G. Lakshmi Ammal vs Elumalai Chettiar and Others

The point involved herein is whether by invoking Section 24(1)(b) C. P. C. a proceeding pending before Rent Controller constituted under Act

18 of 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) can be transferred to another Rent Controller The main opposition to this petition is stemmed on the

claim that the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority constituted under Act 18 of 1960 are ""persona designata"" and they are not courts which are

subordinate to the High Court and that they will not come within the expression ''other proceedings'' as contemplated under Sec. 24(1)(b) C. P. C.

It is further claimed that when an application filed for transfer under Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act has been rejected, the present

application u/s 24 C. P. C. is not maintainable.

On the first point as to whether the Rent Controller is a court or persona designata, Mr. Sivamani relies upon the following decisions to contend

that whatever view might have been taken hitherto, in view of the decision rendered in The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum Vs. T.P.

Kunhaliumma, , when the Rent Controller functions like a civil court, it cannot any longer be held that he functions as a persona designata. In,

support of his contention, he refers to the decision of the Division Bench arising under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 15 of

1946 in ILR (1950) Mad 28: AIR 1949 Mad 776. Where in it was held that the court of Small Causes which was constituted as an appellate

authority under the Act, was only a court. The expression ''authorities'' used in Section 12(1)(4) of the Act was held to cover courts already in

existence"".

Relying upon the decision reported in 1949 MWN 43: AIR 1949 Mad 785 which also arose under the earlier Act, he claims that ''Judge of the

Small Cause Court who is authorised to function as Rent Controller, is not a persona designata, since he was functioning as part of the Small Case

Court. By referring to the decision in The Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur Vs. Dwarka Prasad, in which the scope of the Powers exercised by the

District Magistrate under U. P. Act III of 1947, was, considered and wherein it was held that permission granted by Additional District Magistrate

pursuant to the notification made by the State investing him with all the powers of the District Magistrate under the Code as well as under any other

law including the Eviction Act, made him a court and not a persona designata. In dealing with what functionaries can be treated as persona

designata, it was held that-

A person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular

character"" is a persona designata, What was held in K. Parthasarathi Naidu Garu Vs. C. Koteswara Rao Garu and Another, , to the effect that ''

persona designata'' are persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as Judges, was adopted in that decision.

Proceeding further he relies on the decision in Pitambar Shivlal Vs. Patel Hargovanbhai Amthabhai, for understanding the scope of the word ''A

Court of Small Causes'' occurring in Sec. 24(4) C. P. C. wherein it was held that it would include both Court of Small Causes constituted under

the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act as well as a court invested with the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes.

The decision of the Supreme Court in Ramchandra Aggarwal and Another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, was relied upon by him for

the proposition that where a special or local statute refers to a constituted court as a Court, and does not refer to the Presiding Officer of the court

the reference cannot be said to be of a persona designata and that the provisions of the CPC applied generally to a proceeding before a civil court

arising out of a reference made by a Magistrate u/s 146(1) Cr. P. C. and hence the term ''Proceeding'' used in Section 24 C. P. C. is

comprehensive enough to include all matters coming UP for judicial adjudication and not confined to civil proceedings alone, and therefore, when

the Magistrate makes a reference it relates to a civil court and there is no question of persona designata involved therein. To strengthen his

contention that Rent Controller is only a court he relied on the decision in Gedda Durga Malleswara Rao Vs. Ranga Panaiah and Bros., wherein it

was held that Rent Controller being a Court Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply. Likewise, a Full Bench decision, in Surindra Mohan v.

Dharam Chand, AIR 1971 J&K 76 is also relied upon to contend that when Chief Judicial Magistrate is appointed by designation, and not by

name, he is not a persona designata but only a court, The Full Bench held that, the following aspects had to be taken into account to find out the

nature of powers exercised and they being (1) nature of duties performed and the manner in which appointment is made-, (2) whether appointment

is by name in his individual capacity or with reference to his post; (3) whether the authority selected is a member of the court or not, and (4)

whether he has been empowered to act judicially and possess all the trappings of a court and is to abide by the rules of evidence and dispose of

the matter like a court. If on these aspects considered the ultimate conclusion is that the named authority is to function like a court, it cannot any

longer be claimed that he is a persona designata.

Before completing his citation of catena of case, he would refer to the decision rendered In Krishan Gopal Devi Prasad and Others Vs.

Dattatraya Madho Lad, , arising under Motor Vehicles Act wherein it was held that a statutory tribunal whatever name by which it may be

designated would be treated an a court, if it is called upon to discharge judicial functions and in reaching its conclusions it is required to follow well

recognised Judicial principles, in contradistinction in Laxminarain Misra Vs. Kailash Narain Gupta and Others, it was held that Claims Tribunal

under the said Act is not a Court and therefore no petition u/s 24 C. P. C. can be filed. After placing reliance an these decisions, in conclusion, Mr.

Sivamani laid considerable reliance on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum Vs. T.P.

Kunhaliumma, , wherein in dealing with the provisions of Telegraph Act, It was held that the District Judge empowered to function under the said

Act is a civil court, when he disposes of the applications under, Section 16 of the Act. He would draw my attention to the fact that in this case the

Supreme Court has differed from the view taken in Town Municipal, Council, Athani Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Courts, Hubli and Others

etc., , and which was one of the decisions relied upon by this court In S. Ganapathi Vs. N. Kumaraswami, , wherein it was held that Rent

Controller and the, appellate authority under the Act are personas designate., In finding out whether an authority. Constituted under a statute to

function as a persona designata or a court it was held that so far as Telegraph Act is concerned, even in Section 16 there is intrinsic evidence to

make out that he is to function as a court. Reference was also made to Section 16(4) of Telegraph Act, which requires payment into court u/s 34

which contemplates payment of court fee and the issue of process which all suggest that the ordinary machinery of a civil Jurisdiction is made

available for the settlement of the disputes under the Act. By referring to these conclusions, Mr. Sivamani contends that if the decisions relied upon

by, him are applied in respect of the powers exercised by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority under Act 18 of 1960, necessarily they

function like Civil Courts and when civil judges are called upon to discharge these functions with all the incidents of a court, the view taken hitherto

by this court that they are personae designate, can no longer survive.

The decisions above referred to are to the effect that the authority invested with powers to decide the matters arising under statutes, will not be a

persona designata if they are to function like a court So far as Act 18 of 1960 is concerned u/s 2 (3), Controller is defined, ''Controller'' means any

person appointed by the Government by notification to exercise the powers of a Controller under this Act for such area as may be specified in the

notification. Section 23 empowers the Government by general or special order to notify conferment of powers of the appellate authority on such

officers and authorities as they may think fit in such areas and In such classes of cases as may be specified in the Order In two notifications made in

II-1. No. 3006 (e) of 1973 and II-1 No. 3006 (f) of 1973, certain Judges of the Small Cause Court for the City of Madras and District Munsif''s

in certain districts are to function as Rent Controllers and likewise certain other Judges of the Small Cause Court for the city of Madras and

Subordinate Judges in certain districts have been notified as the appellate authorities. Though in the notification, Judges have been designated as

authorities to function under the Act, he would refer to Rule 22 of the rules, wherein dealing with service of notice, it is provided that if orders are

not pronounced in open ''court'', a notice be served an the Person concerned. To emphasise his point that even in the Act, the Legislature was

conscious of the exercise of powers by the authorities as a court, he also refers to Section 18, wherein dealing with execution of orders of eviction

passed, the Controller is to execute as if such order is an order of a civil court for the purposes of execution and he is to have all the powers of a

civil court which is a significant indicium for holding that both Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority function only as a civil court.

Mr. Mathrubutham would repel this claim by relying upon the decision of this court in S. Ganapathi Vs. N. Kumaraswami, wherein it was held

that Rent Controller and the appellate authority are only personae designate. It is not necessary to re-state the decisions relied upon therein, but on

the aspect of reliance placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Town Municipal, Council, Athani Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Courts,

Hubli and Others etc., , it be noted that the Supreme Court while differing from the said decision, had not concluded that the powers exercised by

Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court, is akin to that of a civil court. Dealing with similar provisions under the Andhra Pradesh Rent Control Act in

Firm of S. Mohd. Ali and Sons and Others Vs. V. Madhavarao and Others, , it was held that the Rent Controller is not a court, coming within the

scope of Section 24 C. P. C. and that it has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for transfer of the proceedings from one Rent Controller to

another Rent Controller. A similar view was taken in Narayanamma v. Bhasker Reddy, (1972) 2 AWR 189, holding that a District Judge has no

jurisdiction to transfer the proceedings because, the authorities created under the Act are personae designate and when the Act itself has made

self-contained rules for transfer of proceedings by constituted authorities; there being an ab initio lack of Jurisdiction in the District Court, it has no

power to transfer a case from one Rent Controller to another.

Therefore to conclude on this point, when the Rent Controller and the appellate authority are constituted by a special notification and who

incidentally happen to be Judges cannot be equated to exercising the powers of a civil court. In making the notification, I there is nothing in Section

2 (3) or Section 23 of the Act to confer the powers of a Controller, only on judicial personnel. The intendment under the Act is to constitute ''any

person'' as a Controller by notification, Section 230 (1) dealing with an appellate authority empower the State Government to confer such powers

''on such officers and the authorities as they may think fit'', and therefore merely because as the matters stand at present, such powers have been

notified to be exercised by certain Judges it would not mean that the Act contemplates the notified functionaries to exercise the powers of a court.

Unlike the: provision made in U. P. Act III of 1947,which came up for consideration in The Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur Vs. Dwarka Prasad, , or

what was held in Surindramohan v. Dharamchand, AIR 1971 J&K 76 so far as Act 18 of 1960 is concerned the intrinsic evidence that could be

made out, u/s 16 of the Telegraph Act as pointed out in The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum Vs. T.P. Kunhaliumma, is absent. Merely

because such authorities record evidence or adopt a procedure more or less like a civil court it cannot be held that all the necessary trappings of a

civil court are involved in such proceedings.

Two other aspects were relied upon by Mr. Mathrubhutham to contend that the statutory authorities do not function like a civil court by stating

that Court-fees Act is not attracted and CPC is not invoked into in respect of the proceedings conducted under the Act, and therefore the

decisions evolved in Surindramohan v. Dharamchand, AIR 1971 J & K 76 or of what had been spelt out in The Kerala State Electricity Board,

Trivandrum Vs. T.P. Kunhaliumma, are not applicable to this case. Undoubtedly, these are relevant factors to ascertain the nature of powers

exercised and necessarily lead to the conclusion that they are not courts. Being in full agreement with the view expressed in S. Ganapathi Vs. N.

Kumaraswami, , which does not call for any reconsideration in the light of what has been held in The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum

Vs. T.P. Kunhaliumma, , both Rent Controller and the appellate authority under Act 18 of 1960 are only personae designate.

u/s 24(1)(b) C. P. C., only in respect of matters which are pending in any court subordinate to the High Court of District Court, the powers of

withdrawal can be exercised. As held above they are not, courts, and as to what relief would be available for aggrieved parties for having the

matters transferred, Act 18 of 1960 them had provided a specific remedy. Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act, empowers the Principal

Judge, City Civil Court, Madras in respect of cases arising in the city of Madras and the District Courts in respect of other cases in the districts to

transfer proceedings. When a specific provision is provided under a self-contained enactment enabling relief of transfer, the aggrieved party has to

necessarily resort only to such a remedy, and Section 24 C. P. C. can have no application. Hence, in this case, when the petitioner herein has

already moved for relief under Rule 24, be cannot file this petition u/s 24 C. P. C.

Mr. Sivamani would yet contend that there can be no inhibition in invoking the powers u/s 24 C. P.C., because, the two statutory authorities

are only subordinates to the High Court and the powers can be concurrently exercised. In K. V. Soorayya Chetti v. Dasaratha Naidu, (1966) 1

AWR 384, it was held that such a concurrent exercise of powers exist, but it dealt with cases which would come within the scope of Section 24 C.

P. C. and not a case wherein the subordinate authorities are personae designate and in spite of orders passed under the self contained enactment

refusing transfer, the concurrent powers of the High Court are invoked. As pointed out earlier, when the power of transfer is provided only to a

limited extent under a self-contained enactment with limited remedies contemplated for aggrieved parties, they have to work out their rights only

within the ambit of the enactment and be satisfied with whatever is contemplated for them in such situations by the Legislature.

Since the petition itself is not maintainable, there is no need to go into the allegations made in the petition. Mr. Sivamani would not content

without mentioning that in this case the transfer was asked for because the Rent Controller had already made certain remarks while disposing of the

fair rent proceedings. I do not think that any such expression of opinion would by itself warrant transfer of a subsequently filed case and this aspect

was considered in Krishan Kanahya and Another Vs. Vijay Kumar and Others, , wherein it was held that while invoking Section 24 C. P. C., this

aspect cannot constitute a valid ground for transfer of the case.

1n the light of what has been considered above when specific provision is made under Rules 14 and 17 of the Rules framed under the Act,

which is a self-contained enactment, remedies will have to be worked out as provided there in, and when the notified authorities are only personae

designate and not Courts, Section 24 C. P. C. cannot at all be invoked. Hence these petitions are dismissed.

Petitions dismissed