High CourtsSingle Bench

Forward Leather Company vs The Inspector General of Registration, The District Revenue Officer (Stamps), District Collector Officer and The Sub Registrar

Madras High Court · Decided on 22 December 2008 · Citation: (2008) 12 MAD CK 0214

HON’BLE JUDGES
R. Banumathi, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 10067 of 2004

AI Structured Summary

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Judgment

23 paragraphs · 1,316 words

R. Banumathi, J.—Petitioner seeks Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to quash the orders of the 1st Respondent in No. 9266 in 1/2003 dated 16.2.2004 and directing the Respondents to accept the valuation of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- as disclosed by the Petitioner for the purpose of payment of stamp duty in respect of sale deed, Document No. 1899/2002 dated 31.7.2002.

2.

The subject matter of the sale deed Document No. 1899/2002 was registered on 16.8.2002. Property relates to 26.73 grounds and building in S. No. 112/41B, 112/41B2 of Pammal village, Tambaram Taluk. In the sale deed, land has been valued at Rs. 101.32 per sq.ft. and total value of land is Rs. 65,00,000/- and Rs. 10,00,000/- for building.

3.

As the document was found to be under valued, notice was issued to the Petitioner to pay stamp duty by correctly valuing the property. After enquiry, in its order dated 03.1.2003, 2nd Respondent has passed the order fixing the land value at Rs. 175/- per sq.ft. In the impugned order, 1st Respondent has fixed the land value at Rs. 185/- per sq.ft. and for building at Rs. 73,91,802/- and called upon the Petitioner to pay deficit stamp duty of Rs. 12,59,193/-.

4.

After due enquiry, the impugned order [dated 16.2.2004] was passed by the 1st Respondent fixing the land value at Rs. 185/- per sq.ft. and value of the building at Rs. 73,91,802/-.

5.

Heard Mr. S.Murugappan, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. N.Senthilkumar, learned AGP for Respondents.

6.

As per Section 47-A Indian Stamp Act any person aggrieved by an order of the Authority prescribed under Sub-section (5) may prefer an appeal before the High Court. Section 47-A (10) of Indian Stamp Act reads as under:

Section 47-A (10) : Any person aggrieved by an order of the Authority prescribed under Sub-section (5) or the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority under Sub-section (6) may, within such time and in such manner, as may be prescribed by rules made under this Act, appeal to the High Court.

7.

Placing reliance upon Jai Enterprises Vs. The Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), The Deputy Commissioner of Customs and The Assistant Commissioner of Customs, ; Madura Coats Ltd. Vs. Asstt. Collector of C. Ex., ; Prasad Film Laboratories Vs. CEGAT, and Thressiamma Vs. Union of India (UOI), , learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that once Writ Petition was admitted and lying in High Court for four years, normally the question of maintainability would not arise.

8.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further contended that once the Writ Petition has been lying in the High Court for 4 years, to dismiss the Writ Petition after the lapse of 4 years on the ground of availability of alternative remedy could not be proper.

9.

Learned AGP would submit that in view of the statutory alternative remedy available u/s 47-A (10) of Indian Stamp Act, Writ Petition is not maintainable. Learned AGP would further submit that challenge to the impugned order would involve questions of fact and Court may have to go into the valuation of the property which exercise cannot done by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India.

10.

As rightly submitted by the learned AGP, the correctness or proprietary order passed by the 1st Respondent fixing the valuation of the land and building involves question of fact, the Court may have to go into the guideline value in comparison with other documents and the Court may have to go into the factual aspects to ascertain the correct value of the land and building. Such factual exercise cannot be gone into exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India.

11.

There is no force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that once Writ Petition has been admitted and lying in High Court for 4 years cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy.

12.

There is no inflexible rule merely because Writ Petition has been admitted, the same cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. In AIR 2008 SCW 6055 (Haryana Financial Corporation and Anr. v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja), Supreme Court has held that there is no inflexible rule that Writ Petition cannot be dismissed once it has been admitted.

13.

The issue relating to entertaining Writ Petition when alternative remedy is available was examined by the Supreme Court in several cases. In U.P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. Vs. R.S. Pandey and Another, , the Supreme Court has held as under:

11.

Except for a period when Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976, the power relating to alternative remedy has been considered to be a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and never a rule of law. Despite the existence of an alternative remedy it is within the jurisdiction or discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that though the matter relating to an alternative remedy has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the case, normally the High Court should not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy. If somebody approaches the High Court without availing the alternative remedy provided, the High Court should ensure that he has made out a strong case or that there exist good grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction.

12.

Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Son Vs. The Income Tax Investigation Commission etc., ; Sangram Singh Vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya, ; Union of India (UOI) Vs. T.R. Varma, ; State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. Vs. State of Madras, , held that Article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Courts a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs. However, the remedy of writ is an absolutely discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or procedure required for decision has not been adopted.

14.

Pointing out the circumstances as to when the alternative remedy would not be a bar to entertain the Writ Petition, in the said decision the Supreme Court has held as follows:

16...There are two well-recognised exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. First is when the proceedings are taken before the forum under a provision of law which is ultra vires, it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground that they are incompetent without a party being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course. Secondly, the doctrine has no application when the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. We may add that where the proceedings themselves are an abuse of process of law the High Court in an appropriate case can entertain a Writ Petition.

15.

In the instant case, there is no such circumstance warranting exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India.

16.

In view of the efficacious alternative remedy available by way of statutory appeal as contemplated u/s 47-A (10) of Indian Stamp Act, Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable.

17.

In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed as not maintainable.

� Petitioner is at liberty to file appeal before the High Court as contemplated u/s 47-A (10) of Indian Stamp Act.

� The period during which Writ Petition was pending shall be construed as the period as contemplated u/s 14 of Limitation Act.