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Judgment
P.S. Narayana, J.—These two writ petitions are filed for issuance of an appropriate Order, writ or direction, one in the nature of Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records pertaining to orders, dated November 15, 1995, in Case No. E/80/95 and in P.W. Case No. 6/93 on the file of the Authority under Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and Labour Officer, Sanga Reddy.
The impugned orders were made by the Primary Authority while exercising powers u/s 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 hereinafter referred to in short as ''Act'' for brevity. It is suffice to state that in both the matters, though different proceedings are questioned, the parties are the same and the claims relate to different periods. The facts, which may be essential for the purpose of disposal of these writ petitions in brief, can be narrated as follows:
The contesting parties in these writ petitions, respondents No. 2. to 18, had invoked the jurisdiction of the authority under the Act claiming the relief of deduction of wages and the delay in payment of wages. No doubt, there is some controversy relating to whether the claims made by these parties, in fact, fall within the parameters of Section 15 of the Act. The Authority under the Act had condoned the delay in filing the application and also had proceeded to decide the matter on merits. Aggrieved by the said orders, which are, in fact, the impugned orders in both these writ petitions, appeals had been preferred on the file of District Judge, Medak at Sanga Reddy in SR Nos. 211 and 212 of 1996 and the petition filed for dispensing with the certificate was dismissed and the memorandum of appeal had been returned for want of complying of the provisions of Section 17(1)(a) of the said Act and the said orders were question by way of C.R.P. No. 4995/2001 and C.R.P. (SR) No. 62301/1996. It is brought to my notice that once C.R.P. was dismissed as withdrawn and the other C.R.P. was not further prosecuted. Inasmuch as even at the stage of deciding an application for condonation of delay, further opportunity was not given and since the impugned orders were made without authority or jurisdiction, questioning the said orders, the present writ petitions are filed.
The other factual details narrating the total historical background of the case may not be essential for the purpose of disposal of both these writ petitions.
Sri Nageswara Sree representing Sri. Nageswara Rao, the learned counsel representing the writ petitioners, had contended that the impugned order was made in gross violation of principles of natural justice and hence, the remedy of appeal provided by the statute cannot operate as a bar to maintain the writ petitions. The learned counsel also had submitted that the stage of deciding whether delay has to be condoned or not, the only question the Authority under the Act, could have decided is the aspect of condonation of delay and further opportunity had not been given and further enquiry was not made and hence, both the impugned orders were made by the Authority under the Act in violation of principles of natural justice. The learned counsel also submitted that even otherwise, it is a case where the Authority under the Act has no authority or jurisdiction to decide the claim of this nature, since they do not fall under either deduction of wage or delay in payment in payment of wages within the meaning of Section 15 of the Act. The learned counsel also had strenuously contended that though the appeals were preferred, in fact, they were not entertained, but they were returned and in the light of the stand taken by him, preferring of appeals may not be of any consequence. It was further submitted that the writ petitions were admitted in the year 1996 and at this distant point of time the writ petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. The learned counsel had drawn my attention to the decisions reported in Payment of Wages Inspector Vs. Surajmal Mehta and Another, ; Administrator, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Vs. Gauri Shanker, D.C.M. Limited Vs. Prescribed Authority (Payment of Wages Act) and Others, ; Oriental Select Granites (P) Ltd. v. Director of Mines & Geology 1996 (2) ALD 633; Mir Sabir Ali Vs. Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad, ; Allied Sales Corporation v. Authority Shops & Establishments Act 1990 II LLJ 510 (AP-DB) and also Dr Bal Krishna Agarwal Vs. State of U.P. and Others, .
Sri Ramanjaneyulu, the learned Asst. Government Pleader for Labour, while supporting the impugned orders made by the Authority under the Act, had submitted that the Act, in question is a welfare legislation and the provisions of the Act are to be interpreted in favour of the working class. The learned counsel further submitted that the authorities deciding the dispute under the Payment of Wages Act are expected to follow the principles of natural justice and the technicalities pointed out by the learned counsel for the writ petitioners may not come in the way of granting the relief. The learned counsel had taken me through the different proceedings and had ultimately contended that the writ petitions are virtually circumvention of the regular procedure contemplated by the Act.
Sri Venkta Ramana, representing Sri P. Raghavendra Reddy, appearing for the contesting respondents who made the claims while making elaborate submissions had maintained that the Writ Court, at this distant point of time, need not go into several factual details relating to the impugned proceedings made by the Authority under the Act. The learned counsel also pointed out that u/s 17 of the Act, a remedy, by way of appeal, is available and since there is a condition relating to deposit, an application was made before the appellate authority to dispense with such certificate, which was not permitted and having elected a forum, the writ petitioners cannot go back again and now contend that they can maintain the writ petitions. The learned counsel also had drawn my attention to the orders made in S. R. Nos. 211 and 212 of 1996 on the file of the District Judge, Medak and also the C.R.P. proceedings in this regard. Commenting on the merits of the matter also, it was submitted that the claims made though, in fact, relate to deduction of wages and the delay in payment of wages, Section 15 of the Act is also attracted. The learned counsel also had pointed out that the authority, in fact, had issued a notice calling upon to show relating to the enquiry into the matter and not about the condonation of delay only and opportunity had been given and even in the counter filed, all the merits of matter also had been answered and hence, the Authority had rightly made the impugned orders. It was further submitted that it is not the very violation of (sic) concept of principles of natural justice and there is a change in the concept of the violation of principles of natural justice in the recent times. The learned counsel had placed reliance on the decisions reported in State Bank of Patiala and others Vs. S.K. Sharma, ; District Co-operative Central Bank Ltd, Eluru Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, ; Vijay Kumar Bhalla v. Dist. Judge, Bahraich 1999 XI LLJ 216 (All); Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others, and also National Airport Authority v. Allah Nawaz Baig 1994 (1) ANWR 312.
Heard the counsel in detail and also perused the material available on record in both the matters. Section 15 of the Act which deal with ''claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims''. Section 17 of the Act deals with ''Appeal'' and Section 17(1-A) of the Act read, as follows:
"No appeal under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited the amount payable under the direction appealed against."
As it can be seen from the facts, the writ petitioners in both these writ petitions, in fact, had invoked the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority by preferring S.R. Nos. 211 and 212 of 1996, wherein the applications were filed requesting for dispensing with the production of the said certificates and those applications were dismissed and aggrieved by the said orders, revisions also had been filed and it is stated that one C.R.P. No. 4995 of 2001 had been withdrawn and yet another C.R.P. is pending disposal.
Now, in the light of these facts stated above, it is to be seen whether the writ petitioners are entitled to question the impugned orders made by the Primary Authority under the Act.
In Payment of Wages Inspector''s case (supra) the Apex Court held as follows 1969-I-LLJ-762 at p. 768:
"It is true, as stated above, that the authority has the jurisdiction to try matters which are incidental to the claim in question. Indeed Section 15 itself provides that the authority has the power to determine all matters incidental to the claim arising from deductions from or delay in payment of wages. It is also true that while deciding whether a particular matter is incidental to claim or not care should be taken neither to unduly expand nor curtail the jurisdiction of the authority. But it has at the same time to be kept in mind that the jurisdiction u/s 15 is a special jurisdiction. The authority is conferred with the power to award compensation over and above the liability for penalty of fine which an employer is liable to incur u/s 20."
The learned counsel for the writ petitioners also placed strong reliance on Admn., K.U.M. Samiti, Doongargarh''s case (supra) and also D. C.M. Ltd, ''s case (supra) in this regard. In A.V. D''costa Vs. B.C. Patel and Another, , it was held after considering the scheme of the Act that the jurisdiction of the authority u/s 15 of the Act was confined to deductions and delay in payment of the actual wages to which the workman was entitled and that the authority under the Act had no jurisdiction to enter into a question of potential wages. On the strength of these decisions, a serious attempt was made by the learned counsel for the writ petitioners to convince the Court that here is a case where the very jurisdiction of the authority under the Act is involved. I am afraid that much water had flown in between the order of the original authority and the date of filing of these writ petitions and hence, the contention cannot be accepted. In Allied Sales Corpn. case (supra), while dealing with the aspect of first appellate authority having no jurisdiction to set aside order of superannuation of an employee under the A.P. Shops and Establishments Act, 1966, the petition filed by Management questioning the order of appellate authority without exhausting alternative remedy was held to be maintainable. The learned counsel also had placed reliance on Oriental Select Granites (P.) Ltd. case (supra) and Mir Sabir Ali''s case (supra) for the proposition that there is violation of principles of natural justice, the alternative remedy cannot be a bar for invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was also pointed out that these writ petitions were admitted in the year 1996 and they cannot be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy after such a long lapse of time and strong reliance was placed on Dr. Bal Krishna Agarwal''s case (supra). In this regard, there cannot be any quarrel for the proposition that when there is gross violation of principles of natural justice and when there is inherent lack of jurisdiction, the mere fact that alternative remedy is available may not operate as a bar to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But, however, the facts in the present writ petitions do not stop there. The matters, in fact, had been carried by way of appeals and being unsuccessful to get an order of dispensing with certificates relating to deposit as contemplated u/s 17 of the Act and aggrieved by the said orders, the revisional jurisdiction of this Court also had been invoked. In Whirlpool Corpn.''s case (supra), it was held that existence of alternative statutory remedy is not a constitutional bar to High Court''s jurisdiction but is a self- imposed restriction and this will not operate at least in three contingencies (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is violation of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. In Dist. Co-operative Central Bank Ltd., Eluru''s case (supra), the Division Bench of this Court while dealing with the constitutional validity of the first proviso of Section 48(3) of the A.P. Shops and Establishments Act, 1988, had arrived at a conclusion that it is not an unconstitutional one and while dealing with this aspect, the provisions under Payment of Wages Act inclusive of Section 13 of the said Act also had been discussed at paragraph No. 9 and at paragraph No. 12 of the said Judgment, it was observed:
"The provisions in the respective legislations referred to above have been made with a view to see that the poor workman whose position is always vulnerable is not subjected to the dictates of the management and the amount of compensation or back wages liable to be deposited as a condition precedent for prosecuting the second appeal by the management be paid to the workman so that he can make a living with it during the pendency of the appeal, otherwise the management will be compelling the workman to starve during the pendency of the second appeal which the management may keep ''pending for years together. Hence, it can safely be said that the classification is reasonable as it is made to secure the safety of the workman and, achieve the object of the Act. As such it is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Time and again it is stated that there can be a reasonable classification under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and such classification shall not defeat the spirit of the Constitution or the object sought to be achieved by any of the legislation. Thus, we hold that the authorities relied on by the learned senior counsel are of no use to the case on hand".
No doubt, a serious attempt was made by the learned counsel representing the contesting respondents that a mere violation of principles of natural justice may not be sufficient and placed strong reliance on State Bank of Patiala''s case (supra) and this is a matter dealing with principles to be followed in the context of disciplinary enquiry and order of punishment imposed by employer upon employee.
Be that as it may, it is suffice to state that while dealing with the matters arising out of the decisions made by the authorities under the Labour Welfare Legislations, when certain statutory remedies are provided for imposing certain conditions, which are beneficial provisions introduced for the sake of workman, in my considered opinion, the concerned management or any other aggrieved party has to adhere to such provisions, if not it will amount to circumvention or defeating the very object of such provisions being introduced into such Welfare Labour Legislations. In this view of the matter also and inasmuch as the writ petitioners elected a forum, even on the ground of approbate and reprobate, I do not think that the writ petitioners are entitled to any reliefer whatsoever prayed for in both the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Except the points discussed above, no other point, had been urged by the respective counsel. In the light of the views expressed by me (supra), I do not find any merit in these writ petitions and the writ petitions are accordingly dismissed with costs.