Ferozali and another vs Amadulla and another <BR> Amadulla and another Vs Ferozali and another

Brij Narain, J.C.

This is an application in revision under S. 34 of the Tripura Courts Order and it arises out of Civil Suit No. 45 of 1954 (Munsiff''s Court, Dharmanagar) which has been decreed by the learned Munsiff on 25-8-1955 on the ground that the opposite parties were in possession over the land in question and they had been dispossessed by the petitioners wrongfully.

It has been contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioners that the opposite parties came to Court with the allegation that they had jote right over the suit land and as the petitioners had wrongfully dispossessed them, possession might be restored to them under S. 9, Specific Relief Act. The opposite parties had further alleged that they had taken jote settlement from petitioner 1 in whose favour a registered kabuliyat had been executed and rent had also been paid.

The learned Munsiff did not decide whether the plaintiffs had any jote right over the suit land or not but it was found that the plaintiffs were in possession and had been dispossessed by the present petitioners and so the suit was decreed. It has been contended that no suit under S. 9, Specific Relief Act was maintainable under the circumstances mentioned above and the plaintiffs should have sought their remedy against dispossession under the old S. 93 or new S. 78, Tripura Tenancy Act.

On behalf of the opposite parties it has been contended that the present revision petition, is not maintainable in law as relief granted in revision is discretionary and as the petitioners had denied the tenancy of the plaintiffs, discretion should not be exercised in their favour and the present petitioners should be made to resort to their ordinary remedy by means of a regular suit.

The first question which is to be determined in this case is whether the present revision application should be entertained or not.

Under S. 115, C. P. C. or para 34 of the Tripura Courts Order the only remedy which, if still open, has been specifically laid down as barring revision is the remedy of appeal. That being so, where there is any remedy other than appeal open to a party, the question whether revisional powers should or should not be exercised should be decided on the particular facte and circumstances of each case.

In Mani Ram v. Jhamru, 1952 HP 24 (AIR V39) (A), it was held that one such instance is whether the remedy by a separate suit was doubtful. Another circumstance which is taken into consideration in favour of the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, even though another remedy by way of suit be available, is that the alternative remedy by suit would not be equally prompt or certain and put he aggrieved party to additional expense vide also Ghulam Shabbir v. Dwarka Prasad, 18 All 163 (B) & Shiva Nathaji v. Jomakasinath, 7. Bom 341 (C). In Desai Narshiprasad Lakhshmiprasad v. Desai Vidurtay Yashwantprasad, 1954 Sau 66 (AIR V41) (D) it was held that where the Court by a wrong or erroneous finding assumes jurisdiction which it has not, or refuses to exercise a jurisdiction which it ought to exercise, then the matter becomes revisable by the High Court vide also Chainsukh Chatur Bhuj v. Firm Deepchand Prakash Chand, 1954 Ajmer 25 (AIR V41) (E) and Satish Chandra v. State of West Bengal, 1953 Cal 392 (AIR V 40) (F). In view of these rulings I think the present petition in revision is clearly maintainable.

Coming now to the mam question whether the suit under S. 9, Specific Relief Act should have been entertained by the learned Munsiff in case where the plaintiffs sought to recover possession as tenants, I think the ruling of Gouranga Chandra Deb v. Satish Chandra Dev, reported in 1955 Tripura 13 (AIR V42) (G) fully applies to this case.

It has been laid down in this case that where the Legislature has prescribed a particular method for the redress of an alleged wrong that method alone should be open to the aggrieved party. Tenancy rights are creation of a statute and persona aggrieved under that law should have recourse to the remedies provided in the tenancy law. The Tripura Tenancy Act provides a remedy against dispossession of the tenant by the landlord under the old S. 93 or new S. 78. This special provision will be binding and the general provision in S. 9, Specific Relief Act should not ordinarily be available to the plaintiffs of such suits vide also Beni Madho Singh v. Prag, 1949 All 510 (AIR V 36) (H).

In view of these rulings I think the learned Munsiff had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit under S. 9, Specific Relief Act and the proper remedy of the opposite parties was by way of seeking their remedy under the provisions of the Tripura Tenancy Act.

The present application in revision is, therefore, allowed and the decree passed by the learned Munsiff is set aside. The opposite parties can seek their remedies under the provisions of the Tripura Tenancy Act if so advised. The parties will bear their own costs in both the Courts.