Francis Xavier Vs Neelamegam, Inspector of Police, Pondy Bazaar Police Station and others

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S.M. Ali Mohamed, J.—In this batch of Petitions, a common question of law arises, viz., whether the petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C., is maintainable, in view of the specific provision u/s 70(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Petitioners in the respective Criminal Original Petitions were enlarged on bail, but failed to appear before the concerned Magistrates/ trial Courts have issued non-bailable warrants to compel the presence of the Petitioners before the Court for trial or enquiry. The Petitioners have filed these Criminal Original Petitions, u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure for recall or cancellation of the non- bailable warrant issued by the Magistrates/trial Courts giving stereo-typed reasons for non-appearance before the Courts, viz., they were sick or down with jaundice or they were held up elsewhere due to alleged reasons beyond their control.

The Point consideration is whether this Court has power u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure to recall or cancel non-bailable warrant and direct the Petitioners to present before the Magistrates/trial Courts on a particular date in the teeth of specific provision containing in Section 70(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Mr. Karpagavinayagam, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner in Crl.O.P. No. 8531 of 1994, vehemently contended that inherent powers of the High Court given u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure is wide and notwithstanding the specific provisions given u/s 70(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, this Court has power to recall or cancel the non-bailable warrant issued by the Courts below and direct the accused persons to present themselves before the Magistrates/trial Courts. In this connection, the learned Counsel submitted that power u/s 482 Cr.P.C., has been exercised by the High Courts even when there are specific provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He further submitted that even if there is no provisions at all in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, various High Courts have exercised the power u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure is to render justice. He further submitted after referring to various rulings of the Supreme Court that power u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure is wide and the Supreme Court in various Decisions has only imposed certain conditions for the guidance of the High Court in various Decisions has only imposed certain conditions for the guidance of the High Court for the exercise of the power and the same are only illustrative and not exhaustive. He further submitted that the said restrictions are self-im 995 1 L.W. (Crl.) 17 posed by the Court. In support of the above contentions, learned Counsel cited the following rulings.

(a) In Raj Kapoor and Others Vs. State and Others, , the Supreme Court observed as follows:

The first question is as to whether the inherent power of the High Court u/s 482 stands repelled when the revisional power u/s 397 overlaps. The opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing in the Code, not even Section 397 can affect the amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482....

In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of the process of the Court or other extraordinary situation exceeds the Court''s jurisdiction. The limitation itself is self-restrained, nothing more. The Policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the Court in the face.

The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the Petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers.

(b) In V.C. Shukla Vs. State through C.B.I., , the Supreme Court observed as follows:

Apart from the revisional power, the High Court under the Code of 1898 possessed an inherent power to pass orders ex-debito justitiae, in order to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This was a special Power which was to be exercised by the High Court to meet a particular contingency not expressly provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Even in the present Code, the inherent power of the Court has been fully retained u/s 482 which runs thus:

482.

Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

Thus, the scope, ambit and range of Section 561-A (Which is now Section 482) is quite different from the powers conferred by the present Code under the provisions of Section 397. It may be that in some cases there may be overlapping but such cases would be few and far between. It is well settled that the inherent powers u/s 482 of the present Code can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not where a specific remedy is provided by the Statute. Further, the power being an extraordinary one, it has to be exercised sparingly.

(d) In Janata Dal Vs. H.S. Chowdhary and Others, , the Supreme Court observed as follows:

Section 482 which corresponds to Section 561-A of the old Code and to Section 151 of the CPC proceeds on the same principle and deals with the inherent powers of the High Court.

Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex-debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the Courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court u/s 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plentitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles."

This inherent power conferred by Section 482 of the Code should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution the High Court being the highest Court of a State, should normally refrain from giving a premature decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal are of grate magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage.

In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court''s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a Court proceedings ought not be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like, would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interests of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realization of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient Jurisdiction.

(e) in Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra, , the Supreme Court observed as follows:

Similar is the position apropos the inherent powers of the High Court. We may read the language of Section 482 (Corresponding to Section 561-A of the Old Code) of the 1973 Code. It says:

At the outset, the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions:

1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party:

2) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code....

On a plain-reading of Section 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code which would include Sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. ''But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be settling at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party.

The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice.

f) In Lalit Mohan Mondal and Others Vs. Benoyendra Nath Chatterjee, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

We have heard counsel for the parties and have gone through the judgment of the High Court. We agree with the High Court that against an order passed in appeal u/s 341 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the order would not be revisable by the High Court u/s 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, but there can be no doubt that the Court is entitled to examine the matter u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which expressly overrules the bar contained in Section 341 of the Code.

(g) In Ratilal Bhanji Mithani Vs. Asstt. Collector of Customs, Bombay and Another, , the Supreme Court observed as follows:

The court makes no express provision for the cancellation of a bail granted u/s 496. Nevertheless, if at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, it is found that any person accused of a bailable offence is intimidating, bribing or tampering with the prosecution witnesses or is attempting to abscond, the High Court has the power to cause him to be arrested and to commit him to custody for such period as it thinks fit. This jurisdiction springs from the over-riding inherent powers of the High Court and can be invoked in exceptional cases only when the High Court is satisfied that the ends of justice will be defeated unless the accused is committed to custody for the reasons given in Talab Haji Hussain Vs. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar and Another, , we hold that this inherent power of the High Court exists and is preserved by Section 561-A of the Code. The person committed to custody under the orders of the High Court cannot ask for his release on bail u/s 496, but the High Court may be a subsequent order admit him to bail again.

(h) In Pampapathy Vs. State of Mysore, , the Supreme Court observed as follows:

The inherent power of the High Court mentioned in S. 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised only for either of the three purposes specifically mentioned in the Section. The inherent power cannot be invoked in respect of any matter covered by the Specific provisions of the Code. It cannot also be invoked if its exercise would be inconsistent with any of the specific provisions of the Code. It is only if the specific provisions of the Code that Section 561-A can come into operation. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that can possible arise and it is an established -principle that the courts should have inherent powers, apart from the express provision of law, which are necessary to their existence and for the proper discharge of the duties imposed upon them by law. This doctrine finds expression in Section 561-A which does not confer any new powers on the High Court but merely recognizes and preserves the inherent powers previously possessed by it. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in a proper case, the High Court has inherent power under

S. 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure to cancel the order or suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the Appellant made u/s 426, Code of Criminal Procedure and grant of bail to the Appellant made u/s 426, Code of Criminal Procedure and to order that the Appellant be re-arrested and committed to jail custody.

The learned Counsel has also referred to the following rulings of various High Courts, in the matter.

(a) Bhavnesh Kumar @ Pappu Vs. Union of India and Others, .

(b) Rajeev Bhatia v. Abdulla Mohamed Gani (1991. Cri.L.J. 2092) (Bombay);

(d) Shri Rabindra Kumar Dey Vs. State of Orissa, ;

(e) Court on its own Motion Vs. Vishnu Pandit and another, .

(f) Ravi Singh and Another Vs. State of Bihar,

(g) Assistant Collector of Customs v. Madam Ayabo (1992 2 SCR 2164 (Bombay).

(h) Prem Chand Vs. State,

(i) The State Vs. Sadanadan,

(j) H.K. Rawal and Another Vs. Nidhi Prakash and Another,

(k) Shyam M. Sachdev Vs. The State and another,

(l) Charan Singh and Others Vs. S.D.M. and Others,

(m) Gulaba Ram v. Smt. Hiri (1991 2 Crimes 521 (H.P.)

(n) Thaniel Victor Vs. State,

(o) Bhanu M. Vakil Vs. Chandra Oshiram Keswani and another,

(p) Krishna Sadan Ghosh Vs. Govind Prasad Saraf,

(q) Inspector of Police C.B.C.I.D. v. Sathy-anarayanan (1988 L.W. (Crl.) 393 (Madras)

(r) Subbiah @ Raju Gounder and Ors. (1981 L.W. (Crl.) 356 (Madras):

(s) Puran Singh Vs. Ajit Singh and Another,

(t) Ramsewak and Others Vs. State of M.P.,

(u) Ali Ahammed v. State of Kerala (1985 M.L.J. (Crl.) 522 (Kerala); and

(v) Mrs. K. Jayanthi v. V. Ramaswamy (Crl. OP. 8158/1993) Madras).

On the other hand, Mr. B. Sriramulu, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the matter in issue is already covered by a ruling of a learned single Judge of this Court reported in P.A. Saleem and Ors. v. State, rep. by. Inspector of Police, R-4 Pondy Bazzar Police Station, Madras (1994 2 L.W.(Crl.) 402 : 1994 Cri.L.J. 402) wherein Janartha-nam.J., has elaborately considering the different aspects of the matter, and the same requires no reconsideration. The learned Public Prosecutor further pointed out that except Section 70(2) Code of Criminal Procedure there is no other particular provision in the Criminal Procedure Code, for the cancellation of the non-bailable warrant and it has been the recent practice of this Court to exercise power u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure to recall or cancel the non-bailable warrant and direct the accused to appear before the Magistrate/ trial Court on a particular date and the same has been misused by the accused. The learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that invariably the accused persons failed to appear before the Court on the date of the trial and then file applications u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure and when non-bailable warrants were issued by the Magistrate/ trial Court, immediately the petitions u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure were filed and stay of the proceedings were obtained with the result, the trials before the Courts have been unduly delayed. It has been held by the Supreme Court in several rulings that speedy trial is guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. He further submitted that the Magistrates/trial courts, when they see that the accused person is present for trial on the date fixed, issue non-bailable warrant to make it sure that the accused person is present at the time of the trial and in particular he referred to Section 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which states that the evidence is to be taken in the presence of the accused person. Therefore, the learned Public prosecutor submitted that there is no illegality committed by the trial courts/Magistrates who have issued non-bailable warrants for the presence of the accused persons at the time of the trial. In this connection, learned Public Prosecutor referred to the rulings of a Division Bench of the Court in Rupert,J. Barnabas v. Josephine Bharani Patimson (1990 L.W. (Crl.) 27) to highlight the abuse of process of Court in this regard. Learned Public Prosecutor also pointed out several cases, where the accused persons deliberately avoided to appear before the Court and thereby prevented the trial of the case and straightway approach the High Court for recall/or cancellation of non-bailable warrant u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure without even filing an application u/s 70(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure for cancellation of the bail before the Court, which issued it. Learned Public prosecutor also referred to the rulings of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra, , wherein the Supreme Court has categorically pointed out certain principles to be followed in the exercise of the inherent powers by the High Court in the following terms:

(1) That the power is not to be restorted to, if there is a specific provision in the Code, for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party:

(2) That it would be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice:

(3) That is should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.

Learned Public Prosecutor emphasized on the first principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court, viz., the power is not to be resorted to, if there is a specific provision in the code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. Learned Public prosecutor has also pointed out that as per Section 70(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, there is a specific provision under the Code for the redressal of the grievance of the Petitioner by filing a separate petition for cancellation of the non-bailable warrant before the Court which issued the same. In view of the same, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the petitions filed by the various Petitioners before this Court u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure are not maintainable and that they are liable to be dismissed, in limine.

In support of the said contention, learned Public Prosecutor has also cited the following decision:

(a) In R.P. Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab, , the Supreme Court held as follows:

The inherent powers of High Court, u/s 561 - A, Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code.

The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

(b) in Ratilal Bhanji v. Assistant Customs Collector, Bombay (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 286 held as follows:

The Code of Criminal Procedure makes express provision for the cancellation of a bail granted u/s 496. Nevertheless, if at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, it is found that any person accused of a bailable offence is intimidating, bribing or tampering with the prosecution witnesses or is attempting to abscond, the High Court has inherent power to cause him to be arrested and to commit him to custody for such period as it thinks fit. This overriding inherent power to cause him to be arrested and to commit him to custody for such period as it thinks fit. This overriding inherent power can be invoked in exceptional cases only when the High Court is satisfied that the ends of justice will be defeated unless the accused is committed to custody.

I have considered the respective contentions of learned Counsel for the Petitioners and learned Public Prosecutor. The point that arises for consideration in this batch of petitions is the ''Power'' of the High Court, u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 to recall or cancel a non-bailable warrant issued by the concerned Magistrate/ trial court when there is a specific provision u/s 70(2) of the code of Criminal Procedure 1973, which says that "Every such warrant shall remain in force until it is cancelled by the Court which issued it, or until it is executed." The ruling of this Court in P.A. Saleem and Ors. v. R-4, Pondy Bazaar Police Station, T. Nagar, Madras-17 and Ors. (1994 2. L.W. (Crl.) 402) supports the contentions of the learned Public Prosecutor. In the above ruling, Janarthanam,J has stressed the need for speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and the presence of specific provision by way of Section 70(2) Criminal Procedure Code. In this connection, the learned Judge has observed as follows:

Simpliciter recall of a warrant, in exercise of power u/s 482 of the Code, in any one of these actions, is not legally permissible and this will be patent, on a cursory perusal thereof. The said section prescribes that nothing in this Code, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is thus patently clear that the inherent power is capable of being exercised either to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

Re-call'' of a warrant can, by no stretch of imagination, be stated to come under the former clause, to give effect to any order under this Code, which would mean that this Court has power to see whether the warrant that has been issued by Magistrate u/s 70 had been executed by the issuance of a proper direction to the Police Officer, or any other person, to whom the same had been issued, if such an officer is keeping the warrant, without executing it, thereby hampering the progress of speedy trial. In view of specific provision engrafted under Sub-Clause(2) of Section 70 of the code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved accused and further remedy by way of revision either u/s 397 or 401 of the Code, simpliciter re-call warrant cannot be stated to attract the latter clause also, namely, to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

However, the scope, ambit and range of the powers of the High Court u/s 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure have been considered by various rulings of the Supreme Court. In Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. Assistant Collector, Bombay (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1639) , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the inherent powers of the High Court u/s 561-A of Old Criminal Procedure Code, corresponding to Section 482 of the New Criminal procedure Code. The Supreme Court has observed as follows:

Now the question is whether the inherent power of the High Court is conferred by or has the sanction of enacted law. From its very inception, the High Court has possessed and enjoyed its inherent powers including the power to prevent the abuse of the process of any court within its jurisdiction and to secure the ends of justice. These powers inhere in the High Court and spearing from its very nature and constitution as a Court of superior jurisdiction. All the existing powers of the High Court were preserved and continued by legislation from time to time.

Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure declared that ''nothing in this Code declared to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order passed under this Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Section was inserted in the Code by Act XVIII of 1928 to obviate any doubt that these inherent powers have been taken away by the Code. In terms, the Section did not confer any power, it only declared that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the existing inherent powers in the High Court, see, AIR 1945 18 (Privy Council) . Then came another enactments which were framed differently. Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935 provided:

Subject to the provisions of this part of this Act, to the provisions of any order in Council made under this or any other Act and to the provisions of any Act of the appropriate Legislature enacted by virtue of powers conferred on that legislature by this Act, the jurisdiction of and the law administered in any existing High Court and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sitting of the Court and the members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of Part-III of this Act.

The Section enacted that the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts and the powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice ''shall be'' the same as immediately before the commencement of Part-III of the Act. The statute confirmed and revested in the High Court all its existing powers and jurisdiction including its inherent powers. Then came the Constitution. Article 225 of the Constitution provides:

Art. 225. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sitting of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution. The provision to the article is not material and need not be read. The article enacts that the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts and the powers of the Judges thereof in relation to administration of justice shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. The Constitution confirmed and revested in the High Court all its existing powers and jurisdiction including its inherent powers, and its powers to make rules. When the Constitution or any enacted law has embraced and confirmed the inherent powers and jurisdiction of the High Court, which previously existed that power and jurisdiction has the sanction of an enacted ''law'' within the meaning of Article 21 as explained in A.K. Gopalan Vs. The State of Madras, . the inherent powers of the High Court preserved by Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure are thus vested in it by ''law'' within the meaning of Article 21. The procedure for invoking the inherent powers is regulated by rules framed by the High Court. The power to make such rules is conferred on the High Court by the Constitution. The rules previously in force were continued in force by Article 372 of the Constitution. The order of the High Court cancelling the bail and depriving the Appellant of his personal liberty is according to procedure established by law and is not violative of Article 21.

The Supreme Court in Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan (A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 67K), has held that the power given u/s 561-A (old Criminal Procedure Code) and Section 482) (New Criminal Procedure Code) are one and the same. The Supreme Court observed as follows:

It may be noticed that Section 482 of the present Code is the ad verbatim copy of Section 561-A of the old Code. This provision confers a separate and independent power on the High Court alone to pass orders ex-debito justitiae in cases where grave and substantial injustice has been done or where the process of the Court has been seriously abused.

In view of the above rulings of the Supreme Court, the inherent powers of the High Court u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are wide. However the various rulings of the Supreme Court have imposed certain self-imposed restrictions in exercise of such inherent powers.

In R.P. Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab, , Gajendragadkar, J, (as he then was), has considered the power of this Court, u/s 561-A of the old Code of Criminal Procedure in the following terms:

It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings, at an interlocutory stage it is not possible or desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abase of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceedings in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegation in the F.I.R. or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged in such cases, no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the F.I.R. to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not, in such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal Court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and case where there is legal evidence which, on its appreciation, may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction u/s 561-A, the High Court would not embark upon enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court''s inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point (vide in In Re: Shripad G. Chandavarkar, Jagat Chandra Mozumdar v. Queen Empress, ILR Cal. 786, Dr. Shankar Singh v. State of Punjab 56 P.H LR54) (AIR 1954 P.H 193) , Nripendra Bhusan Ray Vs. Gobinda Bandhu Majumdar, and Rama-nathan Chettiyar v. Sivarama Subramania, ILR Mad. 722 (AIR 1925 Mad. 38).

10.

In State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and Others, , a reference is made to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab, and it is observed a follows:

Gajendragadkar, J., who spoke for the Court in Kapur''s case observes in his judgment that it was not possible, desirable or expedient to law down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of the High Court''s inherent jurisdiction. The three instances cited in the judgment as to when the High Court would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction are only illustrative and can in the very nature of things not to be regarded as exhaustive.

11.

In Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra, , the Supreme Court has exhaustively considered powers of the High Court u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure and has observed as follows:

1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;

2) That it would be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;

3) that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.

In Raj Kapoor and Others Vs. State and Others, , referring to the powers u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Krishna Iyer, J., observed that limitation is self-imposed and nothing more. Referring to the powers u/s 482 of the Code, Krishna Iyer, J., observed as follows:

Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law; when a specific provision is made, easy resort to inherent power is not right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but the inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code. In Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra, , this Court has exhaustively and, if I may say so with great respect correctly discussed and delineated the law beyond mistake. While it is true that Section 482 is pervasive, it should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code such for instance, in Section 397(2). Apparent conflict may arise in some situations between the two provisions and a happy solution would be to say that the bar provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principle enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then if the order assailed in purely of an interlocutory character which could be correct in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case, the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between the High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceedings initiated illegally, vexa-tiously or as being without jurisdiction.

In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of the process of the Court or other extraordinary situation excites the Court''s jurisdiction. The limitation is self- restraint, nothing more. The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the Court in the face.

There is, therefore force in the contention of Mr. Karpagavinayagam, one of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, to the effect that the inherent powers of the High Court given u/s 482 Cr.P.C., is wide, notwithstanding the specific provisions given u/s 70(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

12.

From the above Supreme Court rulings, it is clear that the inherent powers of this Court are wide and the various conditions imposes by the rulings of the Supreme Court are only illustrative and not exhaustive. In the words of Justice Krishna Iyer, it is self- imposed restrictions. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the inherent powers of this Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C, are wide and in order to prevent abuse of process of Court and to secure the ends of justice, this Court may exercise its inherent powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C., notwithstanding any specific provisions in Section 70(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, this Court will exercise its self-imposed restraint and direct the concerned party to approach the Court below to redress their respective grievance according to specific provision given under the Code of Criminal Procedure. In view of the above, all the petitions are dismissed with the following directions:

1) The Petitioners/ Accused shall file appropriate petition for cancellation of the non-bailable warrant in terms of Section 70(2) Code of Criminal Procedure before the Court which issued the same within a period of three weeks from the date of this Order.

2) The concerned Court shall dispose of the said petition on merits and in accordance with law.

3) In order to redress the grievance of the Petitioners and their apprehension that if they appear in person, the concerned Courts may invariably remand them to judicial custody, the Petitioners may file petitions for cancellation of non-bailable warrant, before Courts below, without personally appearing before the Court and the concerned Magistrate/Trial Court are directed to pass orders on merits in accordance with law. It is made clear that the above direction shall be confined to this batch of the cases and by no means, it can be taken by the Courts below as a precedent for non-appearance of the accused in respect of other cases. In view of the order passed in these Crl.O. Ps., all the Crl.M. Ps. are dismissed.

Francis Xavier vs Neelamegam, Inspector of Police, Pondy Bazaar Police Station and others

Judgment