Edupuganti Raghavendra Rao Memorial High School Committee and Others vs Potluri Atchayya and Others

Chandra Reddy, J.—This Civil Revision Petition arises out of an application under Order 6, Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure, for amendment of the plaint in O. S. No. 176/54 on the file of the District Munsif, Gudivada. The suit was instituted in a representative capacity against the Defendants, members of Sri Edupuganti Raghavendrarao Memorial Committee, Gudlavalleru for a declaration that the committee has ceased to exist by reason of not holding meetings as required by the rules governing the administration of the institution and for an injunction restraining Defendants 2 to 10 from functioning as members of the committee and for other reliefs.

The suit institution a High School was started in or about the year 1945 with donations and subscription from the public. The founders of the school framed the bye-laws and articles of Association and had them registered with the Registrar of joint Stock Companies.

It is alleged in the plaint inter alia that under Rule 8 of the regulations for the governance of this in-situation any member of the committee who failed to attend consecutively three meetings would cease to be a member thereof and that since no meetings were held for six months the members of the committee have ipso facto become defunct and they had no power to hold a meeting subsequent to that date. Pending the suit, the Plaintiffs sought to amend the plaint by adding a prayer:

If in the circumstances of the case this Hon''ble Court deem it necessary to frame a scheme constituting a Committee of management and empowering one member of such committee to act as the President and Anr. member to act as Secretary from out of General Body of Donors and subscribers and to vest the management and the properties of the school in the said committee embodying such necessary directions in the scheme with a view to carry on and facilitate the management of the school and its property.

This petition was opposed on various grounds, the one relevant for the purpose of this enquiry being that Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure, was a bar to it. The trial Court allowed the amendment notwithstanding this, opposition of the Defendants.

In this revision petition, the propriety of the order is canvassed. The contention pressed upon me by the counsel for the Petitioner is that the trial Court could not allow the amendment as it would fundamentally change the character of the suit and would oust its jurisdiction.

The answer of Mr. Suryauarayana counsel for the Respondents to this is that the nature of the suit is not in any way altered, the body of the plaint remaining intact and there being only an addition to the relief and that Section 92, CPC is inapplicable to this case. According to him, the amendment would not bring the suit within the ambit of Section 92 for the reason that a High School cannot be regarded as a charitable institution and that in any event it is a private trust.

It is difficult to agree with these propositions. An institution started for imparting education surety comes within the scope of Section 92, for the purpose for which it was started is of a charitable nature. I am convinced that a school of this description certainly attracts the provisions of Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure.

The next submission of Mr. Suryanarayana, namely, that it is a private trust and therefore civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits for establishing claims for private trust is equally untenable. He placed before me a number of rulings of the Calcutta High Court and the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in AIR 1922 253 (Privy Council) which laid down that it was competent for a Civil Court to settle claims for the administration of private trusts.

The principle underlying these pronouncements would apply only if the present one is regarded as a private trust. Therefore, it is not necessary for me to examine these decisions at length, since the point for determination is whether this is a private or a public trust.

Having regard to the averments in the plaint it is futile to contend that the suit institution is a private trust. The High School was started and was being maintained out of public contributions and the management thereof vests in all the donors who elect their representatives to the managing committee. The institution was registered under the Societies Registration Act.

It is unnecessary to pursue this enquiry any further. It is sufficient to state that a High School which is founded on the subscriptions collected from the members of the public and whoso sustenance depends on the continued co-operations of the public of the place is a public trust.

The question was raised whether a Court has jurisdiction to frame a scheme independent of Section 92 CPC Under the CPC of 1882, there were conflicting views on this aspect of the matter.

Woodroffe J. of the Calcutta High Court in Budfae Das Mukim v. Choonilal ILR 33 Cal 789 (B) took the view that S. 539 corresponding to the present Section 92 was not mandatory and was cumulative and not restrictive in its effect. For that reason, the suit was maintainable independent of that provision even though it was upon such a cause of action and for such a relief as have been mentioned in it.

But this conflict was set at rest by the Legislature by enacting Sub-section (2) to Section 92, which is in the following words:

2(1) xx xx xx

(2) Save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 or by any corresponding law in force ''in a part B State no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in Sub-section (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to expect in conformity with the provisions of that Sub-section.

It is clear that this Sub-section bars any suit debtors Section 92. By creating -a, special jurisdiction in regard to suits of that class, the general jurisdiction of a civil Court cannot be invoked and noncompliance with the specific provision'' would be fatal to the maintainability of the suit.

It follows that suits for the framing of a scheme for trusts created for public purposes of a charitable nature could be brought only under the provisions of that section. Such an action'' is outside the jurisdiction of a District Munsif as the section has specifically conferred jurisdiction only upon the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction.

It is no doubt true that it is open to a State Government to empower any other Court to entertain such suits. But no such power has been conferred by the State on the Courts of the District Munsif. Thus, it is manifest that if this amendment should be allowed it ousts the jurisdiction of a civil Court.

This takes me on to the point whether a Court would permit a plaint to be amended the effect of which would take away its jurisdiction. My answer is in the negative. This view of mine receives support from a judgment of Venkatasubbarao J. in C. Singara Mudaliar Vs. M. Govindasami Chetti and Others, This is what the learned Judge observes:

The test then is if this amendment was applied for in the City Civil Court could that Court have granted it? I conceive that no Court will permit a plaint to be so amended, as to oust its own jurisdiction to try the suit.

I respectfully endorse this view. For these reasons, the order of the District Munsif permitting the amendment of the Plaintiff cannot be sustained. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary for me to consider whether in a suit under Order 1, Rule 8 the Plaintiffs who are eo nomine parties and who could be regarded as dominus litis could ask for amendment which would enlarge the scope of the suit without a fresh permission in that regard.

In the result the C. R. P. is allowed with costs throughout and the order of the trial Court set aside.