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Judgment
K.G. Shankar
Both the criminal petitions are disposed of through the common order. The petitioners and the respondents are common in both the criminal petitions. The allegations more or less are identical in both the criminal petitions. However, Crl.P. Nos. 4728/2008 & 4727/2008 arise from the common order of the learned III Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad in Crl.R.P. No. 95/2007 from Crl.M.P. No. 2642/2007 in C.C. No. 1002/2002, and Crl.R.P. No. 94/2007 from Crl.M.P. No. 2643/2007 in C.C. No. 1003/2002 on the file of the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad.
Sri M. Kalyana Ramakrishna, learned counsel for the petitioners, pointed out that the cases have subsequently been transferred to the Court of XX Special Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad and re-numbered as C.C. Nos. 2 & 3 of 2011. The foregoing orders are recorded with reference to C.C. Nos. 1002 & 1003 of 2002 on the file of the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, re-numbered as C.C. Nos. 2 & 3 of 2011 on the file of the XX Special Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad.
The 1st respondent is a Company. It also runs chit funds. Alleging that the petitioners borrowed monies and also participated in chits conducted by the 1st respondent and issued cheques in discharge of their debts due to the 1st respondent, the 1st respondent laid the complaints under Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on the ground that the cheques bounced. These factors, in fact, are not relevant. The only fact that is relevant for the purpose of these criminal petitions is that the 1st respondent is a body corporate.
The 1st respondent laid two complaints before the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad on 22.08.2002. The complaints were filed by one S.K. Sen Choudhary on behalf of the 1st respondent. A resolution dated 30.06.1998 was produced pointing out that S.K. Sen Choudhary, Manager (Operations) was authorized to represent the 1st respondent before Courts in criminal cases. Inter alia, the resolution also superseded earlier resolutions. However, one G.V. Subramanyam gave sworn statements, which were registered as the complaints by the trial Court. The sworn statements, it is pertinent to notice, were not by S.K. Sen Choudhary. However, this aspect is not the main dispute before me.
It would appear that the 1st respondent filed Crl. MP Nos. 2642 & 2643 of 2007 before the trial Court to permit one K.V.V. Ramana to represent the 1st respondent Company in the place of G.V. Subramanyam. It would appear that Board Resolution dated 24.12.1992 and authorization dated 20.09.2006 were filed by the 1st respondent in support of its right to authorize K.V.V. Ramana to represent the 1st respondent Company before the trial Court.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that K.V.V. Ramana has no authority to represent the 1st respondent and has no right to depose in the cases on behalf of the 1st respondent. He pointed out that the Board Resolution dated 24.12.1992 authorizing V.S.R.P. Adusumilli, Managing Director of the 1st respondent to represent the 1st respondent Company was superseded by the resolution dated 30.06.1998. He also drew my attention to the resolution dated 20.09.2006 issued by V.S.R.P. Adusumilli in favor of K.V.V. Ramana. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that Adusumilli, Managing Director of the 1st respondent Company himself has no authority to represent the 1st respondent Company in view of the resolution of the Board dated 30.06.1998, and that the question of his authorizing K.V.V. Ramana through authorization dated 20.09.2006 does not arise and that such an authorization is invalid.
I wholly agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners. Adusumilli had authority to represent the 1st respondent through the resolution of the Board dated 24.12.1992. This authority was cancelled through resolution dated 30.06.1998. One S.K. Sen Choudhary was authorized to represent the 1st respondent Company before the Criminal Courts. Indeed it is S.K. Sen Choudhary who laid the private complaints. Later, G.V. Subramanyam would appear to have taken over the representation of the 1st respondent. How G.V. Subramanyam was authorized to represent the 1st respondent Company is not known. Be that as it may, where Adusumilli, Managing Director, had no authority to represent the 1st respondent before the Criminal Courts, the question of his authorizing K.V.V. Ramana does not arise.
The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that C.C. Nos. 1002 and 1003 of 2002, renumbered as C.C. Nos. 2 & 3 of 2011 consequently are liable to be quashed.
Sri G. Vasantha Rayudu, learned counsel for the 1st respondent contended that assuming that the authorization was bad, the private complaints could not be quashed. Where the orders of the trial Court permitting K.V.V. Ramana to represent the 1st respondent Company is bad and is liable to be set aside, the status quo ante would emerge leading to the fact that the 1st respondent would stand represented by G.V. Subramanyam.
Learned counsel for the 1st respondent, however, contended that G.V. Subramanyam is no more an employee. If so, the Board of the 1st respondent Company shall decide as to who will represent the Company in Criminal Courts or specifically in these two cases. Such a person would be entitled to represent the 1st respondent. Till then, G.V. Subramanyam continues to represent the 1st respondent. I am afraid that the complaints cannot be dismissed on the ground that K.V.V. Ramana is not entitled to represent the 1st respondent Company.
The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the 3rd petitioner who is the wife of the 2nd petitioner is said to be ailing and that her presence may be dispensed with before the trial Court. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent, on the other hand, contended that non-bailable warrants are pending against the petitioners and that such a dispensation order would be unjustified. Learned counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand, contended that no warrants are pending against the petitioners. I would leave it for the trial Court to decide whether to dispense with the presence of the 3rd petitioner after the 3rd petitioner makes her appearance before the trial Court.
The orders in Crl.M.P. No. 2642/2007 in CC. No. 1002/2002 (CC No. 2/2011) and Crl.M.P. No. 2643/2007 in CC. No. 1003/2002 (CC No. 3/2011) deserve to be dismissed, restoring the status quo ante. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, submitted that in such an event, the evidence deposed by K.V.V. Ramana is liable to be eschewed. I consider that it is for the trial Court to decide this aspect of the case. I, however, point out that K.V.V. Ramana has no authority to represent the 1st respondent Company, in the above mentioned facts. In that view of the matter, Crl.M.P. Nos. 2642 & 2643 of 2007 on the file of the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad and Crl.R.P. Nos. 94 & 95 of 2007 are liable to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed.
These two Criminal Petitions are ordered dismissing the Crl.M.P. Nos. 2642 & 2643 of 2007. The 1st respondent is at liberty to take steps for proper representation on its behalf before the trial Court.