Ex. Constable Yusaf Masih vs The State of Punjab and Another

Tejinder Singh Dhindsa, J.—Plaintiff-appellant, ex-Constable Yusaf Masih filed a suit for declaration impugning the order dated 18.10.2001 whereby he had been dismissed from service. The trial Court vide judgment dated 8.6.2004 dismissed the suit and, even the civil appeal preferred by the plaintiff-appellant, was dismissed by the Additional District Judge-cum-Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Gurdaspur vide judgment dated 18.8.2007. Resultantly, the plaintiff-appellant is in second appeal before this Court. Ms. Ravinder Kaur Manaise, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has been heard at length.

The plaintiff had pleaded that while serving as Constable with the Punjab Police and posted in Gurdaspur District, he had been placed under suspension on 22.1.2001. Departmental proceedings had been initiated against him on the allegation that he had remained absent from duty for a period of 63 days and 23 hours. The extreme penalty of dismissal from service had been imposed upon him in terms of order dated 18.10.2001 passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Gurdaspur. It was pleaded that in terms of Punjab Police Rules, even though he had a right to file an appeal but the same was not binding upon him and as he did not expect any justice from the Department, as such, he had not preferred the statutory appeal. Plaintiff had further pleaded that he had not wilfully absented himself for the period from 21.11.2000 to 23.1.2001 but he had actually remained ill and was under medical treatment.

The suit was contested by the defendants by stating that the plaintiff was a habitual absentee and had, on earlier occasions, also been imposed the punishment of forfeiture of service for the same charge. It was stated that the plaintiff had absented from duty for the period 21.11.2000 to 23.1.2001 and the departmental enquiry had been got conducted in terms of the statutory rules. The Enquiry Officer having returned findings against the plaintiff, a show cause notice had been issued which was duly received and even a reply had been filed. The competent authority, upon due consideration of the reply submitted by the plaintiff to the show cause notice, had taken a decision to impose the extreme punishment of dismissal from service.

Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would strenuously argue that the Courts below have not appreciated the evidence adduced on record in the right perspective and had erred in not returning findings that the appellant had been denied adequate and complete opportunity to defend himself. Learned counsel would further contend that while imposing the major penalty of dismissal, the total length of service of the appellant had also not been taken into consideration.

The Courts below have found it as a matter of fact from the case file that the appellant had been punished on two occasions for the same charge i.e. being absent from duty and his services have been forfeited for purposes of increment on each occasion. This fact had been admitted by the plaintiff-appellant in his cross-examination. Upon due appreciation of evidence, the Courts have noticed that in relation to the plaintiff-appellant having remained absent from duty from 21.11.2000 to 23.1.2001 which finally culminated in the passing of the impugned order dated 18.10.2001, regular departmental enquiry had been initiated by the competent authority and an Enquiry Officer had been duly appointed. Inspite of the appellant having been duly served, he deliberately chose not to associate himself with the enquiry proceedings. Upon the findings having been recorded by the Enquiry Officer against him, a show cause notice had been duly served upon him and the punishing authority had also taken into account the reply submitted by the appellant. The conclusion drawn by the Courts below is to the effect that the appellant being a member of a disciplinary force and his previous record being also reflective of the fact that he was a habitual absentee, there was no illegality in the passing of the impugned order dated 18.10.2001 whereby the penalty of dismissal had been imposed upon him.

I find no basis that would warrant interference to the findings and the conclusions drawn by the Courts below. There has been due appreciation of evidence adduced on record. Even otherwise, the scope of judicial intervention in matters relating to awarding of punishments upon the employees concerned will be limited to the decision making process and not with regard to the decision itself. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has not been able to point out any irregularity with regard to procedure in the conducting of the departmental proceedings against the appellant which led to the passing of the impugned order.

For the reasons recorded above, I find that the present second appeal is wholly devoid of merit and raises no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, for consideration.

CM No.2439-C of 2012 has also been filed u/s 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of 1527 days in filing the present second appeal. The averments made in the application are utterly vague. It was obligatory for the appellant to explain each and every day of delay that has occurred in filing the present second appeal. No cause whatsoever has been shown that would justify the condonation of such an inordinate delay of 1527 days in filing the present appeal. As such, even the prayer seeking condonation of delay is rejected.

Accordingly, the present second appeal is dismissed both, on grounds of delay as well as merits. Appeal dismissed.