ESTATE OFFICER, H.U.D.A vs IOTA INDUSTRIES

THIS appeal is concluded against the appellant Haryana Urban Development Authority by the judgment in 1987 (2) P.L.R. 124 ''Arun Lal Luthra v. State of Haryana'' . It, therefore, suffices to notice the facts and merits with relative brevity.

THE respondent concern had applied for the allotment of an industrial plot at Hisar and in accordance with the regulations also deposited Rs. 12,798/- being 10% of the costs thereof with the said application. THE appellants allotted a plot to the respondent and vide letter dated 13thcf March, 1991 communicated the same to the respondent with the direction to deposit Rs. 19,196/-within 30 days from the date of the issue of the said letter. It would appear that the same was not received by the respondent till the 21st/22nd of March, 1992 and in compliance therewith he duly tendered a demand draft on 19.4.1992 for the aforesaid amount to the appellants which was however, not accepted. Subsequently, by a registered letter dated the 30th of April, 1991 it was intimated to the respondent that the provisional letter of allotment had been withdrawn and further that the 10% of the earnest money deposited earlier was also forfeited. Aggrieved thereby the respondent unsuccessfully preferred an appeal to the Administrator and thereafter sought redress before the District Forum. In the complaint it was alleged that the allotment in his favour had been deliberately cancelled to cause irreparable loss to the complainant and consequential relief was sought. In defending the complaint, the appellants raised some preliminary objections to which reference is unnecessary because they were neither pressed before the District Forum nor before us. On merits the refrain of the reply was the hyper-technical one that the respondent was bound to deposit the amount within 30 days from the issuance date of the provisional allotment letter namely the 13th of March, 1991. It was pleaded that because the tender of the amount was made on the 19th of April, 1991, the appellants were not only entitled to cancel the allotment, but to further forfeit the substantial amount of Rs. 12,798/- deposited earlier.

The respondent put in a replication to the appellant''s written statement and in paragraph 2 therein, it was firmly averred that the relevant letter was received by him only on 21/22nd of March, 1991 and the firm read was that he was required to deposit the a mount within 30 days from the receipt of the letter which had been duly done by the 19th of April, 1991.

THE parties produced documentary evidence in support of their respective cases and the District Forum on the basis of the materials before it directed the appellants to produce proof of the actual delivery of the letter dated 13th of March, 1991 to the respondent. However, neither any post office receipt or U.P.C. or other document could be furnished to establish the date of the dispatch or receipt of the said letter by the respondent. THE District Forum noticed that whilst the letter of cancellation dated the 30th of April, 1991 has been sent under registered cover, no evidence with regard to the communication dated the 13th of March, 1991 was forthcoming. Relying upon the ratio of the judgment in ''Arun Lal Luthra v. State of Haryana'' (supra), it was held that the respondent was entitled to deposit the amount within 30 days of the receipt of the letter and this having been done on the 19th of April, 1991 the cancellation of the allotment of the forfeiture was unjustified and the same was, therefore, set aside. At the very out-set, it may be noticed that a factual error undoubtedly seems to have crept in the order under appeal. As has been rightly pointed out by Mr. Sharma, the demand draft dated the 19th of April, 1991 though admittedly tendered was not accepted by the appellants. The District Forum however, has erroneously observed in the resume of facts as also in the ultimate relief given that the demanded amount has already been deposited. This error is being rectified, but as is somewhat manifest, the same does not at all effect the merits of the case because it is common ground that the demand draft was duly got prepared and tendered by the respondent, but in terms refused by the appellants.

MR. Sharma with considerable persistence and hyper-technicality had contended that in the original complaint itself the respondent had not in terms stated that he had received the provisional letter of allotment on the 21st March. Counsel persistently harped on the averment in Para 3 which merely mentions that one of the partners had gone out of station and had remained busy for about 3-4 days. It was contended that the respondent could not clarify his stand by way of replication. Within the consumer jurisdiction the afore-said technical submission has only to be noticed and rejected. It is somewhat elementary that the Consumer Protection Act and the rules do not envisage any formality of pleadings or any technical construction thereof. Apart from this it is even otherwise well settled that a replication is as much as a part of pleadings as the original plaint or written statement. We must, therefore, hold in no uncertain terms that the replication of the respondent was an integral part of the pleadings wherein he had in no uncertain terms claimed to have received letter of allotment only on the 22nd of March, 1991 and in terms claimed that he was required to deposit the amount within 30 days from the receipt thereof only. In the appellate Forum no serious challenge was or could be laid to the aforesaid averment. What is of significance is the fact that the District Forum required and gave full opportunity to the appellants to establish that the provisional letter of allotment was received by him on that very day of the 13th of March, 1991 and they miserably failed to do so. It must, therefore, be held as established that the respondent received the allotment letter not earlier than the 21st of March, 1991. Once it is held as above, it is plain that the tender of the due amount was duly made within 30 days of the receipt of the letter by the respondent on the 19th of April, 199.1. The ratio of the judgment in ''Arun Lal Luthra v. State of Haryana'' (supra) that the date of the issuance of the letter in this context has to be read as the date of the receipt of the same by the respondent is binding. The relevant observation is in the following terms : "If any other interpretation is placed, then it is possible that in many cases the letter of allotment may reach the allottee sometimes immediately before or even after the expiry of the 30 days time, for which the allottee would not be at fault. It is sometimes also possible that the concerned authority may order the issue of letter, which may be typed but may be kept in office for the signatures of the concerned authority. It is equally possible that even after signatures and complaint issue in letter delayed. Therefore, I hold that the reasonable meaning to be put to the regulation is that 30 days'' time would start from the date of receipt of the allotment letter and not from the date of issue of the letter of allotment."

MR. Sharma in all fairness had conceded that he laid no challenge to the aforesaid authoritative view. Consequently, it follows automatically that in the present case compliance was done by the respondent within the meaning of the said judgment.

BEFORE parting with this order, we must express some concern at the somewhat arbitraries and that the purported date of the issue of a letter is conclusive and would give the appellant-authority the right not only to cancel the valuable allotment in favour of the consumers, but further to even forfeit substantial amount of 10% deposited at the time of application itself. On behalf of the appellants no rule or regulation to this aspect could be brought to our notice which warrants an over-technical reliance on the date of communication as being conclusive against the consumer or the recipient thereof. A mere observation in the provisional letter of allotment to this effect is inevitably of doubtful validity. What is more, such provisional allotment letters a re not being sent by registered post nor any adequate proof or record maintained with regard to the dispatch or delivery thereof. In this context, valuable rights of the consumers would be lost or prejudiced by mere non-dispatch, misplacing or erroneous or non-delivery of such communications to its recipients. It bears repetition that sizeable amounts are received by the appellant alongwith the applications for allotment and equally substantial demands are raised by the letters of allotment. These would give rise to valuable rights to consumers with regard to real estate which cannot be trifled in a somewhat cavalier fashion. The District Forum was not far wrong in its observation that irreparable loss to many persons could occur in such a situation and that the appellant authority should heed the ratio in the said case. It is to be hoped that the H.U.D.A. would now necessarily take corrective action to remedy the situation. For the fore-going reasons, we are unable to find any merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed. However, we decline to burden the appellant with any costs of these proceedings because no appearance was put in on behalf of the respondent. We would further rectify the marginal factual error in the order by directing that the respondent would be entitled to secure the relief granted by the District Forum by depositing the due amount which he had earlier tendered and had been wrongfully refused by the appellant. Appeal dismissed.