Emperor vs Tar Muhammad Jan

Dawson Miller, C.J.—This is an appeal on behalf of the Crown against an order of acquittal of the Magistrate at cuttack, dated the 31st January 1921. The accused was tried for an offense u/s 273 of the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884. The section provides that whoever without, a license uses any place for any of the purposes specified in Section 261 and other sections shall be liable for every such offence to a fine not exceeding Rs. 50 and to a further fine not exceeding Rs. 10 for every day during whish the offense la continued after be has been convicted of such offence. Section 961 provides, in so far as it is material to the present case, that, within such local limits as may be fixed by the Commissioners, no phase shall be used without a license from the Commissioners.

As a yard or (sic) for trade in hay, straw, wood, thatching grass, jute or other dangerously inflammable material.

The provisions of these sections were applied to the area within which the assumed kept a timber warehouse sometime in the year 1919. The accused had nO license, and that wan what gave rise to the present prosecution, and the only point for determination in the case wan whether a timber yard was a yard or depot for trade in wood. It is not disputed that the accused kept a yard for the purpose of trading in timber and that he did not have a license; and the short question is whether timber comes within the term wood as used in the section quoted. The learned Magistrate before whom the case came took the view that the concluding words which I read from the section, which included other dangerous and inflammable material, ought to be read as limiting the application of the preceding words; and that if it could be shown that the yard was not used for trade in wood of a dangerously inflammable nature, then the section had no application.

I am unable to accept that inter-relation. Even assuming that many kinds, of timber may not be highly inflammable, other kinds may properly soma within the description. It may be difficult to draw the line, and, therefore, the keeping of all kinds of wood may well have been regarded as a proper subject for license. The mere fact that in addition to the things are included if they are of a highly inflammable nature does not, in my opinion, limit the meaning of the things specifically mentioned. If any inference can be drawn from the concluding words, I think it is that the Legislature considered all kinds of wood as dangerously it inflammable It seems to me that the word ''wood'' has been advisedly used in this section. There can be no doubt that the word itself includes not merely the more inflammable kinds such as firewood, but also includes all other classes of wood, even large bulks of timber, and the Legislature in passing this section intended, in my view, that every kind of wood should be included, because wood in itself is of a very inflammable nature. It may be that there are large bulks of timber which do not easily catch fire as other descriptions of wood, such as firewood and shavings, but nevertheless the substance itself is always of a highly inflammable nature and the mere fact that it would not catch fire easily is not the first instance is not the only consideration which one has to regard. It san hardly be disputed that case a timber yard does catch fire, then the conflagration may be a very serious one, and of greater extent and duration and more difficult to quell than in the case where firewood and similar materials alone are kept. I can see no reason to suppose that the Legislature in using the word ''wood'' meant that word to be used in any but its ordinary and natural meaning. Even in the case of a timber yard there are various species of timber; some of it may be large and heavy, some of it may he planks or hoards or battens or any other kind of timber, and, in any event, even if the timber yard merely consists of large bulks of timber, it invariably happens that there are ships and other small pieces lying about the plate, which in themselves are highly inflammable in the initial stages of a fire. I am unable to agree with the view taken by the Magistrate that the word ''wood'' was not intended to apply to that species of wood whish is generally known under the name of timber.

Another point was discussed in the decision of the Magistrate and apparently had some influence upon his decision. He says at the end of his judgment that apparently the Municipality itself was for a long time of the same opinion as he was, for it appeared that although several such timber depots or yards had been in existence within such Municipal area for the last 20 years, on no previous occasion had they demanded any license; The learned Magistrate was speaking without information in making that observation, because it was only in the year 1919 that these provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act were applied by notification in the Gazette to the area in question and no consideration of that sort which apparently influenced the learned Magistrate can arise. In my opinion the accused was guilty of the offence charged, and the only question is what is the proper penalty that we should inflict in such a case. The accused is convicted u/s 261 coupled with Section 273 of Bengal Act III of 1884 and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 25, in default to two weeks'' simple imprisonment.

Coutt, J.

I entirely agree with the judgment of his Lordship the Chief Justice. There is no authority for the proposition that has been advanced that the words at the end of the clause or other dangerously inflammable materials" are words of limitation and the learned Deputy Magistrate has clearly misunderstood the application of the ejusdem generis rule. Timber is clearly included in the term wood and we must assume that in using the term wood the Legislature intended to use it in the proper signification of the term.