High CourtsSingle Bench

G. Krishnamurthy and Others vs Sarangapani and Another

Madras High Court · Decided on 25 February 1996 · Citation: AIR 1996 Mad 440 : (1996) 1 CTC 280 : (1996) 1 MLJ 533

HON’BLE JUDGES
A.R. Lakshmanan, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 115 · Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 — Section 7
CASE NUMBER
C.R.P. No. 2261 of 1995
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Judgment

61 paragraphs · 1,463 words
1.

By consent of both parties the main writ petition itself is taken up for final disposal.

2.

Notice of motion was ordered by me on 30-10-1995 returnable by 15-11-1995. Interim stay was granted till then. On service of notice Mr.

Yashod Vardhan entered appearance on behalf of the Respondents. The respondents herein filed the suit O.S. No. 340 of 1990 on the file of the

II Additional District Munsif, of Pondicherry for declaration and recovery of possession of the suit properties. In the suit the petitioner along with

the plaintiff took an objection that the court-fee paid is not sufficient as the plaintiff has to pay the court-fee ad valorem. The Learned District

Munsif, who tried the same as a preliminary issue had that the suit has not been properly valued and correct court-fee has not been paid. Since the

value of the subject-matter of the suit exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif''s Court, the learned District Munsif ordered the

plain! to be returned with a direction to present the same before the proper forum with subsequent court-fees paid on or before 21-12-1992.

Aggrieved by the same the respondents preferred A. S. No. 12 of 1983 on the file of the III Additional District Judge at Pondicherry. The learned

District Judge allowed the appeal permitting the plaintiff to contest the suit and held that the court-fee paid also was sufficient. Aggrieved by the

said order the petitioner has filed the above revision as the second appeal is not maintainable in this Court.

3.

Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the learned III Additional District Judge has erred in reversing the well considered judgment

of the II Additional District Munsif and his reasons therefore are erroneous and that the learned District Judge ought to have seen that the suit lands

are only dry lands used as house sites. This apart, the learned District Judge has failed to appreciate P.W. 9, who has admitted the current value of

the suit properties. He has also failed to consider the guideline value for the suit properties while computing the court-fee. Therefore, the learned

Districl Judge has failed in his duly in not returning the plaint as the value of the suit exceeds and the proper court-fee has not been paid. I have

been taken through the enlire pleadings and also the orders passed by both the Courts below. The learned District Munsif by her order dated 16-

11-1992 determined that the suit has not been properly valued and proper court-fee has not been paid by the plaintiff for the reasons accorded in

her judgment. Since the value of the suit exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif, the suit was ordered to be returned to the plaintiff

with a direction to present it before the proper forum with subsequent court-fee. My attention was also drawn to the judgment of the III Additional

District Judge, who, by his order on 28-4-1975, reversed the finding of the learned District Munsif. I have carefully gone through the findings

rendered by the District Judge, For a better appreciation of the stand taken by both sides, it is better to look into the relevant provisions of the

Court-fees Act. u/s 7(2) the market value of the land in suits under Sections 25(a), 25(b), 27(a), 29, 30, 37(1), 37(3), 38, 45 or 48 shall be

deemed to be where the land is assessed, thirty times the survey assessment on the land and where the land is a house site whether assessed to full

revenue or not, poramboke land, or any other land not falling under Clause (a), its market value. u/s 25(a) where the prayer is for a declaration and

for possession of the property to which the declaration relates, fee shall be computed on the market value of the property or on Rs. 300/-

whichever is higher. Referring to the provisions of the Court-fees Act, the learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Yashod Vardhan had submitted

that the Act contemplated only if the property in question is a land assessed to be taxed and if so 30 times the assessment shall be presumed to be

the market value. Section 2 Clause (b) is to the effect that where the land is a house site whether assessed to full revenue or not, poramboke or

any other land not falling under Clause (a) its market value. So it could be seen that the Court-fees Act makes a distinction between the land and a

house site and where the land is assessed meaning thereby that it is an agricultural land. So, the suit property is classified as ryotwari land in

revenue records and not as a house site. The learned counsel to fortify his stand that the Court has to follow the classification of lands envisaged in

the Act and cannot interpret in the way it viewed had invited the attention of the Court to the cases decided in T.K.M. Alagappa Chetty Vs.

Saminathan Chetty and Others, and 1981 MLW 502. He also cited a decision in Sri Ratnavaramaraja Vs. Smt. Vimla, . It is useful to extract

some portions of the above decision occurring at paragraphs 2 and 3 :

The Court-fees Act was enacted to collect revenue for the benefit of the State and not to arm a contesting party with a weapon of defence to

obstruct the trial of an action. By recognising that the defendant was entitled to contest the valuation of the properties in dispute as if it were a

matter in issue between him and the plaintiff and by entertaining petitions preferred by the defendant to the High Court in exercise of its revisional

jurisdiction against the order adjudging Court-fee payable on the plaint, all progress in the suit for the trial of the dispute on the merits has been

effectively frustrated for nearly five years. We fail to appreciate what grievance the defendant can make by seeking to invoke the revisional

jurisdiction of the High Court on the question whether the plaintiff has paid adequate Court-fee on his plaint. Whether proper Court-fee is paid on

a plaint is primarily ""a question between the plaintiff and the State. How by an order relating to the adequacy of the Court-fee paid by the plaintiff,

the defendant may feel aggrieved, it is difficult to appreciate. Again the jurisdiction in revision exercised by the High Court under S. 115 of the

CPC is strictly conditioned by Cls. (a) to (c) thereof and may be invoked on the ground of refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in the Subordinate

Court or Assumption of jurisdiction which the Court does not possess or on the ground that the Court has acted illegally or with material

irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction..... The Act, it is true by S. 19 provides that for the purpose of deciding whether the subject-matter of

the suit or other proceeding has been properly valued or whether the fee paid is sufficient, the Court may hold such enquiry as it considers proper

and issue a commission to any other person directing him to make such local or other investigation as may be necessary and report thereon. The

anxiety of the Legislature to collect Court-fee due from the litigant is manifest from the detailed provisions made in Ch. III of the Act, but those

provisions do not arm the defendant with a weapon of technicality to obstruct the progress of the suit by approaching the High Court in revision

against an order determining the Court-fee payable. In our view, the High Court grievously erred in entertaining revision application on questions of

Court-fee at the instance of the defendant, when no question of jurisdiction was involved.

The above judgment in my opinion directly applies to the facts of this case. As pointed out by the Supreme Court the civil revision at the instance

of the petitioners is not at alt maintainable. The preliminary issue regarding Court-fee is essential and the matter is between the Court and the suitor

and the finding rendered by the Court cannot be said to have caused any prejudice to the defendants. As pointed out by learned counsel for the

plaintiff, the revision u/s 115, C.P.C. is also not maintainable. The suit property is admittedly classified in the revenue records as agricultural land

and it is assessed to revenue kist. The plaintiff has also adduced oral and documentary evidence to support his contentions. The market value of

the property of any land which is assessed to the revenue records will be reckoned u/s 7 of the Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act. The valuation,

therefore, as made in the plaint, is perfectly tenable in law and calls for no interference in this revision. Therefore, the civil revision petition is

dismissed. No costs.

4.

Revision dismissed.