Fulchandbhai Ambaram Patel vs State of Gujarat

R.M. Doshit, J.—Heard learned Advocates for the respective applicants, and Mr. P. G. Desai, the learned P.P. for the respondent-State.

All these applications raise a common question of law and with the consent of the learned Advocates, are disposed of by this common judgment and order.

The succinct facts are : The applicants in all these applications are public servants who have been charged for commission of offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d), read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). I am informed that in neither of the cases, the trial has yet begun. In some of the matters, charge has been framed against the accused-applicants while in some of the matters, even the charge is yet to be framed. At this stage, the applicants-accused made application before the trial Court seeking discharge on the ground that the investigation carried out by the concerned Police Inspectors of the Anti-Corruption Bureau in respect of the respective offences was illegal and is contrary to the provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act. The reports made by such officers are, therefore, null and void and the Court, therefore, has no jurisdiction to proceed further on the basis of such reports. It was, therefore, prayed that the Court may declare that the cognizance of offence taken by the trial Court on the basis of unauthorised report of the investigating officer is illegal and for consequential reliefs. The said applications were heard and rejected by the learned trial Judge. Feeling aggrieved, the applicants have preferred these revision applications before this Court u/s 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Mr. A. D. Shah has submitted that the investigation in respect of the offences alleged to have been committed under the Act is governed by Section 17 of the Act. Section 17 provides for the persons authorised to investigate in respect of such offences. Clause (a) thereof relates to the cases of Delhi Special Police Establishment; Clause (b) thereof relates to metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and any other metropolitan area notified as such under Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and Clause (c) thereof relates to the areas other than the metropolitan areas. Section 17 provides that no police officer below the rank stipulated in the respective clause shall investigate any offence punishable under the Act, without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of First Class; as the case may be or make arrest therefore without a warrant. First proviso thereof empowers the State Government to make general or special order to authorise the police officer not below the rank of the Inspector of Police to investigate such offence without the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of First Class, as the case may be. Second proviso thereof deals with the offences referred to in Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13. In all these applications, we are concerned with the offence committed within the metropolitan area of the city of Ahmedabad and in respect of offence alleged to have been committed under Sections 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act. Clause (b) of Section 17 provides, as aforesaid, that in the metropolitan areas no police officer below the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police shall investigate any offence punishable under the Act. Mr. Shah has submitted that in all the matters before this Court, the investigation in respect of respective offence has been carried out by the officer of the rank of Police Inspector, who indisputably is an officer below the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police, which is expressly barred by Clause (b) of Section 17. It is submitted that hence the investigation made by the respective investigating officers is without the authority of law and no proceeding could have been initiated on the basis of such report. He, therefore, has submitted that the concerned applicants deserve to be discharged and the complaint lodged against them, on the basis of such unauthorised investigation reports require to be quashed and set aside. He has further contended that while contesting the applications made by the respective applicants-accused, the State has relied upon a Notification dated 10th January, 1989 (hereinafter referred to "the Notification"). It is the defence of the State that under the Notification, the Inspectors of Police attached to the Anti-Corruption Bureau are authorised to investigate the offence punishable under the Act, without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate and therefore, the investigation made by the respective Inspectors of Police is legal and valid and none of the applicants deserve discharge. Mr. Shah has contended that the Notification is confined to the offence committed in the areas other than the metropolitan areas and does not apply to the offence committed within the metropolitan areas. The Notification, therefore, cannot be pressed into service in the present group of applications.

Mr. Thakker has submitted that the cardinal principle of interpretation of a statute requires that any piece of legislation be given its plain, natural and grammatical meaning. He has further submitted that to cull the intention of the Government in issuing the above notification, it should be necessary to peruse the files of the Government. He has further submitted that the intention of the State Government to authorise the Inspectors of Police attached to the Anti-Corruption Bureau to the areas other than the metropolitan areas is clear. He has submitted that reference to Sub-section (c) in the first part of the notification is really a reference to Clause (c) and the same discloses the intention of the State Government to apply the said notification to the areas covered by Clause (c) of Section 17 of the Act. He has submitted that unless the notification is read in that manner, the inclusion of word "Sub-Section (c)" in the first part of the notification would be nugatory and in absence of the said words, the whole notification would lose meaning since in that case the notification cannot be applied to any of the areas covered either by Clauses (a), (b) or (c). He has submitted that Section 17 has been enacted with a view to providing safeguard against vexatious complaints against public servants. It is nothing but an in-built safeguard against such vexatious complaints. Therefore, the Notification issued under the first proviso thereof should be read in furtherance of the underlying object for enacting Section 17. He has submitted that it is, therefore, desirable that investigation into such complaints should be made by superior officers and should not be left to the subordinate officers. However, the Government may have to entrust such investigation to the subordinate officers in the areas where adequate number of superior officers may not be available. Since adequate number of Superintendents of Police may not be available for the areas other than the metropolitan areas, the investigation may have to be entrusted to the subordinate officers, however, there is no such requirement for the metropolitan areas for which many Asstt. Commissioners of Police are appointed. In that view of the matter also, the Notification cannot be applied to the metropolitan areas covered by Clause (b) of Section 17.

Mr. Gupta has supported the application and has adopted the contention raised by Mr. A. D. Shah and Mr. P. M. Thakker.

The question, therefore, boils down to the interpretation of the Notification and whether the Notification applies only in case of the offence committed in the area other than the metropolitan areas or whether it also applies in case of the offences committed within the metropolitan areas. The Notification reads as under:

ORDER

Home Department, 2, Sardar Bhavan, 2nd Floor, Sachivalaya Date : 10-1-1989

No. GG/89/5/LRV-3188/3470-H: In exercise of the powers conferred by the first proviso to Sub-section (c) of Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Act No. 49 of 1988), the Government of Gujarat hereby authorises for the purpose of the said proviso every police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police attached to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Gujarat State.

By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat.

Sd/- R. Balakrishnan Addl. Chief Secy. to the Govt.

Mr. Shah has relied upon the expression "first proviso to Sub-section (c) of Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Act No. 49 of 1988)" used in the Notification and has submitted that the Notification is expressly confined to the cases covered under Clause (c) of Section 17 of the Act, and therefore, necessarily, the authorisation given to the Inspectors of Police attached to the Anti-Corruption Bureau is restricted to the offence committed within the areas other than the metropolitan areas. The said Notification has, therefore, no applicability in the present group of matters and the investigation carried by the respective Inspectors of Police being contrary to Clause (b) of Section 17 is null and void.

To arrive at the correct meaning, the Notification is required to be split in two parts. First part of the Notification deals with the source of authorisation, while the latter part authorises the Inspectors of Police attached to the Anti-Corruption Bureau to investigate any offence under the Act, without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of First Class, as the case may be. The first part refers to the first proviso to Sub-section (c) of Section 17. It is apparent that there is some error in referring to Sub-section (c). Since Section 17 is not divided into sub-sections, what is referred to as "Sub-section (c) of Section 17" is really Clause (c) of Section 17 and the "first proviso to Sub-section (c) to Section 17" referred to therein refers to the first proviso to the section. It is the first proviso which empowers the Government to authorise the police officers not below the rank of Inspectors of Police to investigate such offences without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of First Class; as the case may be. Therefore, in my view, reference to "first proviso to Sub-section (c) of Section 17" in the first part of the Notification is intended to identify the source of power derived by the Government to issue such Notification and in no manner it can be interpreted to mean that the Notification is confined to the cases covered by Clause (c) of Section 17. The latter part of the Notification reads as, "the Government of Gujarat hereby authorises for the purpose of the said proviso, every police officer not below the rank of Inspectors of Police attached to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Gujarat State." Thus, the authorisation conferred under the Notification is not restricted either to the areas covered by Clause (b) or to the areas covered by Clause (c). It should, therefore, govern all the areas covered under Clause (b) as well as Clause (c). The words, "for the purpose of the said proviso" used in the said Notification discloses the intention of the Government to confer such authorisation for all the areas governed either by Clause (b) or Clause (c). Mr. Shah has here argued that if the Notification were split into two parts than the latter part of the Notification which confers authorisation upon the Inspectors of Police, as aforesaid, does not refer to any area, and therefore, cannot be applied to areas covered either by Clause (b) or Clause (c). I am afraid, I cannot accept such an argument. The only possible interpretation, in my view, can be that the said authorisation deals with all areas whether governed by Clause (b) or Clause (c). I am, therefore, of the view that if the investigation has been made by the officer not below the rank of Inspector of Police attached to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the same cannot be said to have been made without the authority of law nor can it be said to be bad, illegal or void, as is argued by the learned Advocates for the respective applicants. It is not disputed that in all the matters before this Court, the investigation has been carried out by the Inspectors of Police attached to the Anti-Corruption Bureau.

Mr. Shah has contended that while interpreting the above Notification, the Court should take assistance of the concerned files of the Government. He has submitted that the real intention of the Government would be disclosed if the files are perused. He has further contended that to the knowledge of the applicants, the Government intended to restrict this authorisation to the cases governed by Clause (c) alone. I cannot accept this argument. For interpreting the Notification, I need not rely upon the Government files and the notings made thereon. The Notification is required to be given its plain and natural meaning and it being clear and unambiguous, no external assistance is required.

In view of the above discussion, I hold that the investigation carried out by the Inspectors of Police attached to the Anti-Corruption Bureau in respect of the offence punishable under the Act is in consonance with the provision contained in Section 17 read with the Government Notification dated 10th January, 1989 and the subsequent proceedings taken on the basis of the report of the Investigating Officer, therefore, requires to be upheld.

Applications are, therefore, dismissed. Rule nisi issued on each of the applications is discharged. Interim relief granted in each of the applications is vacated. Parties shall bear their own costs.