Esupatham

Madras High Court · Decided on 11 November 1994 · Citation: (1995) 2 CTC 398

HON’BLE JUDGES
Thanikkachalam, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI) — Section 19, 4 · Stamp Act, 1899 — Section 49
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
C.R.P. No. 2420 of 1994
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Judgment

42 paragraphs · 975 words

Thanikkachalam, J.—Plaintiff filed O.S. No. 148 of 1992 for recovery of certain amount due on a promissory note dated 9-7-1989. The

promissory note was executed for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- with interest at 9% per annum. There is no words on ""no demand"" in the Promissory

note. Hence the trial court came to the conclusion that it is a promissory note, otherwise payable on demand, and therefore the stamp duty, is

payable as per Section 49(b) of the Stamp Act. Accordingly, the plaintiff was directed to pay stamp duty of Rs. 300/- and penalty of Rs. 3,000/-

before 10-6-1994. It is against that order, the present revision has been preferred by the plaintiff. According to learned counsel apperaing for the

plaintiff/petitioner, the trial Court was not correct in stating that the promissory note in question is one otherwise payable on demand, and,

therefore, the stamp duty is payable u/s 49(b) of the Stamp Act. According to learned counsel, the promisory note is stamped properly u/s 49(a)

of the Stamp Act. According to learned Counsel., even though the words ""on demand"" is not present in the promissory note, the promissory note

is payable only on demand. According to learned counsel there is no time limit fixed for payment of the amount due under the promissory note.

Therefore, it will not come under Article 49(b) of the Stamp Act. Learned Counsel further submitted that in the decision reported in Thenappa

Chettiar Vs. Andiyappa Chettiar, the facts are different. According to the facts arising therein in that case in the promissory note, the promissor

undertook to pay the amount due on the promissory note after two years. Therefore in that case it was held that the promissory note was payable

otherwise than on demand within the meaning of Article 49(b) of the Stamp Act. So also in the decision reported in the case of Devassya v.

Samshuddin, 1976 KLT 24 it was held that, ""if the time is specified in the document and if the same is payable on demand after the period, still the

document is promissory note payable otherwise than on demand, falling under Article 49(b) of the Stamp Act. Therefore, according to learned

counsel for the petitioner, this decision is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. It was, therefore, pleaded that the trial court was not

correct in directing the plaintiff to pay the stamp duty and penalty in view of Article 49(b) of the Stamp Act.

2.

None appeared for the respondent, even though notice was served on the respondent and the name of the respondent was printed in the caste-

list.

3.

I have heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and perused the records carefully. The suit was filed to recover certain amount due on

a promissory note. The trial court pointed out that in the promissory note the words ""on demand"" are not found. Therefore, it is a promissory note

otherswise payable on demand"". Hence according to the trial court the stamp duty is payable according to Article 49(b) of the stamp Act. The

point for consideration in this revision is whether the suit promissory note is a promissory note otherwise payable on demand. In the promissory

note the words on demand"" do not find a place. Even then it can be considered as promissory note. u/s 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a

promissory note"" is an instrument in writing (not being a bank-note or a currency-note) containing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the

maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument.

4.

In Sreenivasan Vs. Subbarama Sastrikal, it was held that ""a promissory note payable on demand is one payable without any demand and time

limit. The true import of the words ''on demand'' is that the debt is due and payable immediately. The instrument involved in this case satisfied this

test even read along with the endorsement. The endorsement does not mean that it is not payable immediately or without any demand. Even the

words ''on demand'' is not necessary to make it on demand because under 5.19 of the Negotiable Instruments Act a pronote in which no time for

payment is specified is one payable on demand."" In order to make a promissory note ''on demand'' it must be payable ''at once'' ''forthwith'' or

''immediately''. The expression ''on demand'' unlike in ordinary parlance, has, a technical connotation in the law of negotiable instruments. If any

time is fixed for payment then payment could be demanded and the amount becomes payable only after that period and in such a case the

instrument is only one payable otherwise than on demand even though the words ''on demand'' are there. The decisions reported in Aiyappankutty

v. Mathai, 1954 KLT 785 Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Andiyappa Chettiar, and Devassya v. Shamsuddin 1976 KLT 24 were concerned with

instruments where periods were fixed for payment. When time for payment is fixed a promissory note cannot be payable ''on demand'' whatever

be the wording. But in the present case no period for payment was fixed under the promissory note and, therefore, the decisions relied upon by the

trial court are not applicable to the facts of this case. The promissory note in question is correctly stamped according to the provisions contained in

Article 49(a) of the Stamps Act. Therefore, the order passed by the trial court in holding that the promissory note in question is a promissory note

otherwise payable on demand and necessary stamp duty is payable according to Article 49(b) of the Stamps Act is liable to be set aside.

Accordingly, I set aside the order of the trial court.

5.

In the result, the revision is allowed. The order passed by the trial court is set aside. No costs.