Tribunals and Commissions

EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, SUB URBAN DIVN. BHIWANI vs DHANPAT SINGH

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission · Decided on 23 December 1993 · Citation: 1994 2 CPJ 156

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.S.Sandhawalia , Basanti Devi , S.Kulwant Singh J.
RESULT
Appeal dismissed
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Judgment

7 paragraphs · 1,248 words
1.

THE Haryana State Electricity Board appeals against the order of the District Forum, Bhiwani allowing the complaint of the respondent and directing the release of an electricity connection in his favour.

2.

IN the complaint it was the case set up by the consumer that he had applied for an electricity connection on a priority basis under the money deposit scheme of the Board. IN pursuance of the said application and on the express direction of the Sub Divisional Officer, Jui of the appellant- Board he duly deposited a sum of Rs. 5,000/- for getting the connection released. The firm allegation was that under the rules or practice the Electricity Board was bound to release the connection expeditiously within a period of one month from the deposit of the amount. The firm allegation also was that a seniority list of the applicants for priority connection was duly prepared in which the name of the complainant figured at Serial No. 17. However to the respondent''s consternation the connection was released to persons far below him in the said seniority list at Serial Nos. 18 & 24 whilst the same was denied to him arbitrarily despite the acceptance of the requisite amount. Relief to the tune of Rs. 1,65,000/- was claimed, apart from the release of the electricity connection. The appellant-Board in its reply admitted the broad matrix of facts alleged in the complaint. It was not disputed that the complainant had duly applied and deposited the requisite amount and in the seniority list he was at No. 17. The specious plea, however, was that subsequently some time in March, 1993 it was decided to release the low tension connection to persons below the respondent at Serial Nos. 18 & 24 but he was denied the same on the ground that his application was of the high tension category. The allegations of financial loss were controverted.

The District Forum on the basis of the material before it observed that after the Board had accepted the security amount it was obligatory upon it to release the electricity connection and with holding thereof was unwarranted. Reliance was placed on A.I.R. 1993 Supreme Court 2005, Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd. v .A.P. State Electricity Board and Another. It was also firmly held that the respondent came within the definition of a consumer and consequently the relief was granted in the terms noticed at the outset, but no further financial compensation was given.

3.

MR. Bhupinder Singh, the learned Counsel for the appellant-Board had primarily pinned himself on the argument that the respondent was not a consumer and was, therefore, not entitled to maintain the complaint. It was argued that despite the acceptance of security deposit etc. the respondent had not been actually released a connection for the supply of electric energy and, therefore, had not yet acquired the status of a consumer. Reliance was placed on 1993 C.P.C. 747 M/s. Manu Bhai v. M/s. Maniti Udyog Limited and Others and 1991 C.P.C. 440 M.N. Narasimha Reddy v. Managing Director, Maruti Udyog Ltd. & Ors. Within this jurisdiction the submission aforesaid has only to be noticed and rejected in view of the exhaustive judgment of this Commission in 1993 C.P.C. 401 , S.D.O. (Operation) H.S.E.B. Siwan v. Thakur Dass of Distt. Kaithal In the said case also an identical stand was taken that unless electric energy is actually released to a person, he can not come within the ambit of a consumer. This primal submission was rejected after an in depth consideration of the matter and the case of M. Ahmad-Ul-Haq v. Asstt. Engineer, K.E.B. Chamaraja Nagar & Ors. II (1991) CPJ 455 was expressly dissented from, and that dissent was rested on the categorical observations of the National Commission upholding the view of this Commission in the context of a similar argument pertaining to registered consumers for Liquid Petroleum Gas connections. The National Commission in Revision Petition No. 86 of 1992. M/s. Mohindra Gas Enterprises & Ors. v. Jagdish Poswal & Ors; I (1993) CPJ 90 (NC), decided on the 2nd of November, 1992 whilst affirming the decision of this Commission by majority view held as follows : - "If no payment is made at the time of registration, it does not mean that a person getting himself registered for a gas connection with the distributor is not hiring any service. Service as defined in Sub-clause (o) of clause (1) of Section 2 means "service of any description which is made available to potential users. The consumer who hires a service has been defined in Sub-clause (ii) of clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 1 of the Act. According to the definition it is not necessary that consideration should be paid at the time of hiring of service. If the transaction is supported by consideration which has been paid or promised, or partly paid or partly promised or under any system of deferred payment even then it will be a valid consideration for the hiring of the service. The present case is one, the payment of part consideration was deferred till the gas connection was released."

Relying on the aforesaid binding precedent and equally on principle & the language of the statute it was concluded as follows : - "In view of the afore-quoted binding observations and in the light of the earlier discussion, the answer to the question posed at the very outset is rendered in the affirmative. It is held that persons in whose favour an electricity connection has been duly sanctioned by the H.S.E.B. would be consumers squarely within the ambit of its definition under the Act."

It is somewhat plain that the aforesaid case concludes the matter against the appellant-Board and the primal argument raised on their behalf must fail and is rejected.

4.

IN all fairness to the learned Counsel for the appellant we may also record that his reliance on 1993 C.P.C. 747, M/s. Manu Bhai v. M/s. Maruti Udyog Limited and Others and 1991 C.P.C. 440 M.N. Narasimha Reddy v. Managing Director, Maruti Udyog Ltd. & Ors. is somewhat vain. Those cases were on the basis of the peculiar facts of the sale and purchase of Maruti vehicles. IN our view they are not attracted remotely by way of analogy even. Altogether apart from the above, what deserves highlighting is the fact that admittedly the respondent had applied way back in 1991 under the scheme for the priority connection. At that time no distinction whatsoever was sought to be made on behalf of the Board with regard to high or low tension connections. It is again common ground that at no stage was the respondent at all informed that and such specious consideration would come in even after the security deposit had not only been demanded in terms but duly accepted by the Board. It was conceded that the purported decision of some officers of the Board was made much later in March, 1993 of which the respondent-consumer was not given the least incline. One fails to see how any purported decision of some officers of the Board which had not been placed on the record could unilaterally deprive the innocent consumer of his right when he duly applied under the 1991 scheme and fully complied with the conditions thereof. The District Forum was thus patently right in rejecting the stand of the appellant. For the fore-going reasons this appeal must fail and is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. _____________