Emperor vs Dagadu Kondaji

Beaumont, C.J.—This is a reference by the Additional Sessions Judge of Poona u/s 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Accused No. 1 was convicted by the jury by a majority of four to one of the offence of rape, and accused No. 2 was convicted by a similar majority of abetment of rape. References u/s 807 are more common, at any rate in this Presidency, in cases of acquittal by the jury than of conviction. Indeed I do not myself remember to have heard any previous reference in the case of a conviction. Section 307 makes no distinction between cases of acquittal and conviction, and the learned Government Pleader argues that we must deal with each ease on the same footing. Just as in cases of acquittal we have only to see that there was evidence on which the jury could properly acquit, so in the case of conviction we have only to see that there was evidence on which the jury could properly convict, in each case the verdict must have been perverse before we can interfere. As a proposition of law I think that statement is correct. But in dealing with the weight and volume of evidence the two cases differ, because of the presumption of innocence. Where a jury have convicted, I think that we have to see not merely that there is evidence of guilt, but that the evidence is strong enough to preclude any reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to the guilt of the accused. Unfortunately in this case the learned Judge, whose summing up of the evidence was very fair, omitted to deal with the law, and he did not point out to the jury that, if they entertained any reasonable doubt, it was their duty to give the accused the benefit of that doubt, and to acquit.

[The remainder of the judgment dealt with the facts of the case. The accused were acquitted and discharged.]

Murphy, J.

I agree.