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Judgment
The 2nd respondent clamped an order of detention against Arivazhagan, son of Ratnam, residing at Vallam Village, Sendhurai Taluk, Ariyalur
District, as he arrived at a subjective satisfaction that he is a goonda as contemplated under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of
Bootleggers, Drug-offenders, (Forest-offenders), Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum-grabbers Act, 1982. Challenging the said order
of detention clamped on Arivazhagan, his next friend, Elavarasan, has moved the present habeas corpus petition.
Heard Mr. R.Sankarasubbu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. I.Subramaniam, the learned Public Prosecutor, appearing for
the respondents.
Though no counter has been filed despite lapse of time by the first respondent-State Government, the learned Public Prosecutor made his
submissions on merits, while placing the file before the Court. Mr. Sankarasubbu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner advanced number of
contentions challenging the detention and also contended that the detention has been rendered illegal by infraction of Article 22(5) of The
Constitution. However, in our considered view, it is not necessary to refer to or consider all the contentions advanced by Mr.Sankarasubbu.
One of the substantial contention advanced by Mr.Sankarasubbu is that the grounds of detention do not have any nexus to the maintenance of
public order and the very ground case relied upon by the detaining authority to brand the detenue as a goonda to clamp detention, assuming to be
correct, the detenue cannot be branded as a goonda as defined in Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. It is pointed out that the alleged act neither
adversely affect the maintenance of public order and there is not even a whisper of the same in the order nor it has been recorded that the detenue
habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offence punishable under Chapter XVI or XVII or XXII of The Indian Penal
Code as no public order is involved. In the absence of such satisfaction even ex-facie, on the face of the order of detention clamped, the order
cannot be sustained.
In other words, it is contended on the basis of the ground case as set out in para 3 (i), the detenue is not a goonda and no order of detention
could be clamped against him and the order ex-facie suffers with illegality and non-application of mind. We find there is force in the contention
advanced by Mr.Sankarasubbu.
As seen from the definition of the expression ""Goonda"" and the expression ""acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order
in the case of a goonda as seen from Sections 2(a)(iii) and 2(f), the said definition refers to the habitual commission or attempt to commit and the
detention is to be effected with a view to prevent the person concerned from acting in any manner prejudicial to public order.
Acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order has also been defined u/s 2(a)(iii). Hence, in the absence of any satisfaction
even subjectively that the activities of the detenue has interfered with the maintenance of public order, it is contended that no order of detention
could be clamped against the detenue. This contention merits acceptance.
Para 3 (i) of the order of detention, which is relevant and which is the ground case based upon which the order of detention has been passed,
reads thus :-
3) The grounds on which the said detention has been made is as follows :
i) On 9.12.2001 at about 9.00 p.m., near Cuddalore New Cinema theatre, while the Sub Inspector of Police, Cuddalore-N.T. P.S. Along with his
police party was conducting vehicular check operation, a TATA Sumo Car with No. TN-50-1881 proceeding towards north from south was
intercepted and checked. On enquiry the driver of the vehicle was identified as Suresh, S/o. Ramalingam and when enquired upon the other
inmates, there were Thiru. Arivazhagan, S/o. Rathinam of Ariyalur district, State Deputy General Secretary of Tamizhar Viduthalai Organisation
and other eight members of the said organisation were found to have travelled in the said car. On enquiry they did not answer property about their
proposed destination. The police conducted a thorough check inside the vehicle and found that there was a dangerous weapon two feet length of
veecharuval and six wooden logs on the back side of the vehicle. They could not offer any explanation for such possession. On further
interrogation, Thiru. Arivazhagan told that they were belonging to the banned organisation of Tamil nadu Liberation force, since it was banned, they
had separately started another party in the name called Thamizhar viduthalai Organisation. It was apparently learnt the Thiru. Arivazhagan along
with his associates carried such dangerous weapon only for the execution of grave crimes and also likely to cause damages to the public
properties. All of them were secured on the spot. Along with them the weapons and TATA Sumo Car No. TN-50-1881 which is used by them
also secured and produced before the Inspector of Police, Cuddalore New Town Police Station for investigation. On special report given by the
Sub Inspector of Police, Cuddalore-T.N. P.S. Cr. No.911/2001 u/s. 25(1-B) Arms Act and Section 7(1) (a) C.L.A. Act, registered and
investigation has been taken up by the Inspector of Police, Cuddalore N.T. P.S.
The remaining portion of the said paragraphs refers to subsequent investigation and in no way it refers to the alleged incident in respect of the
ground case. It is rightly being pointed out that except checking the vehicle, seizing veecharuval and six wooden logs on the back side of the
vehicle, no other allegation or averment finds a place against the detenue at the time of occurrence of the ground case with reference to public
order. In other words, there is not even a whisper that the detenue and others have engaged themselves or acted in a manner prejudicial or acted
adversely or engaged themselves, which affect adversely or likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order.
In the ground case, nowhere it is stated that the maintenance of public order has been affected by the detenue and others, who were arrested
on 9.12.2001 at 9.00 p.m., near Cuddalore New Cinema Theatre. The ground case, if at all, may relate to law and order problem for which action
could be taken under the relevant provisions of the Penal Code. The entire averment in para 3(i) in no manner indicates that the detenue has acted
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
In this respect, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Angoori Devi for Ram Ratan Vs. Union of
India (UOI) and Others, . In the said case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the distinction between public order
and law and order and held thus :-
12) The impact on ''public order'' and ''law and order'' depends upon the nature of the act, the place where it is committed and motive force
behind it. If the act is confined to an individual without directly or indirectly affecting the tempo of the life of the community, it may be a matter of
law and order only. But where the gravity of the act is otherwise and likely to endanger the public tranquillity, it may fall within the orbit of the
public order. This is precisely the distinguishing feature between the two concepts. Sometimes, as observed by Venkatachaliah, J., in Ayya Vs.
State of U.P. : ''What might be an otherwise simple ""law and order"" situation might assume the gravity and mischief of a ""public order"" problem by
reason alone of the manner or circumstances in which or the place at which it is carried out.'' Necessarily, much depends upon the nature of the
act, the place where it is committed and the sinister significance attached to it.
13) As for example dare-devil repeated criminal acts, open shoot-out, throwing bomb at public places, committing serious offences in public
transport, armed persons going on plundering public properties or terrorising people may create a sense of insecurity in the public mind and may
have an impact on ''public order''. Even certain murders committed by persons in lonely places with the definite object of promoting the cause of
the party to which they belong may also affect the maintenance of ''public order''.
The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the later pronouncement in MUSTAKMIYA JABBARMIYA SHAIKA VS. M.M.
MEHTA, COMMISSIONER OF POLICE & OTHERS reported in 1995 SCC (Crl.) 454 in support of his contention that a definition has to be
drawn between law and order and maintenance of public order. The Apex Court in the said decision held thus :-
It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine whether besides the person being a ""dangerous person"" his alleged activities fall within the ambit of
the expression ""public order"". A distinction has to be drawn between law and order and maintenance of public order because most often the two
expressions are confused and detention orders are passed by the authorities concerned in respect of the activities of a person which exclusively fall
within the domain of law and order and which have nothing to do with the maintenance of public order. In this connection it may be stated that in
order to bring the activities of a person within the expression of ""acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order"", the fall out
and the extent and reach of the alleged activities must be of such a nature that they travel beyond the capacity of the ordinary law to deal with him
or to prevent his subversive activities affecting the community at large or a large section of society. It is the degree of disturbance and its impact
upon the even tempo of life of the society or the people of a locality which determines whether the disturbance caused by such activity amounts
only to a breach of ""law and order"" or it amounts to ""public order"". If the activity falls within the category of disturbance of ""public order"" then it
becomes essential to treat such a criminal and deal with him differently than an ordinary criminal under the law as his activities would fall beyond the
frontiers of law and order, disturbing the even tempo of life of the community of the specified locality. In the case of Arun Ghosh Vs. State of
W.B., this Court had an occasion to deal with the distinction between law and order and public order. Hidayatullah, C.J., (as he then was),
speaking for the Court observed that public order would embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of
the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts
directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of
disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law
and order.
The contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is supported by the above two pronouncements of the Apex Court as well
as the later pronouncement in TURNAM VS. UNION OF INDIA reported in 1998 SCC (Crl.) 1037. It is not necessary to multiply this order
with number of authorities.
Mr. I.Subramaniam, learned Public Prosecutor, who appeared in the matter on the directions of this Court, though relied upon para 3 (ii), (iii)
and (iv), which relate to investigation and later developments, he is not able to point out any activities on the part of the detenue with reference to
the ground case as acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In the absence of the same, the detenue cannot be branded as
a goonda and, consequently, no order of detention could be clamped against the detenue branding him as a goonda.
For the above reasons, we hold that the order of detention is liable to be quashed and, accordingly, it is quashed. The detenue is directed to be
set at liberty, unless his presence is required in any other case.