Emperor vs Hazari Lal

Courtney-Terrell, C.J.—The facts relevant to our decision may be stated shortly. Hazari Lal was tried before the Sessions Judge of Patna upon the following charges (1) u/s 302, I. P.C. for the murder of Sub-Inspector Ram Narain Singh, (2) u/s 326, I. P.C. for grievous hurt to Head-Constable Birendra Nath Sen, (3) u/s 3, Explosives Act, 6 of 1908, for causing an explosion endangering life, (4) u/s 19(e), Arms Act 11 of 1878, for carrying a revolver and cartridges in contravention of that Act, and (5) u/s 19(f), Arms Act, for being in possession of a loaded revolver and cartridges in contravention of Section 14 of that Act.

Charges (1) and (2) were tried with the aid of a jury. The other charges were tried by the Judge and the members of the jury officiated as assessors.

The jury acquitted the accused of charge (1) and found him guilty under charge (2). The verdict of the jury is recorded by the Sessions Judge in the following terms:

The accused Hazari Lal is found not guilty u/s 302. This is the unanimous verdict of the jury. The jury find Hazari Lal unanimously guilty u/s 326, I.P.C.

There is no doubt that the real meaning of the jury was that they found him not guilty on the charge of murdering Sub-Inspector Ram Narain Singh and guilty on the charge of causing grievous hurt to Head Constable Birendra Nath Sen, although on a merely strict construction of the words recording the verdict it is doubtful whether the verdict of guilty u/s 326, I. P.C. applied to the injury to Head Constable Birendra Nath Sen only or is a finding of guilty of a minor offence under the first charge relating to the murder of Sub-Inspector Ram Narain Singh, or whether it relates to both charges. To avoid confusion specific questions should have been put to the jury.

This is a matter however of minor importance in the circumstances of the case and needs no farther reference.

The learned Judge agreed with the unanimous view of the assessors and convicted the accused of the charges under the Arms Act and Explosives Act and sentenced him under the third charge to transportation for life and under each of the fourth and fifth charges to two years rigorous imprisonment under each section, the sentences to run concurrently and to be concurrent with the sentence of transportation for life.

In dealing with the verdict of the jury upon the first and second charges the learned Judge took a curious and most unfortunate course. He disagreed with the verdict on the first charge, characterising it as perverse, but accepted the verdict on the second charge, recorded a conviction and sentenced the accused to transportation for life. He now refers the case under the first charge to this Court u/s 307, Criminal P. C.

It is clear that a Judge who disagrees with the verdict of a jury has a choice of alternatives. He may refrain from expressing his disagreement and if the verdict is one of acquittal record that acquittal and if of conviction record the conviction and pass sentence or he may refer the case together with his opinion to the High Court. But he cannot exercise both alternatives. Section 307(1), Criminal P.C. states that if the

Judge disagrees with the verdict of the jurors on all or any of the charges on which any accused person has been tried, and is clearly of opinion that it is necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case in respect of such accused person to the High Court, he shall submit the case accordingly.

That is to say, he must submit the case, not only the matter of the individual charge as to which there is disagreement between him and the jury. This interpretation is made clear when the words of Sub-section (2) are considered:

Where the Judge submits a case under this section, he shall not record judgment of acquittal or of conviction on. any of the charges on which such accused has been tried, but he may either remand such accused to custody or admit him to bail.

A prisoner can only be tried simultaneously on several charges when they arise out of the same transaction and if the High Court is properly to exercise its functions in a reference it cannot approach the transaction as a whole with its hands tied as to one or more aspects.

This is the basis of the section and of the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the somewhat similar case of Emperor v. Ananda Charan Roy [1916] Cri LJ 551. It is clear that if we took up this case we should be constrained by the verdict on one part of the transaction which has been accepted by the Judge.

The reference is accordingly rejected.

Scroope, J.

I agree. The learned Sessions Judge having accepted the jury''s verdict on the charge u/s 326, I.P.C. and having convicted and sentenced the accused under that section has taken it out of her hands to deal with the case on a reference u/s 307, Criminal P.C.