Eastern Institute For Integrated Learning In Management University vs Deputy Director Directorate Of Enforcement, Kolkata

FPA-PMLA-1184/KOL/2016, FPA-PMLA-863/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-869/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-886/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-

871/KOL/2015 & FPA-PMLA-866/KOL/2015

The appellant as shown as serial no. 1 has filed the appeal against the order dated 1st December, 2015 passed by the Adjudicating Authority in

O.C. No. 409/2015. The appeal referred in serial no. 2 to 6 are filed against the order dated 3rd March, 2015 passed by the Adjudicating Authority in

O.C. No. 381/2014. I propose to decide these appeals with the single order as the allegations and cause of action against in both O.C. No. 409 and

O.C. No. 381/2014 substantially similar.

When the matter is taken up today, the learned counsel for all the appellants in the have referred the final judgment dated 22nd September, 2015

passed by the Honâ€​ble High Court Sikkim, Gangtok in Criminal Writ Petition No. 02/2015 as well as our earlier order passed on 9th March, 2017.

They submit that the directions passed by the court in said judgment have not been complied with by the Adjudicating Authority in passing the

impugned order dated 01.12.2015. the said judgment would also directly apply to the appeal No. FPA-PMLA-863/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-

869/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-886/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-871/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-866/KOL/2015 in O.C. No. -381/2014.

On 9th March, 2017 this tribunal allowed the five appeals wherein the similar issue about of judgment delivered by the Honâ€ble Sikkim High

Court was argued which was considered and decided by setting aside the impugned common order dated 15.06.2015. The details of the said appeals

are given as under:-

In FPA-PMLA-943/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-997/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-995/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-991/KOL/2015 & FPA-PMLA-

949/KOL/2015 the said appeals filed against the order dated 15th June, 2015 passed in O.C. No. 409/2015 (hereinafter these appellants in

the above mentioned appeal would be referred as other defendants).

When these appeals were pending, all appellants filed fresh application to set-aside the impugned order dated 15.06.2015 in view of judgment passed.

The prayer was made in the application was opposed on behalf of the respondent. In reply it is stated that the contention of the petitioner is not correct

as the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, being a Special Act, there is no such provision of fulfillment of coram of the Adjudicating Authority while

adjudicating a case in terms of section 8 of the Prevention of Money Laundering, 2002.

The said appeals no. FPA-PMLA-943,997,995, 991 and 999/2015, were allowed by order dated 09.03.2017 in view of the judgment passed by

Sikkim High Court on 22.09.2015 by holding that common impugned order dated 15.06.2015 was passed without jurisdiction passed in O.C. No.

409/2015.

The appellant of in appeal no. 1184/2016 (herein) i.e. EIILM University was the Defendant No. 1 in the said OC No. 409 of

2015, had approached the High Court of Sikkim at Gangtok by way of Writ Petition  (Criminal) No. 2 of 2015 along with Crl. M. Appl. No. 18 of

2015, praying for quashing and setting aside the show cause notice dated 3.2.2015 (common for all including the present Appellants) and the prior and

subsequent investigating proceedings of the Respondent herein who also preferred an application for interim direction for staying further proceedings

in complaint being OC No. 409 of 2015 pending before the Learned Adjudicating Authority.

5.1. The Honâ€ble High Court of Sikkim issued the notice dated 2.4.2015 and directed that “in the meanwhile, the respondents shall not take any

further steps in pursuance of notice to show cause dated 3.2.2015â€. On 14.05.2015 when the matter was listed before the Learned Adjudicating

Authority, who adjourned the matter sine die in view of the orders passed by the Honâ€​ble High Court of Sikkim.

5.2 On 05.06.2015 when the Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 2 of 2015 came before the Honâ€ble High Court of Sikkim, the counsel appearing for the

respondent in the said proceedings requested the Honâ€ble High Court of Sikkim to clarify the interim orders dated 02.04.2015 with regard as other

defendants (who are the appellants herein). The Honâ€ble Court of Sikkim clarified that the order dated 02.04.2015 was to apply only to the writ

petitioner there i.e. EIILM University the defendants no. 1 in the matter and appellant herein.

5.3. On the same day i.e. 05.06.2015, in the e-mail sent by Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, intimating to all the appellants i.e. Jharkhand

Rai University, Rai Technology University, Malvika Foundation, Integrated Institute of Excellence Society, Eastern Institute for Integrated Learning in

Management that the hearing of the complaint was scheduled and fixed on 8.6.2015. In the said mail the “other defendants†were directed to

appear for the hearing of the said complaint, failing which the complaint would be heard and decided in their absence. The mail was sent by the

Respondent on 06.06.2015, which happened to be a Saturday, at 10:10 PM on the official e-mail of the Appellants University. The counsel of

“other defendants†did not get the e-mail sent by the Registrar, Adjudicating Authority, PMLA due to some problems at the end of the office of

the Registrar, Adjudicating Authority.

5.4 The “other defendants†thereafter appeared through their counsels and filed an application for recall of any order passed on

08.06.2015 and to also grant a weekâ€​s time for filing of reply.

However, Adjudicating Authority summarily dismissed the application. As per record the Learned Adjudicating Authority did not even give any time to

the “other defendantâ€​ to file reply and reserved orders in O.C. 409 of 2015.

5.5. One of the parties from “other defendant†namely, Rai Technology University, Bangalore, approached the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka

by way of writ petition being Writ Petition No. 24563/2015 [GM-RES] challenging the action of the Learned Adjudicating Authority in not granting any

opportunity to the “said documents†to file its reply and for personal hearing before passing order under Section 8(3) of the PMLA 2002 and

recalling the order dated 11.06.2015 in O.C. no. 409 of 2015.

5.6. The said mentioned Writ Petition was listed before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka on 16.06.2015 and the Hon'ble Court was pleased to

passed an interim order:-

“Issue notice to respondents no. 1 and 3.

In the meanwhile the third respondents is directed not to pronounce or sign the order in O.C. No. 409/2015 if the same has not yet been

pronounced.â€​

5.7. Apparently, prior to passing of the said order by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka, i.e. on 15.06.2015 the Learned Adjudicating Authority

confirmed the Provisional Attachment Order dated 09.01.2015 by passing final order in O.C. No. 409/2015.The writ petition filed being WP No.

24563/2015 became infructuous in view of the impugned order passed by the Learned Adjudicating Authority on 15.06.2015.

5.8. On the same day i.e. 05.06.2015, in the e-mail sent by Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, intimating to all the appellants i.e. Jharkhand

Rai University, Rai Technology University, Malvika Foundation, Integrated Institute of Excellence Society, Eastern Institute for Integrated Learning in

Management that the hearing of the complaint was scheduled and fixed on 8.6.2015. In the said mail the “other defendants†were directed to

appear for the hearing of the said complaint, failing which the complaint would be heard and decided in their absence. The mail was sent by the

Respondent on 06.06.2015, which happened to be a Saturday, at 10:10 PM on the official e-mail of the Appellants University. The counsel of

“other defendants†did not get the e-mail sent by the Registrar, Adjudicating Authority, PMLA due to some problems at the end of the office of

the Registrar, Adjudicating Authority.

By order dated 15.06.2015, the Adjudicating Authority confirmed the provisional attachment order passed in O.C. No. 409/2015.

The said “other defendantsâ€Â in the same O.C. No.-409/2015 thereafter filed appeals FPA-PMLA-943/KOL/2015, FPA-

PMLA-997/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-995/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-991/KOL/2015 & FPA-PMLA-999/KOL/2015 against the impugned order dated

15.06.2015, interalia, mainly on the following grounds:-

(a) the provisional attachment order, show cause notice, complaint and impugned order dated 15.06.2015 passed by the Learned

Adjudicating Authority is without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Rules and is bad in law as the constitution/Coram of the

adjudicating authority comprising of a single Member which is to hear the Appellants is not competent to issue Show Cause notice and decide the

complaint as it lacks jurisdiction and is in contravention of the provisions of the PML Act.

(b) Section 6 (5)(b) of the PML Act provides that one Member from the field of law has been specifically provided in view of the fact that the

functions conferred on the adjudicating authority are judicial in nature and are for the purpose of deciding lis between the parties, hence the presence

of a member having legal background becomes a sine qua non and cannot be done away with. Moreover, the adjudicating authority while exercising

its powers under the PML Act is called upon to decide questions which are intricate and complicated and pre-eminently of judicial complexion and in

such circumstances the presence of a judicial member or member having legal background is mandatory and a coram comprising of a single Member

or in absence of a Member legal/judicial would be a coram without jurisdiction or without authority in law. In the present case, a single Member Bench

is constituted to hear the appellants without authority or jurisdiction in law and such proceedings are unsustainable and the very initiation of the

proceedings before such an authority by way of issuance of the show cause notice is unsustainable.

(c) The adjudicating authority has adopted a procedure which is violative of principles of natural justice and also contrary to the provisions of the PML

Act and the Regulation of 2013. The reasonable time to file the reply was not granted rather the Adjudicating Authority was in a rush to pass order

against the principles of natural justice. The appellants were denied time to the Appellant to file reply or address arguments. Therefore the impugned

order is liable to set aside.

(d) The Adjudicating Authority ought to have decided the preliminary contentions / objections of coram non judice raised by the

appellant and not insisted in proceeding with the matter on merits and such a procedure is also contrary to settled principles of law as the issue

regarding lack of jurisdiction of an authority goes to the root of the matter and unless and until the authority has jurisdiction in law to adjudicate on a

matter, it should not have proceeded to decide upon the merits of the matter. The act of the adjudicating authority was whimsical even no time was

granted to inspect the record of the adjudicating authority.

(e) The Learned Adjudicating Authority failed to appreciate that the action of the respondent in attaching the land sold by the sponsoring body of the

Appellant as well as the consideration received by it and invested in the endowment fund of the Appellants amounts to double attachment of properties

which is not contemplated under the provisions of the act and violates the provisions of law and violates the fundamental rights of the appellant. The

Learned Adjudicating Authority has failed to appreciate that the action of entering into an agreement to sell does not constitute a crime falling within

the ambit of scheduled offences under the PML Act, 2002.

(f) The Learned Adjudicating Authority has failed to appreciate that money received by the sponsoring body of the Appellant from the legitimate sale

of land and building cannot be termed as a “proceeds of crime†in the hands of Appellant instead it is the assets in the hands of EIILM University

procured from the alleged proceeds of crime which are to be treated as “proceeds of crime†as defined under the Section 2(1)(u) of the

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. Thus the impugned order being bad in lawâ€​ ought to be set aside.

As already mentioned, the appeals filed by “other defendants†in O.C. No. 409/2015 were allowed by this tribunal by order dated 09.03.2017

by setting aside the order dated 15.06.2015 as already mentioned earlier.

It is pertinent to mention here that during the hearing of those appeals filed by the “other defendantsâ€, an impression was given to us that two

weeks before the judgment recorded by the Sikkim High Court, on 22.09.2015 the judicial member was appointed on 07.09.2015, however at the time

of hearing of present appeals, it has come to the my notice that as a matter of fact Judicial Member (legal) was appointed and not the Judicial

Member as directed by the Honâ€​ble Court even as of today I have been informed no appointment of Judicial Member has been made.

As already mentioned on 22.09.2015, the final judgment was delivered by the Honâ€ble High Court of Sikkim Gangtok in

W.P. (Crl) No.-02/2015 passed in the writ-petition filed by present appellant i.e. EIIL in Management University the appellant in appeal No. FPA-

PMLA-1186/KOL/2016.

The court has allowed the petition by passing the following directions mentioned in para 19 of the Judgment. The same are re-

produced here under:-

“(i) The Respondent No.l shall take appropriate steps with the concerned authorities of the Central Government for appointment of the

Judicial Member of the Adjudicating Authority urgently within a period of 3 (three) months and not later than that;

(ii) On appointment of the Judicial Member, the Chairman of the Adjudicating Authority shall constitute the Bench consisting of a Judicial

Member keeping in view the observations made above having regard to the nature of the lis and the anxiety expressed by the Petitioner-

University.

(iii) Soon after it is constituted, the Bench shall then issue notice upon the Petitioner-University and the Petitioner- University shall appear

before the Bench and place before it all grievances expressed in the Petition; and

(iv) Since the proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority was stayed by this Court by order dated 02-04-2015, the period of attachment

prescribed under Sub-Section (1) of Section 5 shall exclude the period spent during the pendency of the case before this Courtâ€​.

The impugned order dated 01.12.2015 was passed by the Chairman and Member (Legal). None of them was/is Judicial Member. The Chairman

who heard the matter is not a Judicial Member and other officer was appointed as Member (legal) on 07.09.2015 two weeks prior to the judgment

delivered by the Honâ€​ble High Court.

The Honâ€ble High Court in the criminal writ petition after hearing the 7-14 have discussed the facts in the matte as well as law on the subject. It

is necessary to reproduce the said paras:-

On a bare reading of Section 6 and Sub-Sections thereunder, I find substance in the submission of the Learned Central Government

Counsel that there is no mandate that a Bench to be constituted by the Chairperson of the Adjudicating Authority under Sub- Section (5) of

Section 6, must necessarily have one Member who is a Judicial Member. Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 6 prescribes the constitution

and composition of the Adjudicating Authority. Sub-Section (3) of Section 6 prescribes the eligibility conditions for persons to be appointed

as the Members of the Adjudicating Authority. We may reproduce below Sub- Sections (1), (2) and (3) and Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-

Section (5) of Section 6 of the PMLAâ€

“6. Adjudicating Authorities, composition, powers, etc.-

(l) The Central Government shall, by notification, appoint [an Adjudicating Authority] to exercise jurisdiction, powers and authority

conferred by or under this Act.

(2) An Adjudicating Authority shall consist of a Chairperson and two other Members:

Provided that one Member each shall be a person having experience in the field of law, administration, finance or accountancy.

(3) A person shall, however, not be qualified for appointment as Member of an Adjudicating Authority,â€

(a) in the field of law, unless heâ€

(i) is qualified for appointment as District Judge;

or

(ii) has been a member of the Indian Legal Service and has held a post in Grade I of that service;

(b) in the field of finance, accountancy or administration unless he possesses such qualifications, as may be prescribed.

…………………………………………………………………..

(5) Subject to the provisions of this Act,â€

(a) the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority may be exercised by Benches thereof;

(b) a Bench may be constituted by the Chairperson of the Adjudicating Authority with one or two Members as the Chairperson of the

Adjudicating Authority may deem fit;

Sub-Section (5) of Section 6 clearly sets out the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority to be exercised by Benches. Clause (b) of Sub-

Section (5) specifically prescribes the strength of an Adjudicating Authority which the Chairperson shall constitute as he may deem fit. To

this extent, I have no hesitation in concurring with the submission of the Learned Central Government Counsel.

However, on a deeper consideration of the provision, it would appear that the constitution of the Bench by the Chairperson under Clause

(b) of Sub- Section (5) of Section 6, would depend upon the nature of the lis to be decided. This would be apparent from the very words

used in Clause (b) of Sub-Section (5) of Section 6 whereby it provides that a “Bench†may be constituted “as the Chairperson of the

Adjudicating Authority may deem fitâ€. This provision, in my view, is quite distinct from Sub-Section (3) of Section 6 as it is quite obviously

an omnibus provision prescribing the composition of the “Adjudicating Authorityâ€​.

In Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited (supra) in which reliance was placed UponK ihoto Hollohan VS.

Zachillhu and Others I 1992 Supp (2) see 651, it has been held as under:-

“59. In view of the aforesaid categorical statement of law, we would accept the submission of Mr Nariman that the tribunal such as the

State Commission in deciding a lis, between the appellant and the respondent discharges judicial functions and exercises judicial power to

the State. It exercises judicial functions of far-reaching effect. Therefore, in our opinion, Mr Nariman is correct in his submission that it

must have essential trapping of the court. This can only be achieved by the presence of one or more judicial members in the State

Commission which is called upon to decide complicated contractual or civil issues which would normally have been decided by a civil court.

Not only the decisions of the State Commission have far reaching consequences, they are final and binding between the parties, subject, of

course, to judicial review.

The passage in Kihoto Hollohan (supra) relied upon to arrive at the above finding is found reproduced in paragraph 58 of the Tamil

Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited (supra) which we may also reproduce below:-

“58. Again in para 99, it is observed as follows: (Kihoto Hollohan case, SCC p.707)

“99. Where there is a lisâ€"an affirmation by one party and denial by anotherâ€"and the dispute necessarily involves a decision on the

rights and obligations of the parties to it and the authority is called upon to decide it, there is an exercise of judicial power. That authority

is called a Tribunal, if it does not have all the trappings of a Court. In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma this Court said:

(AIR p. 1606, para 33 : SCR pp. 386-87

“33... The main and the basic test, however, is whether the adjudicating power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise,

has been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as a part of the State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial

function. Applying this test, there can be no doubt that the power which the State Government exercises under Rule 6(5) and Rule 6(6) is a

part of the State's judicial power. ... There is, in that sense, a lis; there is affirmation by one party and denial by another, and the dispute

necessarily involves the rights and obligations of the parties to it. The order which the State Government ultimately passes is described as its

decision and it is made final and binding.â€​

In L. Chandra Kumar (supra), it has been held that â€

“95................................... It must be remembered that the setting up of these Tribunals is founded on the premise that specialist bodies

comprising both trained administrators and those with judicial experience would, by virtue of their specialised knowledge, be better

equipped to dispense speedy and efficient justice. It was expected that a judicious mix of Judicial Members and those with grassroot

experience would best serve this purpose. To hold that the Tribunal should consist only of Judicial Members would attack the primary basis

of the theory pursuant to which they have been constituted. Since the Selection Committee is now headed by a Judge of the Supreme Court,

nominated by the Chief Justice of India, we have reason to believe that the Committee would take care to ensure that Administrative

Members are chosen from amongst those who have some background to deal with such cases.â€​

“13. In my considered opinion, what emerges from the above with certainty is that in a case where serious questions of law and fact

arise, as in the present case, it is essential that one of the Members of the Bench constituted under Clause (b) of Sub-Section (5) of Section 6

of PMLA by the Chairperson of the Adjudicating Authority should be a Judicial Member as he “with his judicial experience would, by

virtue of his specialised knowledge, would be better equipped to dispense with speedy and efficient justiceâ€. This appears to be import of

the words “as the Chairperson of the Adjudicating Authority may deem fitâ€​.

It is an admitted position that the post of a Judicial Member under Respondent No.3 is still lying vacant and that the impugned show cause notice

was issued and the order under challenge passed in the absence of such a Member. Apart from what have been observed earlier, in a proceeding of

the present kind, where orders were passed ex parte by the Adjudicating Authority in the absence of the Petitioner-University, it would have been

essential for a Judicial Member to be part of the Bench considering the nature of the lis before it to ensure that the orders are passed in satisfaction of

all the principles relevant and acceptable in law. Prima facie, therefore, I am of the view that the order does not appear to pass the muster of the law

laid down in Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited (supra)â€​.

It appears from the judgment passed by the Honâ€ble Court that High Court was concerned about the seriousness of the matter and it was

observed that since important legal issues are involved therefore, it would be appropriate that the matter may be decided by Judicial Member. The said

judgment was not challenged by the respondent.

The impugned order was passed dated 01.12.2015 was passed after passing the final judgment of the Honâ€​ble High Court. The order was passed

by the Chairman (who is not the Judicial Member and even does not have qualification to become Member (legal) and Judicial-Member.

As per section 6, the Member (legal) can be eligible/qualified to be a District judge as he had been an advocate for more than 10 years but the

Member (legal) was not appointed a Judicial Member of the Adjudicating Authority on 07.09.2015. Being a Member (legal) he may be having the

experience as an advocate for than 10 years and has all qualification to become Judicial Member but fact of the matter is that he was meely appointed

as Member (legal) within the meaning of Section 6 (3)(a)(ii). His appointment was not made under Section 6 (3)(a).

The Judicial Member as per Section 6(3)(a) mean District Judge. The Government has not appointed the Judical MemberÂ

in view of directions issued by the High Court. I am also not aware as to whether the Government was informed about the said directions. There

is no force in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that at the strength of section 6, Member (legal) could have heard the matter in

view of directions issued by the Honâ€​ble Court.

While passing the final judgment in the said criminal writ-petition, in para 17 observation were made. The extract of the order passed by the

Honâ€​ble High Court of Sikkim reads as under:

“17. However, in order to allay the apprehensions expressed by the Petitioner-University, it would be sufficient to direct the Respondent

No. 1 to first take up with the appropriate Ministry for appointment of a Judicial member under Clause (a) of Sub-Section (3) of Section 6.

As expressed in Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Ltd. (supra), the matters need to be considered with grave urgency by

the appropriate Central Authority.â€​

At present this tribunal does not wish to give any opinion with regard to argument addressed by the Counsel for the respondent that the member as

per the scheme of the Act was/is empowered to hear the matter on behalf of Adjudicating Authority. Infact the same issue has been raised in many

appeals pending before this Tribunal and the same would be considered as and when the said pending appeals are heard.

It appears that the impugned order dated 1st December, 2015 the same has not been passed by the Judicial Member. The learned counsel for the

appellants submit that even as of today the Judicial Member has not been appointed except after filing the writ petition Member (legal) has been

appointed. It is evident that the directions issued by the Honâ€ble High Court of Sikkim, Gangtok dated 22nd September, 2015 are not complied with.

The impugned order has not been passed by the Judicial Member despite of directions issued by the Honâ€​ble High Court.

No doubt the Member (legal) may be having the qualifications to become Judicial Member, but facts remains that his appointment was not made for

as Judicial Member and this tribunal is bound to the respect the judgment and directions issued in the criminal writ-petition.

I am also not expressing my final opinion with regard to interpretation of 6 of the Act. I am only concerned here with regard to compliance of

direction issued by the High Court in these matter. The only concerned is with the compliance of judgment delivered by the Honâ€ble High Court. I

am of the view that the direction issued by the High Court could not be ignored as the same are clear. The different interpretation cannot be given as

suggested by the counsel for respondent. The subject of dispute has to be determined as per direction.

As far as merit of the case is concerned, no opinion is being expressed in the above mentioned appeals nor forming

any opinion about  the capability of the officers who have the impugned order dated 01.12.2015.

It is settled law if any order is without jurisdiction, the same is nullity and its validity could be set up even in the collateral proceedings. It is clear

that directions have been passed by the Sikkim High Court, have not been complied with impugned order has been without jurisdiction as the impugned

order has not been decided by the Judicial Member. Thus the impugned order dated 01.12.2015 is liable to be set-aside on the ground that it has been

passed by officers of the Authority without jurisdiction.

Once it is clear that none of the hearing officer was a Judicial Member, within the mandate of judgment of the High Court. The passing of order

dated 01.12.2015 was without jurisdiction. Therefore, the said order dated 01.12.2015 is not sustainable in the eyes of law.

The other appeals no. FPA-PMLA-863/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-869/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-866/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-871/KOL/2015 &

FPA-PMLA-886/KOL/2015 are concerned since the ECIR is the same in all the matter, most of the allegations are similar and in view of order

already passed on 9th March, 2017 in appeal no. FPA-PMLA-943/KOL/2015, FPA-PMLA-997/KOL/2015 FPA-PMLA-995/KOL/2015, FPA-

PMLA-991/KOL/2015 & FPA-PMLA-999/KOL/2015 the impugned order dated 3rd March, 2016 passed by Single Member who is neither the

Judicial Member or Judicial Legal is set-aside as the same principles would apply in all set of appeals.

For sake of repetition, the following directions were passed by the High Court:-

“(i) The Respondent No.l shall take appropriate steps with the concerned authorities of the Central Government for appointment of the

Judicial Member of the Adjudicating Authority urgently within a period of 3 (three) months and not later than that;

(ii) On appointment of the Judicial Member, the Chairman of the Adjudicating Authority shall constitute the Bench consisting of a Judicial

Member keeping in view the observations made above having regard to the nature of the lis and the anxiety expressed by the Petitioner-

University.

(iii) Soon after it is constituted, the Bench shall then issue notice upon the Petitioner-University and the Petitioner- University shall appear

before the Bench and place before it all grievances expressed in the Petition; and

(iv) Since the proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority was stayed by this Court by order dated 02-04-2015, the period of attachment

prescribed under Sub-Section (1) of Section 5 shall exclude the period spent during the pendency of the case before this Courtâ€​.

The said directions are binding to the tribunal as well as Adjudicating Authority. The respondent is to take the necessary steps accordingly and

therefore OCs†381/2014 and 409/2015 is to be decided on urgent basis on merit after hearing both sides with regard to confirmation of provisional

attachment order. Till such time, the matters are decided (as per directions issued by the Honâ€ble High Court) the order of provisionalÂ

attachment shall continue. The above said appeals are remanded-back accordingly to the Adjudicating Authority by setting aside

the impugned orders dated 01.12.2015 and 03.03.2015. All pending applications in the above mentioned appeals are also disposed

of.

It is clarified that no opinion is expressed by this tribunal on merit. The order is being passed in view of direction issued by the Honâ€ble Sikkim

High Court.

Copy of the order be given “dastiâ€​ to both sides.