G. Balasundaram vs Lakshmi Ammal and 8 others

Abdul Hadi, J.—Having failed before the Authorities below under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960

(hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''), the sub-tenant has filed this Civil Revision Petition against the concurrent eviction order passed by the said

Authorities against him as well as the Chief Tenant, who was 1st Respondent in the R.C.O.P. Actually speaking, the 1st Respondent did not even

file the first appeal. R.C.A. No. 4 of 1995 was filed only by the petitioner herein. The eviction order that was passed was on two grounds, viz.

wilful default u/s 10(2) (i) of the Act and sub-letting under S.10(2) (ii) (A) of the Act.

What learned counsel for the petitioner'' submits is that both the Authorities below have not manifested the required ""Satisfaction"" spoken to in

Section 10(2) of the Act and so, the impugned orders of both the Authorities are actually nor-test orders. In this connection, he relies on Khader

Md. Rowther & co. v. Sundaram (1978) I M.L.J.79=91 L.W.122).

However, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 6 landlords points out that even though respondents 1 and 2 in the R.C.O.P. filed counter

statements opposing the petitioners'' claim, both of them remained ex parte at the time of the trial and the 1st Respondent in the R.C.O.P. also did

not file any first appeal against the original eviction order passed in the R.C.O.P. While so, he relies on the relevant observations in K.K. Chari v.

R.M. Seshadri AIR 1973 S.C. 1311 Paragraph 27 and Hiralal Moolchand Doshi Vs. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (Dead) by L.Rs., . He also

submits that in an unreported Judgment dated 24.1.1997 in Padmini Jayasundar v. N.S. Chandrasekaran (C.R.P. No. 3355 of 1994) (Since

reported in 1997-1-L.W.535) S.S. Subramani, J. of this Court has held that (1978) I M.L.J. 79 = 91 L.W.122 (Supra) is no longer good law in

the light of the observations of the Supreme Court.

I have considered the rival submissions. The relevant portion of Section 10(2) of the Act runs as follows:-

A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller after giving the tenant a

reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application is satisfied

i). ....

(ii). ....

(emphasis supplied)

(1978) I M.L.J. 79 = 91 L.W. 122 (supra) was a case of petition for eviction for personal occupation of the landlord, and the tenant was absent

on the date of hearing and eviction was ordered. In that context, learned Judge, who decided the said case held that the orders of eviction did not

show the requisite ""Satisfaction"" of the Rent Controller and that hence the order was a nullity. While doing so, no doubt, learned Judge sought to

distinguish K.K. Chari Vs. R.M. Seshadri, on the ground that the said decision related to an order of eviction passed on the basis of compromise

between the landlord and tenant and that hence the said decision would not apply to the facts before him.

After going through K.K. Chari Vs. R.M. Seshadri, no doubt 1 also find that it is a case of eviction order passed on the basis of compromise

between the landlord and tenant. But, there is also the following observation in the said decision in paragraph 27 :-

It is no doubt true that before making an order for possession the Court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord''s claim if

there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant.

So, even in a case, where eviction is not passed based on a compromise between the parties, the above said satisfaction spoken to in Section

10(2) of the Act is required only if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. In the present case, in my view, it cannot be said that there is

a dispute between the landlord and tenant"". Even assuming that respondents 1 and 2 have raised a dispute in their respective counter statements to

the R.C.O.P. both of them remained ex parte and have not chosen even to cross examine P.W.1, one of the landlords. Neither of them entered the

witness box to support their alleged claim made in their respective counter statements. When such is the case, it cannot be said that there was

really a dispute between the parties.

Even assuming that there was a dispute between the parties in the present case, relying on another observation of the Supreme Court in the latter

decision, viz., Hiralal Moolchand Doshi Vs. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (Dead) by L.Rs., , I must hold that there is no infirmity in the

impugned orders. No doubt the above said (1993) 2 SCC 455 arose under Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.

But, there too the same terminology ""Satisfied"" is used. The initial portion of Section 13 of the said Act. runs as follows:-

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of Sections 15and 15-A a landlord shall be entitled to recover

possession of any premises if the Courts is satisfied.

No doubt, it is also true that the said Supreme Court decision arose out of an execution proceeding. But, that will not make any difference. There

too, the contention was that the eviction was a nullity and that aspect has to be gone into by the Execution Court. No doubt in the present case,

even before the matter has reached the execution stage, in this Court the contention of the petitioner is that the eviction order is a nullity on the

above said ground. So, here also, the same reasoning would apply.

Now, the relevant passages in the said Supreme Court decision can be seen. The relevant portion in paragraph 14 of the said judgment runs as

follows :-

There is no doubt that if there is a contest the Court can pass a decree for eviction only if the Court is satisfied about the existence of grounds

mentioned in two sections quoted hereinabove. But the satisfaction can also be inferred impliedly"",

(emphasis supplied)

Regarding the above referred to implied inferential satisfaction, there is also reference in paragraph 20 of the judgment thus:-

The Court also considered the extent to which the Executing Court could go into the matter. It was observed that if the decree on the face of it

discloses some material, on the basis of which the Controller could be satisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it

was not open to the Court to go further and it must accept it and Execute the decree as it stands. If on the face of it, the decree does not show the

existence of such material or jurisdictional fact the Executing Court may look to the original record of the trial court to ascertain whether there was

any material furnishing a foundation for the trial court''s jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material

existed its task is complete. It is not necessary for it to go further and question the presumed or expressed finding of the trial Court on the basis of

that material. All that it has to see is whether there was some material on the basis of which the rent Court could have - as distinguished from must

have - been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction.

7-A. In the present case it would be easily inferred or implied that both the Courts have had satisfaction even though they had not expressly stated

about such a satisfaction. In the order of the Rent Controller the following relevant observation is there:

The relevant observations of the first appellate authority are as follows :-

It is clear from the above referred to observations in both the orders of the Authorities below that the requisite satisfaction can be impliedly inferred

from the said order itself. Therefore, relying on the above referred observations in (1993) 2 SCC 458 (supra). I have only to uphold the orders of

the Authorities below.

I also find that in the above referred to unreported judgment dated 24.1.1997 in C.R.P. No. 3355 of 1994 (1997-1-L.W. 535) S.S.

Subramani, J., after referring to (1978) I M.L.J. 79 (supra) and also another decision in G. Kuthahaksh v. A.P. Swamy (93 L.W.615) has held

thus:

In both these decisions, it was held that the order of eviction itself must show that the Controller was satisfied about the claim. I do not think the

said decisions are any longer good law, in view of the decision reported in Hiralal Moolchand Doshi Vs. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (Dead)

by L.Rs., wherein their Lordships held that satisfaction can also be inferred impliedly'' (see para 14 of the judgment). It is further clear from

paragraph 20 of the judgment that if on the face of decree, satisfaction cannot be read into it the executing Court can look into other materials

including the pleadings to come to the conclusion whether such satisfaction was impliedly inferred by the Rent Controller.

In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is not admitted but dismissed. No costs. Consequently C.M.P. No. 16876 of 1996 is dismissed.