Firtu Ram vs Laxminarayan Sharma

Being aggrieved with the order dated 14.5.2019 passed by the Sessions Judge, District Janjgir-Champa (CG) in Criminal Revision Case No.13/2019, whereby, the revision filed by the respondent has been allowed and the order dated 20.2.2019 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Janjgir in Criminal Case No.115/1992 under Section 145 of Cr.P.C., has been set-aside.

Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is in possession of the subject land prior to 1950. The respondent filed a civil suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction, which has been registered as Case No.367-A/94. The trial Court dismissed the said suit holding that the suit property is not the ancestoral property of the plaintiff/respondent. However, the First Appellate Court re-appreciated the entire evidence and material and allowed the appeal of the respondent vide judgment dated 14.5.1999 passed in Civil Appeal No.39A/96. The said judgment was challenged by the present petitioner before the High Court in Second Appeal No.827/1999, which has been dismissed vide judgment dated 18.3.2013. Thereafter, learned Revisional Court, vide the impugned order, observed that since the Civil Court has already adjudicated the title and possession, continuation of the criminal proceeding under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. would serve no purpose and accordingly, quashed the order passed by the SDM on 20.2.2019 in Criminal Case No.115/1992. Hence, this petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 14.5.2019 passed by the Revisional Court is bad in law as the petitioner has already filed SLP No.37374/2019 before the Supreme Court. He submits that the scope of civil case and criminal case is entirely different, therefore, he prays to quash the impugned order.

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent informs this Court that the said SLP has been dismissed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court. Thus, he supports the impugned order.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents annexed along with the petition.

In the matter of M. Siddiq (Supra), the question relating to scope of Section 145 of the CrPC when the civil suit is pending came for consideration, which is no longer res integra, having already dealt with by the Constitution Bench and the following was held at paras 299.1, 299.2, 300 & 304:-

“299.1 In Amresh Tiwari v Lalta Prasad Dubey {(2004) 4 SCC 440}, Justice S N Variava, speaking for a three judge Bench of this Court held thus {SCC P.445, Para-12}

12... The law on this subject-matter has been settled by the decision of this Court in the case of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P. [(1985) 1 SCC 427 : 1985 SCC Cri 98] In this case it has been held as follows: (SCC pp. 428-29, para 2)

2….. When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the civil court is binding on the criminal court in a matter like the one before us...parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the civil court, the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be

wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore,

satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue.”

299.2 The Court in Amresh Tiwari (Amresh Tiwari Vs. Lalta Prasad Dubey, (2000) 4 SCC 440 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 806 rejected the submission that the principle in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v State of UP {Ram Sumer Puri Mahant Vs. State of UP, (1985) 1 SCC 427 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 98} will apply only after the civil court has adjudicated on the issue: (SCC P.445, para-13)

We are unable to accept the submission that the principles laid down in Ram Sumer case [(1985) 1 SCC 427 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 98] would only apply if the civil court has already adjudicated on the dispute regarding the property and given a finding. In our view Ram Sumer case [(1985) 1 SCC 427 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 98] is laying down that multiplicity of litigation should be avoided as it is not in the interest of the parties and public time would be wasted over meaningless litigation. On this principle it has been held that when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for adequate protection of the property during the pendency of the dispute, the parallel proceedings i.e. Section 145 proceedings should not continue.”

Dealing with the issue as to when the proceedings under Section 145 should not be pursued any further on the institution of a suit for adjudication, this Court in Amresh Tiwari held: (SCC p.446, para-14)

Reliance has been placed on the case of Jhummamal v. State of M.P. [(1988) 4 SCC 452 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 974] It is submitted that this authority lays down that merely because a civil suit is pending does not mean that proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be set at naught. In our view this authority does not lay down any such broad proposition. In this case the proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code had resulted in a concluded order. Thereafter the party, who had lost, filed civil proceedings. After filing the civil proceedings he prayed that the final order passed in the

Section 145 proceedings be quashed. It is in that context that this Court held that merely because a civil suit had been filed did not mean that the concluded order under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be quashed. This is entirely a different situation. In this case the civil suit had been filed first. An order of status quo had already been passed by the competent civil court. Thereafter Section 145 proceedings were commenced. No final order had been

passed in the proceedings under Section 145. In our view on the facts of the present case the ratio laid down in Ram Sumer case [(1985) 1 SCC 427 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 98] fully applies. We clarify that we are not stating that in every case where a civil suit is filed, Section 145 proceedings would never lie. It is only in cases where civil suit is for possession or for declaration of title in respect of the same property and where reliefs regarding protection of the property concerned can be applied for and granted by the civil court that proceedings under Section 145 should not be allowed to continue. This is because the civil court is competent to decide the question of title as well as possession between the parties and the orders of the civil court would be binding on the Magistrate.

(Emphasis supplied)

In view of the settled position in law, as it emerges from the decisions of this Court, after the Magistrate‘s order dated 29 December 1949 for attachment of property, nothing prevented Nirmohi Akhara from filing a declaratory suit for possession and title. The Magistrate‘s order did not decide or adjudicate upon the contesting rights to possess or the merits of conflicting claims of any of the parties. Substantive rights with respect to title and possession of the property could have been dealt with only in civil proceedings before a civil court. The Magistrate did not have jurisdiction to determine questions of ownership and title. The proceedings under Section 145 could not have resulted in any adjudication upon title or possession of the rightful owner as that is within the exclusive domain of civil courts. Nirmohi Akhara cannot take the defence that no final order had been passed in Section 145 proceedings and as a result limitation did not commence. The Magistrate simply complied with the directions given by a civil court with respect to maintaining status quo in Suit 1 and accordingly, deferred the proceedings under Section 145.”

Reverting back to the facts of the present case, indisputably, the respondent has filed a civil suit, which was allowed in the First Appeal and Second Appeal No.827/1999 preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by this Court on 18.3.2013. Further, it is informed by learned counsel for the respondent that the said SLP preferred against the second appeal has also been dismissed. Therefore, considering the dispute in respect of the same property, for which, an application under under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. was preferred before the concerned SDM as the relief regarding protection of property can be claimed and granted by the Civil Court, this Court is of the view that continuation of the proceeding under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. should not be allowed to continue.

The impugned order passed by the Revisional Court is just and proper, which does not call for any interference invoking jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

For the foregoing, the present petition being bereft of any substance deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.