G. Kotireddi vs B. Subbareddi

Madhavan Nair, J.—The defendants who are the alienees from the 1st defendant the widow of the deceased Rammana, are the appellants

in these two connected second appeals. The plaintiff''s suit is for the recovery of one half of the properties of his maternal grandfather,

Venkatareddi, on the ground that the compromise entered into in Original Suit No. 193 of 1888 by his mother as his guardian with the first

defendant is unlawful fond not binding on him. Venkatareddi died in 1876 and his widow died in 1888. Their only daughter Appamma, the mother

of the plaintiff, died in 1907, Appamma''s elder son Rammanna died in 1887 leaving a widow Achamma, the present first defendant. In 1888

Achamma instituted a suit for the recovery of the properties of Venkatareddi alleging that her husband Ramanna had been adopted by

Venkatareddi. The defendant in the suit was present plaintiff who was a minor represented by his mother Appamma as guardian. The suit ended in

a compromise by which the present first defendant Achamma, the plaintiff in that suit, got half of the properties of Venkatareddi and half of the

ancestral properties of her husband, and the other half was allotted to the present plaintiff. It is this compromise that is attacked by the plaintiff as

not binding on him.

The lower Appellate Court holding that the compromise does not amount to a bona fide settlement of doubtful claims and also that Appamma''s

conduct in connection with the compromise does not amount to a surrender"" of her life-estate, came to the conclusion that it was not valid and

binding on the plaintiff and gave him a decree for possession of the properties. I agree with the Subordinate Judge as regards both the grounds on

which his decision is based. I do not think that the case of adoption set up by the present first defendant in Original Suit No. 193 of 1888 was a

strong one. One ground in support of it that is put forward was the transfer of patta to Ramanna''s name in the mutation proceedings of 1881. It is

to be observed that this transfer took place five years after the death of Venkatareddi and the adoption was not put forward as a ground for a

transfer of pattas (See Exhibits III and IV series). Further, in some of these documents the transferee''s name is described as Battulu Ramanna,

Battulu"" being the name of Ramanna''s natural family. Achamma described herself as the widow of Battulu Ramanna. If Ramanna had been really

adopted, he would have been referred to by the house name of Venkatareddi which was ""Bommareddi."" The only ground in support of the

adoption that could have been put forward, so far as one could sea from the materials on record, was the transfer of patta effected in the

circumstances already mentioned. The case of adoption does not appear to have been so strong as to cause serious apprehension in the mind of

the mother who was the guardian of the present plaintiff in that suit. I, therefore, agree with the Subordinate Judge in thinking that the compromise

does not amount to a bona fide settlement of doubtful claims.

We have next to consider whether Appamma''s conduct in connection with the compromise amounted as to surrender of her life-estate. As

pointed out in Bhagwat Koer v. Dunhdari Prasad Singh AIR 1919 P.C. 75 it is no doubt true that ""a Hindu widow can renounce that estate in

favour of the nearest reversioner, and by a voluntary act, efface herself from the succession as effectively as if she had then died""; and ""this

voluntary self-effacement, sometimes referred to as a surrender and sometimes as a relinquishment or abandonment of her rights may be effected

by any process having that effect, provided that there is a bona fids and total renunciation of the widow''s right to hold the property."" Though there

was no formal surrender by the widow of her estate in the case referred to, as pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council, there was an

express agreement binding upon the widow that for considerations which appeared to be sufficient she would abandon the claim. It is to be noticed

that in the case before us there is no act of surrender by the widow. The question is whether such a surrender can be inferred from the conduct in

connection with the case. Appamma was not a party to the suit in her personal capacity as representing Venkatareddi''s estate. The defendant in

the suit was her minor son, the present plaintiff. She denied the adoption and contended that her elder son the deceased husband of the present

first defendant acquired no interest in the properties of Venkatareddi, Venkatareddi''s heirs being his widow, herself and her son. The suit was

compromised and the plaintiff therein got one half of Venkatareddi''s properties. I do not think that the inference made by the Subordinate Judge in

the circumstances of the case that the conduct of Appamma in connection with the compromise cannot be considered to amount to a surrender of

her life-estate is wrong.

I, therefore, dismiss these second appeals with costs.